1. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WAR
PREPARATIONS AND USA
ATTACK PROPHECIES
Russians Put New “Satan” Nuke Into Play
Russia, frustrated with anti-nuke talks with the United states has decided to put an end to
the talks and move forward with its plans to upgrade its nuclear defensive and offensive
systems, including the construction on a new and more powerful Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile (ICBM). Nicknamed “Satan” by Western intelligence, the new missile carries a
100-ton warhead. This giant ICBM will take its place at the head of an already

2. impressive missile arsenal which includes the Yars, Topol-M and Bulava-class ballistic
missiles sometime in 2015.
This announcement come on the heels of a US announcement that its last B-53 nuclear
weapon has been dismantled. The B-53 was the largest bomb in the US arsenal.
Russian president Dimitri Medvedev walked out of talks with the United States back in
November over US plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe. The European
Phased Adaptive Approach plan is a intricate array of sea and land based missiles which
were designed to be used against a missile attack from Iran. The US says that cooperation
from Moscow is needed to help the shield work. Moscow on the other hand claims the
talks were useless because the US refused to guarantee the missiles would not be aimed
at Russia. At that point, Moscow decided to end their particiaption in the talks and
shortly after announced it plans to build the Satan Nuke.
Washington claims that the real bone of contention was that Russia wanted access to the
secret system’s designs and locations, a huge problem for the US. The US legitimately
feels that if they give the Russians access to the information, it will make its way to Iran
rendering the system useless. The only positive being that both the US and Russia are still
in contact and have both announced their desire to see the negotiations through.
Should Russia be given access to the US Missile Shield?
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RUSSIA'S UNDENIABLE NUCLEAR
WAR PREPARATIONS
by J. R. Nyquist AUG 27 2007
Since 1998 I have publicly warned of Russia’s war preparations.
The idea of preparing for nuclear war is absurd for most Americans, because the idea of
nuclear war makes no sense in a consumer society.
However that may be, Russia’s war preparations were as undeniable then as they are
today. And Russia is not a consumer society.

3. In the late 1990s Russia was refurbishing huge nuclear war bunkers and building
underground cities.
The only purpose such bunkers and cities could serve is in relation to a future nuclear
war. For a country that was supposedly broke to be spending its precious resources on
something so expensive, so far out of the way of “normal” expectations, seemed
inexplicable.
“Oh well,” people would shrug.
“The Russians are used to doing this sort of thing. It gives them psychological comfort.
Let them do what they want. It needn’t trouble us.” The public missed the fact, however,
that Russia was continuing to violate arms control agreements.
It was not admitting to all the nuclear warheads it possessed, and was not reliably
disposing of them. It was developing new, deadly, biological and chemical weapons.
Why in the midst of peace, a few short years after the end of the Cold War, were the
Russians adhering to this insane path? Were they anticipating a future war?
The answer must be yes.
And the answer continues to be yes. In the 1990s Russia forged an alliance with China
that involved a growing series of joint military exercises.
Why would the Russians do this? Why would they seek to develop a joint military
capability that would link Russian missile power with Chinese manpower?
For over a decade the Russians have been providing the Chinese with technology and
weapons.
This is not merely a commercial transaction, as some would insist. These transactions are
carefully considered strategic steps. Since the mid-1990s, Russia and China have initiated
joint-armaments programs that further solidified their military partnership.
It is obsolete thinking to suppose Russia and China are enemies. It must be understood, as
a practical matter, that Russia and China are underdog powers locked in a struggle for
primacy with the United States.
The only sensible strategy, if Russia and China expect to emerge on top, is to unite
against the Americans.
And that is what the two countries have been doing for the past decade.
A week ago today, on August 17, the Russians and Chinese conducted joint military

4. exercises on Russian soil, in the southern Ural Mountains. These coincided with strategic
air operations involving Russian nuclear bombers.
The combination of ground exercises with nuclear bomber exercises is a characteristic of
Soviet nuclear war theory, which holds that troops must be used to follow up nuclear
strikes.
President Putin and China’s President Hu Jintao watched the exercises while holding a
summit in Bishkek (the capital of former Soviet Kyrgyzstan).
While China and Russia insist that their preparations aren’t aimed at any specific power,
only a simpleton would believe them. (I am sad to acknowledge that many Americans, in
this regard, are simpletons.)
Last week, in an obvious upgrading of nuclear war readiness, Russian President Vladimir
Putin announced the resumption of long-range nuclear bomber patrols that had previously
been suspended in 1992. “I made the decision to restore flights of Russian strategic
bombers on a permanent basis,” said Putin.
“Combat duty has begun.” For some reason, Americans cannot digest Putin’s statement
or his decision to resume bomber patrols. Why is this happening? Well, we say to
ourselves, there is no reason other than the peculiar psychology of the Russians.
President Bush has not put U.S. strategic bombers on patrol.
And why should he? Russia isn’t our enemy. We are all friends. We are all economic
partners and allies in the war against terror.
In Washington the State Department spokesman, Sean McCormack, responded to the
Russian announcement of permanent strategic bomber patrols by saying, “It’s interesting.
We certainly are not in the kind of posture we were with what used to be the Soviet
Union. It’s a different era. If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old
aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that’s their decision.”
It’s as if the Russian military had resumed stamp collecting or archery.
There is no strategic alarm, no threat, no difficulty and no discomfiture. Let them play
with their obsolete toys.
We are living in a new era, and these activities no longer trouble us.
The Cold War ended and the animosity between the great powers is gone.

5. Say good-bye to it. Any evidence to the contrary is not evidence. We’re living in “a
different era.” Anyone who doesn’t know this, even if they are the president of the
Russian Federation, is out-of-step.
One might imagine Washington’s reaction to a Russian missile strike against U.S. targets.
“It’s interesting,” the State Department would purr. “This is not the sort of missile strike
we would have expected from the Soviet Union.
Of course, it’s a different era. If Russia feels that they want to launch some old, useless
missiles, that’s their decision.”
Our lack of imagination, our inability to grasp our enemy’s thought process, leads us to
dismiss what is obvious. The Russians are getting ready. Why isn’t the American side
responding?
Why aren’t the Americans getting ready?
We have been seduced by a series of comforting illusions. We are also absorbed in a
struggle against Islamic terrorism (only we are at pains to admit the “Islamic” aspect of
it).
The American shopping mall regime produces stupefaction and complacency.
The regime is predicated on economic optimism and entertainment. This optimism is
about to be shattered. The Russians know this is going to happen, and they are preparing
even as we fail to prepare.
Experts: U. S. unprepared for nuclear
terror attack
"...attempting to evacuate could "put you on a crowded freeway where you'll be
stuck in traffic and get the maximum radiation exposure." Yet, "...the only choice
for most people would be to flee" because they are unprepared!
By Greg Gordon McClatchy Newspapers
http://www.realcities.com/mld/krwashington/16812686.htm
Thu, Mar. 01, 2007
WASHINGTON - Although the Bush administration has warned repeatedly about
the threat of a terrorist nuclear attack and spent more than $300 billion to protect
the homeland, the government remains ill-prepared to respond to a nuclear
catastrophe.
Experts and government documents suggest that, absent a major preparedness

6. push, the U. S. response to a mushroom cloud could be worse than the debacle
after Hurricane Katrina, possibly contributing to civil disorder and costing
thousands of lives.
"The United States is unprepared to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear
attack," Pentagon analyst John Brinkerhoff concluded in a July 31, 2005, draft of
a confidential memo to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "We were unable to find any
group or office with a coherent approach to this very important aspect of
homeland security. ...
"This is a bad situation. The threat of a nuclear attack is real, and action is
needed now to learn how to deal with one."
Col. Jill Morgenthaler, Illinois' director of homeland security, said there's a
"disconnect" between President Bush's and Vice President Dick Cheney's
nuclear threat talk and the administration's actions.
"I don't see money being focused on actual response and mitigation to a nuclear
threat," she said.
Interviews by McClatchy Newspapers with more than 15 radiation and
emergency preparedness experts and a review of internal documents revealed:
The government has yet to launch an educational program, akin to the Cold War-
era civil defense campaign promoting fallout shelters, to teach Americans how to
shield themselves from radiation, especially from the fallout plume, which could
deposit deadly particles up to 100 miles from ground zero.
Analysts estimate that as many as 300,000 emergency workers would be needed
after a nuclear attack, but predict that the radiation would scare many of them
away from the disaster site.
Hospital emergency rooms wouldn't be able to handle the surge of people who
were irradiated or the many more who feared they were.
Medical teams would have to improvise to treat what could be tens of thousands
of burn victims because most cities have only one or two available burn-unit
beds. Cham Dallas, director of the University of Georgia's Center for Mass
Destruction Defense, called the predicament "the worst link in our health care
wall."
Several drugs are in development and one is especially promising, but the
government hasn't acquired any significant new medicine to counteract
radiation's devastating effects on victims' blood-forming bone marrow.
Over the last three years, several federal agencies have taken some steps in
nuclear disaster planning. The Department of Health and Human Services has

7. drawn up "playbooks" for a range of attack scenarios and created a Web site to
instruct emergency responders in treating radiation victims.
The Energy Department's Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory is geared to
use real-time weather data, within minutes of a bombing, to create a computer
model that charts the likely path of a radioactive fallout plume so that the
government can warn affected people to take shelter or evacuate. The
government also has modeled likely effects in blast zones.
Capt. Ann Knebel, the U. S. Public Health Service's deputy preparedness chief,
said her agency is using the models to understand how many people in different
zones would suffer from blast injuries, burns or radiation sickness "and to begin
to match our resources to the types of injuries."
No matter how great the government's response, a nuclear bomb's toll would be
staggering.
The government's National Planning Scenario, which isn't public, projects that a
relatively small, improvised 10-kiloton bomb could kill hundreds of thousands of
people in a medium-sized city and cause hundreds of billions of dollars in
economic losses.
The document, last updated in April 2005, projects that a bomb denoted at
ground level in Washington, D. C., would kill as many as 204,600 people,
including many government officials, and would injure or sicken 90,800. Another
24,580 victims would die of radiation-related cancer in ensuing years.
Radioactive debris would contaminate a 3,000-square-mile area, requiring years-
long cleanup, it said.
Brinkerhoff, author of the confidential memo for the Joint Chiefs, estimated that
nearly 300,000 National Guardsmen, military reservists and civil emergency
personnel would be needed to rescue, decontaminate, process and manage the
1.5 million evacuees.
The job would include cordoning off the blast zone and manning a 200-mile
perimeter around the fallout area to process and decontaminate victims, to turn
others away from the danger and to maintain order. Brinkerhoff estimated that the
military would need to provide 140,000 of the 300,000 responders, but doubted
that the Pentagon would have that many. And the Public Health Service's Knebel
cited studies suggesting that the "fear factor" would reduce civil emergency
responders by more than 30 percent.
Planning for an attack seems to evoke a sense of resignation among some
officials.
"We are concerned about the catastrophic threats and are trying to improve our
abilities for disasters," said Gerald Parker, a deputy assistant secretary in Health

