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1 · www.nic.at
Encrypted DNS Research @ nic.at
EDNS Padding, Experiments, Cost Simulation
#JCSA17 · public
2017-07-06 · Alexander Mayrhofer · Head of R&D
2 · www.nic.at
Agenda
• About nic.at
• ENDS Padding is required for Privacy!
 Motivation / History
 RFC7830
 Padding Size Considerations
• Practical experiments @ nic.at
 Stubby
 Knot Resolver
• TLS/TCP Cost Simulation
 Current UDP-based volume
 Client Behaviour - Assumptions
 TLS/TCP Traffic Simulation
#JCSA17 · public
3 · www.nic.at
About nic.at
.at
1.3M domains
gTLDs
Backend + Registry
RcodeZero
DNS Services
R&D
4 FTEs
4 · www.nic.at
EDNS(0) Padding
It‘s required for privacy – but, why?
5 · www.nic.at
EDNS(0) Padding – why?
• Encryption removes „direct“ access to the information
 What‘s left for the Attacker?
• „Pretty Bad Privacy – Pitfalls of DNS Encryption“*
 Haya Shulman @ IETF 93
 Applied Networking Research Price – IRTF
• Side Channel information is key!
 Countermeasures
*https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/93/slides/slides-93-irtfopen-1.pdf
6 · www.nic.at
Application Queries – it‘s a stream
• A Pattern - Not just a single query/response pair
7 · www.nic.at
Encrypted DNS
• Streams still create size/timing „patterns“
8 · www.nic.at
Size based Correlation
• Compare with known clear text patterns
• Even works with a subset of message sizes
9 · www.nic.at
Introducing Padding
• Obfuscates the size pattern -> Hampers correlation
• More „hits“ -> less likely that identification is possible
10 · www.nic.at
RFC 7830 – EDNS(0) Padding Option
• EDNS Option code 12
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7830
11 · www.nic.at
Size of Padding?
• Block? Random? Power
of 2? Maximum?
 Tradeoff resources vs.
Identifcation potential
• Empirical Research Work
by Daniel K. Gillmor*
 Evaluates strategies
against Attacker /
Defender Costs
• IETF: Padding Policy
Draft** (wip)
*https://dns.cmrg.net/ndss2017-dprive-empirical-DNS-traffic-size.pdf
**https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dprive-padding-policy
12 · www.nic.at
Experiments with
encrypted DNS
13 · www.nic.at
Stubby + Knot Resolver
Pssst… nothing new here… move on…
14 · www.nic.at
Encrypted DNS
Cost Simulation
There‘s no Free Lunch in Security
15 · www.nic.at
Basic Question & Idea
• „What if 100% of all DNS queries would reach us
via TCP/TLS?“
• Let‘s simulate it!
Assumption of client behaviour +
Real world packet traces =
---------------------------------
Simulated TLS/TCP Traffic/events *
Estimated cost factors
---------------------------------
„Guesstimated“ TLS/TCP Costs
16 · www.nic.at
Simulation „Rules“ / Assumptions
• Sessions & Queries:
 First query from an IP starts
TLS session
 Subsequent queries use
existing session
 One session per client IP
 Assumes pipelining etc..
• Session will terminate after:
 N seconds idle time
 M seconds max session
length (M > N)
 X number of max. queries
17 · www.nic.at
Simulated Events / data
• Queries (Responses)
• Concurrent session count
 at a given time
 Idle vs active
 Session duration
(Etc. etc. etc)
• Session Setup
• Session Teardown
 Idle timeout
 Max. session duration
 Max. session queries
18 · www.nic.at
Input Data
• .at PCAP data
 Authoritative!
 Single server
 78M queries (~1000qps)
 IPv4 / UDP only
• Traffic properties
 „normal“ day (20170620)
 Few spikes / no DDoS
 Biggest spike: 11k qps
 ~7% of .at total traffic
19 · www.nic.at
Simulation Results: Session setups
Idle = 60s; maxduration=3600s; maxqueries=10.000
20 · www.nic.at
Sessions: Established vs. Active
Idle = 60s; maxduration=3600s; maxqueries=10.000
21 · www.nic.at
Session Teardown Details
• Reasons:
 Idle Timeout: 13.8M sessions (99.98%)
 Maximum Duration: 16222 session (0.12%)
 Maximum Queries: 1339 sessions (0.0097%)
• Idle Timeout – by „usage intensity“:
 Short sessions (d < 2*idle): 12.6M (91.3%)
 „Burst“ sessions (active < 3s): 10.6M (77,0%)
• # of Queries: 38.25 per session (avg.)
