Anna Kvinge, Political Science - summa cum laude

A n n a K v i n g e | 1
Norway’s Internationalism: Third Party Participation,
Advocacy, and the Role of Advanced Small Markets in the
World Trade Organization.
by Anna Kvinge
I. Introduction
Third party participation is not a new concept under the World Trade Organization
(WTO). It was already established and used under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
However, under the WTO, the practice of third party participation, which is when a WTO
Member1
is neither the complainant nor the defendant in a case but presents its views and
arguments in favor of one of the disputing parties, has been questioned. The concerns are about
whether or not it is beneficial for members to participate as third parties or if it helps the party
who initiated the dispute. Certain Members such as the United States or the European Union,
have participated as a third party in over 130 cases, while other countries, such as the Republic
of Korea, China, Canada and India among others, have participated in over 100 cases as a third
party. Given that some scholars state that third party participation does not necessarily help the
case when it is brought up to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB),2
it begs the question of why
there are still so many Members exercising their third-party rights when a case proceeds into the
panel hearing within the WTO Dispute Settlement process. Therefore, in what follows I
1
On both the official World Trade Organization and in the majority of the documents written by the World Trade
Organization, Members and scholars, the word “member(s)” is written with capital m, which is why I will also be
writing member(s) with a capital m. I will follow their lead and capitalize Member(s) throughout this paper.
2
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric."Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." In Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the US, and the WTO.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "With a Little Help From Our Friends? Developing Country Complaints and Third
Party Participation." In Chantal Thomas and Joel P. Trachtman (eds.), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal
System. New York: Oxford, 2009 pg. 21, 23

ask:“Why do Members choose to be a third party to some cases and not others?” and “How do
Members decide in which disputes to be part of?”
The DSB hears cases on a range of issues from cereals to renewable energy. I will be
focusing my research on anti-dumping and dumping calculations. Since the World Trade
Organization was established in 1995, eighteen cases have been brought to the WTO Dispute
Settlement that focus on the zeroing methodology used in calculating the dumping rates with
regards to foreign export goods. Dumping is when a company exports a product at a lower price
than the same product costs in its own home market. Zeroing is a calculation device used to
establish the anti-dumping duty that a country has to pay, a method that increases (often
substantially) the margin of dumping of the exporter, and thus increases the amount of anti-
dumping duty that the exporter has to pay.3
Governments take action in order to protect the
country’s own domestic industry from the “dumping” of a product. The imports, which are
priced lower abroad than they are in the home market of the product, are then taken into account
and calculated under the zeroing formula.4
Given that every country has a right to impose anti-
dumping duties on products from foreign markets that enter the domestic market at a lower price
than valued on the foreign market, there has been a lot of controversy and discussion regarding
the fairness of zeroing as a method of calculating.
Out of the eighteen cases that were brought up to the WTO Dispute Settlement with
regards to zeroing, sixteen cases have been filed against the United States in the span of fourteen
years,5
whereas the other two cases were against the European Communities (EC).6
In the cases
3
“What is Zeroing?” Pg. 1
4
I will be explaining the zeroing formula in Part III when addressing the zeroing cases.
5
The first case was brought up in 1999 and the latest case began in 2013.
6
The first case was brought up in 1998 and the second in 2000.

against the United States, there have been twenty-three Members who have participated in these
cases as third party.7
For the cases brought against the United States, Norway has participated as a third party
in six of these sixteen cases, a high number for such a small Member state. This number is
almost on the same high level to countries such as India, Brazil and Mexico, all of which are
significantly larger countries.8
Further, Norway’s overall participation as a third party in the DSB
is extremely frequent; as of April 2016 the country has been a third party in a total of seventy
two cases. This significant number is similar to that of Turkey, Mexico, Australia, or Thailand,
and exceeds other countries that are bigger than Norway, such as Argentina and Chile.
Therefore, I focus on Norway, an advanced small market nation, as a case study in order to
examine why smaller Members of the WTO continue to join cases as third parties and to discern
how they chose cases to (not) support. Within this paper I use the term “advanced small markets”
to describe developed countries that have strong but small economies. I focus on Norway’s
participation as a third party in four of the sixteen cases against the United States, and I also
consider one case in which Norway did not participate as third party. I then use the oral
statements and the written submissions Norway submitted as a third party in these cases, together
with Norway’s Trade Policy Reviews (1996-2012) to answer my research questions.
FIGURE 1: Cases Under Consideration:
Complainant Case topic Norway as 3rd party
DS294 European Communities Zeroing (general - 21cases, most products steel) Yes
DS322 Japan Zeroing (general + Sunset Review) Yes
DS350 European Communities Continued Zeroing Yes
DS404 Viet Nam Shrimp No
DS429 Viet Nam Shrimp II Yes
7
It is twenty-three Members because I am counting the European Communities and the European Union as one
Member.
8
India has been a third party in 116 cases, Brazil in 99 cases and Mexico in 75 cases, as of 30 April 2016.
“DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE DISPUTE Disputes by country/territory.”

In addition to reviewing documents Norway submitted as a third party in disputes and
Norway’s Trade Policy Reviews, I conducted an interview with two lawyers, Linn Edvartsen and
Camilla Høvding Blom, from the department on the European Economic Area (EEA)- and trade
law in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2015. The lawyers stated that
Norway has participated as a third party in so many disputes at the DSB because that is the only
way other WTO Members have access to the documents of the disputes. Therefore, Norway’s
participation as a third party is only to get access to the dispute documents – in order to stay on
top of international trade. I, however, argue that advanced small market choose to participate as a
third party for a variety of reasons. These reasons include: a) they have a strong (trade/economic)
connection to the complainant of the case; b) the case topic is generally broad and therefore is
applicable to various Members and other cases; c) the third party Member is using the DSU to
advocate for greater support and involvement of smaller, perhaps developing, countries in the
process and procedures of the WTO; or d) push for legal precedent to be followed by all WTO
Members in international trade. The two final reasons – suggests countries like Norway may be
acting out of a kind of benevolent internationalism – contradicts assumptions about the
fundamentally selfish economic motivations behind WTO Member actions. By using Norway as
a case study, we can better understand the decisions taken by advanced small markets to
participate as third parties in disputes at the DSU. A close analysis of Norway as a third party
participant in the Zeroing cases against the United States provides us with further information on
how an advanced small market Member expands on the use of the WTO Dispute Settlement.
I argue further that by choosing to participate in dispute cases as a third party Norway’s
government is not being manipulated by industries in Norway or domestic politics. Rather, the

small group of people working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in the department of the
European Economic Area (EEA)- and trade law are, through Norway’s participation as third
party in dispute cases at the WTO, working toward a vision of a more equitable world. This
small group of people is acting as internationalists, which I define as a group of people working
in their own legal capacity with little or no EEA-influence of domestic politics, with a goal of
promoting greater cooperation among nations and peoples. These internationalists do this in
order to improve the process of the World Trade Organization and to defend the place of the
smaller (and weaker/less developed) nations in the WTO and the Dispute Settlement process. In
addition, I argue that the internationalists of Norway focus on the legal precedent made in the
cases brought to the Dispute Settlement, where they argue for every country to be held
responsible by the WTO to the precedent set by Panels and the Appellate Body of the World
Trade Organization, so that all countries are in line with international rules.
II. Roadmap
In order to examine third party participation by advanced small markets in the World
Trade Organization, I begin this paper by providing a historical background on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) before moving on to the historical background of the
World Trade Organization. Together with the general background on the creation of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade I will explain the Dispute Settlement Procedure and third party
participation under GATT, as well as explain Norway’s role in the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. During the background on the World Trade Organization I will also explore the role
of third party participation in the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, before I will tackle
Norway’s overall participation in the World Trade Organization.

In section IV I provide information on anti-dumping and the zeroing methodology, before
I move on to section V where I explain my research methods and how I chose Norway as my
special case for this paper. After that, I move into my case study – Norway, where I examine
four arguments of the paper for why advanced small markets participate as third parties in the
Dispute Settlement, before I conclude the paper in section VII.
III. Historical background
i. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The focus of my paper, third party participation in the World Trade Organization was
born in the precursor to the WTO, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), a multilateral trading system, was one of three
established international institutions after the end of World War II. These institutions were
established at the Bretton Woods monetary conference held in New Hampshire in July 1944.
Together with the establishment of GATT, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (currently the World Bank) were
established.9
GATT was the outcome of failed negotiations under the United Nations Conference
on Trade and Employment for the creation of the International Trade Organization (ITO),10
which extended beyond trade disciplines to include “rules on employment, commodity
agreements, restrictive business practices, international investment, and services”.11
GATT was
envisioned to be neither a treaty nor an organization, rather a mere trade agreement put into place
by executive order, which meant that the participants of GATT were not members but
9
Irwin, Douglas A., Petros C. Mavroidis, and A. O. Sykes. The Genesis of the GATT. American Law Institute
Reporters' Studies on WTO Law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. Pg. 65
10
From GATT to the WTO and Beyond Research Guide: History and Basic Information.
11
GATT: ‘provisional’ for almost half a century.

