1. PROSPECTS OF UKRAINE'S COOPERATION WITH EUROPEAN AND
TRANSATLANTIC STRUCTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF UKRAINIAN
IDENTITIES
To have an efficient and adequate discussion on the above subject the scientific
premises must be clearly defined. First of all, it is critical to identify two terms:
"cooperation" and "identity" so that they could be correctly applied in the context of
the problem in question.
We suggest interpreting the term "cooperation" in a broad sense since the notion
of cooperation as such has a sufficiently spacious functional field. This interpretation
is best implemented, in our opinion, in the concept of interactionism. From this stand
point, cooperation is the action that emerges when two or more objects influence
each other and such bilateral influence is key in the concept of interactionism [12, 5-
24; 350]. In concrete implementation this is the system of direct and indirect contacts,
ties, communication relations at individual ana group levels in all strata of public life
whose process is associated with exchange of information, new unions, various joint
projects etc [5, 99-100]. The highest form of cooperation is institutionalized unions
and the most efficient results are achieved when this cooperation takes place in the
framework of these unions (which incidentally can be built as result of this coop-
eration) leading to formation of large interactive societal systems. The example of the
latter is European Council (EC), European Union (EU), NATO, Common Economic
Space (CES) etc.
It is quite evident that identity (identities) of population, groups predominantly
affects elites and broad public attitude toward cooperation and integration of any
country, in our case Ukraine, into European and transatlantic processes and structures
(in a broader sense, interactive systems), and, finally, into the European and in-
ternational space. In this article we will attempt to prove this relationship.
In terms of structure and subjects the arguments will be presented in the following
fashion:
1) First of all, let us be clear about basic in this context notions of "identity",
"identities" and criteria of identity classification in the Ukrainian context; establish
markers for identities, specifically national identities. It should be borne in mind that

2. these markers just as identities have different expressions, at least in three
dimensions: a) in theoretical applications of scientists researching problems of social,
cultural and ethno-political identities; b) in the ways they function in practice; c) in
the way they (markets and finally the identities) are interpreted and implemented by
elite, at least, its composite part that in one way or another establishes or regulates
the process of Ukraine's cooperation and integration into European and transatlantic
structures; 2) consider factors and reasons that affect the content and dynamics of
identities; 3) design ways of overcoming dissensions and strengthening bases of
consolidated Ukrainian identity and coordination of its functioning in the context of
current globalization processes, or in a narrower sense, integration processes; 4) from
multiple transatlantic and European structures for the purposes of this analysis let's
select European Union, European Council, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and others.
These days, the socio-humanitarian sciences abound with numerous notions of
"identity" and its varieties [2]. Having done an in-depth analysis, we suggest using a
generalized definition, which can be used in the context of this discussion, namely in
perspective of Ukraine's prospects of cooperation with international structures and,
undoubtedly, its participation in these structures.
It should be noted that identity is an umbrella term that, on one hand, is used by
the bearer of this identity to express his perception (understanding) of himself as a
complex and special being, and on the other hand as an expression of this individual
perception by other persons. Properly speaking, identity has two facets: internal
related to self-identification of a person and external: its identification by others.
Noteworthy, the other facet is important from perspective of having a possibility to
manipulate the process of building public opinion with regard to any given situation,
in our case, the behavior of individuals developing their position to a set of different
alternatives and also their decision to cast votes for any particular alternative.
The prevailing definition of identity, at least in social and humanitarian sciences is
the following: identity is the process or result of individual's self-identification (by
others) with respect to any given group, territory, country, nation, ethnicity or being
referred to these categories by others [6]. In the framework of external identification