-> Idle Timeout has the biggest impact!
22 · www.nic.at
Vary the Idle Timeout
• Simulate for 5, 10, 20, (60), 120, 300s idle timeout
 Retain other parameters (max duration, max queries)
 Tradeoff Established Sessions vs. Session Setups
 Where‘s the „Sweet Spot“?
23 · www.nic.at
Cost Estimation
• Packets per Second (pps – 600kpps capacity)
 Query/Response: 2 packets / 3.3 ppm
 TCP/TLS setup: 6 packets (…) / 10 ppm
 Teardown: 3 packets / 5 ppm
• CPU/IO/ …*
 Query: 200k qps/server 5 ppm
 TLS Setup: 3300 sps/server 300 ppm
 Session Teardown: ? 20 ppm (guess!!)
• Memory - 2GB capacity (for TLS)
 TLS Session: 3kB/session** 1.5 ppm
*https://cdn-1.wp.nginx.com/wp-content/files/nginx-pdfs/Sizing-Guide-for-Deploying-NGINX-on-Bare-Metal-Servers.pdf
**https://www.wolfssl.com/wolfSSL/benchmarks-wolfssl.html
24 · www.nic.at
Cost Comparison
25 · www.nic.at
What‘s the „Magic Number“?
• TLS vs. UDP Cost Ratio
~8
(60s idle timeout)
26 · www.nic.at
Summary
• ENDS Padding – required for Privacy!
 RFC7830 - Size recommendations in progress
• TLS-DNS Experiments
 Use Stubby + Server of your choice
• TLS Cost Simulation
 The Magic Number is roughly 8.
 And, it depends. TLS optimization, cost assumptions
 Future work: Better simulation (vary client behaviour), more
precise cost factor estimation
27 · www.nic.at
nic.at GmbH
Jakob-Haringer-Str. 8/V · 5020 Salzburg · Austria
T +43 662 4669 -DW · F -29
alexander.mayrhofer@nic.at · www.nic.at

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Encrypted DNS research @ nic.at

  • 1. 1 · www.nic.at Encrypted DNS Research @ nic.at EDNS Padding, Experiments, Cost Simulation #JCSA17 · public 2017-07-06 · Alexander Mayrhofer · Head of R&D
  • 2. 2 · www.nic.at Agenda • About nic.at • ENDS Padding is required for Privacy!  Motivation / History  RFC7830  Padding Size Considerations • Practical experiments @ nic.at  Stubby  Knot Resolver • TLS/TCP Cost Simulation  Current UDP-based volume  Client Behaviour - Assumptions  TLS/TCP Traffic Simulation #JCSA17 · public
  • 3. 3 · www.nic.at About nic.at .at 1.3M domains gTLDs Backend + Registry RcodeZero DNS Services R&D 4 FTEs
  • 4. 4 · www.nic.at EDNS(0) Padding It‘s required for privacy – but, why?
  • 5. 5 · www.nic.at EDNS(0) Padding – why? • Encryption removes „direct“ access to the information  What‘s left for the Attacker? • „Pretty Bad Privacy – Pitfalls of DNS Encryption“*  Haya Shulman @ IETF 93  Applied Networking Research Price – IRTF • Side Channel information is key!  Countermeasures *https://www.ietf.org/proceedings/93/slides/slides-93-irtfopen-1.pdf
  • 6. 6 · www.nic.at Application Queries – it‘s a stream • A Pattern - Not just a single query/response pair
  • 7. 7 · www.nic.at Encrypted DNS • Streams still create size/timing „patterns“
  • 8. 8 · www.nic.at Size based Correlation • Compare with known clear text patterns • Even works with a subset of message sizes
  • 9. 9 · www.nic.at Introducing Padding • Obfuscates the size pattern -> Hampers correlation • More „hits“ -> less likely that identification is possible
  • 10. 10 · www.nic.at RFC 7830 – EDNS(0) Padding Option • EDNS Option code 12 https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7830
  • 11. 11 · www.nic.at Size of Padding? • Block? Random? Power of 2? Maximum?  Tradeoff resources vs. Identifcation potential • Empirical Research Work by Daniel K. Gillmor*  Evaluates strategies against Attacker / Defender Costs • IETF: Padding Policy Draft** (wip) *https://dns.cmrg.net/ndss2017-dprive-empirical-DNS-traffic-size.pdf **https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-dprive-padding-policy