contracting parties.12
Therefore GATT had a “de facto” status as an international organization
before the creation of the World Trade Organization, because the nations of the original
signatory expected that the agreement signed would eventually become part of the permanent
ITO Charter.13
The General Agreement was signed on October 30th
1947 by twenty-three nations
in Geneva at the Palais des Nations,14
and began full operation from Geneva in 1948.15
The
founding parties to GATT were members of the Preparatory Committee which was created to
draft the charter of the International Trade Organization by the United Nations Economic and
Social Council in 1946, where a delegation of fifty-six nations met in Havana, Cuba for the UN
Conference on Trade and Employment in 1947 to look over and sign the final draft of the ITO as
a whole.16
Fifty-three of those nations signed the Final Act in March 1948 authenticating the text
of the Havana Charter, but without any commitment from governments to ratification of the text,
the ITO is believed to have been stillborn.17
All of the negotiations for lowering tariffs in trade between nations during the GATT
years were conducted during what is known as rounds of multilateral trade negotiations (MTNs),
of which there were eight completed rounds.18
The first round of multilateral trade negotiations
began before the signing of the General Agreement, but finished in Geneva during the signing of
GATT along with 123 agreements which covered 45 000 tariff items “related to about one-half
of the value of world trade.”19
The basic legal principles of GATT remained much the same for
almost half a century, where continuous efforts to reduce tariffs continued through the trade
12
Irwin, Douglas A.,. Pg. 145
13
From GATT to the WTO and Beyond Research Guide: History and Basic Information.
14
The 23 founding members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern
Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United Kingdom and the United States.
15
WTO/GATT –Chronology of Achievements
16
17
18
From GATT to the WTO and Beyond Research Guide: History and Basic Agreement.
19
Irwin, Douglas A., Pg. 141

rounds, all of which have lasted from five months (Annecy and Geneva II rounds), to the
Uruguay round which lasted eighty-seven months. This round was not only the longest, but also
the final round of GATT.20
Up until the Kennedy Round which was signed by fifty participating
countries accounting for seventy-five per cent of world trade, the negotiation rounds focused
mostly on lowering tariffs.21
However, the Kennedy Round brought an Anti-Dumping
Agreement (ADA) to the table along with a section on development. From there on, the
negotiations began to move away from general tariffs and focus on tackling major trade barriers
in order to improve the system, such as cuts in customs duties.22
The eight round, which lasted
from 1986 to 1994 was the most extensive of the multilateral trade negotiation rounds and led to
the establishment of the World Trade Organization and with it a new set of agreements.23
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 was the new and updated version of GATT 1947
and implemented substantial changes which were negotiated during the Uruguay Round and are
still an integral part of the WTO.24
ii. GATT: Dispute Settlement Procedure
With the main focus of GATT concentrated on lowering the tariffs, there was little
attempt to develop a serious and effective system of mechanism that would monitor the
obligations that the nations signed onto. There was an early draft of dispute settlement
procedures that was incorporated in GATT, but it neither had teeth nor was it seen as a force to
20
21
22
23
The Uruguay Round which led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization is an extensive negotiation
round which took several years. Given that the concentration of my paper is not on the transition from GATT into
the WTO and that it would take an extensive amount in my paper to describe the details of the transition, I refer
anyone interested in this topic to:
Reshaping the World Trading System: A History of the Uruguay Round by John Croome (1999) Second and Revised
Edition.
24

be reckoned with since GATT was considered by the parties to the agreement to be self-
enforcing.25
The goal of the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) contained two types of
disputes. The first type was to settle claims made by one party of GATT assessing that another
party had violated the provisions of the General Agreement, while the second type of dispute was
an objection produced by one party to the practices of another party, practices that are not
prohibited by the GATT, but practices that still have adverse effects on the objecting party.26
The GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure is believed to have been successful during the
first decade of GATT’s existence, after which the effectiveness of the DSP began its decline. As
a result of the growing membership over a period of time and the rapid expansion of the world
economy, the system became overwhelmed and then fell into disrepute and disuse.27
The DSP
was already seen by its members as weak or lacking force. After the initial peak of the DSP the
system was barely used, and was implemented approximately once a year, with the majority of
the complaints brought by the United States.28
However, nations still used the system and over
two-hundred cases were initiated under the GATT Dispute Settlement Procedure over the entire
course of GATTs career.29
As with other parts of GATT, the DSP was expanded throughout the
negotiation rounds. However, it was not until the Tokyo Round which began in 1973 and
finished in 1979 that the type of issues considered by the dispute settlement panels was
significantly expanded.30
What was lacking even after these changes were made was a rule-
oriented approach (‘legalistic approach’) to the disputes processed under GATT which would put
25
DeKieffer, Donald E. "GATT Dispute Settlements: A New Beginning in International and U.S. Trade Law."
Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 2, no. 2 (1980): 317-33. Pg. 317
26
Davey, William J. "Dispute Settlement in GATT." Fordham International Law Journal 11, no. 1 (1987): 51-109. Pg.
67
27
Davey, William J. Pg. 62
28
29
Kovenock, Dan, and Marie Thursby. "GATT, DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND COOPERATION*." Economics & Politics 4,
no. 2 (1992): 151-70. Pg. 1
30
DeKieffer, Donald E. pg. 318

more pressure on the dispute settlement and GATT itself.31
Other problems that still existed after
the Tokyo Round included the possibility of one party blocking the adaptation of the dispute
settlement panel’s decision, the inefficiency of the system because of the long delays, and the
inability to ensure the implementation of the DSP’s decision together with the lack of retaliatory
measures for non-compliance with the decisions.32 33
The Tokyo Round only partially improved
the DSP.
iii. GATT: Third Party Participation
Among the several rounds of negotiations for the improvement of the DSP, third party
rights were also included. These provisions for the practice of third party participation were
made during the Uruguay Round.34
The opportunity to be heard before the panel as well as to
make a written submission with regards to a case was presented after the Uruguay Round.35
If a
Member has substantial interest in the matter it would notify the Council of the substantial
interest in order to participate as a third party.36
Nonetheless, third parties did matter before this
negotiating round even if it was less clearly stated. Before GATT’s dispute settlement system
became more judicialized in October 1952, there was a system of “working parties,” an informal
system which came together to examine particular disputes over the interpretation of GATT.37
During this informal time, there would be one or two countries supporting each side and a couple
of neutral countries.38
In this informal time third parties “played an important role in helping to
31
Davey, William J. Pg.53, 78
32
Davey, William J. Pg.65
33
Castel, Jg. "THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GATT DISPUTE SETTLEMENT RULES AND
PROCEDURES." International And Comparative Law Quarterly 38 (1989): 834-49. Pg. 836, 841
34
Castel, Jg. Pg. 846
35
Castel, Jg. Pg. 846
36
Castel, Jg. Pg. 846
37
Carmody, Chi. "Of Substantial Interest: Third Parties under GATT." Michigan Journal of International Law 18, no.
4 (1997): 615-657. Pg. 625
38
Carmody, Chi. Pg. 624

generate a consensus that became the basis for many decisions.”39
The change from working
parties to panel proceedings under the dispute settlement changed the role of third parties. Third
parties came to have a separate status and distinct interests at stake instead of being presumptive
equals who came up with suggestions for the collective good.40
Further, after the more
institutional establishment of the dispute settlement came the hierarchy of the system with
regards to the interest of a nation to a case, ranging from ‘interest’ to ‘substantial interest’ and in
some cases going to ‘principal supplying interest’. After the Tokyo Round, ‘substantial interest’
not only assumed formal importance which it still holds today under the WTO, but third parties
no longer had any right to intervene in pre-hearing consultations.41
In addition, access to
settlement information and the entitlement to receive the submissions of the litigant before the
hearing became restricted.42
Even thought ‘substantial interest’ holds merit during today’s
participation of third parties under the WTO, under GATT the meaning was not always
considered a necessary condition while at other times it lost all qualification.43
iv. GATT: The Kingdom of Norway
Norway was among the twenty-three countries to sign the General Agreement in Geneva
in 1947, and was present during the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization.44
It
has been said that the dispute settlement system was widely tested by a variety of nations under
GATT, even though the United States along with the European Communities and Canada has
made the most extensive use of the system.45
From the research I’ve conducted it is unclear
whether or not Norway has been a third party to any of the cases brought under the DSP. Still,
39
40
41
42
43
Carmody, Chi. Pg. 630-31
44
“United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment.”
45
“Davey, William J. Pg. 82-83