3. identities are usually constructed artificially, very often, depending on the purpose
pursued by those who identify the individual. How well this identification matches
the real state of things depends on level of information and knowledge about the
subject and opportunities of the field where the identification object is located.
Depending on field and classification criteria several types of identities can be
differentiated: 1) spatial and territorial identity: correlation to a concrete place of
residence (local), region (regional), country (geo-political), continent (continental),
the entire world (self-identification as a citizen of the world); 2) political and civic
identity: self-perception as a citizen of a concrete state (civil), being part of a nation:
political nation, nation-state (national), being a member or partisan of political
structures in society (political); 3) social, cultural identity: involvement in social
structures and social relations (social), identification with a certain system of cultural
values (cultural), affinity with a certain ethnic community or quality (ethno-cultural)
characteristics, attributable to this community (ethnic); 4) religious identity:
professing certain religion, beliefs.
For our study most important are two first types of identities, if only from a stand
point that they portrait the results of their generation, i.e., enable us to assess attitudes
of individual citizens and correlate them with real prospects of getting closer to or
farther from international structures. In our context it is important to take into
account another classification of identities: depending on the subject and number of
people aware of their belonging to a certain group identity can be categorized as
individual and collective. This categorization plays a critical role in Ukraine's
position toward possibilities of joining international structures since collective be-
havior prevails over the aggregate of individual thoughts. This becomes extremely
clear during surveys, referenda etc. Another important circumstance is that identity is
always a product of social cooperation between individuals in spatial and territorial,
social, psychological, ethno-cultural, political and civic fields resulting in at least two
essential consequences: 1) production of new identities and, therefore, new types of
groups and institutions; 2) creation of environment where the actors of social process
can engage in a dialogue or confront each other. These specific traits must be
reflected in tie analysis of public opinion surveys and elucidation of their possible

4. impacts on authorities' decision-making process regarding joining (association,
integration) certain international structures or cooperation with them.
I suggest selecting from the multiple factors affecting formation of identities and,
therefore, determination of interactive desires among people and, accordingly, the
pressure they produce on decision making process the following: 1) ethnic
composition (specifics of population structure); 2) residential structure of population
by taking into consideration the ethnic factor; 3) geographical boundaries within the
modern territory of Ukraine (some of its composite parts belong to different ethno-
political bodies – states); 4) political orientation (politization of social life), division
of the Ukrainian territory into different spheres of political influence; 5) migration
(internal and external): 6) extent of cooperation between components of Ukrainian
ethno-national population groups and the countries where these ethnicities are
originated; 7) possibility of raising population awareness on essence of transatlantic
and European structures (regional, ethnic specifics).
The following significant factors should be borne in mind with regard to the ethnic
composition of the Ukrainian population, its residential structure and prevailing
dynamics:
1) availability of autochthonous and allochthonous population (their heirs). The
first group is the category of people who have been permanently living within the
boundaries of today's Ukraine, strictly speaking the Slavic tribes that have laid a
foundation of Ukrainian, Russian and Belarusian ethnoses. The Ukrainian ethnos
(ethnic group) has virtually completely settled down in the territory of Ukraine within
its present boundaries, along with small portions of the Russian and Belarusian
ethnoses. The second category is the ethnic groups who have arrived to Ukraine at
different points of time (Jews, Poles, Armenians, etc). The current multiethnic com-
position of the Ukrainian society was affected by two factors: a) migration, b)
emergence of new independent nations from the ancient Slavic tribes that had resided
in the territory of Kyivan Rus.
2) since consistent patterns and singularities in formation and dynamics of the
Ukrainian ethnic composition can be traced back on the example of different
ethnoses settling down in this territory at different historical periods this factor must

5. be considered in this study. The overall color of ethno-national palette is undoubtedly
determined by the most numerous ethnic communities and communities with well-
rooted cultural and ethno-demographic traditions. In this context it should be
mentioned that the residential structure of Ukrainian ethnic communities are
characterized by their predominantly disperse settlement pattern although in some
regions there are still some densely populated areas where representatives of certain
ethnoses make up a significant percentage of the regional populace. We focused
mostly the ethnic communities that have a potential of affecting attitude of the
Ukrainian society toward Ukraine's cooperation with international structures and at
the same time are subject of informational impact from interested circles in ethnic
motherlands: Poles, Russians, Romanians, Slovaks, Hungarians and Moldovans.
According to recent statistic censuses today compact settlements of the Russians
are most spread in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Sumy and Donetsk Oblasts and in the south of
Mikolaiv, Kherson and Odesa Oblasts. The regions with considerable concentration
of the Russian include also Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kyiv. These are seats of
predominant Russian ethnic community. The most prominent concentration of the
Russians among other ethnicities can be observed the Autonomous Republic of
Crimea (over 50%). Belarusians reside mostly in the border areas between Republic
of Belarus and Ukraine. Historically, the Poles in Ukraine have been living in the
Western Galicia and sporadically across the Dnieper River. These days the most part
of Ukrainian Poles reside in the mixed Ukrainian-Polish villages of Vinnitsa,
Khmelnitsk and Zhitomir Oblasts and in cities of Kyiv, Lviv, Rivne and Chernivtsi.
Another Ukrainian minority are Moldovans: the compact Moldavian settlements can
be found in the border Ukrainian regions.
Representatives of other large minorities such as Hungarians, Romanians, Greeks
and Armenians appeared in Ukraine under different circumstances. For example the
Hungarians settled down in the territory of today's Transcarpathian Oblast
(Zakarpattya) in 9th century. Interethnic relations in the regions where Hungarian
mentality and traditions remain quite prominent are still characterized by a specific
impression that can be traced back to the multiethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. The
first Romanians settlements in Ukraine have been founded by the villagers who came