8. and Human Services' new Office of Preparedness and Response. "But you have
to look at what's pragmatic as well."
Dr. Andrew Garrett of Columbia University's National Center for Disaster
Preparedness, put it this way: "People are just very intimidated to take on the
problem" because "there may not be apparent solutions right now."
The U. S. intelligence community considers it a "fairly remote" possibility that
terrorists will obtain weapons-grade plutonium or highly enriched uranium, which
is more accessible, to build a nuclear weapon, said a senior intelligence official
who requested anonymity because of the sensitive nature of the information. The
official said intelligence agencies worry mainly about a makeshift, radioactive
"dirty bomb" that would kill at most a few hundred people, contaminate part of a
city and spread panic.
But concerns about a larger nuclear attack are increasing at a time when North
Korea is testing atomic weapons and Iran is believed to be pursuing them. Al-
Qaida's worldwide network of terrorists also reportedly has been reconstituted.
The 9/11 Commission's 2004 report rated a nuclear bombing as the most
consequential threat facing the nation.
"We called for a maximum effort against the threat," Lee Hamilton, the panel's
vice chairman, told McClatchy Newspapers. "My impression is that we've got a
long ways to go. ... I just think it would overwhelm us."
Dr. Ira Helfand, a Massachusetts emergency care doctor who co-authored a
report on nuclear preparedness last year by the Physicians for Social
Responsibility, chided the administration for trying "to create a climate of fear
rather than to identify a problem and address it." The doctors' group found the
government "dangerously unprepared" for a nuclear attack.
Government officials say they have drafted playbooks for every sort of radioactive
attack, from a "dirty bomb" to a large, sophisticated device.
But radiation experts and government memos emphasize the chaos that a bigger
bomb could create. Emergency responders could face power outages, leaking
gas lines, buckled bridges and tunnels, disrupted communications from the
blast's electromagnetic pulse and streets clogged by vehicle crashes because
motorists could be blinded by the bright flash accompanying detonation.
No equipment exists to shield rescue teams from radiation, and survivors would
face similar risks if they tried to walk to safety.
Defense analyst Brinkerhoff proposed having troops gradually tighten the ring
around the blast zone as the radiation diminished, but warned that the
government lacks the hundreds of radiation meters needed to ensure that they

9. wouldn't endanger themselves. He said those making rescue forays would need
dosimeters to monitor their exposure.
Emergency teams would have no quick test to determine the extent of survivors'
radiation exposure. They would have to rely on tests for white blood cell declines
or quiz people about their whereabouts during the blast and whether they had
vomited.
For those with potentially lethal acute radiation sickness, only limited medication
is available, said Richard Hatchett, who's overseeing nearly $100 million in
research on radiation countermeasures for the National Institute of Allergies and
Infectious Diseases.
The Department of Health and Human Services might commit to a limited
purchase of one promising drug as early as this month. But currently federal
health officials plan to fly victims of acute radiation sickness to hospitals across
the country for bone marrow transplants.
The National Planning Scenario expressed concern that uninformed survivors of
an attack could be lethally exposed to radiation because they failed to seek
shelter, preferably in a sealed basement, for three to four days while radioactive
debris decayed. Another big problem: Only a small percentage of Americans
store bottled water, canned food and other essentials for an ordeal in a shelter.
Helfand said it would be too late to help most people near the blast, but that
advance education could save many people in the path of the fallout.
Education is critical, he said, because attempting to evacuate could "put you on a
crowded freeway where you'll be stuck in traffic and get the maximum radiation
exposure."
California's emergency services chief, Henry Renteria, said it might be time "to
re-establish an urban area radiation shelter program."
Brinkerhoff wrote that people could build their own radiation-proof shelters if the
government engaged in "large-scale civil defense planning" and gave them
meters and dosimeters to monitor the radiation.
Since there hasn't been "any enthusiasm to address this kind of preparedness,"
Brinkerhoff concluded, the only choice for most people would be to flee.
Medvedev: Russia may target missile
defense sites

10. AP – Wed, Nov 23, 2011
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev speaks at an award ceremony in the Gorki
residence …
MOSCOW (AP) — Russia will deploy new missiles aimed at U.S. missile defense sites
in Europe if Washington goes ahead with the planned shield despite Russia's concerns,
President Dmitry Medvedev said Wednesday.
Russia will station missiles in its westernmost Kaliningrad region and other areas if
Russia and NATO fail to reach a deal on the U.S.-led missile defense plans, he said in a
tough statement that seemed to be aimed at rallying domestic support.
Russia considers the plans for missile shields in Europe, including in Romania and
Poland, to be a threat to its nuclear forces, but the Obama administration insists they are
meant to fend off a potential threat from Iran.
Moscow has agreed to consider NATO's proposal last fall to cooperate on the missile
shield, but the talks have been deadlocked over how the system should operate. Russia
has insisted that the system should be run jointly, which NATO has rejected.
Medvedev also warned that Moscow may opt out of the New START arms control deal
with the United States and halt other arms control talks if the U.S. proceeds. The
Americans had hoped that the treaty would stimulate progress further ambitious arms
control efforts, but such talks have stalled over tension on the missile plans.
"The United States and its NATO partners as of now aren't going to take our concerns
about the European missile defense into account," a stern Medvedev said, adding that if
the alliance continues to "stonewall" Russia it will take retaliatory action.
The U.S. plan calls for placing land- and sea-based radars and interceptors in European
locations over the next decade and upgrading them over time.
Medvedev warned that Russia will deploy short-range Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad, a
Baltic Sea exclave bordering Poland, and place weapons in other areas in Russia's west
and south to target U.S. missile defense sites.

11. Medvedev added that prospective Russian strategic nuclear missiles will be fitted with
systems that would allow them to penetrate prospective missile defenses.
He and other Russian leaders have made similar threats in the past, and the latest
statement appears to be aimed at domestic audience ahead of Dec. 4 parliamentary
elections.
Medvedev, who is set to step down to allow Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reclaim the
presidency in March's elections, leads the ruling United Russia party list in the
parliamentary vote.
A sterm warning to the U.S. and NATO issued by Medvedev seems to be directed at
rallying nationalist votes in the polls.
Putin not able to track all nukes
By The Washington Times
Tuesday, May 1, 2007
Russian President Vladimir Putin told President Bush he could not account for all of
Moscow’s nuclear weapons at the same time al Qaeda was seeking to purchase three
Russian nuclear devices on the black market, former CIA Director George J. Tenet said.
In his new book, Mr. Tenet states that shortly after the September 11 attacks, Mr. Bush
briefed Mr. Putin about a Pakistani nongovernmental group, Umma Tameer-e-Nau. The
group, whose members included extremist nuclear scientists, was helping the Taliban and
al Qaeda develop nuclear arms.
The president “asked Putin point blank if Russia could account for all of its [nuclear]
material,” he states in his book, “At the Center of the Storm.”
“Choosing his words carefully, the Russian president said he was confident he could
account for everything — under his watch,” Mr. Tenet stated, noting that the deliberately
ambiguous response tended to confirm reports of nuclear smuggling shortly after the
1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.
Mr. Tenet said the CIA informed Russian intelligence about former Soviet nuclear
scientists who were working with al Qaeda.

12. Russian officials “refused to delve into any matters related to the security of their nuclear
facilities and nuclear weapons, including reports sourced to Russian officials concerning
possible theft of Russian ‘suitcase nukes,’ ” Mr. Tenet stated.
The comments contradict Russian government claims for the past 16 years that no
nuclear arms were missing.
Alexander Lebed, a former Russian national security adviser, stated in 1997 that Russia
could not account for about 80 portable nuclear weapons, a claim later denied by
Moscow.
Mr. Tenet disclosed the presidential exchange in explaining detailed intelligence reports
from late 2002 to spring 2003 stating that senior al Qaeda leaders were “negotiating for
the purchase of three Russian nuclear devices.”
The former CIA chief identified the al Qaeda nuclear procurement group as including No.
2 leader Ayman al-Zawahri and Abdel al-Aziz al-Masri, who is described as the “nuclear
chief” for the terrorist group.
The disclosures in Mr. Tenet’s book are generating criticism from people who say some
meetings and dates described in the book are inaccurate.
Kenneth deGraffenreid, a former senior intelligence official, said the book cannot be
gauged for accuracy because the CIA continues to withhold a critical inspector-general
report on the agency’s pre-September 11 activities.
Michelle Van Cleave, a former high-ranking counterintelligence coordinator, said Mr.
Tenet’s book and its “kiss and tell” format are more than “bad manners.”
“Insights into how decisions are made — the thought processes and confidences and
personal traits of our senior leaders — are real intelligence jewels,” she said. “Our
enemies hunger for these kinds of insights. Of all people, George Tenet knows that. He at
least could have waited until the president was out of office before baring his soul.”
Intelligence officials said the book inaccurately quoted Defense Intelligence Agency
analyst Tina Shelton during an August 2002 meeting at the CIA, falsely claiming that
Miss Shelton said connections between Iraq and al Qaeda were an “open-and-shut case.”
Officials who were present at the meeting said the statement was never made.
CIA spokesman Mark Mansfield praised the book as an accurate depiction of Mr. Tenet’s
“service and leadership at the CIA during a time of great intensity and challenge.”
SATURDAY 24 NOVEMBER 2007

13. Top police officer warns that nuclear
attack is inevitable
Scotlandmust prepare for �absolute terror�
Rob Edwards, Environment Editor
CUSTOM DISQUS IDENTIFIER:
http://www.heraldscotland.com/archive/
A nuclear attack by terrorists causing widespread panic, chaos and death is inevitable and
will happen soon, a senior Scottish police officer has warned.
Efforts to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining materials that could be made into
radioactive dirty bombs - or even crude nuclear explosives - are bound to fail, he said.
And the result will be horror on an unprecedented scale.
"These materials are undoubtedly out there, and undoubtedly will end up in
terrorists' hands, and undoubtedly will be used by terrorists some time soon," he
declared. "We must plan for failure and prepare for absolute terror."
Dickinson is assistant chief constable with Lothian and Borders Police, and has
responsibility through the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland for protecting
Scotland from chemical and nuclear attacks. He has been closely involved in co-
ordinating the country's counter-terrorism response.
He said: "An incident will continue for days and all the public will see is people dying
without reason. What will we do when our children come home from school with blisters
on their skin and their parents don't know what to do?
"What happens if 10 deaths, 50 deaths, 100 deaths start occurring in an unconnected and
random way all over the country? The public will be rightly and understandably
terrified."
Casualties caused by radiation, which most people don't understand, would trigger
widespread "panic and fear", said Dickinson. And the response of the emergency services
"would be chaotic" because of a shortage of resources.
The police capability for dealing with the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
threat - known as CBRN - needs to be increased, he argued. "I haven't got as many
officers with protective equipment as I would like," he added. "We must prepare for the
worst."
Dickinson delivered his dire warnings to an international conference in Edinburgh last
week. More than 300 experts from 70 countries were taking part in a high-level meeting

