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Us9ag 000659dp

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Us9ag 000659dp

  1. 1. s E c R E T //NOFORN | | 20300610 DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE JOINT TASK FORCEGUANTANAMO GUANTANAMO BAY. CUBA APOAE 09360 JTFGTMO-CG l0 June2005 MEMORANDUMFORCommander,UnitedStatesSouthernCommand,3511NW 9lstAvenue, Miami,FL33172. SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DOD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN:US9AG-000659DP(S) JTFGTMODetaineeAssessment 1. (FOUO)PersonalInformation: o JDIMSAIDRC ReferenceName: AbdenourSameur o Aliasesand Current/TrueName: Mustafa. Sameur/Samir Abdenour.Abdul Rashid.CarlosPerrera o Placeof Birth: Alsiers. Alseria (AG) o Dateof Birth: 28 March 1973 o Citizenship: Algeria o IntemmentSerialNumber(ISN): US9AG-000659DP 2. (FOUO)Health: Detaineeis in goodhealth,hasnoknownallergiesandis notcurrentlyon anymedications.Hehasnotravelrestrictions.' 3. (S/NF) JTF GTMOAssessment: a. (S) Recommendation: JTFGTMOrecommendsthisdetaineebeRetainedin DoD Control(DoD). b. (S//NF)Summary: JTFGTMOpreviouslyassesseddetaineeasTransferto theControl of AnotherCountryfor ContinuedDetention(TRCD)on30August2003. Basedupon informationobtainedsincedetainee'spreviousassessment,it isnowrecommendedhebe Retainedin DoDControl(DoD). CLASSIFIEDBY: MULTIPLESOURCES REASON:E.O.12958SECTION1.5(C) DECLASSIFYON: 20300610 s E c R E T //NOFORNI / 20300610
  2. 2. S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 2030O610 JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S) For this updaterecommendation,detaineeis assessedasa memberof Al Qaida'sglobal terrorist network with specificties to theNorth African Extremist Network Q.JAEN)in London andAfghanistan.Detaineehasa history with Islamic Jihadandtrained at the Al- QaidasponsoredAl FarouqCamp. Detaineewas armedandlikely participatedin hostilities in JalalabadandToraBora. It is assessedthis detaineeis a HIGH risk, ashe is likely to pose a threatto the US, its interestsandallies. 4. (S//NF) Detainee Background Summary: Unlessotherwisenoted,thefollowing paragraphsarebasedsolelyon the detainee'sstatements. a. (S) Prior History: Detaineehelda varietyof oddjobs anddesertedfrom the Algerian military aftera few monthsof service.In 1995detaineefoughtin thejihad in Bosnia. Detaineeleft Algeria andtraveledvia Tunisia to Rome,Italy (IT). A man namedNouradin facilitated his travel. From the airport in Rome,IT, detaineewent to a bus station. Herehe askeda group of unknown Algerians for help in obtaining falsedocumentssohe could travel to the United Kingdom (UK). An unknown associateof the groupprovided detaineewith a SpanishID cardandtold him to travelto Londonvia Sicily, IT. In October1999,detainee andan associatenamedKorim, variant Kareem,traveledto London, UK. They stayedfor a yearanda half. In London, detaineeattendedthe Finsbury Parkmosque,the Baker Street mosque,andthe Shepard'sBushmosque. b. (S) Recruitment and Travel: At the FinsburyParkmosque,detaineemet Algerians, JamalAl Din andToufik who told detaineeaboutliving in Afghanistan(AF). Detaineelived in the UK illegally andAfghanistanappealedto him. (Analyst note: His illegal statusmay be a referenceto traveling to the UK on falsedocuments.Detaineenotedhe haspolitical asylum in the UK.) Detaineedecidedto travel to Afghanistanto studyIslam andseeka betterlife, noting he did not like the treatmenthe receivedin the UK from the governmentandcitizens. Toufik provided detaineewith a contactnumberfor Muhammad(Likely Muhammad Shah, who servedasa facilitator undernetwork facilitators JafarAl Jazaieriand SulaymanAl lazaierl) anda Pakistanivisa, but detaineepaid for his own ticket. Detaineetraveledwith Nouradinfrom Londonto Islamabad,Pakistan(PK), in the summerof 2001. An Afghan namedMuhammadescorteddetaineeto Peshawar,PK, andthento Jalalabad,AF. In Jalalabad,detaineestayedabout40 daysat the Algerian guesthouserun by Abu Jaffar. c. (S) Training and Activities: Detaineetraveledto Khandahar,AF andthento theAl- QaidasponsoredAl Farouqtraining campwherehe trained on the AK-47 for aboutone week. (Analyst note: In Kandahar,detaineelikely stayedat the Haji Habbashguesthouse.) The 11 Septemberattackson the US occurredanddetainee'strainer, Abu AssadAl-Suri (Asuri), informed the traineesthe programwas canceledbecausethe US would be bombing the camp. Detaineetraveledto Abu Jaffar's Kabul, AF, guesthouse.Then he went to the 2 s E c R E T //NOFORNI I 20300610