6. from the south-western Wallachia and southern Transylvania. As in the above
example, ethnic Romanian communities play an important role in the current
political life of the region.
It should be remembered that ethno-national dynamics can not be measured
exclusively by quantitative parameters; qualitative characteristics must also be
considered. The latter are related to ethnocultural traditions that tend to change and
transform as the result of cooperation between representatives of different ethnic
communities within the same ethno-political body (EPB), the Ukrainian state in our
case. We are talking about characteristics that have been acquired in the process of
community's historical evolution and shaped predominantly by their affiliation with a
certain group, community of nations. Noteworthy in Ukraine the natives of 14
communities of nations (of total 58 across the globe) and 18 groups (of total 300) [8]
can be found.
This represents a factor significant for this analysis: polyethnicity of Ukrainian
population and compact settlement pattern of some of its components (Poles,
Russians, Rumanians, Hungarians).
The following factor to be considered is that some parts of present-day Ukrainian
territory belonged to different ethno-political bodies at different historical periods
and their proximity or considerable distance from the ethnic origin counties. For
information, throughout different time periods the territories of the modern Ukraine
have been part of the following states: Austria-Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania,
Czechoslovakia. Today Ukraine borders: with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary in the
west; Moldova and Romania in south-west; with Belarus and Russia in the north and
south east. The fact that historically different parts of Ukrainian population resided in
other states whose "neighborly" cooperation impacts the attitude of Ukrainian
citizens toward international structures is hard to overestimate. Consequently we
have to deal with another factor that influences formation of identities (consolidated
and individual, i.e., situational): the existence of border areas where different
identities arise as a product of an intensive cooperation between bearers of different
ethnicities [1]; these identities, according to our observations, prevent the Ukrainian

7. population from building a solid perspective toward potential Ukraine's integration
with international bodies.
Dependence of attitudes although possibly of different nature on the party and
political factors cannot be discounted either. The recent sociological surveys
(especially those that are held in the eve of presidential and parliamentary elections)
clearly demonstrate the existence of "party and political influence zones" correlating
predominantly with certain regions if not in form of a well-defined (stable) umbrella
identity at least by situational one. In this article I will not dwell on these political
forces and will limit myself only by stating this fact as a given. This argument
appears all too important for the logic of weighting different factors affecting for-
mation of identities (artificial to some extent – as in this case), attitude of population
throughout geographical regions and finally the prospects of Ukraine's entry
(integration) into transatlantic and European structures. This is especially evident in
cases (such as NATO) where people find themselves at opposite extremes and the
only way out is to hold a referendum. Systematic research made by sociologists from
Institute of Sociology, the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences (Ukrainian
society. Sociological monitoring) and Olexander Rozumkov Center or Economic and
Political Studies provides a vast amount of data that can be used to draw conclusions
on the prospect of Ukraine's cooperation with international bodies. This issue was
scrutinized in a number of concrete studies, first of all surveys, such as: 1) research
project "Lviv-Donetsk" authored by Lviv researchers in 1994, 1999 and 2004; 2)
project "Polyvalent identities in modern Ukraine: can they close the gap between
East and West?» performed in 2010 jointly by the Ivan Franko Lviv State University
and Michigan State University (USA); 3) survey of Ukrainian ethnic communities
held in 2003 under the supervision of Professor Volodymyr Yevtukh (then at the
Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University) and Professor Vicki L. Hesli (Iowa
State University, USA); 4) research project "Regions in Ukraine: dynamics,
movements and politics"; 5) joint project of the Ukrainian NAS Institute of
Sociology and the Institute of Sociology (Russian Academy of Sciences) "National
Civil Identities and Tolerance. Experience of Russia and Ukraine in the
Transformation Period"; 6) Rozumkov Center analytical report "Crimean AR:

