THE MOST HOODWINKED BLACKED OUT AND CENSORED PART OF 23 DIVISION HISTORY-HOW MILITARY HISTORY IS DISTORTED AND TWISTED WHEN IT IS UNPLEASANT Major A.H Amin (Retired) EXTRACT FROM MY BOOK BELOW-HOW LTG ISRAR GHUMMAN INSPIRED THIS SCRIBE

1. THE MOST HOODWINKED BLACKED
OUT AND CENSORED PART OF 23
DIVISION HISTORY-HOW MILITARY
HISTORY IS DISTORTED AND
TWISTED WHEN IT IS UNPLEASANT
Major A.H Amin (Retired)
EXTRACT FROM MY BOOK BELOW :---
THE MOST HOODWINKED BLACKED OUT AND CENSORED PART OF 23 DIVISION
HISTORY-HOW MILITARY HISTORY IS DISTORTED AND TWISTED WHEN IT IS
UNPLEASANT Major A.H Amin (Retired) EXTRACT FROM MY BOOK BELOW
 May 2022
 DOI:
 10.13140/RG.2.2.15209.36965
 Project:
 MILITARY HISTORY
 Agha H Amin

3. When I joined 11 Cavalry (FF) on 27th
March 1983 , I
was sent to the sub caliber ranges , which were to
become the central part of my life throughout my
military career. Somehow I was either sent to sub
caliber ranges whether it was 58 Cavalry or 15
Lancers or I decided to go to sub caliber ranges
when I was in independent command of 5
Independent armoured squadron , this particular
place enriched my knowledge of military history.
The tank crews in 11 Cavalry always discussed one
particular battle and that was battle of Mandiala of
4th
December 1971.
Daffadar Bashir from Pind Dadan Khan was my very
dear friend in 11 Cavalry and later in 58 Cavalry.
His tank was hit at Mandiala , but he being driver
survived, as T 59 drivers being least exposed almost
always do !

5. Bashir narrated the trauma and shock of Mandiala
which Colonel Saeed GSO 1-23 Division , white
washed in his book.

6. Apart from Saeed every Pakistani military historian
who I read , whitewashed or to be more exact
blacked out , the net psychological impact of this
battle , on Pakistani higher commanders , whether
it was the lowest level tank crew of 11 Cavalry or
highest level of Pakistani operational command i.e

7. 23 Division Headquarter including the GOC , Major
General Eftikhar Khan Janjua !
THE PROBLEM WITH WRITING MILITARY HISTORY
The most intricate problem with writing military
history or any type of history is that “events” ,
“feelings of direct participants” etc can be changed
when colonel saeed or anyone writes 23 Divisions
history in 1973, 1979 or today in 2022 !
Saeed’s account “DODGES” the massive “SHOCK
AND TRAUMA” that 11 Cavalry as well as 23 Division
commander and his staff experienced when 11
tanks 1
of 11 Cavalry were hit at Mandiala on 4th
December 1971.
As per 11 Cavalry direct participant other ranks who
I interviewed from 1983 till todate, Mandiala battle
shocked 11 Cavalry as a whole, bottom to top and
1
Page-251- PUNJAB CAVALRY- Colonel Sardar Yahya Effendi –
Oxford University Press-Karachi-2007

8. the atmosphere in the evening was most
demoralizing and gloomy .
The only positive action was that of 4 Punjab and
two tank troops of C Squadron 11 Cavalry led by
Lieutenant Shujaat Ali Janjua who captured
Mandiala North.
Perception and decision making powers of 23
Division was in reality severely shaken on 4th
December 1971 and it is because of this reason that
they failed to note the obvious fact that Mandiala
South had to be cleared if any attack across Tawi
River was to succeed.
This point is totally “ HOODWINKED” by colonel
Saeed and all Pakistani historians who I have so far
read !
LTC Saeed (GSO-1 23 Division) makes a casual
remark that Brigadier Ahmad Jamal met LTC Feroz

9. Alam CO 33 FF at Kamali Chappar and urged him to
take Mandiala South ! 2
GSO 1 Saeed HOODWINKS WHY HQ 23 DIVISION
DID NOTHING TO CAPTURE MANDIALA SOUTH
ALTHOUGH TWO BATTALIONS OF 66 BRIGADE
WERE AVAILABLE TO ATTACK MANDIALA SOUTH
AND TILL NOW HAD SUFFERED PUNY 3 KILLED
CASUALTIES OR EVEN LESS !
This classic hoodwinking and intellectual dishonesty
was not understood when I read Saeed’s book
various times , till my attention was drawn to it by
my dear USTAAD Lt Gen Israr Ghumman when I met
him in 2016 :---
2
Page-46- THE BATTLE OF CHHAMB-1971- Lt Col Ahmad Saeed-
Army Education Press-1973

10. That Saeed states that Brigadier Ahmad Jamal
“urged” Feroz Alam to take Mandiala South on
evening 4th
December , but evades why 23 Division
headquarters both GSO 1 and GOC did nothing
about it.
The only deduction I could arrive at was that the
perception and decision making powers of HQ 23
Division were severely damaged and malfunctioning

11. because of 11 Cavalry’s fiasco at Mandiala ( loss of
11 tanks and third squadron lost and disappeared –
a later hidden and rationalized fact that they were
manoeuvring from right-a totally false claim later
invented and supported by Saeed based on 11
Cavalry claims). That A Squadron was lost on 4th
December 1971 was a much known fact when I
joined 11 Cavalry in March 1983 !
HOODWINKING AND LYING ABOUT ROUTE
ADOPTED BY 33 FF
66TH
brigade was spurred and pushed to act on
clear orders it had been given since start of the war
and thus 33 FF arrived in Mandiala area at about
1200 Hours 5th
December 1971 as per GSO-1 Lt Col
Saeed’s account.3
3
Page-46- THE BATTLE OF CHHAMB-1971-Op cit.

13. But Saeed leaves his books readers about the route
adopted by 33 FF to reach Mandiala North.
This route was to move north , safely bypassing
company of 5 Sikh on Phagla ridge facing 33 FF and
move to Mandiala.
Saeed forever evasive does not tell us why 23
Division did not force 66 Brigades two battalions
who had done nothing apart from clearing puny BSF
, weakly held screens on3rd/4th
December and
suffered 3 or less fatal casualties till now , to attack
and clear Mandiala South !
LTG Ghummman thus brilliantly summed it up as
below :---
AT THIS STAGE OF THE BATTLE , ONE FAILS TO
UNDERSTAND THAT IF 66 BRIGADE WAS
RELUCTANT TO MOVE OUT OF THEIR INITIAL
BRIDGEHEAD WHY HQ 23 DIVISION DID NOT
INTERVENE AND CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE
BRIGADE’S OPERATIONS AND ENSURED THAT 66
BRIGADE MOVE OUT OF THEIR INITIAL
BRIDGEHEAD AND ATTACK MANDIALA SOUTH

14. DURING THE EVENING (4TH
DECEMBER 1971) OR
LATER AFTER LAST LIGHT ? 4
After sitting with LTG Israr Ghumman on 10th
May
2022 I was inspired to draw this map as part of my
book on Chhamb battles :--
4
Conversation with dear LTG Israr Ghumman on 10th
May 2022.

16. I was convinced after sitting with LTG Ghumman
that his “INTELLECTUAL HONESTY” was much
HATED by so called naieve and PEDANTIC
CUSTODIANS OF MILITARY HISTORY sitting in TOPI
Park Rawalpindi !