SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 29
Dirty Little Secret


Mobile Applications Invading Your Privacy
Presenter Background
Are Mobile Applications Really
    Invading My Privacy?
Mobile Device Risks at Every Layer

  APPLICATION: Apps with vulnerabilities and malicious code have access
   to your data and device sensors
      » Your device isn’t rooted but all your email and pictures are stolen,
        your location is tracked, and your phone bill is much higher than
        usual.

  OS: Defects in kernel code or vendor supplied system code
      » iPhone or Android jailbrakes are usually exploiting these defects

  HARDWARE: Baseband layer attacks
      » Memory corruption defects in firmware used to root your device
      » Demonstrated at CCC/Black Hat DC 2011 by Ralf-Philipp
        Weinmann

  NETWORK: Interception of data over the air.
      » Mobile WiFi has all the same problems as laptops
      » GSM has shown some cracks. Chris Paget demo DEFCON 2010
Mobile Device Risks at Every Layer

  APPLICATION: Apps with vulnerabilities and malicious code have access
   to your data and device sensors
      » Your device isn’t rooted but all your email and pictures are stolen,
        your location is tracked, and your phone bill is much higher than
        usual.

  OS: Defects in kernel code or vendor supplied system code
      » iPhone or Android jailbrakes are usually exploiting these defects

  HARDWARE: Baseband layer attacks
      » Memory corruption defects in firmware used to root your device
      » Demonstrated at CCC/Black Hat DC 2011 by Ralf-Philipp
        Weinmann

  NETWORK: Interception of data over the air.
      » Mobile WiFi has all the same problems as laptops
      » GSM has shown some cracks. Chris Paget demo DEFCON 2010
10.9 billion mobile apps downloaded
     in 2010, according to IDC




                        Expected to rise to
                     76.9 billion apps by 2014
3rd Party Applications                                                                     … and account for most of
Process Most of the Data…                                                                  the vulnerabilities




3rd Party Application processing of PII, critical and                                      % of Vulnerability Disclosures Attributed to Top Ten
confidential data                                                                          Vendors

March 2009 online Forrester survey of 204 Application and Risk Management Professionals.    IBM X-Force® 2008 Trend and Risk Report
Software Value Chain Complexity Makes it Impossible to
Develop Secure Software
                                                               Crowd Sourced              Current Solutions Inadequate
   Internal Teams                                                Developers
  Dev Site A Dev Site B
                                                                                         Security Consultants
                                                                                            • Very expensive
                                                                                              • In short supply
                                                                         iPhone          • Time to results too long
         Dev Site C                                                       Apps
                                           Crowd
                            Internal      Sourcing                                                  Tools
                                                                                          • Do not scale across sites
             Open                             3rd Party                                     • Very high noise ratio
            Source         Open               Software          Software Vendors         • Can not test 3rd party code
                          Source                                     SYMC         MSFT   • Separation of duties issue

                                     Outsourced
                                                                                                Developers
                                            Offshore                                     • Do not know how to write
                                                                            Oracle                secure code
                                            Provider
                                                                                           • Prioritize time-to-ship,
                                                                                           functionality over security

                                                                                                Processes
                                                                                            • Difficult to implement
                           Eastern                 China                                      • Years to fine tune
                           Europe          India                                         • Low adoption (< 1% of US
                                Contractors                                                companies CMMI Level 5
                                                                                                     certified)
                                                     Unknown
                                                      Skills
Case Study – Pandora Radio




                             9
WSJ Breaks Story on Pandora Investigation




                  “Federal prosecutors in New
                  Jersey are investigating
                  whether numerous
                  smartphone applications
                  illegally obtained or
                  transmitted information
                  about their users without
                  proper disclosures”


                                                10
Static Analysis

  Analysis of software performed without
   actually executing the program
  Full coverage of the entire source or
   binary

  In theory, having full application
   knowledge can reveal a wider range of
   bugs and vulnerabilities than the “trial
   and error” of dynamic analysis
  Impossible to identify vulnerabilities
   based on system configuration that exist
   only in the deployment environment
JD-Gui Analysis