8. people, problems, prospects" (societal, political, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional
relations in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea); 7) project "Social transformations
in border areas – Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova"; 8) project "Interaction of European,
national and regional identities: nations between states along new eastern borders of
the European Union" that is performed by researchers from ten countries: seven from
the EU and three from Commonwealth of Independent States. The results of this
research make it possible to establish certain vectors in preferences among the
population of these ethnic regions, in particular to what extent these regions (via
opinion of their population) associate their future with an independent state or with
neighboring states; how they perceive prospects of cooperation between Ukraine and
European or transatlantic structures.
Migration factor has always been conspicuous in the formation processes of
Ukrainian nation [9, 51-68], and today its impact on different areas of social life in
our country becomes even more prominent; this impact can be felt also in the area
under analysis. In this sense closer attention should be paid to relations between
migration processes and the prospects on Ukraine's entry into the European and
international social, cultural spaces, specifically by joining structured institutions
that define predominant if not absolute development trends (especially for European
countries). Two observations can be made in this conjecture: a) Ukraine becomes an
even more active player in these processes, meaning it is simultaneously the country
the migrants enter and the country the migrants exit. By the way, for this analysis
Ukraine is more attractive as a county of entry; b) a rather significant number of
people prone to migration tend to be more open-minded with respect to euro-inte-
gration prospects of Ukraine than those who are not considering immigration as an
option. The certain potential of strengthening Europe- and transatlantic-center
trends should be looked for among people who are predisposed to migration or –
strictly speaking – emigration since the most of those individuals who think about
emigration think about going to European countries, the United States of America
and Canada.
Let's now review the analysis of interface between components of ethno-national
structure in Ukrainian society (ethnic communities – national minorities) and their

9. origin countries in the context of the problem in question. The question is how these
factors influence consolidation of Ukrainian society in terms of building the
Ukrainian political (related to the single Ukrainian ethno-political body – the state)
identity, which determines its unity and opens the possibilities of addressing urgent,
sometimes controversial issues of social development. Historically the most
intensive this cooperation was with the origin countries sharing with Ukraine the
same border. In this sense, two group of countries and consequently two groups of
influence can be identified (we are talking first of all about ethnic factor – an
influence that is produced by supporting certain ideas generated in these countries);
1) north-eastern: Russia and Belarus; 2) western and south-western: Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Hungary. We exclude from this list Moldova, which holds a
stand-alone position since it hardly affects to any noticeable extent the progress of
Ukraine (in political meaning of this word) process of identity consolidation. In this
context its influence (i.e., the influence that can be expressed through the Moldavian
ethnicity in Ukrainian society) is conflict breeding: on one side there is Russia
(through factor of Dniester region that is totally suppressed by Russia) who wants to
shape the public opinion of Ukrainian Moldavians on a number of issues, on the
other side there is a significant Romanian dominance in the mindset of Moldavians
residing in Ukraine.
The analysis of these two influence groups leads to conclude that they operate in
opposite directions. The Russian side is keen on severing Ukraine from European
integration processes (or at least interfere with them) and isolating it from
transatlantic opportunities. The other side (especially, Poland) quite on the contrary
is set on strengthening integration ambitions of certain Ukrainian population groups
and Ukrainian authorities. The most obvious this desire could be felt when Poland
assumed the presidency of the European Union (second half of 2011). These days the
examples of such political divergences are abundant; one has only to compare some
official declarations and concrete actions made by different players and the reactions
among ethnic communities related by their origin to the above countries and to look
at pro-Russian politicians.