14. organised by the UN International Atomic Energy Agency on the risks of nuclear
terrorism.
The police response to a CBRN incident when it happened would have a "profound effect
on our communities which should not be underestimated", he said. The protective
clothing that officers would have to wear would look "terrifying".
As Dickinson made the point in his speech on Wednesday, one of his fellow police
officers appeared dramatically on the stage dressed head to toe in a regulation black
protection suit. With his face completely obscured by a gas mask, the officer then walked
slowly through the delegates seated in the Edinburgh International Conference Centre.
Decontamination after a radiation attack would be an "enormous cost", Dickinson
contended. It would far exceed the multi-million pound bill for cleaning up the 50
premises contaminated with polonium-210 after the poisoning of the former KGB agent,
Alexander Litvinenko, in London last year.
There would also be a huge drain on resources from having to reassure many people who
were unharmed but worried. The additional monitoring and clean-up work would be "a
major problem", he said.
Worldwide efforts to stem the spread of radioactive materials by the governments
represented at the conference were vital, Dickinson concluded. "But the sad fact is that
your work will fail."
Dickinson's nightmare analysis was backed up by Dr Frank Barnaby, a nuclear
consultant who used to work at the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment in
Berkshire. "The amazing thing is that this hasn't happened already," he told the
Sunday Herald.
"We should expect it any minute. It's an obvious thing for a terrorist to do. A
primitive nuclear explosion would simply eliminate the centre of a city like Glasgow or
Edinburgh."
The Edinburgh conference heard a series of other warnings about the risks of radioactive
materials being stolen and used to cause devastation.
"As the terrorists look for the next spectacular attack, we know that al-Qaeda in Iraq is
calling on nuclear scientists to join in the jihad," said William Nye, director of counter-
terrorism and intelligence at the Home Office in London.
Richard Hoskins, from the International Atomic Energy Agency's Office of
Nuclear Security in Vienna, revealed that there had been 1266 confirmed incidents in
which radioactive materials had been stolen or lost around the world since 1993.

15. Most involved radiation sources that could be made into dirty bombs, although in 18
instances small amounts of bombs-grade uranium or plutonium had been seized.
Russia to deploy monsterous ‘Satan’ nuclear weapon
in arsenal
Posted on December 21,2011 by The Extinction Protocol
December 21,2011 – MOSCOW – Russia, frustrated with anti-nuke talks with the United
States has decided to put an end to the talks and move forwardwith its plans to upgrade its
nuclear defensive and offensive systems, including the construction on a new and more powerful
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Nicknamed “Satan” by Western intelligence, the new
missile carries a 100-ton warhead. This giant ICBM will take its place at the head ofan already
impressive missilearsenal which includes the Yars, Topol-Mand Bulava-class ballistic missiles
sometime in 2015.This announcement comes on the heels ofa US announcement that its last B-
53 nuclear weapon has been dismantled. The B-53 was the largest bombin the U.S. arsenal.
Russian president Dimitri Medvedev walkedout oftalks with the United States back in November
over U.S. plans to set up a missile defense system in Europe. The European Phased Adaptive
Approach plan is an intricatearray ofsea and land based missiles which were designed to be used
against a missile attack from Iran. The U.S. says that cooperation from Moscow is needed to help
the shield work. Moscow on the other hand claims the talks were useless because the U.S. refused
to guarantee the missiles would not be aimed at Russia. At that point, Moscow decidedto end
their participation in the talks and shortly after announcedit plans to build the Satan Nuke. –
Inquisitor

16. Russia upgrading nuclear
arsenal with new 'Satan'
ICBM
By JohnThomas Didymus
Dec 21, 2011 in World
1 comment
By JohnThomas Didymus.
Moscow - Russia has reacted to what it says is the security threat the new U.S.
defense system in Europe poses. Russia says it's upgrading the old RS-36
Voyevoda ICBM, known in the West as the "Satan missile," by building a new 100-
ton ICBM.
According to the English Pravda, Sergei Karakaev, commander of the missile troops
said: "The decision about the creation of the new silo-based missile system with a
liquid-fuel heavy missile has been made. The complex will have increased
possibilities in overcoming the prospective missile defense system of the United
States."
Pravda reports further that the new missile will go into service in 2015.
The Russian government said it was building the new ballistic missile to "preserve
parity in the field." Business Insider reports that Russia's Strategic Missile Forces
(SMF) will be renovating their Topol-M and Yars RS-24 missile systems and
constructing an enormous new 100-ton ballistic missile. According to the official
Russian Pravda, "Russia does not stand against the US missile defense system.
Russia stands against the creation of the missile defense system, which would be
directly aimed against Russia to potentially reduce the possibilities of the Russian
nuclear containment forces."
Analyst see the latest move by Russia as in protest of the European Missile Defense
Shield being built by the U.S. Digital Journal reported in November that the,

17. "Russian President threatened that if the U.S. proceeds with the planned European
missile shield system, Russia will deploy Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad border
area between Poland and Lithuania to strike against the system."
The Russian president , according to Digital Journal, said that:
"I have given the armed forces the task of drawing up plans to destroy the
information and command and control systems of the (US/NATO) anti-missile
shield...Our NATO partners are not for now showing any readiness to take our
concerns about the architecture of the European missile shield into account,
something which convinces us that their plans are aimed at Russia."
The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, also said that Russia may pull out of any
disarmament treaties it has made with the U.S.
Business Insider reports that the Russian Ria Novosti said the Russians have
successfully carried out short-range interceptor missile test and are developing their
own missile defense shield.
The Inquisitr reports that the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, abandoned talks
with the U.S. in November over its new European missile defense system. The
Russians abandoned the talks after they accused the U.S. of refusing to guarantee
that the defense system will not be used against Russia. The U.S., however, alleged
that Moscow's demand was to access the secret system's designs and locations,
which it cannot allow. The U.S. says that the Russians may share the information
with Iran against which the U.S.missile defense system is being deployed.
Read more: http://digitaljournal.com/article/316513#ixzz1jB4eIw9t
SS-18 Mod 4
Country: Russian Federation
Alternate Name: Satan, RS-20V
Class: ICBM
Basing: Silo Based
Length: 34.30 m
Diameter: 3.00 m
Launch Weight: 211,100 kg
Payload: 10 MIRV warheads
Warhead: Nuclear 500 kT (x10 MIRV)
Propulsion: 2-stage liquid

18. Range: 11000 km
Status: Operational
In Service: 1982-?
Details
Russian Designation: RS-20V
The SS-18 is an intercontinental-range, silo-based, liquid propellant ballistic missile
deployed by the Soviet Union. It is the largest of the fourth generation Soviet
intercontinental-range missile and the only ‘heavy’ missile allowed under the second
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). A total of six versions are known to exist.
The SS-18 was extremely similar in design to its predecessor, the SS-9.
The SS-18 Mod 4 is an extremely powerful strategic weapon. It carries Multiple
Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads, each with a nuclear yield greater than
that of many contemporary missiles. It has range such that all major targets within the
continental United States could be attacked. The SS-18 Mod 4 is simply an upgraded
version of the SS-18 Mod 3. The Mod 3 may have been insufficient for an effective anti-
silo attack, but the upgrades for the Mod 4 make the missile a likely candidate for an
attack against hardened targets. An SS-18 Mod 4 warhead has a decent chance at
destroying a US silo and the probability of a successful strike can be significantly
increased by aiming multiple MIRV at a single silo. The MIRV warheads could also be
used to destroy population centers, making the SS-18 Mod 4 a viable asset for counter-
value targets.
The SS-18 Mod 3 and 4 have the same general design; the only difference is MIRV
accuracy. Whether the Mod 4 brought accuracy to 650 m CEP or improved upon this
accuracy is unclear. The missile uses an inertial navigation system with digital computer
guidance and control. The missile is a massive 211,100 kg, with a length of 34.3 m and a
3.0 m diameter. It uses a two-stage liquid propellant engine.The SS-18 Mod 4 can deploy
its 10 MIRV warheads up to a range of 11,000 km. Each MIRV warhead has a yield of
500 kT.
The SS-18 entered development in 1969 as a replacement for the SS-9 missile. It was
essentially a redesigned, modernized SS-9. The flight tests started in 1973 and the Mod 1
version of the missile was first deployed operationally in 1975 within converted SS-9
missile silos and launch complexes. The SS-18 Mod 2 entered service in 1978, with the
Mod 3 and Mod 4 entering service in 1980 and 1982 respectively. By 1991, there were
308 SS-18 missiles in silos grouped among six major launch sites.
The first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) required the number of SS-18
missiles to be reduced to 154 by 2003. As a result, the early versions of the SS-18 were
removed from service to maintain the more advanced models; all Mod 1 missiles were
removed by 1994 while the Mod 2 missiles were removed by 2001. The requirement of
the START I has been fulfilled, as only 145 SS-18 missiles remained in service by the
end of 2002. This was accomplished by destroying or converting the missiles into

19. satellite launch vehicles. There were believed to be about 58 Mod 4 missiles still in
service in 2001. As the project to deconstruct SS-18 missiles is still underway, it is
believed that only 70 of the missiles were operational in July 2008.
The Mod 5 and 6 missiles were first launched in 1988. These models have improved
accuracy, a similar first and second stage motor, similar accuracy and a similar
payload. Due to an extended life program they will be in service until 2020.(1)
Footnotes
1. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems, Issue 50, ed. Duncan Lennox, (Surrey: Jane’s
Information Group, January 2009), 167-69.
Russia Developing a New ICBM
January 20, 2011 :: The Telegraph :: News
The head of Russian General Engineering (Rosobshemash), a Russian military contractor,
has told the ITAR-TASS news agency that a replacement for the mainstay of Russia's
ICBM nuclear deterrent, the SS-18, may be completed as early as 2017.
The SS-18, the only 'heavy' (she weighs well over 200 tons) ICBM allowed to Russia
under the original Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, has a range (depending on
modifications) of 11,000-16,000 km, putting all of the continental United States easily
within range. The replacement now under development, brags the head of Rosobshemash,
will be unstoppable by either U.S. missile defenses or the NATO missile shield now
being developed for Europe. (Article, Link)
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4