because Norway was among the nations that was a respondent under the GATT Dispute
Settlement Procedure,46
it is likely that Norway has also been a participant in the DSP. Since
Norway was a respondent in cases under the DSP we see that the country was already a strong
user of the Dispute Settlement Procedure, even then.
v. The World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization was established on January 1st in 1995 through the
negotiations of the Uruguay Round.47
A particularly strong focus has been on whether the
change from GATT to the WTO has been successful and whether or not the change has produced
more successful outcomes to all countries in trade agreements. Mike Moore, former Director-
General of the World Trade Organization, wrote the book, “A World Without Walls: Freedom,
Development, Free Trade and Global Governance” in order to evaluate the changes that the
WTO provided, coming from GATT. 48
He emphasizes how these changes created better
confidence in the system through the various improvements, and how the system has been an
upgrade from GATT. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade started off in 1947 with twenty-
three countries and has now expanded to one hundred and sixty two members in November 2015
in the WTO.49
Moore writes that the most crucial aspect to this international organization is that
the membership is not imposed on the countries.50
Instead the nations choose to belong to this
organization.51
Having played a significant role in the WTO by having been the Director-General
for three years, he had seen first-hand that it has been in the interest of almost every country in
46
47
The Uruguay Round negotiations lasted from 1986 until 1994.
48
Moore is a former Prime Minister of New Zealand, who served as the Director-General of the World Trade
Organization from 1999 until 2002.
49
“WTO | Understanding the WTO - Members,”
50
Moore, Mike. A World Without Walls: Freedom, Development, Free Trade and Global Governance (Cambridge,
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Pg. 103
51
Moore, Mike Pg. 103

the world to participate “in an open, rules-based multilateral trading system” because otherwise
the countries face an uncertain and less prosperous participation in the world economy.52
Not
only has the membership of the WTO widened, but also the focus of the system’s body of rules
has deepened to not only focus on trading in goods, but also services, intellectual property,
subsidies, textiles and agriculture. The expansion with regards to industrial goods, services and
agriculture occurred during the November 2001 Doha Agenda.53 54
Moore believes that the WTO is unique in the international sphere of trade and
negotiations because it is “the binding nature of its disputes mechanism.”55
One of the two
fundamental concepts of the WTO that connect to the dispute settlement within the organization
is the principle of non-discrimination, which ensures in theory that all members of the WTO are
treated equally no matter who they are, or how strong or small they are. Still, because there are
often no significant consequences for the discrimination, we cannot be certain that there is
none.56
Under the non-discrimination principle there are two rules that are at the core of the
WTO, the ‘most favoured nation’, “which prevents WTO Members from treating products from
one WTO Member better than those from another” and the ‘National Treatment’ rule, “which
obliges governments to treat like goods from foreign and domestic sources equally.”57
Mike Moore states that it is good for nations to bring new cases to the Dispute
Settlement, because, according to him, one of the major flaws of the WTO is that in order to
52
Moore, Mike Pg. 103
53
Moore, Mike Pg. 103
54
The Doha Development Round or Doha Development Agenda (DDA) is the latest trade negotiation among the
WTO members which officially launched in November, 2001 in order to reform the system through lower trade
barriers and revised trade rules, which covers twenty areas of trade. Part of the objective is to improve the system
of trading for developing countries, however through many meeting in various parts of the world the negotiations
broke down in 2008 and as of 2014 the future of this agenda is uncertain.
“WTO | The Doha Round,” World Trade Organization,
55
Moore, Mike. Pg. 101
56
The second concept being the “Consensus decision-making.”
57

create new rules or to clarify existing ones the WTO system relies on a new major negotiation
round. 58
This system makes it difficult to change something within the Dispute System without
Members pushing for new negotiation rounds, which take years and are not always successful.
Even though only a small fraction of all world trade is affected by disputes, Moore points out
that when the system is utilized, the rules are enforced by both big and small Members, which
builds not only the credibility of the WTO, but also the prosperity of each of the countries.
Therefore with the development and move from GATT to the WTO, there was also an extensive
improvement in the Dispute Settlement of the organization. It has been stated by scholars that the
“GATT dispute settlement lacked not only ‘teeth,’ but also a consistent set of rules more
generally,” which explains to us why there was a need for a change as well as why so many
governments and scholars are overjoyed over the new system, even though it may have its own
flaws.59
According to Busch and Reinhardt the greater clarity of law, together with a stricter
timeline, the right to a panel, automatic adoptions of reports and the review by a permanently-
constituted Appellate Body are the improvements of the Dispute Settlement that need to be
praised.60
vi. WTO: Dispute Settlement Body
During GATT and before the 1995 change into the WTO, disputes between nations were
not settled in a manner that explicitly stated strength or created credibility. The panels which met
to examine the complaints from Member states published a report that was not binding, and
therefore did not hold anyone accountable.61
Likewise, the rulings were inconsistent
58
Moore, Mike Pg. 106
59
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric."Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." In Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A. Pollack (eds.), Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the US, and the WTO.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Pg. 466
60
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric."Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." Pg. 467
61

throughout.62
Scholars have stated that “it is not possible to approach dispute settlement in the
WTO in the same way that it was approached under the GATT,” because of its new and
fundamentally different system for the settlement of international trade disputes.63
Other scholars
say that the best kept secret in the WTO is that the dispute settlement still works as it did under
GATT where the bedrock of the system are the consultations.64
Currently the ruling of the WTO
panel is binding in that unless both parties come to an agreement, the WTO allows for
retaliations for violations of WTO rules against politically sensitive industries and regions.65
This
is described as a more ‘legalized’ system of the dispute settlement under the WTO whereas the
old system under GATT could only be described as a more ‘political’ system.66
The permanent
Appellate Body holds not only compulsory jurisdiction, but has additional enforcement
jurisdiction for its cases.67
However, research conducted by the International Centre for Trade
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) has shown that retaliation options available are more
focused on re-balancing the level of concessions and not as much on inducing compliance with
Member obligations. The opportunities to find a significant retaliatory target which will not
affect the domestic economy are extremely slim for economies with a more narrow trading
profile of a country.68
In “Dispute Settlement in the WTO: the developing country experience,”
the authors state right away that the system does not have adequate opportunity or incentive for
62
63
Shaffer, Gregory and Melende-Ortiz, Ricardo. Dispute Settlement at the WTO: The Developing Country
Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2010) Pg. 344
64
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "Fixing What Ain't Broke? Third Party Rights, Consultations, and the DSU." In
Kim Van der Borght and Dencho Georgiev, (eds.), WTO Dispute Settlement Reform. London: Cameron May, 2006.
Pg. 9
65
Alter, Karen J. The New Terrain of International Law : Courts, Politics, Rights. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2014. Pg 21
66
Experience Pg. 342
67
Alter, Karen J. The New Terrain of International Law : Courts, Politics, Rights. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 2014. Pg.169
68
Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2010) Pg. xii

the disputing parties “to agree to meaningful compensation,” where the only economies who
have a position to impose ‘effective’ retaliation are those of larger economies.69
The new system under the WTO Dispute Settlement however is constructed through three
main procedures, namely consultation, formal litigation, and implementation. These proceedings
are part of a stronger push for adopting the outcomes of the Dispute Settlement.70 71
Even though
we cannot say with complete certainty that the new system is one hundred percent binding,
through the automatic adoption of the reports by the panel, there is more pressure on the
countries to adopt the decision made.72
A request for consultation is the first step in the Dispute Settlement which is brought by
the complainant, the Member government bringing the case to the Dispute Settlement against the
defendant. The complainant claims the defendant has failed to live up to their trade obligations.
The next sixty days are set aside for consultation and negations between the two sides, with the
goal in mind of finding a mutually satisfactory solution for both parties. In the 2004 publication,
Busch and Reinhardt write that forty-six percent of the disputes end at the consultation stage and
that three-quarters of them end up with partial concessions from the defendant.73
For the rest of
the cases, the complainant has the ability to request a panel proceeding, which is an independent
panel, consistent of three to five people who have a strong background in trade law and are all
agreed to by the member states on a case-by-case basis.74
69
Dispute settlement at the WTO: the developing country experience” Gregory C. Shaffer and Ricardo Melendez-
Ortiz pg. xii
70
The consultation stage consists of ‘consolations,’ the formal litigation state consists of ‘panel proceedings’ and
the ‘appellate body,’ and the Implementation stage consists of a ‘compliance panel’ and an ‘arbitration panel.’
71
Busch and Reinhardt, “The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing Countries.” Pg. 1
72
Petersmann and Pollack, Transatlantic Economic Disputes. Pg.467-468
73
74
Busch and Reinhardt, “The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing Countries.” Pg.2

