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REFORM PHILIPPINES COALITION
HEADQUARTERS: 4
th
Floor, VICTORIA ONE BLDG., QUEZON AVENUE CORNER SGT. ESGUERA AVENUE,
METRO...
IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS, ONLY A PARTIAL SOURCE CODE REVIEW, I.E.
THE PCOS SOURCE CODE, WAS CONDUCTED AFTER THE ELECTIONS.
IN...
PAGE THREE
THE CONSEQUENT EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES IS
BEST REPRESENTED BY THE DOCUMENTED CASES IN BILIR...
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Reform Philippines Coalition Press Statement Restore PCOS Security Feature

Chairman: Greco Belgica
Vice Chairman: Atty. Glenn Chong

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Reform Philippines Coalition Press Statement Restore PCOS Security Feature

  1. 1. REFORM PHILIPPINES COALITION HEADQUARTERS: 4 th Floor, VICTORIA ONE BLDG., QUEZON AVENUE CORNER SGT. ESGUERA AVENUE, METROMANILA, PLDT LANDLINE: (02) 546-8450 / email: reformph@yahoo.com MEDIA/PRESS STATEMENT DECEMBER 15, 2015 MANILA YACHT CLUB MANILA OFFICIAL RPC STATEMENT BY: RPC CHAIRMAN GRECO BELGICA MEDIA COMMITTEE & OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN CONTACT NOS: 09175920631 // 09255699777 AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE: ________________________________________ URGENT DEMAND FOR THE COMELEC TO IMMEDIATELY RESTORE THE FOUR (4) PCOS SECURITY FEATURES!! CREDIBLE EVIDENCE HAS RECENTLY COME TO LIGHT WHICH SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED THE LEGITIMACY, INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 2010 AND 2013 AUTOMATED ELECTIONS, ESPECIALLY THOSE INVOLVING THE FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 (AUTOMATED ELECTIONS LAW) ON THE OUTRIGHT REMOVAL AND/OR EFFECTIVE DILUTION OF THE MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES OF THE SMARTMATIC AUTOMATED ELECTIONS SYSTEM, PRIMARILY THE FOLLOWING: 1. BALLOT VERIFICATION (UV DETECTOR) – WHICH IS INTENDED TO PREVENT THE USE OF FAKE BALLOTS AND PREVENT THE PRE- LOADING OF SPURIOUS VOTES INTO THE CF CARDS – IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS, THE UV DETECTORS OF THE PCOS MACHINES WERE NEVER USED PURPORTEDLY FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, I.E. SMARTMATIC SUPPLIED THE WRONG UV INK; THE UV MARK WAS MISALIGNED; THE UV INK WAS NOT PRINTED ACCORDING TO THE REQUIRED DENSITY SPECIFICATIONS, THUS, CAUSING THIS COMMISSION TO PURCHASE 30 MILLION PESOS WORTH OF HANDHELD UV SCANNERS WHICH, ACCORDING TO THE FINAL REPORT OF THE CARTER CENTER’S LIMITED MISSION TO THE MAY 2010 ELECTIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES, WAS OBSERVED IN ONLY A HANDFUL OF POLLING STATIONS (PAGE 32). IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS, AUDIT LOG REPORTS FROM 145 PCOS MACHINES IN BILIRAN SHOWED A TOTAL OF 4,114 BALLOTS WERE ALREADY SCANNED BY THE PCOS MACHINES BEFORE ELECTION DAY, RAISING VERY SERIOUS CONCERNS OF PRE-LOADING OF CF CARDS. 2. SOURCE CODE REVIEW – WHICH IS INTENDED TO INSURE THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM BY SUBJECTING THE SOURCE CODES OF THE ENTIRE ELECTION SYSTEM TO INDEPENDENT REVIEW, TESTING AND FORENSIC EXAMINATION – IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS, NO LESS THAN THEN CHAIRMAN SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., ADMITTED BEFORE THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON THE AES THAT NO SOURCE CODE REVIEW WAS EVER CONDUCTED. PAGE TWO
  2. 2. IN THE 2013 ELECTIONS, ONLY A PARTIAL SOURCE CODE REVIEW, I.E. THE PCOS SOURCE CODE, WAS CONDUCTED AFTER THE ELECTIONS. IN THE ON-GOING SOURCE CODE REVIEW FOR THE 2016 ELECTIONS, WE NOTE THE OBJECTIONS OF A NUMBER OF I.T. PRACTITIONERS THAT A REVIEW INVOLVING “READ-ONLY COPY” AND WITHOUT THE ABILITY TO ACTUALLY TEST THE SOURCE CODES MAKES THE REVIEW INEFFECTIVE AND UNRELIABLE. 3. VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL – WHICH IS INTENDED TO ASSURE THE VOTER THAT HIS VOTES HAD BEEN CORRECTLY READ AND COUNTED BY THE VOTING MACHINE – SECTION 7(E) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 IS QUITE CLEAR IN THAT THE REQUIRED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL MUST BE VOTER VERIFIED AND NOT MERELY A CONGRATULATORY SCREEN MESSAGE CONTAINING NOTHING FOR THE VOTER TO VERIFY HIS VOTES AS HOW THIS COMMISSION INTERPRETED THE LAW IN BOTH 2010 AND 2013 ELECTIONS. THE ELECTION RETURNS AND THE AUDIT LOG REPORTS DO NOT EVEN COME CLOSE AS TO BE CONSIDERED ITS FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT WHEN THE SAME CONTAIN NO DETAILS OF THE VOTER’S VOTES. VOTER VERIFIED PAPER AUDIT TRAIL SIMPLY MEANS THE VOTER’S RECEIPT WHICH ALLOWS HIM TO VERIFY WHETHER OR NOT HIS VOTES WERE CORRECTLY READ AND COUNTED. EFFECTIVE MEASURES CAN BE PUT IN PLACE TO PREVENT THE SELLING OF THE VOTER RECEIPT OUTSIDE THE POLLING PLACES AS FEARED BY THIS COMMISSION BY REQUIRING THE VOTERS TO DROP THEIR RECEIPTS AFTER THEIR PERSONAL VERIFICATION INTO THE OLD YELLOW BALLOT BOXES, WHICH, AFTER THE POLLS CLOSED, CAN BE MANUALLY COUNTED FOR PURPOSES OF VERIFICATION WITH THE AUTOMATED COUNT PRIOR TO TRANSMISSION, THUS PROVIDING TOTAL TRANSPARENCY IN THE COUNTING OF THE VOTES. 4. DIGITAL SIGNATURES – WHICH IS INTENDED TO AUTHENTICATE ALL TRANSMITTED ELECTION RESULTS AND PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF FAKE ELECTION RESULTS VIA UNAUTHORIZED NETWORK INTRUSION OR HACKING – THIS COMMISSION HEAVILY RELIES ON THE CAPALLA DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT AS JUSTIFYING THE USE OF MACHINE DIGITAL SIGNATURES. HOWEVER, THE CASE IS ABOUT THE EXERCISE OF THE OPTION TO PURCHASE THE PCOS MACHINES AND ITS TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES. THE CASE OPINION THAT THE PCOS MACHINES ARE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING DIGITALLY SIGNED TRANSMISSIONS REFERRED TO THE ISSUE OF TECHNICAL CAPABILITY. CAPALLA DID NOT AFFIRM THE ACTUAL USE OF MACHINE DIGITAL SIGNATURES. ADDITIONALLY, COMELEC RESOLUTION 8739 PROMULGATED ON 29 DECEMBER 2009, MENTIONED OF TWO (2) IBUTTONS IN SECTION 33(A). ONE IBUTTON WAS INTENDED AS AN ACCESS DEVICE TO OPEN AND CLOSE THE POLLS WHILE THE OTHER IBUTTON, USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PIN OF EACH OF THE BEIS, WAS INTENDED TO BE USED TO DIGITALLY SIGN THE ELECTIONS RETURNS. HOWEVER, IN THE REVISED VERSION, I.E. COMELEC RESOLUTION 8786 PROMULGATED ON 4 MARCH 2010, IN SECTION 34(A), THIS PROVISION ON IBUTTONS WAS OMITTED. THE SECOND IBUTTON TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PINS OF THE BEIS FOR PURPOSES OF THE DIGITAL SIGNATURE REQUIREMENT WAS NO LONGER PROVIDED. THEREFORE, RESOLUTION 8739 CLEARLY INTENDED TO COMPLY WITH THE LAW WHILE RESOLUTION 8786 CLEARLY SKIRTED WITH THE LAW.
  3. 3. PAGE THREE THE CONSEQUENT EFFECT OF THE ABSENCE OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES IS BEST REPRESENTED BY THE DOCUMENTED CASES IN BILIRAN IN THE 2010 ELECTIONS WHERE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS DOUBLE TRANSMISSION OF RESULTS WERE CLEARLY OBSERVED. NOTABLY, THE COMELEC AND SMARTMATIC HAVE REPEATEDLY REFUSED TO TIMELY AND SERIOUSLY ADDRESS THESE GRAVE PUBLIC CONCERNS DESPITE CLEAR AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE AND THE FILING OF NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ON THE AES, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, THE OMBUDSMAN, AND THE PNP/CIDG (CYBER CRIME UNIT) BY DIFFERENT CIVIL SOCIETY GROUPS AND PERSONALITIES OVER THE COURSE OF FIVE YEARS. THE LEGITIMACY, INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE 2016 ELECTIONS ARE AGAIN SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THE VERY SAME CONTROVERSIAL REMOVAL AND/OR DILUTION OF THE AES SECURITY FEATURES AND THE VERY SAME FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF OUR ELECTION LAWS BY THOSE ENTRUSTED WITH ITS CONDUCT AND MANAGEMENT. HENCE, WE DEMAND, AS INTEGRAL TO THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT OF SUFFRAGE, THE FAITHFUL, FULL AND EFFECTIVE INSTITUTION AND/OR RESTORATION OF ALL THESE FOUR (4) MAJOR SECURITY FEATURES OF THE AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM AS REQUIRED BY LAW. THE HONESTY, TRANSPARENCY AND CREDIBILITY OF OUR ELECTIONS ARE NOT WHAT THIS COMMISSION AND CONTRACTED SUPPLIER SAY IT IS. BUT RATHER, HOW IT IS TRULY PERCEIVED BY THE PEOPLE WHOSE VOTES ARE WHAT THIS COMMISSION IS CONSTITUTIONALLY AND LEGALLY BOUND TO GIVE FULL MEANING AND EFFECT. GRECO BELGICA CHAIRMAN, RPC --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- RPC SECRETARIAT/HEADQUARTERS: 4 th Floor, VICTORIA ONE BLDG., QUEZON AVENUE CORNER SGT. ESGUERA AVENUE, METROMANILA, PLDT LANDLINE: (02) 546-8450 / email: reformph@yahoo.com

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