20. New RS-24 Missiles to Replace Older Russian Systems
June 12, 2007 :: Interfax :: News
At a press conference, Commander Colonel-General Nikolai Solovtsov confirmed that
Russia's new RS-24 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) will replace older missiles
as they are retired over the coming years, Interfax-AVN reported on June
12. Specifically, the RS-24s will replace the RS-18s (SS-19, Stiletto) and the RS-20s
(SS-18, Satan), which carry six and ten warheads respectively. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 3, SS-18 Mod 4, SS-19 Mod 2
Russia’s Strategic Missile Troops Holding War Game
March 16, 2006 :: RIA-Novosti :: News
Russia’s Strategic Missile Troops are conducting wargames that include the deployment
of mobile ground-based missile systems, according to Russian news sources. Over 2,000
troops and 400 pieces of equipment are taking part in the exercise, which will include the
deployment of SS-25 Sickle missile systems and SS-18 Satan heavy missiles. According
to the SMT, the purpose of the exercise is to improve cooperation between command and
control elements while fighting off an enemy attack. The wargames will run from March
14 through 18. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-N-5
Russia Tests SS-18
December 22, 2004 :: Itar-Tass :: News
Russia today tested its SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missile, which it test fired from the
Dombarovsky missile base in the Odenberg region of Russia, traveling some 6,000km to
the Kura testing ground on the far eastern Kamchatka peninsula. This was the first test of
a missile being launched from within Russia proper since 1991, reports Interfax—most
test launches of the SS-18 take place from Kazakhstan.
The missile in question was described as the RS-20V (R-36M2) Voyevoda, which
has been in service for some 16 years, and which will remain in service for another ten or
15 years. It is known as the SS-18 or as “Satan” in the West. Of the two versions or
“modifications” of SS-18s currently deployed, this was probably the SS-18 Mod 4.
Russia reportedly has about 40-50 of these missiles currently in service.
Russia is expected to test one more missile in 2004, the Topol-M, this Friday,
December 24. (More »»»)

21. » RIA Novosti on SS-18, upcoming Topol-M, tests
» Podvig on SS-18 launch
» More stories on: Russia, Testing - Foreign
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 3, SS-18 Mod 4
Two More Russian Missile Tests in 2004
November 9, 2004 :: Interfax :: News
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced today, during a meeting with Russian
President Putin, that Russia will conduct an additional two launches of ballistic missiles
in 2004, of the silo-launched SS-18 (RS-20) heavy missile, and of the mobile Topol-M,
the last test of the Topol-M before it is more fully adopted for service.
At the meeting, Ivanov apparently referred to the SS-18 by its Western name,
“Satan,” prompting Putin to call the missiles by the Russian name, saying, “Please use
our own names, there is no need to say Satan and the like,” and “Let those people over
there who have objections use the NATO terminology,” according to press
reports. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-27
Status of Russian Strategic Forces
October 20, 2004 :: News
Pavel Podvig, editor of Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces, reports that exchange data
under the START Treaty was released earlier this month, updating the number and type
of Russia’s deployed ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads. Currently, Russia is said to
have some 874 “delivery platforms,” fielding some 3885 large, strategic, nuclear
warheads.
Some 315 SS-25 (Topol) road-mobile missiles are now deployed, though their
numbers will be diminishing. Some 15 SS-24 rail-mobile missiles are said to have been
decommissioned in the past year, as well as a few “heavy” SS-18s.
While the older missiles are phased out, newer ones replace them. Most importantly
the new and advanced SS-27 (Topol-M) missiles continue to be deployed in silos. Four
SS-27s are expected to be deployed in December 2004, and an additional ten in 2005-
2006. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-24, SS-25, SS-27

22. Russia Tests SS-N-23 and SS-18 Ballistic Missiles
June 29, 2004 :: Express India :: News
Russia today successfully tested a submarine launched RSM-54 (SS-N-23 or “Skiff”)
ballistic missile from the Yekaterinburg Delta IV-class missile submarine submerged in
the Barents Sea. The missile traveled some 7,000 km before reaching its target, the Kura
testing ground on the Kamchatka Peninsula, located on Russia’s Pacific coast. The
missile’s flight across Russia lasted only some 28 minutes. The SS-N-23 missile tested
today was the same type as those which failed to launch during naval exercises attended
by Russian President Vladimir Putin in February.
In addition, Russia also launched an SS-18, or RS-20, intercontinental ballistic
missile. The SS-18 or “Satan” missile was launched from the Baikonur cosmodrome in
Kazakhstan. (Article, Link)
» More stories on: Russia, Testing - Foreign
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-N-23
Russia Extending Life of ICBMs
May 6, 2004 :: Itar-Tass :: News
Speaking to journalists, Russian Strategic Missile Troops commander Col.-Gen. Nikolay
Solovtsov said that the service life of Russian ICBMs would be extended an additional
10-15 years, for a total of 25-30 years, reports ITAR TASS.
Though Solovtsov did not specify which missiles were being extended, he was
likely referring to SS-18 and SS-19s. He attributed the extension of the missile’s usability
to “good maintenance.” Equally relevant, however, is the cash-strapped nature of the
advanced Topol-M (SS-27) missile deployment, which continues to proceed but is
currently behind schedule in producing replacing older ICBMs.
Solovtsov seemed to indicate that the Topol-M deployments would be largely
complete in 10 years: “After 2015, the mainstay of the SMT group will be the Topol-M
missile systems, both silo-based and mobiles ones, with various armaments.” (Article,
Link)
» More stories on: Russia
» Missile details: SS-18 Mod 4, SS-19 Mod 2, SS-27
Home :: Missiles of the World
R-36 (missile)

23. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
R-36; NATO reporting name: SS-18 Satan
Type Intercontinental ballistic missile
Place oforigin USSR
Service history
In service 1967 - Present
Used by Soviet and Russian Strategic
Rocket Forces
Production history
Manufacturer Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant
Specifications
Weight 209,600 kg (462,000 lb)
Length 32.2 m (106 ft)
Diameter 3.05 m (10.0 ft)
Warhead Three stage fission-fusion-
fission, over 20 Mt of TNT
Detonation
mechanism
Airburst

24. Engine Two-stage liquid propellant
Operational
range
10,200–16,000 km (depending
on R-36M missile variants)
Speed up to 7.9 km/s
Guidance
system
Inertial, autonomous
Accuracy 220–700 m CEP (depending on
R-36M missile variants)
Launch
platform
Silo
The R-36, (Russian: Р-36) is a family of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and
space launch vehicles designed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The original R-
36 was produced under the Soviet industry designation 8K67 and was given the NATO
reporting name SS-9 Scarp. The later version, the R-36M was produced under the
GRAU designations 15A14 and 15A18 and was given the NATO reporting name SS-18
Satan. This missile was viewed by certain U.S. analysts as giving the Soviet Union first
strike advantage over the U.S., particularly because of its very heavy throw weight and
extremely large number of re-entry vehicles. Some versions of the R-36M were deployed
with 10 warheads and up to 40 penetration aids and the missile's high throw-weight made
it theoretically capable of carrying more warheads or penetration aids. Contemporary
U.S. missiles, such as the Minuteman III, carried up to three warheads at most.

25. Contents
 1 Description
 2 R-36M (SS-18) variants
o 2.1 Deployed variants of R-36M missiles[2][3]
 3 Development
 4 Multiple warheads
 5 Deployment
 6 R-36ORB
 7 Elimination
 8 Derivatives
 9 Operators
 10 See also
 11 References
 12 External links
Description
The R-36 (SS-9) is a two-stage rocket powered by a liquid bipropellant, with UDMH as
fuel and nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizer. It carries one of three types of re-entry vehicles
(RVs) developed especially for this missile:
 The Mod 1 and Mod 2 carried single nuclear warheads of 18 and 25 megatons (mt) of
TNT yield respectively.
 The Mod 4 carried three multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRV).
An additional version, the Mod 3, was proposed (it was to be a Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS), a missile that travels through space in a low-earth orbit),
but was not adopted due to the Outer Space Treaty.
The R-36P missile was developed to carry the Mod 4 warhead, while the R-36O (the
letter O) was to be for the Mod 3 FOBS. R-36 and R-36P missiles were hot launched
from their silos.
The R-36M (SS-18) is similar to the R-36 in design, but has the capacity to mount a
MIRV payload of 10 warheads, each with a 550–750 kt yield, or a single warhead of up
to 20 mt. Throw-weight of the missile is 8,800 kg. This makes the Soviet R-36 the
world's heaviest ICBM; for comparison, the heaviest US ICBM (the retired LGM-118
Peacekeeper, that carried 10 warheads of 300 kT each) had less than a half of this at
4,000 kg. The R-36M has two stages. The first is a 460,000 kgf (4.5 MN) thrust motor
with four combustion chambers and nozzles. The second stage is a single-chamber
77,000 kgf (755 kN) thrust motor.

26. R-36M (SS-18) variants
 R-36M (SS-18 Mod 1): The SS-18 Mod 1 carried a single large reentry vehicle, with
a warhead yield of 18-25 MT, a distance of about 6000 nm. In January 1971, cold-
launch tests began during which the mortar launch was perfected. The actual flight
tests for the single-RV Mod 1 began on 21 February 1973, though some sources
suggest that testing began in October 1972. The testing phase of the R-36M with
various different types of warheads was finished in October 1975 and on 30
December 1975 deployment began (though some Western sources suggest that an
initial operational capability was reached in early 1975). A total of 56 were deployed
by 1977, though all were replaced by Mod 3 or Mod 4 missiles by 1984. These high-
yield weapons were assessed in the West as possibly developed to attack American
Minuteman ICBM launch control centers. Tom Clancy described this potential
tasking as the ability to 'turn Cheyenne Mountain into Cheyenne Lake.'[1]
 R-36M (SS-18 Mod 2): The SS-18 Mod 2 included a post-boost vehicle and up to
eight reentry vehicles, each with a warhead yield estimated at between 0.5 to 1.5 MT,
with a range capability of about 5500 nm. The MIRVs were placed in pairs, and a
post boost vehicle with a command structure and a propulsion system were contained
in the nose cone of the R-36M. The flight tests of the MIRVed Mod 2 began in
September 1973 (though some Western sources suggest that the initial flight test of
the Mod 2 MIRV version occurred in August 1973), with IOC in 1975.
Approximately 132 were deployed by 1978, but the post-boost vehicle design was
seriously flawed, and the Mod 2 missiles were all replaced by the Mod 4 variant by
1983.
 R-36M (SS-18 Mod 3): The SS-18 Mod 3 carried a single large reentry vehicle that
was an improved version of the SS-18 Mod 1. On 16 August 1976, a few months
after the R-36M entered service, the development of an improved modification of the
R-36M (15A14) was approved. This missile subsequently received the designation R-
36MUTTh (15A18) and was developed by KB Yuzhnoye (OKB-586) through
December 1976. The R-36MUTTh was capable of carrying two different nose cones.
On 29 November 1979, deployment of the improved R-36M with a single reentry
vehicle carrying a 18-25 MT warhead (SS-18 Mod 3) began.
 R-36MUTTh (SS-18 Mod 4): The SS-18 Mod 4 was probably designed to attack and
destroy ICBMs and other hardened targets in the US. Its increasing accuracy made it
possible to reduce the yield of the warheads and allowed an increase in the number of
warheads from 8 to 10. According to some Western estimates, evidence suggested
that the Mod 4 may be capable of carrying as many as 14 RVs (this may reflect
observation of the deployment of countermeasures intended to overcome a ballistic
missile defense, or to confuse American attack characterization systems). The flight-
design tests of the R-36MUTTh began on 31 October 1977 and in November 1979
the flight tests of the MIRVed missile were completed. The first three regiments were
put on alert on 18 September 1979. During 1980 a total of 120 SS-18 Mod 4 missiles
were deployed, replacing the last remaining R-36 (SS-9) missiles. In 1982–1983 the