10. The awareness of Ukrainian population, in particular of other ethnic affiliations
also plays a significant role in formation of consolidated identities, primarily with
regard to the attitude toward Ukraine's integration with European and transatlantic
institutionalized structures. Information can be provided in two basic ways: either 1)
directly in Ukraine by mediation of the Ukrainian public and non-governmental
organizations and international centers operating under the auspices of European
Union, European Council, NATO center etc., or 2) through representatives of ethnic
homelands visiting Ukraine or through communication with representatives of the
ethnoses residing either in their homeland or in Ukraine, usually, the Russian
ethnoses since this kind of communication is most widely spread among the natives
of the Russian ethnic community in Ukraine. It should be mentioned that the
information influence related to integration attitudes is only a part, possibly not
substantial one, of the entire body of data that are created by the above means.
Contrary to information from the first source which is measurable the second source
is out of control since here information is generated from different points of origin:
meetings between Russian politicians and the Russian diaspora in Ukraine, provision
of nongovernmental organizations run by the Russian national minority with mass
media means, convening the global meetings of Russian diaspora in Russia etc. The
same situation can be observed also among representatives of diasporas whose ethnic
homelands lie west of Ukraine. The distinction between the two is that in the first
case bulk of information data is directed at forging an image of international
structures, first of all, NATO that does not stimulate the euro- and transatlantic
aspirations, in particular among the representatives of pro-Russian portion of the
Ukrainian society, and in the second case quite on the contrary: integration of
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary in the international structures objectively
promotes maintaining and strengthening such aspirations. However in any event the
flows of information generated within respective ethnic communities have a
distinctive regional color: compact residence seats of various ethnic communities
(Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Transcarpathian and Chernivetska Oblasts).
In our context it hardly makes sense to dwell on the quality of information, let us
take just a few examples instead. For the purpose of this study it is sufficient to

11. account for this factor in measurement of problems associated with formation of a
single (we consciously do not apply the word "unified") Ukrainian identity, at least
with regard to the problem that is debated in this article.
Let us provide several excerpts of social monitoring research that the Institute of
Sociology, the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences has been performing since
1992 to illustrate dependence of Ukrainian identities, in particular consolidated
identity, on the above factors.
1. What direction of national development do you think is preferential for
Ukraine? (let's differentiate four positions inter-related with the proposed analysis
(1994 – 2010): focus on relations within framework of CIS countries: 40.5 to 12.5%;
develop relations predominantly with Russia: 16.6 to 10.5%; strengthen eastern-
Slavic block (Ukraine, Russia, Belarus): 23.7 (1998) to 29.8% (the highest index was
in 2004 – 34.3%); establish relations with the developed countries of the West: 12.6 –
17.7%.
2. What is your position to ... Ukraine joining the European Union (2000-2010):
rather agree: 56.0 to 44.1%; rather disagree: 9.6 to 18.8% (the highest index was in
2005: 19.9%); hard to say: 34.4 to 36.9% (the highest index was in 2002: 40.1%).
3. What is your position to ... Ukraine joining NATO (2000–2010): rather agree:
24.9 to 12.7%; rather disagree: 33.5 to 64.4% (the highest index was in 2006: 64.4%);
hard to say: 42.6 to 24.1% (the highest index was in 2002: 42.6%) [10, 494-496].
So far the Ukrainian sociology lacks sufficient data to draw generalized
conclusions about the extent of influence produced by regional or ethnic factors on
variations in identities building process that is directly related to the prospects of
Ukrainian cooperation with international structures. However they are sufficient to
discover some consistent patterns. The research project "Lviv-Donetsk" performed
by the Lviv researchers in 1994, 1999 and 2004 is sufficiently representative to
mirror mindsets predominant across different regions with regard to cooperation with
international structures [8, 317-334].
In the context of this study, most indicative are responses to the question: "What
possible options of the future national development are preferential to you?": Ukraine
remains completely independent, non-block state (apparently not a NATO member):