  • 12. 12 · www.nic.at Experiments with encrypted DNS
  • 13. 13 · www.nic.at Stubby + Knot Resolver Pssst… nothing new here… move on…
  • 14. 14 · www.nic.at Encrypted DNS Cost Simulation There‘s no Free Lunch in Security
  • 15. 15 · www.nic.at Basic Question & Idea • „What if 100% of all DNS queries would reach us via TCP/TLS?“ • Let‘s simulate it! Assumption of client behaviour + Real world packet traces = --------------------------------- Simulated TLS/TCP Traffic/events * Estimated cost factors --------------------------------- „Guesstimated“ TLS/TCP Costs
  • 16. 16 · www.nic.at Simulation „Rules“ / Assumptions • Sessions & Queries:  First query from an IP starts TLS session  Subsequent queries use existing session  One session per client IP  Assumes pipelining etc.. • Session will terminate after:  N seconds idle time  M seconds max session length (M > N)  X number of max. queries
  • 17. 17 · www.nic.at Simulated Events / data • Queries (Responses) • Concurrent session count  at a given time  Idle vs active  Session duration (Etc. etc. etc) • Session Setup • Session Teardown  Idle timeout  Max. session duration  Max. session queries
  • 18. 18 · www.nic.at Input Data • .at PCAP data  Authoritative!  Single server  78M queries (~1000qps)  IPv4 / UDP only • Traffic properties  „normal“ day (20170620)  Few spikes / no DDoS  Biggest spike: 11k qps  ~7% of .at total traffic
  • 19. 19 · www.nic.at Simulation Results: Session setups Idle = 60s; maxduration=3600s; maxqueries=10.000
  • 20. 20 · www.nic.at Sessions: Established vs. Active Idle = 60s; maxduration=3600s; maxqueries=10.000
  • 21. 21 · www.nic.at Session Teardown Details • Reasons:  Idle Timeout: 13.8M sessions (99.98%)  Maximum Duration: 16222 session (0.12%)  Maximum Queries: 1339 sessions (0.0097%) • Idle Timeout – by „usage intensity“:  Short sessions (d < 2*idle): 12.6M (91.3%)  „Burst“ sessions (active < 3s): 10.6M (77,0%) • # of Queries: 38.25 per session (avg.) -> Idle Timeout has the biggest impact!
  • 22. 22 · www.nic.at Vary the Idle Timeout • Simulate for 5, 10, 20, (60), 120, 300s idle timeout  Retain other parameters (max duration, max queries)  Tradeoff Established Sessions vs. Session Setups  Where‘s the „Sweet Spot“?
  • 23. 23 · www.nic.at Cost Estimation • Packets per Second (pps – 600kpps capacity)  Query/Response: 2 packets / 3.3 ppm  TCP/TLS setup: 6 packets (…) / 10 ppm  Teardown: 3 packets / 5 ppm • CPU/IO/ …*  Query: 200k qps/server 5 ppm  TLS Setup: 3300 sps/server 300 ppm  Session Teardown: ? 20 ppm (guess!!) • Memory - 2GB capacity (for TLS)  TLS Session: 3kB/session** 1.5 ppm *https://cdn-1.wp.nginx.com/wp-content/files/nginx-pdfs/Sizing-Guide-for-Deploying-NGINX-on-Bare-Metal-Servers.pdf **https://www.wolfssl.com/wolfSSL/benchmarks-wolfssl.html
  • 24. 24 · www.nic.at Cost Comparison
  • 25. 25 · www.nic.at What‘s the „Magic Number“? • TLS vs. UDP Cost Ratio ~8 (60s idle timeout)
  • 26. 26 · www.nic.at Summary • ENDS Padding – required for Privacy!  RFC7830 - Size recommendations in progress • TLS-DNS Experiments  Use Stubby + Server of your choice • TLS Cost Simulation  The Magic Number is roughly 8.  And, it depends. TLS optimization, cost assumptions  Future work: Better simulation (vary client behaviour), more precise cost factor estimation
  • 27. 27 · www.nic.at nic.at GmbH Jakob-Haringer-Str. 8/V · 5020 Salzburg · Austria T +43 662 4669 -DW · F -29 alexander.mayrhofer@nic.at · www.nic.at