27. remaining R-36M missiles were also replaced with the new R-36MUTTh and the
total number of deployed missiles reached the maximum 308 ceiling established in
the SALT-1 treaty. The SS-18 Mod 4 force had the estimated capability to destroy 65
to 80 percent of US ICBM silos using two nuclear warheads against each. Even after
this type of attack, it was estimated that more than 1000 SS-18 warheads would be
available for further strikes against targets in the US. After 2009, the SS-18 Mod 4s
were all eliminated in favor of the newer SS-18 Mod 5.
 R-36M2 Voivode (SS-18 Mod 5): The newer, more accurate SS-18 Mod 5 version
placed in converted silos allowed the SS-18 to remain the bulwark of the SRF's hard-
target-kill capability. The Mod 5 carries 10 MIRVs, each having a higher yield than
the Mod 4 warheads. The Mod 5 warheads have nearly twice the yield of the Mod 4
(approximately 750 KT to 1 MT) according to Western estimates, though Russian
sources suggest a yield of 550-750 KT each. The increase in the Mod 5's warhead
yield, along with improved accuracy, would, under the START treaty, help allow the
Russians to maintain their hard-target-kill wartime requirements even with the 50
percent cut in heavy ICBMs the START agreement required. The technical proposals
to build a modernized heavy ICBM were made in June 1979. The missile
subsequently received the designation R-36M2 Voivode and the industrial index
number 15A18M. The design of the R-36 M2 Voivode was completed in June 1982.
The R-36M2 consisted of a series of new engineering features. The engine of the
second stage is completely built in the fuel tank (earlier this was only used on
SLBMs) and the design of the transport-launching canister was altered. Unlike the R-
36M, the 10 warheads on the post-boost vehicle are located on a special frame in two
circles. The flight tests of the R-36M2 equipped with 10 MIRVs began in March
1986 and were completed in March 1988. The first regiment with these missiles was
put on alert on 30 July 1988 and was deployed on 11 August 1988.
 R-36M2 Voivode (SS-18 Mod 6): The flight tests of the R-36M2 missile carrying a
single warhead (SS-18 Mod 6) with a yield of 20 MT were completed in September
1989 and deployment began in August 1991. Ten Mod 6 missiles were deployed.
One intended use of these large warheads was high altitude detonation to incapacitate
electronics and communications through a very large electromagnetic pulse. The SS-
18 Mod 6 missiles were all decommissioned by late 2009.
At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 SS-18 launch silos
were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the
territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent
Kazakhstan. The dismantling of 104 launchers located in Kazakhstan was completed in
September 1996. The START II treaty was to eliminate all SS-18 missiles but it did not
enter into force and the missiles remained on duty. Russia has steadily decreased the
number of operational SS-18s and by July 2009, only 59 (all of the 10 MIRV Mod 5
version) remain. About 40 missiles will have their service lives extended so that they
remain in service until about 2020. With the retirement of the 20 megaton SS-18 Mod 6
warheads, the highest yield weapon in service with any nation is the estimated 5 MT
Chinese Dong Feng 5 (DF-5) ICBM (CSS-4) warhead.

28. All R-36 variants were designed to be launched from silos in dispersed and hardened
locations. The R-36M is placed into its 39 m deep silo in a tubular storage/launch
container. Upon launch the missile is shot out of the tube, mortar-fashion, by a piston,
driven by the expansion of gases from a slow-burning black powder charge inside the
piston. The missile's main engine is ignited tens of metres above the ground, preventing
any damage to the internal equipment of the silo itself from the rocket engine's fiery
efflux.[citation needed]
Deployed variants of R-36M missiles[2][3]
System: R-36M R-36M R-36M
R-
36MUTTH
R-
36MUTTH
R-36M2
Treaty-
designation:
RS-20A RS-20A1 RS-20A2 RS-20B RS-20B RS-20V
GRAU-
designation:
15A14 15A14 15A14 15A18 15A18 15A18M
NATO-
designation:
SS-18
Satan Mod
1
SS-18
Satan Mod
2
SS-18
Satan Mod
3
SS-18 Satan
Mod 4
SS-18 Satan
Mod 5
SS-18
Satan Mod
6
Deployment: 1974–1983 1976–1980 1976–1986 1979–2005 1986–2009
1988–
Present
Maximum
deployed
number:
148 10 30 278 30 58
Length: 32.6 m 32.6 m 32.6 m 36.3 m 36.3 m 34.3 m
Diameter: 3.00 m 3.00 m 3.00 m 3.00 m 3.00 m 3.00 m
Launch
weight:
209,600 kg 209,600 kg 210,000 kg 211,100 kg 211,100 kg 211,100 kg
Number of
warheads:
8 10 1 10 1 10
Warhead
yield:
4 x 1.0 MT
+ 4 x 0.4
MT
0.4 MT 20 MT 0.5 MT 20 MT 0.8 MT
Range: 11,200 km 10,200 km 16,000 km 11,000 km 16,000 km 11,000 km
CEP: 700 m 700 m 700 m 370 m 370 m 220 m
Development
Rocket nozzles of SS-9 Scarp R-36
Development of the R-36 was begun by OKB-586 (Yuzhnoye) in Dnipropetrovsk,
Ukraine in 1962, and built upon the work of the R-16 program. The Chief Designer was

29. Mikhail Yangel. Initial development was of light, heavy, and orbital versions, with flight
testing from 1962 through 1966, at which time initial operational capability was
achieved. News of the development of the orbital version caused alarm in the West with
the possibility that the Soviets would be able to launch a large number of nuclear
weapons into orbit where there was no capability to intercept them. The prospect of
orbital nuclear weapons led both sides to agree a treaty banning the use of weapons of
mass destruction in space.
In 1970, development of a fourth version, capable of delivering multiple warheads, was
developed, and test flown the next year.
Further improvement of the R-36 led to the design of the R-36M, which provided a
theoretical first-strike capability—the ability to destroy the United States' LGM-30
Minuteman ICBM silos and launch control centers before they could retaliate. However,
neither the Soviet Union nor the Russian Federation have ever publicly delineated the
missile's particular role in their arsenal. The initial design of the R-36M called for a
single massive 12-Mt warhead to be delivered over a range of 10,600 km. The missile
was first tested in 1973 but this test ended in failure. After several delays the R-36M was
deployed in December of 1975. This “Mod-1” design was delivered with a single 18–20
Mt warhead and a range of just over 11,000 km. This new version was given a new
identity by NATO: SS-18 Satan.
The SS-18 has gone through six separate modifications, with the first modification (Mod-
1) being phased out by 1984. The final modification (Mod-6) designated R-36M-2
“Voevoda” was deployed in August of 1988. This missile could deliver the same 18–20
Mt warhead 16,000 km. Modifications prior to Mod-6 mainly introduced MIRV
(Multiple independent reentry vehicles) warheads. These missiles (Mods-2, 4, and 5)
surpassed their western counterpart the US LGM-118 Peacekeeper in terms of megatons
delivered, range, and survivability, but were inferior in terms of accuracy (CEP).
Control system for this rocket was designed at NPO "Electropribor"[4] (Kharkiv,
Ukraine).
Multiple warheads
Missiles of the R-36M/SS-18 family have never been deployed with more than ten
warheads, but given their large throw-weight (8.8 tonnes as specified in START), they
have the capacity to carry considerably more detonation power. Among the projects that
the Soviet Union considered in the mid-1970s was that of a 15A17 missile—a follow-on
to the R-36MUTTH (15A18).[5] The missile would have had an even greater throw-
weight—9.5 tonnes—and would be able to carry a very large number of warheads. Five
different versions of the missile were considered. Three of these versions would carry
regular warheads—38 × 250 kt yield, 24 × 500 kt yield, or 15–17 × 1 Mt yield. Two
modifications were supposed to carry guided warheads (“upravlyaemaya golovnaya
chast”)—28 × 250 kt or 19 × 500 kt.[5] However, none of these upgraded models were
ever developed. The SALT II Treaty, signed in 1979, prohibited increasing the number of

30. warheads ICBMs could carry. Equally, from a strategic point of view, concentrating so
many warheads on silo-based missiles was not seen as desirable, since it would have
made a large proportion of the USSR's warheads vulnerable to a counterforce strike.
The operational deployment of the R36M/SS-18 consisted of the R-36MUTTH, which
carried ten 500 kt warheads, and its follow-on, the R-36M2 (15A18M), which carried ten
800 kt warheads (single-warhead versions with either 8.3 Mt or 20 Mt warhead also
existed at some point). To partially circumvent the treaty, the missile was equipped with
40 heavy decoys to utilize the capacity left unused due to the 10-warhead limitation,.[6]
These decoys would appear as warheads to any defensive system, making each missile as
hard to intercept as 50 single warheads, rendering potential anti-ballistic defense
ineffective.
Deployment
Dnepr inside silo
At full deployment, before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, 308 R-36M launch silos
were operational. After the breakup of the USSR, 204 of these were located on the
territory of the Russian Federation and 104 on the territory of newly independent
Kazakhstan. Part of the missiles in Kazakhstan (54 of them) were under the 57th Rocket
Division at Zhangiz-Tobe (Solnechnyy), Semipalatinsk Oblast.[7] The other R-36
establishment in Kazakhstan was the 38th Rocket Division at Derzhavinsk, Turgay
Oblast.[8] In the next few years Russia reduced the number of R-36M launch silos to 154
to conform with the START I treaty. The missiles in Kazakhstan were all deactivated by
1995. The subsequent START II treaty was to eliminate all R-36M missiles but it did not
enter into force and the missiles remained on duty.
R-36ORB
The development of the R-36 missile complex for use with the 8К69 fractional-orbit
missile ("FOBS") began on April 16, 1962. Such a missile provides some advantages
over a conventional ICBM. The range is limited only by the parameters of the orbit that
the re-entry vehicle has been placed into, and the re-entry vehicle may come from either
direction, compelling the enemy to build considerably more expensive anti-missile
systems. Due to the possibility of placing the warhead in orbit and keeping it there for
some time, it is possible to reduce the time required to strike to just a few minutes. It is
also much more difficult to predict where the warhead will land, since while the re-entry
vehicle is on orbit, it is a very small object with few distinguishing marks and is hard to
detect; moreover, since the warhead can be commanded to land anywhere along the
orbit's ground track, even detecting the warhead on orbit does not allow accurate
prediction of its intended target.