  3. 3. S E C R E T // NOFORN I / 2O3OO6IO JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S) Algerian guesthousein Jalalabadto retrievehis belongingsandattemptedto leave Afghanistan. Detaineestayedat the guesthouseuntil forcedto leavedueto the US campaign (probablymid November2001). Detaineeandotherresidentsfled to the mountainsof Tora Bora wherehe remainedfor approximatelyonemonth. Detaineeanda group of over 100 menthen fled to Pakistan.While at the guesthousein Jalalabad,prior to fleeing to Tora Bora, an unknown individual assignedan AK-47 to detainee. d. Capture Information: In February2002,Pakistanimilitary captureddetaineeandhis entire group afterthey had crossedinto Pakistan. Pakistaniforcesheld the group andduring a transferto anotherprison, the prisonersrioted, flipped a bus detaineewas on, anddetainee attemptedto escape.During this escapeattempt,Pakistaniforcesshotandwounded detainee.(Analyst note: Basedon detainee'saccount,he was likely capturedin the operation that nettedover 100Al-Qaida/extremistmemberswho were led out of Afghanistanby Ibn SheikhAl Libi.) On 5 April 2002,the Pakistanigovernmenthandeddetaineeto US custody. e. (S) Transferred to JTF GTMO: 14 June2002 f. (S/NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF GTMO: To provideinformationon the following: o The Algerian Guesthouse . Terrorist personalitiesat the Algerian Guesthouse o Terroristpersonalitiesandmethodsin theUK 5. (S/NF)DetaineeThreat: a. (S)Assessment:It isassessedthedetaineeposesaHIGHrisk,asheislikelytoposea threatto the US, its interestsandallies. b. (S//NF)Reasonsfor ContinuedDetention: . (S) Detaineetrained at the Al-Qaida sponsoredAl-Farouq training camp. He is assessedto be a memberof the NAEN becauseof his recruitmentandnotedassociations in London andCentralAsia. (Analyst note: The NAEN is a Tier 0 Counterterrorism targetdefinedasterrorist groupswhich posea clearandimmediatedangerto US persons or interests. DetaineenotedToufiq might haveperformeda backgroundcheckon him through Toufiq's connectionsto the mujahideenin Algeria. This indicatesdetaineehad associationswith otherextremistorganizationsin Algeria, possibly including the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) andthe SalafistGroup for PreachingandCombat(GSPC).) 3 SE C R E T // NOFORNI I 2O3O0610
  4. 4. s E c R E T // NOFORN/ / 20300610 JTFGTMO-CG SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN:US9AG-000659DP(S) o (S) Detaineewas an associateof extremistsincluding Toufik in London, Muhammadin Pakistan,andJaffarin Jalalabad.Detaineeattendedjihad indoctrination classesgiven by Jaffar at the Algerian guesthouse.(Analyst note: Toufik is likely RabahKadre akaToufiq. Toufiq wasthe numbertwo man of the Al- Qaidacell in London andassumedcontrol of the Al-QaidaA{orth African Extremist Network recruiting andfacilitation segmentin London. Al-Qaida memberAbu Doha ran this segmentuntil his arrest. Toufiq operatedout of the mosquesin London and servedasa recruiterand facilitator for the campsin Afghanistan. Muhammadis likely Muhammad Shah. Shahwas involved in a radiological plot involving uranium andred mercury (a nuclearscammaterial). Shahalso servedasa facilitator under network facilitators JafarAl Jazaieriand SulaymanAl Jazaieri. He movedpersonnel acrossthe Afghanistan/Pakistanboarder. Jaffar is JafarAl JazaieriakaOmar Chabani,a known extremistfacilitator with direct links to Algerian training campsin JalalabadandtheNorth African Extremist Network. He alsohasdirect links to Al- Qaidaoperativesin the UK andthroughoutEurope.) o (S) In London,detaineeattendedthe Shepard'sBushMosque,theFinsburyPark Mosque,andthe BakerStreetMosque. All threemosqueshavereportedlinks to extremistrecruiting andfacilitating. . (S) Detaineehashistorical ties to Islamicjihad andextremistgroups. Interrogators believemuchof detainee'scoverstoryis fabricated.Detaineedeniedfighting in Bosnia althoughhe previouslyadmittedto doing so.(Analystnote: Detaineebelieveshe is smarterthaninterrogatorsbut hasunwittingly given information of intelligencevalue. Additional claims andrecantationsby detaineearedesignedto negatesuchincriminating statements.Detaineelikely did participatein the Bosniajihad, indicatingan established history with Islamicjihad andlikely extremistentitiesthat arealsoknown to have participatedin Bosnia. This indicatesdetaineelikely receivedadditionaltrainingin 1995. If his military training from Algeria was deemedsufficient, detaineecould havebypassed trainingin Bosniaandimmediatelyjoined thehostilities.) o (S) Detaineeis a supporterof the IslamicLiberationFront (ILF), which advocates violent oppositionto thegovemmentof Algeria.