12. Lviv (62.2; 43.2; 41.6%), Donetsk (13.3; 18.5; 25.8%); Ukraine becomes a large part
of the union that comprises Russia: Lviv (5.4; 2.3; 2.5%), Donetsk (57.0; 47.0;
55.6%); Ukraine becomes a part of the European Union: Lviv (25.2; 47.3; 47.4%),
Donetsk (18.0; 21.5; 6.1%); Ukraine becomes a part of the large union comprising
Central and Eastern European countries: Lviv (5.9; 6.7; 8.3%), Donetsk (6.6; 12.7;
8.1%). Similarly significant is the response to the question about the extent of
possible cooperation with differently oriented structures. Closer relations with Russia
and CIS are regarded as priority in Lviv by 14.1% (1999) and 9.4% (2004), in
Donetsk by 73.8 and 87.2%; Closer relations with the USA and NATO countries are
regarded as priority in y Lviv by 59.2 and 51.5%, in Donetsk by 10.5 and 1.6%.
Some researchers looking for other arguments in the discourse on the issues of
cooperation between Ukraine and international structures choose to use the data of
sociological surveys on the attitudes of Ukrainian citizens to such important (in our
opinion) phenomena of the social life (social thought) as "national idea" and "cultural
tradition". The first (as we think) is a virtual notion (nurtured mostly by politicians
and researchers and rather weakly, systematically, accepted by the public opinion);
the other one is rather real and more comprehensible to great number of Ukrainians.
One of the recent similar studies (2007) (as was demonstrated above) shows that
most Ukrainians (65%) believe that today the national idea is nothing but a notion.
For our case it is interesting to observe the difference in responses across regions: as
it appears the differences are almost non-existent. The divergence emerges between
respondents who believe that the national idea really exists: western oblasts: 15%;
center and eastern oblasts: approximately 8-9%. Let's not go too deep into what
Ukrainians residing in different regions believe the "national idea" is about but note
instead that understanding (perception) of this word remains unclear: to 30%
Ukrainians in western and 43% in south-western oblasts [14]. Speaking about the
national idea it is worthwhile to consider it in conjunction with such phenomenon as
"patriotism". The responses to the question posed in Olexander Rozumkov Center's
survey held in the eve of the 2009 Independence Day: "Do you consider yourself the
patriot of Ukraine?" the clearly positive answers across regions were distributed in
the following fashion: West – 56.3, Center – 35.2, South – 31.8, East – 33.4% [3].

13. On the other hand, the prospects of building the solid system of cultural tradition
look somewhat brighter, which can positively influence the attitude of Ukrainian
toward various phenomena of the country's social development. The reasons for this
assertion are provided by the above mentioned survey "Culture and arts": 60 percent
of respondents identify themselves as representatives of the Ukrainian cultural
tradition; to say the truth, however, this opinion is not shared equally across different
regions: 84% in the West, 77% in Center, 39% in South-East. Another survey
(Olexander Rozumkov Center, December 2005) confirms the previous findings and
provides new ones that define more specifically our reflections with regard to
possible influence of cultural tradition on building consolidated identities among
Ukrainian citizens. This path apparently remains strenuous: one year after, the
number of "Soviet cultural tradition" proponents grew to 19.4% (as opposed to
16.4%); among ethnic Ukrainians only 43.1% believe that the "Ukrainian national
cultural tradition" will prevail in future; 21.0% believe that in different regions
cultural traditions are also different and 18.7 prefer the "pan-European tradition" [7].
Identification matrix of the Ukrainian population can be supplemented by other
data showing what territories and political and territorial formations Ukrainians
residing in different regions believe they belong to. These data can be found in the
research done by the Olexander Rozumkov Center or Economic and Political Studies
(they are most trustworthy): the following percentage of respondents believe
themselves to be the residents of area or city/town where they live: 39.4 in the West,
43.1 in the Center, 29.8 in the South, 37.0% in the East (38.2% across Ukraine); the
following percentage of respondents believe themselves to be the residents of the
region where they live: 15.4, 22.9, 24.5, 19.1% (20.4%) respectively; or residents of
Ukraine as a country: 34.8, 25.2, 35.8, 32.0% (30.7%); or residents of Europe: 2.4,
1.8, 3.3, 0.2% (1.6%); or residents of the world: 4.0, 1.4, 1.0, 3.3% (2.9%) [4].
The sociological research performed jointly by the Ukrainian and American
Universities has also provided interesting data: they confirmed our thesis about direct
relationship between three factors (ethnic origin, residential structure and political
and party preferences) and the nature of Ukrainian identity formation and content.
The survey targeted representatives from seven ethnic communities (Ukrainians,