31. The structure and design of the fractional-orbit bombardment system were similar to a
conventional P-36 ICBM system. A two-stage rocket was equipped by the liquid rocket
engines using storable propellants. The silo launcher and command point were hardened
against a nuclear explosion. The basic difference from a conventional ICBM consists of
the design of the re-entry vehicle, which is fitted with a single 2.4Mt warhead, de-orbit
engine and control block. The control system uses independent inertial navigation and
radar-based altimeter which measures orbit parameters twice—in the beginning of an
orbital path and just before de-orbiting engine firing.
Flight testing consisted of 15 successful launches and four failures. During test launch
#17, the warhead was retrieved with a parachute. Flight tests of a rocket have been
completed by May 20, 1968 and on November 19 of the same year it entered service. The
first (and the only) regiment with 18 launchers was deployed on August 25, 1969.
The R-36orbs (8К69) were retired from service in January, 1983 as a part of SALT II
treaty (they were considered "space-based" nuclear weapons).
The Tsyklon series of civilian space launchers is based on the R-36orb (8К69) design.
Elimination
Senator Richard Lugar inspects an SS-18 ICBM being readied for decommission under
the Nunn-Lugar Program
In the last decade Russian armed forces have been steadily reducing the number of R-
36M missiles in service, withdrawing those that age past their designed operational
lifetime. About 40 missiles of the most modern variant R-36M2 (or RS-20V) will remain
in service until 2019[9] and will be then replaced by newer MIRV version of Topol-M.[10]
In March 2006 Russia made an agreement with Ukraine that will regulate cooperation
between the two countries on maintaining the R-36M2 missiles. It was reported that the
cooperation with Ukraine will allow Russia to extend the service life of the R-36M2
missiles by at least ten to 28 years.[11]

32. In December 2008 Strategic Rocket Forces had 75 R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 operational
missiles.
The commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces Lt. Gen. Andrei Shvaichenko announced
on December 16, 2009, that Russia planned to "develop a new liquid-propellant ICBM to
replace the Voyevoda (SS-18 Satan), capable of carrying 10 warheads, by 2016."[12]
Derivatives
Several remaining SS-18 missiles have been modified for surface launch and now carry
lightweight satellites to Low Earth Orbit (LEO), including many foreign payloads.
Operators
Soviet Union and Russia
The Strategic Rocket Forces have been the only operator of the R-36.
57th Rocket Division at Zhangiz-Tobe (Solnechnyy), Semipalatinsk Oblast;
38th Rocket Division at Derzhavinsk, Turgay Oblast
other Rocket Divisions
See also
 List of missiles
 List of military rockets
References
1. ^ Clancy, Tom (1991). The Sumof All Fears. Putnam. ISBN 0-399-13615-0.
2. ^ PavelPodvig: The Window of Vulnerability That Wasn't: Soviet Military Buildup
in the 1970s--AResearch Note. InternationalSecurity, Summer 2008, Vol. 33, No. 1:
118–138
3. ^ Nuclear Notebook: U.S. and Soviet/Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles,
1959–2008
4. ^ Krivonosov, Khartron: Computers for rocket guidance systems
5. ^ a b
Multiple (as in “up to 38”) warheads - Blog - Russian strategic nuclear forces
6. ^ "Moscow extends life of 144 cold war ballistic missiles". The Guardian (London).
2002-08-20. http://www.guardian.co.uk/russia/article/0,2763,777379,00.html.
Retrieved 2006-10-24.
7. ^ "57th Missile Division". Ww2.dk. http://www.ww2.dk/new/rvsn/57md.htm.
Retrieved 2011-09-26.
8. ^ "38th Missile Division". Ww2.dk. http://www.ww2.dk/new/rvsn/38md.htm.
Retrieved 2011-09-26.
9. ^ "Russia to test launch 14 ICBMs in 2009 - missile forces chief | Russia | RIA
Novosti". En.rian.ru. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090410/121052406.html. Retrieved
2011-09-26.
10. ^ "New RS-24 Missiles to Replace Older Russian Systems". MissileThreat. 2007-06-
12. http://www.missilethreat.com/archives/id.5373/detail.asp. Retrieved 2011-09-26.

33. 11. ^ Russia and Ukraine will maintain R-36M2 missiles - Blog - Russian strategic
nuclear forces
12. ^ Russia says destroyed 9 ICBMs in 2009 under START 1 arms pact, by RIAN
 Podvig, Pavel (2001). Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces. Cambridge, MA: The
MIT Press.
Externallinks
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: R-36
 [1]
 [2]
 [3]
 [4]
 Russia's nuclear forces - 2006, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April
2006
 Yuzhnoe Design Bureau—English-language home page
 Strategic Rocket Forces—Russian strategic nuclear forces
 R-36—Federation of American Scientists
 Strategic Missile Forces museum (photos)
Strategic Missile Forces museum is a former central battle front position missile.
There are many exhibits related to nuclear weapon, underground postern, missile
engines, protection facilities, underground unified command post.

34.  Entrance

35.  Tanks on the museum grounds

36.  Special car for refueling of missle

37.  Specialised car to transport container with a missile and its load in silos

38.  Automotive equipment, Silo-launcher facility and Warhead of missile SS-24
'Scalpel'

39.  Сomplex of protective structures

40.  Intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) SS-18 'Satan'

41.  Ukrainian military bus Blue Bird

43.  The place of chief officer on duty squad
 Scheme

44.  Samples of missile engines

45.  Billboard
Strategic Rocket Forces
Strategic Rocket Forces is a separate branch of the Russia's Armed
Forces, subordinated directly to the General Staff. The Strategic
Rocket Forces were demoted to this status from the status of a
separate service of the Armed Forces by a presidential decree of 24
March 2001. The current commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces --
Lt.-General Sergei Karakayev -- was appointed to this post by a
presidential decree of 22 June 2010.
At the end of 2010, the Strategic Rocket Forces were estimated to
have 375 operational missile systems of four different types.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles of these systems could carry 1259
warheads.
Number of systems
Total
warheads

46. Missile system Warheads Deployment
R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-
18)
58 10 580 Dombarovsky, Uzhur
UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) 70 6 420 Kozelsk, Tatishchevo
Topol (SS-25) 171 1 171 Yoshkar-Ola, Nizhniy
Tagil, Novosibirsk,
Irkutsk, Barnaul,
Vypolzovo
Topol-M silo (SS-27) 52 1 52 Tatishchevo
Topol-M mobile (SS-27) 18 1 18 Teykovo
RS-24 mobile 6 3 18 Teykovo
Total 375 1259
Strategic Rocket Forces units
Strategic Rocket Forces include three missile armies: the 27th Guards
Missile Army (headquarters in Vladimir), the 31st Missile Army
(Orenburg), the 33rd Guards Missile Army (Omsk). The 53rd Missile
Army (Chita) was disbanded in 2002. It appears that the 31st Missile
Army (Orenburg) will be liquidated by 2016.
As of the end of 2010, the missile armies included 11 missile divisions
with operational ICBMs.
Number of missiles
Missile division Missile system
27th Guards Missile Army (Vladimir)
Tatishchevo: 60th MD (Tatishchevo-5,
Svetlyy)
41 UR-100NUTTH (SS-19)
52 Topol-M silo (SS-27)
Kozelsk: 28th GMD 29 UR-100NUTTH (SS-19)
Vypolzovo: 7th GMD (Ozernyy, Bologoye-
4)
18 Topol (SS-25)
Teykovo: 54th GMD (Krasnyye Sosenki) 6 RS-24 mobile
18 Topol-M mobile (SS-27)
Yoshkar-Ola: 14th MD 27 Topol (SS-25)
31st Missile Army (Rostoshi,
Orenburg)
Dombarovsky: 13th MD (Yasnyy) 30
R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-
18)
Nizhniy Tagil: 42nd MD (Verkhnyaya 27 Topol (SS-25)

47. Salda, Nizhniy Tagil-41, Svobodnyy)
33rd Guards Missile Army (Omsk)
Uzhur: 62nd MD (Uzhur-4, Solnechnyy) 28
R-36MUTTH/R-36M2 (SS-
18)
Novosibirsk: 39th GMD (Novosibirsk-95,
Pashino, Gvardeiskiy)
36 Topol (SS-25)
Irkutsk: 51st GMD (Zelenyy) 27 Topol (SS-25)
Barnaul: 35th MD (Sibirskiy-2) 36 Topol (SS-25)
MD - Missile Division, GMD - Guards Missile Division
Missile systems
R-36MUTTH (also known as RS-20B and SS-18) and R-36M2 (RS-
20V, SS-18) missiles were developed by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau
(Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine). R-36MUTTH missiles were deployed in
1979-1983, R-36M2 -- in 1988-1992. The missiles were produced by
the Yuzhnyy Machine-Building Plant (Dnepropetrovsk, Ukraine). The
missiles have two liquid-fuel stages and can carry 10 warheads. The
Strategic Rocket Forces plans to keep all R-36M2 missiles in service.
With service lives extended to 25-30 years as planned, R-36M2
missiles could remain in operation until about 2016-2020.
UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) missiles were developed by the Machine-
Building NPO (Reutov, Moscow oblast) and were deployed in 1979-
1984. The missiles were produced by the M. V. Khrunichev Machine
Building Plant (Moscow). The missile has two liquid-fuel stages and can
carry 6 warheads. A number of missiles have been removed from
service, but after a series of test launches service life of the missile
was extended to more than 30 years, so some of them could be kept
in service.
Road-mobile Topol (SS-25) missile system was developed at the
Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. The systems were deployed
in 1985-1992. The missile has three solid-propellant stages and carries
single warhead. The missiles were produced at the Votkinsk Machine-
Building Plant. The currently deployed missiles are close to the end of
their service lives and are being withdrawn from service.
Topol-M (SS-27) and RS-24 missile systems have been developed at
the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology. Topol-M exists in two
versions -- silo-based and road-mobile. Deployment of the silo-based
version began in 1997. The road-mobile version has completed flight
tests in December 2004. The first mobile missiles began service in
December 2006. The missile has three solid-propellant stages and was