This second step in the dispute settlement is said by Moore to be one of the ways in
which the WTO has progressed. The independent panel usually listens to two rounds of
testimony, which can and in most of the cases includes third parties. For each dispute that
requires an independent panel a different panel is composed ad hoc, because there are no
permanent panels or panelists in the WTO.75
Further, the panel produces an “interim report” of
the case which includes all of the information on the case together with the conclusion,
recommendations and suggestions for implementations made by the panel. At this point, both
parties to the dispute can negotiate a settlement, where thirteen percent of the cases do.76
However, if they choose not to, the panel issues a final report which is adopted by the World
Trade Organization unless both sides agree not to adopt the report, (something that has yet to
happen) or one of the sides decides to appeal the report. The appeal of the final report of the
interdependent panel is a frequent occurrence and happens in seventy-three percent of the cases,
where the case is then transferred to the Appellate Body. According to Moore, this is the second
important new aspect to the Dispute Settlement change from GATT to WTO. 77
The Appellate Body is a standing body of jurists, “designed to ensure greater consistency
across its rulings” and has to hear testimonies from both parties as well as any third parties
interested in participating.78
The decision of the Appellate Body is final, and they can either
uphold or overturn the independent panel in whole or in part. The case usually ends if the verdict
favors the defendant, while if the verdict favors the complainant, the dispute will proceed to the
75
“DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE: Chapter 6 The process — Stages in a typical WTO dispute
settlement case,” World Trade Organization, accessed January 28, 2016,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s3p2_e.htm
76
77
78

implementation stage.79
If the defendant has not taken measures to comply with the obligations
put in place by the Appellate Body, there is a possibility for the complainant to request a
“compliance” panel which would make certain that all of the obligations are met and then also
request an “arbitration” panel if there is a need for retaliation by the complainant against the
defendant. However, two-thirds of the disputes brought to the Dispute Settlement “are resolved
to the full satisfaction of the complainant.”80
For some countries, the DSB has been extremely effective, while for others it has been
fairly insignificant in terms of gaining power. There has been an unusual interest in considering
how the Dispute Settlement affects specific nations.81
With this in mind there has been an
interest in looking into disputes between specific nations to determine the effectiveness and, in
some cases, lack of importance of the DSB for various countries.
In their paper, “Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement”,
published in 2003, Busch and Reinhardt argue that the superior record of resolving the United
States-European Communities disputes since 1995 to 2002 should not be attributed to the dispute
settlement reforms, but rather to the “expansion of the WTO’s scope in new areas, notably
intellectual property (IP) and traded services.” 82 83
They argue that in high stakes cases with big
nation players like the United States and the European Union, the WTO has not improved in
term of resolving transatlantic disputes than the predecessor, GATT. In this paper, Busch and
Reinhardt argue that there is even more focus on early settlement in the Dispute Settlement under
79
The members of the Appellate Body need to have an extensive expertise in international trade, law and the
subject-matter of the agreements covered, as well as not to be affiliated with any government. Even though
nationalities of the members are heavy weighted on certain countries such as the United States and Japan, there is
representation from various parts of the world such as Uruguay, South Africa and Korea among others.
“WTO | Dispute Settlement - Appellate Body Members,”
80
81
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric."Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." Pg. 465-66
82
From now on referred to as US-EC
83

the WTO, which for some cases can come out as problematic because a defendant who is
determined to not be held accountable “can wring at least three years of delays from the system
before facing definitive legal condemnation.”84
This means that those who want and have
sufficient funds have the power to delay the dispute from steadily processing through the three
main stages of the dispute settlement.85
This can often create enough time for the defendant to
change their policy rulings or put in place measures that will weaken or possibly destroy the
entire argument of the complainant. For member states such as the United States or the European
Union, it is easier to use their massive resources in order to wiggle out of a dispute, or rather to
slow the process down in order to change the aspects affected by the dispute. Busch and
Reinhardt do however believe that there are two aspects which are exceptions to this, namely
intellectual protection and traded services, because these areas did not previously exist under
GATT and therefore they expect the WTO dispute settlement to produce clearer decisions under
these areas.86
Under their research of US-EC dispute outcomes between GATT and the WTO,
Busch and Reinhardt found a statistical significance where both the US and EC have made more
concessions under the WTO Dispute Settlement to each other in these areas. This indicates that
the improvement to the dispute settlement has created favorable outcomes, but the outcomes
have not been as large as the system hoped for when it was created.87
In “The Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement” Busch and Reinhardt state that
many observers see favourable results achieved by a greater variety of members, particularly
developing countries under the Dispute Settlement “due to the reforms introduced with the DSU
84
85
86
87

[Dispute Settlement Understanding] and the WTO’s greater clarity of law.”88
The understanding
that the improvements from GATT to the WTO are really significant in the Dispute Settlement
can be understood because of the increased amount of concessions made by the defendant to
some or perhaps all of the demands made by the complainant. According to Busch and Reinhardt
the concession number rose from three-fifths under GATT to four-fifths (of at least partial
concessions) under the World Trade Organization.89
However, the complainants from poor or
developing countries have not received a lot of concessions from the defendants in contrast to the
higher amount of concessions that rich and developed nations have received under the WTO.90
Therefore there is an indication that the improvements from GATT to WTO have only benefitted
a certain part of the Members of the WTO.
vii. WTO: Third Party Participation
Third parties are not specifically defined under the World Trade Organization, nor are
they explicitly defined under international law in general. But in over sixty percent of the
disputes brought under the DSB there is third party involvement.91
Christine Chinkin defines
third parties as “those outside a bilateral relationship, whether formally creates, for example by
treaty or the commencement of proceedings, or occurring through events such as the outbreak of
armed conflict,” where she goes on to further explore that with regards to international
adjudication third parties are “all States other than the applicant or respondent.”92
Nonetheless,
with this definition in mind only WTO Member governments have “direct access to the dispute
settlement system” either as parties or as third parties, where access means that the party has the
88
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "The Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." Pg. 143
89
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "The Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." Pg. 154
90
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "The Evolution of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement." Pg.160-161
91
Johns, Leslie and Pelc, J. Krzysztof. On the strategic Manipulation of Audiences in WTO Dispute Settlement. (23
June 2011) Pg. 5
92
Chinkin, Christine. Third Parties in International Law. (Oxford: Clarendon Press/New York: Oxford University
Press, 1993). Pg. 7-9

ability to participate in a dispute either as the complainant, defendant or third party.93
No non-
governmental actors have the ability to bring disputes to the table at the WTO, neither as private
individuals or companies nor as non-governmental organizations (NGOs).94
However, even with
divergent views on whether or not NGOs should have this opportunity, they are able to file
amicus curiae submissions with the DSB bodies. The panels and the Appellate Body have the
“discretion to accept or reject,” but are under no obligation to consider these submissions.95
Chinkin writes that while third parties to both treaties and international proceedings may
be readily identified, she states that “it may be more complex to identify the parties to a conflict
or dispute.”96
As known from both GATT and the WTO, disputes may not be bilateral in nature,
which complicates the interests of possible third parties where it can range in not only intensity
but also directness.97
The intensity and range of the interest of a third party in a dispute can
create complications for the case itself, which can be considered to be one of the reasons there is
a possible restriction of how a case is filed under the DSB to whether or not third parties are
allowed to join a case. If the complainant invokes (sues under) Article XXII:1 of GATT 1994,
the responsibility admitting any interested third parties is in the hands of the respondent of the
case.98
However, if the complainant chooses to file the dispute under Article XXIII:1 of GATS99
the complainant has the full ability to prevent any legal involvement of a third party under the
93
9.1 Parties and third parties and principle of confidentiality
94
1.4 Participants in the dispute settlement system
95
1.4 Participants in the dispute settlement system
96
Chinkin, Christine. Pg. 15
97
Chinkin, Christine. Pg. 16-18
98
6.2 Consultations
99
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) is a treaty in the WTO that entered into force in 1995 under the
establishment of the WTO.

consultations of the DSB.100
Under Article XXII third party participation is easier and is said to
average three participants per case over an average of less than one half of third party
participants for Article XXIII, which is traditionally used for private consultations and makes it
extremely difficult for third parties to participate.101
Nonetheless, in Busch and Reinhardt’s study
of third party participation in the WTO from 1995 until 2002102
where they observed that third
parties were present in almost every case and only nineteen of the five hundred and seven that
requested to join the consultations were rejected.103
This not only portrays that third party
participation is viewed as critical in the function of the WTO, but that there seems to be little
objection to countries reserving their third party rights.
The third parties are not only allowed to make written submissions to assist the case they
are party to, but also have the opportunity to be heard by the panels when they present their
opinion with regards to the case.104
The written submissions will be reflected in the panel report
as well as provided to both parties in the dispute.105
However, they do not receive the interim
report like the main parties do, even though third party views are presented in both the interim
report and the final report of the panel.106
Busch and Reinhardt wrote that third parties not only
participate in the majority of the WTO dispute settlement cases, but that they also typically
100
6.2 Consultations
101
“On the Strategic Manipulation of Audiences in WTO Dispute Settlement” Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc Pg. 3
102
I understand that the study is old, going only until 2002, which ended fourteen years ago. However, this study
has not been updated yet by neither the authors nor other scholars. Therefore I am using this research, which still
explains certain aspects of third party participation.
103
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "Three's a Crowd: Third Parties and WTO Dispute Settlement." Pg. 446,451
104
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE: CHAPTER 6 The process — Stages in a typical WTO dispute
settlement case
105
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE: CHAPTER 6 The process — Stages in a typical WTO dispute
settlement case
106
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "Fixing What Ain't Broke? Third Party Rights, Consultations, and the DSU." Pg.
3