14. Russians, Crimean Tatars, Poles, Hungarians, Jews, Gypsies) in four social, cultural
regions (Western Ukraine, Center Ukraine, Eastern Ukraine, Southern Ukraine).
Regarding the residential structure, it was discovered that: 1) the most compact
residence pattern is characteristic for Crimean Tatars (Autonomous Republic of
Crimea – almost 99%) and Hungarians (Transcarpathian Oblast – almost 97%); 2)
the average level of compact residence pattern is characteristic for the Poles and
Gypsies; 3) rather dispersed residence pattern is characteristic for the Russians (in
some oblasts however their residence concentration was rather high: 33 to 56 %
(Kharkiv, Donetsk, Lugansk Oblasts and Crimea); 4) the highest level of dispersion
is characteristic for Ukrainians. For our analysis two groups of questions have been
most relevant: 1) questions related to respondents' attitude toward group of countries
and international organizations (USA, Russia, Germany, European Union, NATO);
2) questions related to assessment of relations with European countries, USA and
Russia. The general typology looks as follows: Ukrainians, Hungarians, Crimean
Tatars, Poles across all regions tend to be by far more (as compared with Ukraine's
average) attached to the idea of joining international structures and NATO (the data
of this ethno-sociological research have been compared with data of the above men-
tioned research); Russians gave most of their preferences to Russia, favored less the
idea of joining the European Union and almost completely rejected the idea of
joining NATO; the Jews across all indices remained in the middle of the preferential
hierarchy; the Gypsies have been uncertain in most cases. Special perspective was
exhibited by the Crimean Tatars when they have been asked about their attitude to
the Middle East countries: their preferences have been rather high [13, 1-28].
To summarize, the analysis of concrete sociological data, historical factors, nature
of political process, logical substantiation of interrelations between different
phenomena and events, their interface and analysis of some other factors allows
drawing the following conclusion about relations between Ukrainian identities and
prospects of Ukraine's cooperation with international structures, in particular its
integration into some of these structures:
1) Polyethnic structure of Ukrainian population has not as yet become, as it is
believed in Europe [14], the factor of ethno-political health and strength. Ethnic

15. communities in Ukraine remain in the middle of their restoration (such possibility
has appeared after Ukraine has acquired independence and launched democratic
processes, in particular those in the area of ethno-national development), which
stimulates disintegration processes, impels ethnic communities to focus most efforts
on their internal problems and compete for more comfortable (more prestigious)
niches in a social (and sometimes political) hierarchy of the Ukrainian society. The
latter results sometimes in hidden, if not open, confrontation preventing Ukrainians
from adopting a consolidated decision about Ukraine's cooperation with European
and Transatlantic structures and deferring the prospect of its integration with these
structures;
2) The Ukrainian society exhibits two clearly defined trends in the attitudes
toward Ukraine's cooperation with international structures: a) promoting
collaboration with Russia and integration into structures inspired by Russia; b)
making further progress to mutual understanding with and participation in European
and Transatlantic organizations. In the first case the trend gets all the more
pronounced from West to East and in the other case on the contrary from East to
West. A very important role in this process is played by regional factor and to some
extent by ethnic composition of Ukrainian population;
3) The relatively significant Russian component in the ethno- national
composition of the Ukrainian population, and in a broader sense, the so-called
Russian-speaking community apparently remaining under influence of Russia's
ideology (rejecting the Ukraine's euro-integration aspirations) is not willing to see
out country at the head of these processes, decreases Ukraine's integration potential
and reinforces the pro-eastern trends in the Ukrainian society;
4) A clearly defined regional aspect of political factor resulting in different
preferences and loyalties to Ukraine's development, as confirmed by the above
sociological surveys, does not contribute to consolidation of efforts in Ukrainian
society toward support of euro – and transatlantic aspirations and defers Ukraine's
entry into international structures;
5) Outflow of Ukrainian citizens, especially those who support western
orientation, undermines the process of building integral identity of population

16. inclined to closer cooperation between Ukraine and the western international
structures.
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