48. initially developed as a single-warhead missile. In 2007 Russia began
tests of a MIRVed version of the Topol-M mobile missile, which was
designated RS-24. Deployment of this missile began in 2010.
[April 20, 2011]
Missiles
After the Second World War new ways were formed on further weapon development with allowance for
obtained experience. In the course of the war it became evident that destruction of strategic objects of
military and economical potential in the enemy rear is extremely important. These tasks were placed on
long-range bombers. Creation of nuclear weapon demonstrated its unique striking capabilities. An aspiration
rose to develop a kind of weapon which later would named as a strategic offensive weapon.
One of the basic elements of the SOW is a family of various carriers of nuclear charges. The first specimens
of this kind were USA bombers B-29, number of which grew rapidly. The threat of new military blocs and
plans of attack on the USSR was a reason to take extraordinary measures on defense capacity assurance of
the country, and the main goal was - to create the nuclear weapon.
In 1953 the nuclear charge was tested in the USSR, and thus the first basic element of the SOW appeared.
The next necessary step - creation of NC carriers. The main requirements for them were: long range close
to the intercontinental one, weight-lifting capacity of more than one ton, firing accuracy (deviation from the
impact point) of no more than several kilometers. These requirements could be met by then bombers
except the range. This shortage could be compensated by location of the base aerodromes closer to targets,
and it was done by the USA AF.
This way was unacceptable for the USSR because of absence of heavy bombers until beginning of fifties and
bases for them near borders of possible opponents. Besides, the serious disadvantage of bombers was very
long time of target reaching and vulnerability to the AD. So, both the USA and USSR in the first after-war
years had come to a decision to create long-range ballistic missiles.
During the Second World War the armies of belligerent powers used reactive missiles on smokeless powder.
But their main characteristics were lower by one-two orders than requirements for the SOW carriers,
therefore it was impossible to create the LRBM on the basis of their improvement.
The specialists turned their attention to the fact that utilization of engines burning liquid propellants may
considerably increase both speed and range of rockets owing to much higher power potential of liquid
propellants. Correspondingly, the rockets with LRE have better mass characteristics.
The most intensive investigations and development of LRE and rockets with LRE were conducted in
Germany, beginning from the thirties of the last century. Creation of A-4 rocket in the first half of forties
was an outstanding achievement on the way of new weapon development. The single specimen of a rocket
from the times of the war ending, which may be evaluated as a prototype of the LRBM was the Germany
rocket A-4 known also as V-2. The A-4 rocket used such liquid propellants as ethanol and liquid oxygen
(LOX). Both USA and USSR concentrated their attention on this rocket and took measures for acquisition of

49. all available data and materials in order to use an experience of Germany for creation of the LRBM as fully
as possible.
The soviet specialists began study of the German rocket technology on a territory of the East Europe. This
activity was concluded in 1946 by release of the government order on development of the research
institutes, design offices, test centers and allocation of experimental plants. These measures allowed
creation of all conditions required for development of the new weapon in the USSR in the shortest time.
FIRST GENERATION
The main organization on LRBM was NII-88 headed by S.P.Korolyov. Under his management and use of an
experience of German experts the A-4 rocket was reconstructed under designation R-1. Then R-2 rocket
was designed, the first strategic missile R-5 was drafted and its version R-5M as a nuclear ammunition
carrier.
The propellant which used the liquid oxygen in rockets R-1, R-2 and R-5M was convenient for the first
LRBM. The oxygen is a strong oxidizer, and mixing with an efficient fuel it brings a high specific impulse.
The propellant LOX+ ethanol is not toxic, and this facilitates development and handling of engines and
rockets. Both components are rather inexpensive and mass-produced. These advantages determined
propellant selection for the first LRBM and ICBM.
However, a well-known disadvantage of this propellant is that the LOX shall be continuously kept at the
combat position in the frosted-up steaming tanks. Because of that, an application of the LOX-based
propellant is not advisable for military rockets or missiles. The rocket cannot stay for a long time in loaded
state, and the ground tanks shall be replenished at an oxygen-produced plant close to the rocket.
Consequently, the launch complex becomes cumbersome and hardly camouflaged. The pre-launch
processing of such rocket is complicated and protracted. As a result, the wartime readiness of this rocket
complex is extremely low.
Another disadvantage of R-2, R-5, R-7 and R-9 rockets was utilization of systems of the side radio-correction
and range radio-control of a distance which were not protected against external interference. They required
disposition of two radars and a station of radio-control at the launch site.
Taking all this into account, the Administration of the Head of Jet Armament which was a customer and user
of missiles put a requirement that the future missiles would be protected against interferences, be veiled
and be ready for a launch to the maximum extent.
The studies on possibility to create the LRBM with engines operating on storable high-temperature
propellants began. Assimilation of these propellants was quite difficult, but they allowed prolonged stay of
the rocket in the loaded state with considerable increase of its wartime readiness.
The persistent advocate of the idea to use the storable propellants for missiles was M.K. Yangel, the former
Deputy Chief Designer of OKB- 1 in beginning of fifties, and then Director and Chief Engineer of NII-88.
Namely in NII-88 an effectiveness of various propellants was investigated in the framework of a special
scientific-research program. In that time the first Soviet tactical missile R-11 with a storable propellant was
developed. It has the same range as the R-1, but two times higher operational readiness.
Creation of this missile had proved possibility and advisability to develop the LRBM with storable propellants.
SECOND GENERATION

50. During development of the first missiles designed by OKB-586 a possibility became evident to perfect them
significantly. In particular, the potential of high-temperature propellant was not used in full measure, the
time of stay duration in loaded state did not exceed one month. To bring the missile into the full readiness
for a launch some tens of minutes or even hours was required depending on initial state.
This is why the OKB-586 made a proposal in the end of fifties to update all the three kinds of its missiles
with designations R-22, R-24 and R-26. The first figure indicated the second step in elaboration of these
missiles, the second one reflected a continuity of the preceding respective missile. The main new property
of each updated missile was an encapsulated design and possibility to stay in the loaded state within up to
one year. Besides, the proposed technological and design improvements provided considerable reduction of
overall dimensions, lift-off mass and recurring cost.
The government was not able to accept this proposal, since at that moment preparation of five plants were
in full swing for mass production of missiles R-12, R-14 and R-16. An exception was made for the R-26
missile, elaboration of which was assigned to the OKB-586 in May 1960 for replacement of R-16 missile. But
some then events influenced a fate of the R-26 missile.
The USA were creating the high-temperature silo-based Titan-2 ICBM that was able to carry a nuclear
charge of great power. The USSR was in possession of superpower thermonuclear charge, but there was no
corresponding carrier. The missile design offices began elaboration of heavy and superheavy missiles.
In the OKB-1 a three-stage global missile GR-1 was designed.
The OKB-52, strengthened by design offices of V.M.Myasishchev and S.A.Lavochkin transferred to it jointly
with nearby plants and technical documentation from OKB-1 and OKB-586 proposed three types of missiles:
UR-100, UR-200 and UR-500. Here the letters "UR" means "Universal Rocket", and figures indicate a range
of the missile's lift-off mass.
The light class missile UR-100 with the lift-off mass lesser almost by 3 times and with the charge power
lesser by 1.5 times in comparison with the R-16 missile was proposed also as an anti-missile weapon.
The medium class missile UR-200 was of the same lift-off mass as R-16. The proposal was to use it also for
injecting anti-satellite means as well as means of global sea reconnaissance into the Earth orbit.
The UR-500 missile of around 600t lift-off mass was able to carry the PU of around 20t mass and also solve
some space tasks.
In the strategic plan of the country leadership two tasks had been formed: to increase as soon as possible a
total number of ICBM (the USA in 1962 had 3 times higher fleet) and to create a missile that could carry the
most powerful NC among existing ones, penetrate through the AMD to be developed and stay long time in
loaded state at maximum battle readiness.
For solution of the first task the UR-100 missile was chosen. It was manufactured under an up-to-date
technology, intended for a service in an encapsulated state condition inside a TLC, and was able be stored
for several years inside a SL of simplified type.
Solution of the second task was imposed upon the new R-36 missile under development by OKB-586 in two
versions - ballistic (8K67) and global one (8K69).
The super-heavy rockets were transferred into a space category. The further development of R-26 and UR-
200 was stopped. However, all the innovative technical solutions of the R-26 rocket were used at creation of
powerful R-36 missile.
THIRD GENERATION
In the end of the sixties - beginning of seventies a qualitative leap occurred in creation of strategic missile
complexes. Many research institutes (NII) and design offices (KB) from various branches of industry had
developed miniature digital computing devices, command instruments of high accuracy for control and

51. targeting systems, nuclear charges of high specific characteristics, advanced propulsion systems, new
schemes of launchers strengthening. A great amount of theoretical and experimental works was performed
in the dynamics of rockets. These combined effects was a basis for creating the third generation of ICBM.
The leadership of the country took a decision to modernize the missile complexes R-36 and UR-100 that
composed the main potential of Strategic Missile Forces. The developers of these complexes were charged
with a task to submit their technical proposals on competitive basis.
In 1967-1968 a couple of scientific research works was performed with allowance for the latest scientific-
technical achievements. As a result, the Yuzhnoye SDO jointly with a number of NII and KB had formulated
five basic principles of the impending modernization of strategic missile complexes, implementation of which
should provide the qualitative increase of their combat effectiveness:
1. Increase of survival probability of the missile complexes in any conditions of combat actions, including
nuclear or non-nuclear attacks, with following launches of missiles for a guaranteed back strike at targets of
potential aggressors.
2. Increase of probability to hit the most important objects and economical regions at a territory of potential
enemy protected by fortification means, as well as by upgraded CMD system in conditions of both back or
preventive strike.
3. Increase of a stay of missile complexes in an autonomous mode both in the menacing time and after
non-destructive strike.
4. Reduction of time required to put the MC on duty, as well as reduction of time for performing any service
operations at simultaneous reduction of attending personnel for all service phases.
5. Increase of the guaranteed service life and inter-maintenance period.
These principles formed the basis of technical proposals for elaboration of three strategic stationary MC with
silo-based missiles and high grade of protection against NE factors:
- R-36M MC with a liquid missile equipped with the SWH having 10 WHU or monoblock PU with charges of
considerably higher power than SWH WHU (2 versions);
- MR-UR100 MC with a liquid missile equipped with the SWH having 4 WHU unified with WHU of R-36M MC
and monoblock PU with more powerful charge than SWH WHU;
- RT-23 MC with a solid propellant missile equipped with 10 WHU
The first two complexes were planned to replace existing complexes
with heavy missile 8K67 and light missile 8K84. The third complex could be created depending on readiness
of production of solid propellant mixture, large-scale blocks from them, shells and nozzle assembly of SRM
from polymer composite material.
The specificity of combat tasks, conditions of combat application of the ICBM and their mass-scale
deployment required to update such characteristics as:
- effectiveness of warhead payloads;
- firing accuracy and battle readiness;
- protection of launch devices;
- service properties;
- reliability and guaranteed service life
The technical proposals on modernization of liquid MC were submitted by Yuzhnoye SDO in 1968. The
improved in 1969 proposals were based on following main principles realized in subsequent designs:
- elaboration of autonomous CS on the basis of digital computer, and a complex of command instruments of
higher accuracy;
- creation of a multi-unit split-up warhead with individual targeting of WHU;
- elaboration of a complex of counter-missile defense penetration aids, including fault warheads
operationable both outside and inside the atmosphere;
- full ampoulization (encapsulation) of the missile's propellant systems;
- constant service of the missile inside the transport-launch container, arrangement of all technological
equipment and instrumentation necessary for the duty and launch on the TLP;

