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Securely Deploying Android
                 Devices
                  Angel Alonso-Parrizas


22th March 2011
About me and this project

•   Angel Alonso-Parrizas – parrizas@gmail.com
     –   Security Engineer @ Verizon Zurich team
     –   MSc, BSc, MSSF, GCIH, GCIA, GCFW, GCFA, GSEC, GSNA, CISSP, CISA, CISM
     –   8 years working in different security roles and companies
     –   http://www.angelalonso.eu | http://twitter.com/Angelill0
•   The project
     –   Practicum for the Master in Security and Forensic at Dublin City University
         http://www.uv.es/parrizas/alonsoparrizas-android-thesis.pdf
     –   GIAC GCIH Gold Paper
         http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/sysadmin/securely-
         deploying-android-devices_33799
•   The idea
     –   Need vs security
     –   Android smartphones aligned with security policies/standards
Agenda
•   Android model and threats
     –   Android architecture
     –   Linux model / permissions
     –   Some example of recent threats
•   Improving security in different areas
     –   Communications channel
     –   Access control
     –   Software policy
     –   Password policy
     –   Remote access control
     –   Additional security layers
     –   Hardening the stack and the Operating System
•   Conclusions
Android Model
•   Applications
     – Linux UID model
     – File permissions




•   Libraries & VM
     – Dalvik VM isolation
     – SSL


•   Kernel 2.6
     – Drivers
     – Devices (eg: bluetooth)
Permissions
•   Open repositories: Market, Appbrain..
•   Developer decides the permissions
     –   AndroidManifest.xml
•   User install the application
     –   Install the application (up to the user!)
     –   Do all the user read ?
     –   Do all the user understand ?                <manifest
                                                     xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk
     –   Low granularity (everything or nothing)     /res/android"

•   Any security issues?                             package="com.example.android.home">
                                                         <uses-permission
     –   Repository vs malware                       android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE"/
                                                     >
     –   Developers vs bad guys                          <uses-permission
                                                     android:name="android.permission.GET_TASKS"/>
     –   End user is not a security expert               <uses-permission
                                                     android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACT
                                                     S"/>
                                                         <uses-permission
                                                     android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPE
                                                     R
Some examples of threats
•   Catching AuthTokens in the Wild, The Insecurity of Google's
    ClientLogin Protocol [13/05/2011]
     –   Steal authentication tokens through open WiFi in some Google
         Applications
     –   Impersonate the user and even steal his Google account
     –   Application not properly build and lack of encryption in critical tasks
•   DroimDreamLight / DroidDream [30/05/2011]
     –   Typical malware (nothing new so far)
     –   30k -120k users affected (not too bad)
     –   Steal information, install software..
•   Android.Nickspy [27/07/2011]
     –   Trojan horse
     –   What else can we expect? Umm.. Something recording our
         conversation?, yes we can!
     –   …and sending the stolen information through a TCP connection
The lab
•   HTC Desire
•   SDK Toolkit (Linux, Mac or windows)
•   WiFi connection
•   3G card with Internet access
•   Some security tools
     –   iptables
     –   OpenVPN
     –   SSH
•   Dedicated Linux server
     –   Virtual Private Server (VPS)
Communication channels
     Communications
                    channel



                     N       Netfilter / Policies on demand
                   VP




                         1. Encryption of traffic
                         2. Drop traffic in the smartphone
                         3. Traffic policy in the VPS (eg: user)
                         4. Analysis of the traffic in the VPS
 Netfilter / DROP
Default route = tun0
Access control
• Android user has access to control the phone
– USB is used to manage the software
– USB is used to access the shell – full access to the system
– USB must be disable
– Just remove permission on the adbd daemon (/sbin/adbd)


• SSH access should be given to Security Administrator
– Dropbear is your friend (SSHD version for embedded system)
– Use keys instead of password
– The authorized host is the VPS endpoint
– SSH only allowed through VPN interface (tun0)
Software Policy
•   Only authorized software must run on the device
     –   Follow the internal policies / standards
     –   Mitigate the risk of infected software
•   Baselines for each user / role
     –   Some users might need special software for their role
•   Remove unnecessary software
     –   Remove Market
     –   Change permission of the container for each application
•   Applications must be able to be installed remotely – No
    need of physical access
     –   Use SCP to upload the APK file
     –   Change the permissions of the /system/bin/pm
     –   Install the application
     –   Revoke the permissions
SD Card and Bluetooth
•   SD Card
     –   FAT file system
     –   Lack of encryption
     –   Model of permission is broken
     –   Some attacks can use the SD card to execute code and hijack
     –   Umount the /mnt/sdcard on booting time


•   Bluetooth
     –   To be or not to be, that’s the question!
     –   Functionality vs Security, that’s the question!
     –   Disable /dev/ttyHS0 and /dev/ttyMSM0
Password Policy
•   Password policy aligned with company policies
•   Google Apps for business
     –   Centralize policy management
     –   Enforce the policy
     –   Password complexity
     –   Number of characters
     –   Expiration date
     –   Number of old password
     –   Wipe threshold
•   Device Policy application (agent)
Remote control and additional security
                  controls
•    Locate remotely through GPS
•    Google Apps for business
      –   GPS + Google Maps
      –   Remote wipping
      –   Remote Lock
•    Autowipe
      –   Remote wipe through text message
      –   Wipe if the SIM card is swapped
•    Antivirus
      –   AVG for mobile
      –   Scan applications
      –   Web filters in real time
Hardening of the Operating system
               while booting
•   Remove unnecessary binaries
     –   irssi, netcat, tcpdump…
•   Set properly the permissions
     –   root rw-------
•   Harden the TCP/ IP stack
•   Boot process in Android
     –   Ramdisk is a problem
     –   But.. /data/local/userinit.sh
•   Customize scripts
     –   userinit.sh, removesotware.sh, iptables.sh
     –   Easily adaptable to different environment
Conclusions
•   Improved the security in different Areas
•   Implemented a security channel
•   Filter and analyze the traffic
•   Reduced the risk of unauthorized software
•   Aligned with corporate policies
•   Setup a central point to manage
•   Added additional security controls / layers
•   Deployed customizable scripts
Questions?