outnumber both the complainant(s) and the defendant by a substantial margin.107
This shows
that third party participation in the WTO is significant. To become a third party in a WTO
dispute settlement case and have the ability to participate in the panel procedures, a nation
member must have considerable interest in the matter of the dispute. The nation must notify the
Dispute Settlement Body of their substantial interest through the WTO Secretariat within a ten-
day deadline from when the panel was established for the Members to reserve their rights as third
parties in the case.108
For third parties to be part of the consultations under the dispute the Members must have
“substantial trade interest,” which is different from the “substantial interest” that a Member as a
third party must have in order to stand before the panel.109
Third parties who join the main
litigants in consultations under the DSU 4.11 are referred to by Busch and Reinhardt as informal
third parties, where nearly every formal third party began as an informal.110
Unless the
respondent in the dispute case accepts the nation as a third party, it is not possible for that
Member to join the consultations. However, officially the World Trade Organization writes that
“any Member who invokes a systemic interest, in practice, is admitted to a panel procedure as a
third party without any scrutiny whether the interest truly is “substantial”.”111
Then during the
first substantive meeting the third parties receive the complainant and the defendant’s first
107
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "With a Little Help From Our Friends? Developing Country Complaints and
Third Party Participation." In Chantal Thomas and Joel P. Trachtman (eds.), Developing Countries in the WTO Legal
System. New York: Oxford, 2009. Pg 1
108
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM TRAINING MODULE: CHAPTER 6
The process — Stages in a typical WTO dispute settlement case
109
110
Third Party Participation." Pg. 5
111

written submission to the panel and present their views to the panel through an Oral Statement.112
Technically third parties do not have any more rights beyond these, however, a panel can extend
the rights of third parties in some individual cases, which the panel often does.113
Conventional wisdom says that by offering a broader perspective on a dispute third
parties influence the verdicts. However, Busch and Reinhardt in their paper “With a Little Help
From Our Friends? Developing Country Complaints and Third Party Participation,” argue that
conventional wisdom misses the real action. The authors state that even though third parties have
an influence on rulings in disputes, the third parties first undermine the early settlement and
prolong the dispute between the complainant and the defendant. Third parties in the dispute
settlement make negotiations more transparent which, according to Busch and Reinhardt
motivates the protagonist to stand still.114
As James Fearon argues, an audience for negotiations
makes the states more prone to dig in their heels and to not move from their position.115
Busch
and Reinhardt argue that third parties damage the cases because disputes which have third parties
present have much smaller chances of ending in early settlement.116
This is even more damaging
when the complainant is a poor nation, because their chance of reaching early settlement is worse
than for developed nations who have third party presence.117
Furthermore, mixed testimony for
both sides in a dispute washes out the influence that third parties have on a case.118
Nonetheless,
112
113
114
Fearon, James “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands Versus Sinking Costs” (1998) Journal of Conflict
Resolution. Pg. 69, 73, 87
115
Fearon, James Pg. 69, 73, 87
116
Third Party Participation." Pg. 10, 18
117
Third Party Participation." Pg. 10, 18
118

there are those who argue that the presence of third parties during a dispute ensure that the
settlements are consistent with the WTO rules.119
Developing countries, on the other hand, are in
favor of higher and stronger participation of third parties, in consultations as well.120
Japan
proposed that “submissions be shared with all Members so that this information can be used to
help interpret decisions, and be used by others in deciding whether to file their own disputes,”
which will allow for greater transparency and perhaps reduce the need to reserve third party
rights.121
Johns and Pelc’s study on the use of audience in the DSB suggests that there is merit in
the fact that third parties also play the role of insurance in the WTO disputes “by insuring states
against the adverse consequences of failure,” where Members of the WTO manipulate the size of
the audience depending on the case at hand.122
Further, they argue that third parties reduce the
force of panel rulings by lowering the winner’s payoffs and raising the loser’s payoffs compared
to cases with no expressed views of third parties. By generating a cost in the case of success and
a benefit in the case of failure, third parties participate with their own views and expressions and
thus serve as insurance of reduced risk for the overall dispute. 123
This being the view of some
scholars, others empirical records suggest that third parties have little influence over the direction
of the panel or Appellate Body rulings where the complainant wins sixty percent of the rulings
no matter which side receives the majority of third party support or any support at all, and that
119
“On the strategic Manipulation of Audiences in WTO Dispute Settlement.” Leslie Johns and Krzysztof J. Pelc (23
June 2011) Pg. 1
120
121
Third Party Participation." Pg. 22,23
122
Johns, Leslie and Pelc, J. Krzysztof. On the strategic Manipulation of Audiences in WTO Dispute Settlement. (23
June 2011) Pg. 4-5
123
Johns, Leslie and Pelc, J. Krzysztof. Pg. 11

third party participation rather serves to “bolster the credibility of the institution [the WTO
Dispute Settlement].”124
Evans and Shaffer write that, “participating as a third party in disputes of systemic
interest can be a useful way to increase understanding of DSB procedures and style, and
substantive issues of WTO treaty interpretation,” which they go on to describe as being a
“relatively simple and low-cost way to develop capacity.”125
They do state that some legal
capacity is needed in order to have a meaningful input as a third party, but their main focus is on
developing capacity through this kind of participation.
Bown writes that, “the resource costs of merely initiating or participating in a case as
either a complainant or an interested third party (or reserving third party rights) are not large,”126
which is big reason why even developing countries are able to reserve their third party rights.
When a country reserves their third party rights, there is no need to have an entire delegation
present to fully participate. The only opportunities given to third parties is either to present
before the panel or the Appellate Body or submit a written statement presenting their stance on
the issues, or to do both. If a country with limited resources wanted to participate, they would
only need one member in Geneva before the panel or Appellate Body to present their view, and
given that the World Trade Organization has resources for poor countries who have trouble
affording to send a delegate or those who do not even have delegates present at all times, the
opportunity for a country to be part of the DSB to a case as a third party are fully possible.
124
Busch, March and Reinhardt, Eric. "Fixing What Ain't Broke? Third Party Rights, Consultations, and the DSU."
Pg. 7-8, 15
125
Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2010) Pg. 346-47
126
Bown, Chad. "Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants; Interested Parties; and Free Riders."
World Bank Economic Review 19, no. 2 (2005): 287-310.Pg. 12

When it comes to the use of a county’s third party rights in a WTO dispute, most of the
conversation has been focused on developing countries and how a considerable number of
developing or even least developing countries have been more and more involved in the DSB as
third parties. Unless the literature focuses on how much influence third parties yield in disputes
or how they sabotage the possibility of settling the disputes, most of the literature is simply
focused on statements such as “how third party rights can be improved in a way that serves the
interests of the developing members.”127
However, even though the participation of developing nations in the DSB as third parties
grows, the other significant portion of the third party participants are developed countries. The
role has not only evolved for developing nations, but that is has also done so for advanced small
markets that are not on the same playing field as the United States, Japan or the European Union.
Further, it is not possible to influence the shaping of policies that might affect a country’s
interests in the long run, unless a Member participates in the Dispute Settlement. The United
States has full capacity to file disputes in the DSB as a complainant, but chooses to not always
do that. The US has participated in one hundred and thirty cases as a third party, twenty-one
cases more than they has brought up as a complainant.128
Scholars have noticed that the
European Union and the United States do not miss the opportunity to be third parties, which is
why they register their third party rights in all cases where they are not the complainant or the
respondent.129
They want to be informed and be part of the system, especially at the Appellate
127
A S A Albashar, Faisal, and Afm Maniruzzaman. "Reforming the WTO Dispute Settlement System: A Rethink of
the Third Party Right of Access to Panel and Appeal Processes from Developing Countries' Perspectives." The
Journal of World Investment & Trade 11, no. 3 (2010): Vii-373. Pg. 313
128
Disputes by Country/Territory https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm
129
Shaffer, Shaffer. How to make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing Countries. (March
2003). International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development. Pg. 10-11

stage which is where, “the effect on interpreting WTO rules is the greatest.”130
Shaffer writes
that the U.S. and the E.U. participate in every part of the DSB in order to have a say on the
development of the WTO law, which is strategically smart.131
What other way to know how to
improve the system and the WTO law than to partake in it. Other nations ought to only learn
from them. The United States, the European Union and Japan take part in cases as third parties
even if they do not have direct interest in the dispute.132
viii. WTO: The Kingdom of Norway
With the transition from GATT to the WTO, Norway officially became a member of the
World Trade Organization on January 1st 1995 and has since then had an active role in the
organization.133
On December 16th 2015 the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs handed over
the instrument of acceptance for the ratification of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA)134
to
the Director-General, becoming one of sixty-three nations to have formally accepted the TFA.135
This recent ratification of TFA and the donation of NOK 58.5 million to trade-related programs
for developing countries,136
in particular least-developed countries (LDCs), which Norway
130
A S A Albashar, Faisal, and Afm Maniruzzaman. Pg. 317
131
A S A Albashar, Faisal, and Afm Maniruzzaman. Pg. 322
132
Manduna, Calvin. Daring to Dispute: Are there shifting trends in African participation in WTO Dispute
Settlement? (tralac Trade Brief, No 3, June 2005). Pg. 5
133
Member Information: Norway and the WTO.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/norway_e.htm
134
The Trade Facilitation Agreement focuses on expediting the movement, release and clearance of goods,
including those in transit. It contains provisions for technical assistance and capacity building in this area of trade,
as well as sets out measures for effective cooperation between customs and other appropriate authorities on
customs compliance issues and trade facilitation.
Trade Facilitation. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tradfa_e/tradfa_e.htm
135
WTO receives six additional ratifications for Trade Facilitation Agreement.
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/fac_17dec15_e.htm
136
Since 2001, Norway has donated NOK 300,044,180 to WTO trust funds.