                  12
AdMob Location Requests




                          13
AdMob android_id Request




                           14
Medialets Location Requests




                              15
Medialets android_id Requests




                                16
SecureStudies getDeviceId Request




                                    17
Android Manifest Permissions
   ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES         DISABLE_KEYGUARD               RECEIVE_SMS
   ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION            DUMP                           RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH
   ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION              EXPAND_STATUS_BAR              RECORD_AUDIO
   ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMAN      FACTORY_TEST                   REORDER_TASKS
    DS                                FLASHLIGHT                     RESTART_PACKAGES
   ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION              FORCE_BACK                     SEND_SMS
   ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE              GET_ACCOUNTS                   SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER
   ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER            GET_PACKAGE_SIZE               SET_ALARM
   ACCESS_WIFI_STATE                 GET_TASKS                      SET_ALWAYS_FINISH
   ACCOUNT_MANAGER                   GLOBAL_SEARCH                  SET_ANIMATION_SCALE
   AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS             HARDWARE_TEST                  SET_DEBUG_APP
   BATTERY_STATS                     INJECT_EVENTS                  SET_ORIENTATION
   BIND_APPWIDGET                    INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER      SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS
   BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN                 INSTALL_PACKAGES               SET_PROCESS_LIMIT
   BIND_INPUT_METHOD                 INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW         SET_TIME
   BIND_REMOTEVIEWS                  INTERNET                       SET_TIME_ZONE
   BIND_WALLPAPER                    KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES      SET_WALLPAPER
   BLUETOOTH                         MANAGE_ACCOUNTS                SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS
   BLUETOOTH_ADMIN                   MANAGE_APP_TOKENS              SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES
   BRICK                             MASTER_CLEAR                   STATUS_BAR
   BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED         MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS          SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ
   BROADCAST_SMS                     MODIFY_PHONE_STATE             SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_WRITE
   BROADCAST_STICKY                  MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS       SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW
   BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH                MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS      UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS
   CALL_PHONE                        NFC                            USE_CREDENTIALS
   CALL_PRIVILEGED                   PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY            USE_SIP
   CAMERA                            PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS         VIBRATE
   CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STA      READ_CALENDAR                  WAKE_LOCK
    TE                                READ_CONTACTS                  WRITE_APN_SETTINGS
   CHANGE_CONFIGURATION              READ_FRAME_BUFFER              WRITE_CALENDAR
   CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE              READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS         WRITE_CONTACTS
   CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE       READ_INPUT_STATE               WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE
   CHANGE_WIFI_STATE                 READ_LOGS                      WRITE_GSERVICES
   CLEAR_APP_CACHE                   READ_PHONE_STATE               WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS
   CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA               READ_SMS                       WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
   CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES          READ_SYNC_SETTINGS             WRITE_SETTINGS
   DELETE_CACHE_FILES                READ_SYNC_STATS                WRITE_SMS
   DELETE_PACKAGES                   REBOOT                         WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS
   DEVICE_POWER                      RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED
   DIAGNOSTIC                        RECEIVE_MMS
Permissions Requested by Pandora Application


 Network Communication                                       Phone Calls
   »   Full Internet Access                                          » Read Phone State and Identity
   »   Create Bluetooth Connections
   »   View Network State                                     System Tools
   »   View Wi-Fi State                                              »    Modify Global System Settings
                                                                     »    Prevent Device From Sleeping
 Your Personal Information                                          »    Bluetooth Administration
   » Read Contact Data                                               »    Change Wi-Fi State
   » Add or Modify Calendar Events and                               »    Change Network Connectivity
     Send Email To Guests                                            »    Automatically Start at Boot




              https://market.android.com/details?id=com.pandora.android&feature=search_result – 4/25/2011
                                                                                                            19
Just A Bit Deeper...




                Google purchases AdMob for $750
                million dollars. Closed May, 2010

                                                    20
ESPN, CBS Interactive, Geico, Starbucks…

            100,000 – 500,000 installations
            Permissions:
            • FINE (GPS) LOCATION
            • COARSE (NETWORK-BASED) LOCATION
            • FULL INTERNET ACCESS

            5,000,000 – 10,000,000 installation
            Permissions:
            • RECORD AUDIO
            • CHANGE YOUR AUDIO SETTINGS
            • FINE (GPS) LOCATION
            • COARSE (NETWORK-BASED) LOCATION
            • FULL INTERNET ACCESS
            • MODIFY/DELETE USB STORAGE CONTENTS MODIFY/DELETE SD CARD
              CONTENTS
            • PREVENT DEVICE FROM SLEEPING




                Permissions retrieved from official Android Marketplace on 4/25/2011   21
CBSNews Advertising Networks




                               22
TV.Com Advertising Networks




                              23
Taking a Proactive Stance




                   “… the popular
                   Internet radio service is
                   removing third-party
                   advertising platforms,
                   including Google,
                   AdMeld and
                   Medialets.”

                                               24
What Can Be Reliably            Detected?

 The problem is determining intent
 FP/FN tradeoffs with “unauthorized” behaviors
    » e.g. Is it good or bad that the app uses GPS?