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Securely Deploying Android Devices

  • 1. Securely Deploying Android Devices Angel Alonso-Parrizas 22th March 2011
  • 2. About me and this project • Angel Alonso-Parrizas – parrizas@gmail.com – Security Engineer @ Verizon Zurich team – MSc, BSc, MSSF, GCIH, GCIA, GCFW, GCFA, GSEC, GSNA, CISSP, CISA, CISM – 8 years working in different security roles and companies – http://www.angelalonso.eu | http://twitter.com/Angelill0 • The project – Practicum for the Master in Security and Forensic at Dublin City University http://www.uv.es/parrizas/alonsoparrizas-android-thesis.pdf – GIAC GCIH Gold Paper http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/sysadmin/securely- deploying-android-devices_33799 • The idea – Need vs security – Android smartphones aligned with security policies/standards
  • 3. Agenda • Android model and threats – Android architecture – Linux model / permissions – Some example of recent threats • Improving security in different areas – Communications channel – Access control – Software policy – Password policy – Remote access control – Additional security layers – Hardening the stack and the Operating System • Conclusions
  • 4. Android Model • Applications – Linux UID model – File permissions • Libraries & VM – Dalvik VM isolation – SSL • Kernel 2.6 – Drivers – Devices (eg: bluetooth)
  • 5. Permissions • Open repositories: Market, Appbrain.. • Developer decides the permissions – AndroidManifest.xml • User install the application – Install the application (up to the user!) – Do all the user read ? – Do all the user understand ? <manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk – Low granularity (everything or nothing) /res/android" • Any security issues? package="com.example.android.home"> <uses-permission – Repository vs malware android:name="android.permission.CALL_PHONE"/ > – Developers vs bad guys <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_TASKS"/> – End user is not a security expert <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_CONTACT S"/> <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SET_WALLPAPE R
  • 6. Some examples of threats • Catching AuthTokens in the Wild, The Insecurity of Google's ClientLogin Protocol [13/05/2011] – Steal authentication tokens through open WiFi in some Google Applications – Impersonate the user and even steal his Google account – Application not properly build and lack of encryption in critical tasks • DroimDreamLight / DroidDream [30/05/2011] – Typical malware (nothing new so far) – 30k -120k users affected (not too bad) – Steal information, install software.. • Android.Nickspy [27/07/2011] – Trojan horse – What else can we expect? Umm.. Something recording our conversation?, yes we can! – …and sending the stolen information through a TCP connection
  • 7. The lab • HTC Desire • SDK Toolkit (Linux, Mac or windows) • WiFi connection • 3G card with Internet access • Some security tools – iptables – OpenVPN – SSH • Dedicated Linux server – Virtual Private Server (VPS)
  • 8. Communication channels Communications channel N Netfilter / Policies on demand VP 1. Encryption of traffic 2. Drop traffic in the smartphone 3. Traffic policy in the VPS (eg: user) 4. Analysis of the traffic in the VPS Netfilter / DROP Default route = tun0
  • 9. Access control • Android user has access to control the phone – USB is used to manage the software – USB is used to access the shell – full access to the system – USB must be disable – Just remove permission on the adbd daemon (/sbin/adbd) • SSH access should be given to Security Administrator – Dropbear is your friend (SSHD version for embedded system) – Use keys instead of password – The authorized host is the VPS endpoint – SSH only allowed through VPN interface (tun0)
  • 10. Software Policy • Only authorized software must run on the device – Follow the internal policies / standards – Mitigate the risk of infected software • Baselines for each user / role – Some users might need special software for their role • Remove unnecessary software – Remove Market – Change permission of the container for each application • Applications must be able to be installed remotely – No need of physical access – Use SCP to upload the APK file – Change the permissions of the /system/bin/pm – Install the application – Revoke the permissions
  • 11. SD Card and Bluetooth • SD Card – FAT file system – Lack of encryption – Model of permission is broken – Some attacks can use the SD card to execute code and hijack – Umount the /mnt/sdcard on booting time • Bluetooth – To be or not to be, that’s the question! – Functionality vs Security, that’s the question! – Disable /dev/ttyHS0 and /dev/ttyMSM0
  • 12. Password Policy • Password policy aligned with company policies • Google Apps for business – Centralize policy management – Enforce the policy – Password complexity – Number of characters – Expiration date – Number of old password – Wipe threshold • Device Policy application (agent)
  • 13. Remote control and additional security controls • Locate remotely through GPS • Google Apps for business – GPS + Google Maps – Remote wipping – Remote Lock • Autowipe – Remote wipe through text message – Wipe if the SIM card is swapped • Antivirus – AVG for mobile – Scan applications – Web filters in real time
  • 14. Hardening of the Operating system while booting • Remove unnecessary binaries – irssi, netcat, tcpdump… • Set properly the permissions – root rw------- • Harden the TCP/ IP stack • Boot process in Android – Ramdisk is a problem – But.. /data/local/userinit.sh • Customize scripts – userinit.sh, removesotware.sh, iptables.sh – Easily adaptable to different environment
  • 15. Conclusions • Improved the security in different Areas • Implemented a security channel • Filter and analyze the traffic • Reduced the risk of unauthorized software • Aligned with corporate policies • Setup a central point to manage • Added additional security controls / layers • Deployed customizable scripts