52. - mortar type launch of the missile out of the TLP installed in the SL;
- startup of the 1st stage engines in weightlessness environment after ejection out of the TLC;
- principally novel scheme of the missile mounting in the SL - suspending inside the damping system
secured in the upper part of the silo;
- unification of the LD and CC structural elements.
The most principal moment in selection of the MC development way was decision on elaboration of the
missile's CS on the basis of an onboard digital computer that in combination with the ground digital
instrumentation installed on the TLC is a central control unit solving all mathematical and logical tasks with
high accuracy, reliability and speed. Application of the ODC allowed provision of:
- solution of the full navigational task and reduction of methodical errors of the CS;
- possibility to increase the firing accuracy through determination and account of systematic instrumental
errors;
- timely remote retargeting of missiles during the duty for any in advance listed objects;
- increase of CMC reliability owing to timely reception of information about the battle readiness of the
missile, systems of TLC and CD, provision of timely exposure and elimination of malfunctions;
- full automatization of a control for all systems of the LD, TLC and missile during duty of the complex and
launch of the missile.
The azimuthal targeting is provided by the fully automatic CS, without utilization of the ground geodetic
network. The targeting system uses an automatic gyrocompass and quantized optical gyrometer, both in the
LD. It provides preliminary determination of the azimuth's basic direction at beginning of the duty and its
keeping in the course of the duty, including conditions of the nuclear attack against the launch area, as well
as restoration of the azimuth's basic direction after attack.
The proposals were considered by the Defense Council in August 1969. Their great promise and validity
were a foundation for a decision to charge the Yuzhnoye SDO with modernization of both complexes
designated as R-36M and MR-UR100 with missiles 15A14 and 15A15, respectively.
The conceptual design of 15A14 missile was elaborated in December 1969.
The 15A15 missile, conceptual design of which was elaborated in September 1970, was designed and
developed under maximum utilization of technical solutions proven already for the 15A14 missile. The high
degree of succession promoted an acceleration of 15A15 development. The flight tests of both missiles
began practically simultaneously.
FOURTH GENERATION
Rocket complexes of the fourth generation were created as a basis of strategic nuclear forces to support the
military strategic parity for 1990-2000 period and as basic complexes for creation of the counteraction
measures against the propagandized anti-missile defense system (AMDS) with the space-based elements.
Operations of further improvement of the technical performances of liquid-propellant intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBM) and successful completion of the cycles of long research and experimental
development works of solid-propellant ICBM (their performances were not worse than the performances of
the best world samples) were of the same importance in creation of the above complexes.
A basic task was to provide invulnerability in the counteraction to the missiles with very high shooting
accuracy. It has led to creation of new directions in the domestic practice:
- creation of the missiles that can start directly in the conditions of nuclear attack of the area given;
- creation of mobile solid-propellant missiles with such vitality which could be achieved due to their mobility
and indefinite location.
Both directions have been realized in development works of "Yuzhnoye" SDO. The following new decisions
have been realized in practice:
- the control system (CS) with a stable element base and with diagram-algorithmic protection which

53. provides working ability in the nuclear burst conditions;
- a multifunctional cover along all missile length for protection from harmful and destructive effects;
- command devices of continuous operation that provided high combat readiness;
- direct guidance methods which provide calculation of the mission during the flight;
- thermal regulation systems which are needed at continuous CS operation in the launcher.
The following items have been introduced in the solid-propellant missiles of the fourth generation:
- new methods of flight control: a chamber gas "blowing" system, a swinging nozzle and deviations of the
main section;
- probes of the nozzle blocks which are foldable in the initial position;
- new types of propellants with unique power and operational performances and with optimum forms of
charges on their basis;
- optimum designs of cruise solid-propellant rocket engines (SPRE): bodies of a "cocoon" type, central
nozzles which are partially submerged;
- new structural thermal protective and erosion-resistant materials.
Application of the above complexes was a basis for negotiations and achievement of a new agreement for
real reduction of the strategic offensive armament (SOA).
At present, "Yuzhnoye" SDO provides guarantee maintenance of the above complexes independently of
their location and state belonging.
UNFINISHED DEVELOPMENTS
Some Yuzhnoye SDO project proposals and developments of strategic weapon were not embodied in the
samples adopted for service by the USSR Strategic Rocket Forces, Navy, and Air Forces. The reasons and
phases in which the developments were terminated were different.
As mentioned above, the technical proposals on R-22 and R-24 liquid propellant medium range missiles and
R-46 heavy ICBM were not accepted. With the purpose of acceleration of development of R-14 and B-16
missiles, is the phase of Preliminary Design, the work on R-15 missile of D-3 system and R-21 missile of D-4
system for equipping the submarine of 639 project was terminated and the design documentation was
transferred to SKB-385.
Because of inexpediency, the development of military version of R-56 rocket was terminated after the issue
of Preliminary Design.
The further development of R-37 light class rocket in the PD phase and R-26 light class rocket before flight
testing was stopped as the decision was made to create UR-100 and R-36 rocket complexes.
Because of insufficient, by GURVO assessment, combat effectiveness, after the PD issue and mock-up
manufacture, the work on small-size one-stage ICBM R-38[8K610] was terminated.
The solid-propellant rockets developments encountered big difficulties. In the period since 1966 till 1973,
many times, due to insufficient effectiveness of combat equipment and high cost of the rocket complexes,
the PD of RT-21 [15Zh41] with three basing options and of RT-22 [15Zh43] with railway and silo types of
launch were rejected. Temporary failures during the flight tests were the reason for termination of series
production and all the work on RT-20P rocket complex with 8KE9 rocket. All the working documentation,
design, methodological, and report materials were transferred to Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering
that was developing at that time "Temp-2C" rocket [15Zh42] according to analogous technical
requirements.
Many times the requirements to RT-23 [15Zh44 and 15Zh52] rocket complex were changed, these rockets
were never adopted for service despite the positive results of complete cycle of test development and flight
tests. The last unfinished developments of combat rocket complexes of Yuzhnoye SDO were "Krechet",
"Kopye-R", and RT-2PM2.
In 1991 the initial concepts were developed for the rocket complexes of fifth generation R-36M3 (Ikar) and

54. RT-23M (Ermak), but the talks on START-2 and the break down of the USSR stopped their further
development.
Launch Vehicles
COSMOS LAUNCH VEHICLE
Launch of the first artificial Earth satellite October 4, 1957 marked a new space era in the human progress.
It boosted the interest in launching the spacecraft worldwide and in Soviet Union alike. The only available
Soviet rocket R-7 at that time (two-stage version dubbed Sputnik and three-stage version dubbed Vostok)
was quite sophisticated and expensive. Developing another simpler, lighter and cheaper launcher became
the question of the day.
Yuzhnoye DO suggested transforming the already proven missile into a launcher. The suggestion was
supported by industry's decision-makers.
Cosmos LV was the first Yuzhnoye launcher developed on the basis of single-stage missile R-12, adding
additional stage. It is light class launcher to place up to 450 kg payloads into LEOs. Second stage fuel and
dry compartments are similar in structure to those of Stage 1. Tubular interstage truss was used to join
stages. Stages were separated in “hot state” (second stage separates from interstage truss at the same
time when first-stage braking solid-fuel rocket engine starts simultaneously with second-stage main liquid
propellant engine). Spacecraft was located atop second stage under the fairing, jettisoned after the re-
entry. Second stage was fueled with UDMH and liquid oxygen.
On March 16, 1962 Cosmos LV successfully delivered first Yuzhnoye-developed satellite DS-2 (Cosmos-1)
into low Earth orbit. Until June 18, 1977 Cosmos LV was operated in Kapustin Yar and Plesetsk launch sites.
Out of total of 165 launches 143 launches were successful.
COSMOS-2 LAUNCH VEHICLES
Increasing demand for regular orbiting of various-purpose satellites prompted the development of the new
launcher. It was either economically unsound or having no sufficient payload capability to use the available
performances of R-7 launcher (Sputnik, Vostok, Voskhod) or light class Cosmos launcher.
Missile R-14 was transformed into launcher, partially modifying its first stage and developing second stage
from scratch. Both stages were fueled with the same self-inflammable fuel components: UDMH and nitric
acid. For the first time in Soviet Union , second stage propulsion system featured double burn of the main
engine, resulting in lifting spacecraft onto high near-Earth orbits.
Specific quality of the launcher was that second-stage engine had three modes of operation.
1 – basic mode. This mode featured double-burn of engine in flight.
2 – mode of tail rudders operation. Used to stabilize the rocket before, in the process and after the engine
burn in mode 1.
3 – low thrust mode. Used to orient the rocket and to slightly accelerate it, ensuring engine's second burn in
basic mode.
Cosmos-2 launch-vehicle allowed launching of multiple satellites weighing total of 1500 kg at one time.
Busy with development of R-36 and R-56, Yuzhnoye DO had to shift the completion of Cosmos-2
development onto OKB-10 (Krasnoyarsk).
Starting from 1970, PO Polyot (Omsk) has been manufacturing these launch vehicles, though the latest
modification of the rocket is referred to as Cosmos-3M.
Maiden flight of Cosmos-2 was August 18, 1964. This was the only launcher in the USSR to be operated
from three launch sites: Baikonur, Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar. These days Cosmos-3M rocket is launched
from Plesetsk and Kapustin Yar. In 2008 more than 700 rockets were launched, orbiting more than 1000
spacecraft, achieving the best result of all USSR-developed launch vehicles.