(Analystnote:The ILF is the Islamic SalvationFront(FIS). The FIS, asa memberof theNAEN.) . (S) Detaineeutilized counterinterrogationtechniquesby recantingprevious information or leaving out significant information when discussinghis past,associates, andactivities in an attemptto preventassociationwith incriminating entitiesand activities. Detaineerarely repeatedthe sameinformation with the samedetails. o (S) Detaineeclaimedadvanceknowledgeof the 11 September2001attacks againstthe US. Detaineeadmittedan unidentified individual informed him oneweek prior to the attacksthat somethingwas going to happento the US. (Analyst note: Anyone with information aboutattackson the US would not provide such + SE C RE T // NOF'ORNI I 203OO610
  5. 5. S E C R E T //NOFORN I I 203006IO JTF GTMO-CG SUBJECT: UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control (DoD) for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN: US9AG-000659DP(S) information to a simple acquaintance.Detaineewould haveto be a trustedmember of the network in orderto haveacquiredthe information.) . Detaineelater claimed no onehad discussedthe attacksdirectly with him, contradictinginformation he admittedto in previousdebriefings. o (S) Detaineeacknowledgedthat otherindividuals actively conductedfundraising andrecruiting activities in the mosquesin London, but deniedhe went to Afghanistan dueto theseactivities. (Analyst note: Detaineehasnot provided specificdetailed information on theseactivities, althoughhe notedmoney collectedat the Finsbury ParkmosquefundedAbu Jaffar'sAlgerian guesthousein Afghanistan.It is possible detainee,andotherrecruits,courieredmoney from the UK to Abu Jaffar. Detainee canlikely provide information concerningrecruiters,fundraisers,methods, couriering,facilities,andrecruitsthemselves.) o (S) Detaineeclaimedhe paid he own way to Pakistan,but later contradicted himself andstatedthe Finsbury Park Mosque(likely Toufik) provided him with a ticket,Pakistanivisa,andfalseFrenchpassport.This is assessedto bethe most accurateaccount. At onetime, detaineehadfour passports. o (S) In initial interviews,detaineedid not disclosehe andLondonassociate Nouradin traveledto Pakistantogether. Detaineealsochangedhis storyto state Toufik hadprovidedthe phonenumberfor Muhammadto Nouradin insteadof detainee. Detaineefunher changeddetailsstatingNouradin andToufik werethe sameindividual, but detaineetraveledalone. Another changeis detaineestatedhe sawNouradin in London andthen in Jalalabad.(Analyst note: Changingthe story in this mannerattemptsto placeextremistassociationswith Nouradin andremovethem from detaineein oneinstance,andhelpsto protectthe identitiesof associatesand attemptto avoid incriminating himself with the others. Detaineehimself, asnoted above,is assessedto havebeena memberof, andhaveassociationswith, extremists in the NAEN in London andItaly. Detaineehad severalvariationsin his story regardinghis travels.) o (S) Detaineestatedhe traveledto London via Romeafter leaving Tunisia,then contradictedhimself and statedhe traveledto Sicilv from Tunisia. c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee'sbehavioris generallynoncompliantand aggressive.Detaineehasthreatenedto kill military membersseveraltimes andhasbeen cited routinely for failure to comply andharassingguards. Detaineeincited disturbanceson at leasttwo occasions. 6. (S/NF)DetaineeIntelligenceValueAssessment: a. (S)Assessment: JTFGTMOdeterminedthisdetaineeisofMEDIUMintelligence value. s E c R E T //NOFORN I | 20300610
  6. 6. SE C R E T //NOFORN I I 203O061O JTFGTMO-CG SUBJECT:UpdateRecommendationto Retainin DoD Control(DoD)for Guantanamo Detainee,ISN:US9AG-000659DP(S) . (S) Detaineeis routinely notedfor deceptionduring interrogationsandwas identified asa habitualliar with a superiority complex. He likely hasinformation of high value,but doesnot provide it willingly, if at all. He likely hasinformation regardingterrorist operationsin Algeria, North African Extremist Network personnelandoperationsin the UK. He maypossessinformationon Al-Qaidain Afghanistanandon the 11 September terrorist attacks. b. (S//NF)Areasof PotentialExploitation: o l1 September2001terroristattacks- personnelin Afghanistanduring2001with advanceknowledgeof the attacks o Terrorist facilities o Al-Qaida/network personnelin Afghanistan/Pakistan o Algerian terrorist groups 7. (S) EC Status: Detainee'senemycombatantstatuswasreassessedon 4 October2004,and he remainsan enemvcombatant. L.bl"g TAYW. HOOD BrigadierGeneral,USA Commanding 6 s E c R E T //NOFORN I I 20300610

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