pledged on November 11th 2015 portrays Norway’s continuous interest in participating as well
as aiding trade negotiations and development.137
Norway is a strong participant in the World Trade Organization, not only based on
ratified agreements and donations made, but in particularly in the dispute settlement of the WTO.
There has not been one case where Norway has been the respondent to a dispute, but there have
been four cases where Norway was the complainant – three of which have been against the
European Communities138
and one of which was against the United States.139
However, the
major Norwegian participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement has been as a third party in
seventy two cases from 1995 to present day.140
Currently Norway is a third party in over
eighteen ongoing cases at the dispute settlement.141
When it comes to representation in third
party participation at the WTO Dispute Settlement, Busch and Reinhardt have written that the
economic superpowers are not only well represented, but are frequent participants. Countries
such as the United States, the European Union and Japan,142
have each taken part in well over
one hundred cases as a third party with the EU and Japan being the only two WTO Members to
go beyond one hundred and fifty cases each.143
Busch and Reinhardt write that developing
137
Norway donates NOK 58.5 million to boost trading capacity of developing countries and LDCs
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres15_e/pr758_e.htm
138
The European Union (EU) was until November 30
th
2009 officially known in the World Trade Organization for
legal reasons as the European Communities (EC). In the older documents of the WTO the EU was formerly known
and referred to as the EC. Therefore throughout this paper I will be using these two names interchangeably, and
use EC to refer to text and documents in which the correct name was the European Communities, and the same
will be used for the European Union.
Member information: The European Union and the WTO.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_communities_e.htm
139
Disputes by country/territory.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm
140
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm
141
Verserande WTO-tvistesaker kor Noreg er tredjepart.
https://www.regjeringen.no/no/tema/naringsliv/handel/ud---innsiktsartikler/noreg_tredjepart/id2414548/
142
143
Disputes by country/territory. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm

countries “account for 52% of all third parties,”144
with the most frequent third parties being
Canada, Brazil, Chile, Australia, India, Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, China, Chinese Taipei and
Norway.145
Furthermore, Norway also participates at the WTO Dispute Settlement in the capacity of
panelists for the various disputes. With the surge of third party participation in the DSB at the
beginning of the World Trade Organization’s establishment, the Council to the Appellate Body
of the WTO, Debra Steger, discussed how the increased third party participation has a possibility
of hindering the system from finding panelists for the disputes.146
Among Switzerland and New
Zealand, Norway was a particularly popular choice in the use of panelists for disputes because of
the country’s position as one of the few nations not a European Union member.147
Norway’s
engagement in the World Trade Organization is not only broad but also extensive.
Norway is a small nation with a strong economy, and was ranked number twenty-six in
the 2014 GDP ranking done by the World Bank,148
significantly lower than countries and
economic superpowers such as the United States, Canada, China, Japan, Brazil, India, Korea,
Mexico and others.149
Nonetheless, Norway’s participation as a third party in the WTO is on the
same level as most of these nations – which is interesting.
IV. Zeroing methodology in Anti-dumping150
Anti-dumping is measurement taken by countries to protect their own industries from
foreign markets. A company is said to be “dumping” a product if it exports the product at a lower
144
145
Last accessed 22 March 2016 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm
146
Carmody, Chi. Pg 641
147
Carmody, Chi. Pg 641
148
“Data: Norway.” http://data.worldbank.org/country/norway
149
“Gross domestic product 2014.” World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 29 December 2015
150
More information (and calculation of zeroing) can be found in the Appendix.

price than the price the company normally charges in its own home market,151
meaning that the
firm sells the exported product at unfairly low prices outside its home market.152
Through the
practice of dumping the domestic industry of the host country suffers material injury when a
product is dumped in its own market.153
According to the World Trade Organization every
country has a right to apply anti-dumping duties on products from foreign markets that enter
their host market at a lower price than it originally costs in its domestic market.154
This
protection is intended to remedy when foreign firms sell their products at prices below the
‘normal’155
value in the host country.156
Some imports which are priced at a lower level than in the products home market are
taken into account under the zeroing formula. Zeroing is a methodology used to calculate anti-
dumping rates, more accurately the calculation of foreign exporter dumping margins.157
‘Zeroing’ is used to calculate whether or not imports are being sold in the country at less than
‘normal’ value.158
This antidumping calculation is used by the United States, where the U.S.
151
Anti-dumping. World Trade Organization. Retrieved from
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_e.htm
152
Reynolds, Neal J. "Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Role of the U.S. Courts in Resolving Conflicts between
U.S. Law and WTO Dispute Settlement Reports in the Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Area." Tulane Journal
of International and Comparative Law 21, no. 2 (2013): 273-90. Pg. 276
153
“Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping activity.” Bruce A. Blonigen (2006) pg. 874-75
154
What is Zeroing? http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/february/tradoc_149065.pdf Pg. 1
Understanding the WTO: the Agreements. World Trade Organization.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm
Blonigen, Bruce A. "Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Antidumping Activity." Canadian Journal of
Economics/Revue Canadienne D'économique 39, no. 3 (2006): 874-900. Pg. 875
155
Normal value is defined as “the average of a set of observations of sales of the product in the home market.”
“The implications of ‘zeroing’ for enforcement of US antidumping laws.” William W. Nye (4 December 2009)
Journal of Economic Policy Reform Pg. 264
156
Blonigen, Bruce A. Pg. 874-75
157
What is Zeroing? Pg. 1
158
“A WTO Panel Openly Rejects the Appellate Body's "Zeroing" Case Law.” Sungjoon Cho (11 March 2008)
American Society of International Law Last accessed 30 April 2016 Last Accessed 29 April 2016
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/12/issue/3/wto-panel-openly-rejects-appellate-bodys-zeroing-case-law

enforces its own antidumping laws differently than other nations.159
For the past decade the
Appellate Body of the WTO has been consistent in condemning the practice of zeroing as unfair,
and deemed the practice prohibited.160
Those that look at the antidumping laws see them as safeguards which countries apply in
order to favour domestic producers over foreign firms, and not to protect the competitive
process.161
In 1991, Barcelo wrote that these laws were funded on an unfounded fear of
predatory dumping, but currently function as quasi-safeguard laws.162
The United States has been
practicing the methodology of zeroing for a long time, and has not let the World Trade
Organization stop the country from using the methodology. The U.S. has argued over the years
against the WTO antidumping laws. They have argued as follows; first, the panelists that sit on
WTO disputes are often not judges, do not have extensive experience in appellate review, and
follow WTO principles over US Law;163
second, US courts should not give significant weight to
WTO reports in the antidumping area because the Federal Circuit has noted that the final WTO
report is not binding on the members involved in the dispute;164
and finally, decisions made by
the WTO panels may conflict with US statutes and/or judicial precedent.165
China, the European Union, Mexico and Japan have filed WTO disputes regarding the
country’s practicing of zeroing, stating that the methodology is unfair.166
Other countries (see
159
“The implications of ‘zeroing’ for enforcement of US antidumping laws.” William W. Nye (4 December 2009)
Journal of Economic Policy Reform Pg. 263-64
160
What is Zeroing? (2012, February 6). European Commission: Trade. Retrieved from
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/february/tradoc_149065.pdf Pg. 1
“Between a Rock and a Hard Palce: The role of the US courts in resolving conflicts between US law and WTO
dispute settlement reports in the antidumping and countervailing duty area.” Neal J. Reynolds (2013) Pg. 274
161
“A history of GATT unfair trade remedy law -- confusion of purposes.” John J, Barcelo III (1991) Pg. 313
162
“A history of GATT unfair trade remedy law -- confusion of purposes.” John J, Barcelo III (1991) Pg. 332
163
Reynolds, Neal J. Pg. 278
164
165
166
Robertson, Scott. (2009, August 24). Views mixed on WTO ‘zeroing’ ruling. Metal Bulletin Daily: Iron and Steel
General.

Figure 2) have also filed cases against the United States use of zeroing. Even though in February
2012 the United States together with Japan and the European Union announced that they had
reached an agreement on settling their zeroing disputes, the United States has not conformed
with the Appellate Body decisions on cases from other WTO Members.167
Therefore we are still
seeing cases brought up to the Dispute Settlement Body against the US with regards to zeroing.
V. Research Methods
Third party participation in the World Trade Organization has grown since the creation of
the WTO in 1995. Almost every case disputed at the Dispute Settlement has at least one and
often several WTO Members as a third party. The enormity of these numbers make it difficult
for me to study every single one of them in order to better understand why certain nations
continuously employ the Dispute Settlement Body through third party participation. Therefore, I
study a special case, Norway’s participation as a third party in the DSB which I apply to the
general use of third party participation by advanced small markets in the Dispute Settlement.
The disputes brought to the World Trade Organization vary not only in the size of the
dispute, but also in topic, with everything from wine to aircraft to ceramic floor tiles.168
I have
chosen anti-dumping, a topic that has been a big issue in the WTO. Over one hundred anti-
dumping cases have been taken to the DSB with regards to anti-dumping.169
This is a large sum
of cases, a number that would not allow me for an in-depth study of each of the cases in this
research project. Therefore I have chosen to focus on a selected part of anti-dumping, namely the
use of zeroing as an anti-dumping calculation measurement. There have only been eighteen
167
“No More Zeroing?: The United States Changes its Antidumping Policy to Comply with the WTO.” Sungjoon Cho
(9 March 2012) American Society of International Law Last accessed 30 April 2016
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/8/no-more-zeroing-united-states-changes-its-antidumping-policy-
comply-wto
168
“DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE DISPUTES Find disputes cases.”
169
“DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE DISPUTES Chronological list of disputes cases.”

disputes taken to the DSB with regards to zeroing as a measurement of antidumping, of which
sixteen were brought up against the United States. This narrows my research and allows me to
look deeper into the documents I study.
I focus on what makes a country decide to take part in some disputes as a third party, but
not others. Therefore I have chosen one advanced small market nation as my case study.
Norway, a country with few disputes filed as a complainant, but with more than seventy taken
part in as a third party is a good choice for my research. In the sixteen cases which have been
brought up to the DSB against the United States, Norway has been a third party participant in six
of them (see Figure 2). Out of these six cases I use four of them for my research. The European
Communities were the complainant in two of the cases and the other two were brought up to the
DSB by Japan and Viet Nam. The fifth, supplementary case I look into is another brought by
Viet Nam during which Norway was not a third party participant. This will allow me to
understand why a country takes party in some disputes and not others (given that there have been
several zeroing disputes brought against the United States with regards to shrimp, and Norway
decided to participate as a third party in only one of them).
I am not studying every part of the cases I have selected, but concentrate on the five cases
I have chosen through Norway’s perspective. In order to do this I utilize Oral Statements and
Written Submissions which were given by Norway for the cases during which Norway was a
third party. This allows me to study the Norwegian arguments and focus for choosing to be part
of these cases as a third party. In addition to examining the Oral Statements and Written
Submissions, I am supplementing my arguments with Trade Policy Reviews. These are papers
published by the Norwegian government every four years since 1996 (except for the 2016 one
which have not yet been published). The Trade Policy Reviews are part of the Uruguay Round

agreement and focus on the Members own trade practices and policies, which result in enabling
“outsiders to understand a country’s policies and circumstances.”170
These additional reviews
allow me to examine whether or not the exact same argument presented by Norway in the cases
as a third party are reflected in other documents.
In addition to the Oral Statements, Written Submissions and the Trade Policy Reviews
that I examine for my research, I conducted an interview with two lawyers, Linn Edvartsen and
Camilla Høvding Blom, from the department on the European Economic Area (EEA)- and trade
law in the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in August 2015. This interview I have used as
supplementary documentation throughout this research paper for information on Norway’s
participation in the World Trade Organization, in particularly the Dispute Settlement Body.
FIGURE 2: Case Division for Zeroing
Norway not Third Party
Complainant Case topic
DS179 Korea Stainless Steel
DS264 Canada Softwood Lumber
DS335 Ecuador Shrimp
DS343 Thailand Shrimp
DS344 Mexico Stainless Steel
DS382 Brazil Orange Juice
DS383 Thailand PET Bags
DS402 Korea Products (stainless steel+, diamond sawblades+)
DS404 Viet Nam Shrimp
DS422 China Shrimp, Diamond Sawblades
Norway as Third Party
Complainant Case topic
DS294 European Communities Zeroing (general - 21cases, most products steel)
DS322 Japan Zeroing (general + Sunset Review)
DS350 European Communities Continued Zeroing
DS420 Korea Carbon Steel
DS429 Viet Nam Shrimp II
DS471 China Anti-Dumping Methodology
170
Trade policy reviews: ensuring transparency.
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm11_e.htm

VI. Advanced small markets in the Dispute Settlement
Beginning my research, I expected to see that part of Norway’s motivation for third party
participation in the Dispute Settlement would be because of the Norwegian industry. However,
that is far away the case. As I learned from my interview with the lawyers from the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA), they are not being manipulated by the Norwegian industry in bringing
up cases to the WTO. Camilla Bloom told me that it is the nature of the case that makes Norway
be the complainant in a dispute at the WTO and the few times that Norway has taken up a case to
the DSB, then the case has been very serious. As they pointed out, Norway has a very high
threshold for taking a case to the Dispute Settlement, and that the Norwegian government relies
on settling all of its potential disputes in WTO committees or in bilateral conversations.
As Linn explained, there is of course a dialog, as in any country, that the MFA has with
the Norwegian industry and business together with various government departments. It is the
government that decides which cases to take up in the Dispute Settlement and the industry is not
as involved as it is in the United States or even Canada. Camilla said that in Norway the industry
does not have a tradition to be “hands on deck,” rather it depends on how the society functions.
In Norway, the society is very different from other places.
There was one case which Norway took up to the DSB that had a different ring to it, than
it usually functions in Norway, namely the salmon case, DS337.171
The salmon case, according
to Camilla, was very well known in the Norway through the media. There were a lot of different
opinions, in the Norwegian salmon and fish industry as well, whether or not it was the right
171
DS337 – The DSB received request for consultations on 17 March 2006. The case, which has six Members as
third party, was about anti-dumping duty on imports of farmed salmon originating in Norway. “DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: DISPUTE DS337 European Communities — Anti-Dumping Measure on Farmed Salmon from
Norway.” https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds337_e.htm

decision to take the case up against the European Union in the WTO Dispute Settlement. As the
MFA lawyers explained to me, there had been problems between Norway and the European
Union regarding anti-dumping duties on salmon for twenty years before Norway finally decided
to take the case up to the DSB. Even then, as Linn pointed out, the case was not urgent and some
people who work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have said that Norway could have waited
longer before taking up the case through the World Trade Organization.
Other than the salmon case, I have not found any evidence of lobbying in Norway for
taking up cases to the Dispute Settlement. The last case Norway was a complainant in began in
2009 and even then172
, the seal case was pushed forward by Canada and the Canadian industry.
As Camilla pointed out, the society is different and lobbying as it is known and understood in the
United States and other countries is not part of the Norwegian government. Therefore, there are
other reasons as to why Norway continues to be a frequent third party participant in the Dispute
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization, which I explore in the rest of this paper.
a. Strong economic/trade connection to the complainant
The first reason why advanced small markets choose to participate as third parties in the
WTO disputes is because the nation has a strong connection to the complainant of the case
through economy or trade, or both. In this section I show how Norway’s strong trade connections
to a WTO Member affect which cases Norway participates in as a third party. I begin by
discussing i) Norway’s focus on still being an influence in the international trade system before I
shift to show how Norway’s strong trade connections with WTO Members draw Norway into
disputes as a third part in order to show support for the complainants through ii) the European
Communities.
172
DS401 - Measures Prohibiting the Importation and Marketing of Seal Products.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds401_e.htm

i. Influence on the international trade system
One of the main reasons that Norway consistently participates in the World Trade
Organization, specifically as a third party in the Dispute Settlement, is the Norwegian
commitment to open international trade and a transparent global economy. Though the cases
Norway chooses to participate in are not always directly related to country itself, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA) considers their involvement crucial for creating a more equitable global
economy. These cases are critical for understanding how and why Norwegian internationalists
see the WTO as a vehicle through which to achieve their goal of reforming the ethics of
international trade and the way the global economy functions.173
In the 2014-15 report to the Parliament,174
the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
explicitly states that there is a growing risk that the Norwegian influence in international trade
has been reduced and will continue to decline in the future, while the rest of the international
community is becoming more closely integrated in international trade. The fear of being blocked
from shaping international trade explains why the Norwegian government will take any possible
part in international trade in order to hold its current position – as an influencer and a country
others come to for advice. The ministry states in the report that not only does Norway lack free
trade agreements with six of the ten largest economies in the world, but that Norway is not party
to any of the negotiations with regards to the Pacific and the Atlantic trade agreements.175
This
means that Norway has no way to influence these negotiations whereas the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership (TTIP)176
will have a great impact on Norway.177
Given that eighty
173
“Globalisation and trade: Trade policy challenges and opportunities for Norway.” Norwegian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. Report to the Storting (white paper) summary. (2014-2015) pg. 3
174
In the sources it says “report to the Storting,” where Storting is Norwegian for the Parliament.
175
Report to the Storting (white paper) summary. (2014-2015) pg. 4
176
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is high-standard trade and investment agreement
being negotiated between the United States and the European Union.

percent of Norway’s exports go to the European Union and sixty-five percent of Norway’s
imports come from the European Union, the TTIP will have an immense impact on the
Norwegian economy.178
One of the strategies the Norwegian government employs to be present
in international trade is to participate as third parties in the Dispute Settlement Body.
Norway’s trade expansion into new markets is a reason as to why Norway has over the
past years been increasing their participation as a third party in the DSB. Trade expansion into
new markets is difficult when the markets Norway is trying to enter still have trade barriers in
place.179
Given that the Norwegian government states that protectionist measures makes
Norway’s dependence on trade vulnerable, the governments participation in WTO disputes helps
Norway be part of the conversation in shaping trade and the future of trade in these regions. And
as stated by the Ministry, “Norway … is best served by being part of a system based on common
rules that are observed.”180
Furthermore, the Ministry stated in the report to the Parliament that, “export interests of
many developing countries have received too little attention in negotiations.”181
This shows that
the Norwegian government is interested in working with developing Members and assists other
nations in their growth, which is why Norway has a comprehensive system of generalized
preferences for imports from developing nations. According to the World Bank data there are
over twenty developing nations in the region of East Asia and Pacific,182
an area where Norway’s
trade is expanding to. Therefore, Norway’s expansion into these markets together with the
177
“About TTIP.” European Commission on Trade.
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/about-ttip/
Report to the Storting (white paper) summary. (2014-2015) pg. 3, 11, 12
178
“Trenger Norge EØS og tilslutning til TTIP? ” (23 October 2015). State Secretary Elsbeth Tronstad. Last accessed
29 March 2016 https://www.regjeringen.no/no/aktuelt/eos-ttip-tale/id2459102/
179
180
181
182
“Data: East Asia & Pacific (developing only).” http://data.worldbank.org/region/EAP

country’s participation as a third party in disputes brought by WTO Members from this region
show Norway’s interest in assisting these nations. Norway’s participation as a third party adds
legitimacy to these nations and their arguments at the DSB. By standing up for other nations in
the Dispute Settlement and the WTO, Norway is exercising their power of influence to make
every Member at the World Trade Organization matter. If Norway is worried about their role in
international trade, an advanced small market, then what awaits small (and developing) nations
who do not have Norway’s resources and are not number twenty-six in the World Bank GDP
Ranking.183
Therefore, when the Norwegian government said that an instrument of development
policy that Norway will use is trade,184
the World Trade Organization is an important aiding
factor for this. Moreover, Norway’s interest in implementing and developing agreements that
“are better adapted to the situation in the specific countries,”185
is not only beneficial for the
small (and developing) nations, but for Norway – who’s internationalists are presenting Norway
to be a strong force fighting for the same rights of all nations.
Even though Norway is in favour of the WTO and is a frequent user of the Dispute
Settlement Body through third party participation, like many other nations, the country has some
reservations, especially with regards to further development of the trading system.186
The
Norwegian government considers the strengthening and safeguarding of the system to be the
main trade policy interest together with a further interest to promote Norwegian interests in the
regular work of the WTO.187
In the report to the Parliament it was written that, “the success of
Norwegian companies in the global market is important for the Norwegian economy,”188
which
183
“World Bank: Gross domestic product 2014.” http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf
184
185
186
Report to the Storting (white paper) summary. (2014-2015) pg. 12-13
187
188

means that the Norwegian government, like any other, looks for benefits for its own nation and
its businesses. Furthermore, given that Norway is worried about a lack of participation in the
negotiations of trade agreements Norway’s participation in the WTO is crucial.189
The
government wants to have a word in the conversations with any means possible – from informal
to formal channels.190
ii. Economic and trade connections to the European Communities
The majority of the submissions made by Norway in the cases I examined focused on the
laws of GATT and the WTO as well as on the legal precedent made in previous cases. In
addition, Norway restates the arguments of the complainant and the respondent in their third
party submissions to the Panel(s) or the Appellate Body. What is limited in all of these
submissions is the opinion of the third party. With most of the focus on laws and previous cases,
there is little argumentation made by Norway as a country. Even though the 2005 Oral Statement
by Norway begins by saying, “I would like to thank you for this opportunity to present the
Norwegian view on the case at hand,”191
and the 2009 Written Submission begins with “Norway
welcomes this opportunity to be heard and to present its views as a third party in this appeal
concerning a disagreement…”192
there is almost no Norwegian view throughout these or other
statements and submissions made by Norway. There are a few times with statements like,
“Norway agrees with…”193
or “Norway believes that…,”194
in the 2005 Oral Statement. In other
submissions we also see statements such as, “Norway argues that…,”195
“Norway believes
189
190
191
DS294 - Oral Statement (Geneva, 17 March 2005) Pg. 2
192
DS294 - Third Party Submission. (Geneva, 10 March 2009) Pg. 1
193
DS294 - Oral Statement of Norway. (Geneva, 17 March 2005) Pg. 2
194
DS294 - Oral Statement of Norway. (Geneva, 17 March 2005) Pg. 5
195
DS294 - Third Participant Submission by. (Geneva, 13 February 2006) Pg. 5

that…,”196
“Norway supports…”197
or “In Norway’s view…,”198
however, these statements are
rare. In a document of fifteen pages only in five small parts does Norway state what their own
view on the case is. This shows that even though third party participation in the DSB is
important, Norway’s submissions to dispute cases as a third party are not focused on their
individual views. Rather, this shows that the focus of third party participation lies in reiterating
the same points over and over again and to show strong support for the party that the third party
is supporting. By focusing on the laws of the WTO the third party participant is pounding on the
same point the complainant or the defendant is focusing on. In other words, the third party
participant is showing its support for the other Member and is telling either the Panel or the
Appellate Body of why the Member they are supporting is correct. This shows that advanced
small markets participate as third parties in cases to support the dispute party they are connected
to.
In the WTO, there have been seventeen cases in which the European Union was the
complainant and Norway was a third party. There have been thirteen cases where the EU was the
respondent in a case where Norway was a third party, and there have been forty-two cases in
which Norway and the EU were both third parties.199
This shows that there are other strong
connections between Norway and the European Union in addition to the European Free Trade
Association (EFTA). This trade connection is one explanation as to why Norway participates as
a third party in disputes, especially in those which the European Union is the complainant. The
outcome of a dispute in which the European Union is involved in can strongly affect Norway’s
196
DS294 - Third Party Submission by Norway. (Geneva, 10 March 2009) Pg. 2, 10
197
DS294 - Third Party Submission by Norway. (Geneva, 10 March 2009) Pg. 5
198
DS294 - Third Party Submission by Norway. (Geneva, 10 March 2009) Pg. 14
199
“DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: THE DISPUTES Find disputes cases.”
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/find_dispu_cases_e.htm#results

economy and trade. Therefore, by participating in the cases in which the EU is the complainant,
Norway’s internationalists support a strong trade ally and look out for Norway’s interests.
Norway, one of the few nations not a member of the European Union is strongly
connected to the politico-economic union through the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).
EFTA was founded by Norway and six other nations in 1960.200
Norway shares this free trade
agreement with Iceland, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.201
Given that EFTA promotes free trade
and economic integration and that almost every other country not party to EFTA is part of the
European Union,202
a lot of Norway’s economic interests are intertwined with the EU. Through
this free trade agreement Norway does a lot of trade with the EU (Figure 3). This figure shows
Norway’s biggest export markets for goods and services in 2013 in millions of krona,203
with the
European Union being number one. Furthermore, looking at the difference between number one
- the EU and number two - the United States of America, the export numbers are significantly
different. The number for the European Union is fourteen times larger than the one for the US. In
addition, Norway does not have a free trade agreement with the United States as Norway has
with the EU. This shows Norway’s stronger connection to the European Union from the one with
the United States.
200
The European Free Trade Association. http://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association
201
The European Free Trade Association. http://www.efta.int/about-efta/european-free-trade-association
202
The European Free Trade Association. http://www.efta.int/
203
Krone is the Norwegian currency, which translates into English as crown. On May 2nd 2016, one US dollar is
8.02 kroner. www.dn.no

FIGURE 3: Norway’s biggest export market for good and services in 2013204
Given the strong trade connection between Norway and the European Union, Norway has
a significant reason for participating in disputes as a third party in support of the European
Union. First, Norway participates in certain cases because the internationalists believe that the
laws of the WTO and the legal precedent made in the disputes under the Dispute Settlement
Body are applicable to all WTO Members. Second, as I was told in my interview with the
lawyers from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs the precedent established in some cases
can be extended to other WTO Members at a later point. This was reaffirmed in the 2012 article
in the American Society of International Law where Cho writes that, “countries [will] continue
to challenge U.S. zeroing…in the hope that the United States will recalculate dumping margins
on those products…as it did for the EU and Japan,”205
and again by New Zealand when the U.S.
filed a case against Japan over import restrictions on apples, “The Americans will now sit down
204
Report to the Storting (white paper). (2014-2015) Pg.96
205
“No More Zeroing?: The United States Changes its Antidumping Policy to Comply with the WTO.” Sungjoon Cho.
(9 March 2012). American Society of International Law https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/8/no-more-
zeroing-united-states-changes-its-antidumping-policy-comply-wto

Anna Kvinge, Political Science - summa cum laude

Anna Kvinge, Political Science - summa cum laude

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