 Actual vulnerabilities are more straightforward
 Think differently – behavioral profiling?
Best Practice: Embed Security Acceptance Testing
into Contracts
   Software contracts typically focus on features,
    functions, maintenance and delivery timeframes

   Enterprises can embed security language into contracts
    »     New purchases or maintenance renewals are
          optimal times to introduce security

   Security testing is not functional testing, the contract
    should specify:
    »     Specific security measures (for example, static
          analysis (code review), dynamic testing,
          penetration testing)
    »     Specific process that should be used for testing
    »     Acceptance thresholds for testing
    »     Vulnerability correction rules
Best Practice: Purchase from Rated-Approved
COTS Vendors
   Make security a formal part of your vendor/product
    selection criteria

   Involve Vendor Relations/Procurement

   Purchase from COTS vendors that have established
    security certifications and independent ratings

   Look for security related certifications to indicate
    vendor commitment:
    »    Common Criteria
    »    FIPS-140-2
    »    PA-DSS (Visa PABP)
    »    VerAfied Mark
Best Practice: Leverage the Power of Community

    Pooling the purchasing power of peer
     organizations to create demand for
     secure software
    Vendors will react to fill a market need

    Creating a community
    » User Groups
    » Customer Advisory Boards
    » Vendor Relations/Procurement
Questions?

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Semelhante a Dirty Little Secret - Mobile Applications Invading Your Privacy

More Apps More Problems
More Apps More ProblemsMore Apps More Problems
More Apps More ProblemsTyler Shields
 
Defending Behind the Mobile Device
Defending Behind the Mobile DeviceDefending Behind the Mobile Device
Defending Behind the Mobile DeviceTyler Shields
 
The New Mobile Landscape - OWASP Ireland
The New Mobile Landscape - OWASP IrelandThe New Mobile Landscape - OWASP Ireland
The New Mobile Landscape - OWASP IrelandTyler Shields
 
IT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every Layer
IT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every LayerIT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every Layer
IT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every LayerTyler Shields
 
Vulnerability Management
Vulnerability ManagementVulnerability Management
Vulnerability Managementjustinkallhoff
 
Crafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & Veracode
Crafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & VeracodeCrafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & Veracode
Crafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & VeracodeDigital Defense Inc
 
The Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and Monitoring
The Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and MonitoringThe Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and Monitoring
The Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and MonitoringCorrelsense
 
Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012
Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012
Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012Andris Soroka
 
Security Testing Mobile Applications
Security Testing Mobile ApplicationsSecurity Testing Mobile Applications
Security Testing Mobile ApplicationsDenim Group
 
Debunking Common Myths of Mobile Application Development
Debunking Common Myths of Mobile Application DevelopmentDebunking Common Myths of Mobile Application Development
Debunking Common Myths of Mobile Application DevelopmentAntenna Software
 
Application Security Program Management with Vulnerability Manager
Application Security Program Management with Vulnerability ManagerApplication Security Program Management with Vulnerability Manager
Application Security Program Management with Vulnerability ManagerDenim Group
 
Deliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CT
Deliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CTDeliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CT
Deliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CTPerfecto by Perforce
 
Peuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Peuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the WinPeuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Peuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the WinDroidcon Berlin
 
Offensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseOffensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseChristiaan Beek
 
Jan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Jan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the WinJan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Jan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the WinDroidcon Berlin
 
Jornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: Alljoyn
Jornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: AlljoynJornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: Alljoyn
Jornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: Alljoynvideos
 

Semelhante a Dirty Little Secret - Mobile Applications Invading Your Privacy (20)

More Apps More Problems
More Apps More ProblemsMore Apps More Problems
More Apps More Problems
 
Defending Behind the Mobile Device
Defending Behind the Mobile DeviceDefending Behind the Mobile Device
Defending Behind the Mobile Device
 
The New Mobile Landscape - OWASP Ireland
The New Mobile Landscape - OWASP IrelandThe New Mobile Landscape - OWASP Ireland
The New Mobile Landscape - OWASP Ireland
 
IT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every Layer
IT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every LayerIT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every Layer
IT Hot Topics - Mobile Security Threats at Every Layer
 
Vulnerability Management
Vulnerability ManagementVulnerability Management
Vulnerability Management
 
Mobile Security
Mobile SecurityMobile Security
Mobile Security
 
Mobile Apps Security
Mobile Apps SecurityMobile Apps Security
Mobile Apps Security
 
Crafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & Veracode
Crafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & VeracodeCrafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & Veracode
Crafting Super-Powered Risk Assessments by Digital Defense Inc & Veracode
 
The Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and Monitoring
The Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and MonitoringThe Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and Monitoring
The Essentials of Mobile App Performance Testing and Monitoring
 
Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012
Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012
Lumension Security - Adjusting our defenses for 2012
 
Security Testing Mobile Applications
Security Testing Mobile ApplicationsSecurity Testing Mobile Applications
Security Testing Mobile Applications
 
Android system security
Android system securityAndroid system security
Android system security
 
Debunking Common Myths of Mobile Application Development
Debunking Common Myths of Mobile Application DevelopmentDebunking Common Myths of Mobile Application Development
Debunking Common Myths of Mobile Application Development
 
Application Security Program Management with Vulnerability Manager
Application Security Program Management with Vulnerability ManagerApplication Security Program Management with Vulnerability Manager
Application Security Program Management with Vulnerability Manager
 
iScan Online - PCI DSS Mobile Task Force
iScan Online - PCI DSS Mobile Task ForceiScan Online - PCI DSS Mobile Task Force
iScan Online - PCI DSS Mobile Task Force
 
Deliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CT
Deliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CTDeliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CT
Deliver Flawless Mobile Apps Faster with CI/CD & CT
 
Peuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Peuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the WinPeuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Peuker, Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
 
Offensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defenseOffensive malware usage and defense
Offensive malware usage and defense
 
Jan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Jan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the WinJan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
Jan Peuker, Raoul Neu: Enterprise Android for the Win
 
Jornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: Alljoyn
Jornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: AlljoynJornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: Alljoyn
Jornada Formativa Qualcomm y Movilforum: Alljoyn
 

Mais de Tyler Shields

Avoiding the Pandora Pitfall
Avoiding the Pandora PitfallAvoiding the Pandora Pitfall
Avoiding the Pandora PitfallTyler Shields
 
Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!
Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!
Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!Tyler Shields
 
Social Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social Media
Social Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social MediaSocial Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social Media
Social Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social MediaTyler Shields
 
United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...
United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...
United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...Tyler Shields
 
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesShmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesTyler Shields
 
Survey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital Forensics
Survey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital ForensicsSurvey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital Forensics
Survey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital ForensicsTyler Shields
 
Source Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers Viewpoint
Source Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers ViewpointSource Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers Viewpoint
Source Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers ViewpointTyler Shields
 
Source Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part Deux
Source Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part DeuxSource Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part Deux
Source Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part DeuxTyler Shields
 
Software Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Software Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesSoftware Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Software Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesTyler Shields
 
Raleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Raleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesRaleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Raleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesTyler Shields
 
Static Detection of Application Backdoors
Static Detection of Application BackdoorsStatic Detection of Application Backdoors
Static Detection of Application BackdoorsTyler Shields
 
Blackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned Software
Blackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned SoftwareBlackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned Software
Blackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned SoftwareTyler Shields
 
Anti-Debugging - A Developers View
Anti-Debugging - A Developers ViewAnti-Debugging - A Developers View
Anti-Debugging - A Developers ViewTyler Shields
 
Praetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile Privacy
Praetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile PrivacyPraetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile Privacy
Praetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile PrivacyTyler Shields
 
Owasp Ireland - The State of Software Security
Owasp  Ireland - The State of Software SecurityOwasp  Ireland - The State of Software Security
Owasp Ireland - The State of Software SecurityTyler Shields
 
IT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks
IT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone AttacksIT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks
IT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone AttacksTyler Shields
 
iSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile Spyware
iSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile SpywareiSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile Spyware
iSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile SpywareTyler Shields
 
IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?
IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?
IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?Tyler Shields
 
Triangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and Devices
Triangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and DevicesTriangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and Devices
Triangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and DevicesTyler Shields
 
GovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The Berries
GovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The BerriesGovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The Berries
GovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The BerriesTyler Shields
 

Mais de Tyler Shields (20)

Avoiding the Pandora Pitfall
Avoiding the Pandora PitfallAvoiding the Pandora Pitfall
Avoiding the Pandora Pitfall
 
Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!
Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!
Social and Mobile and Cloud - OH MY!
 
Social Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social Media
Social Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social MediaSocial Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social Media
Social Media Basics: Security Loopholes with Twitter & Other Social Media
 
United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...
United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...
United Security Summit 2011 - Using the Mobile Top 10 as a Guide to Assessing...
 
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesShmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Shmoocon 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
 
Survey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital Forensics
Survey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital ForensicsSurvey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital Forensics
Survey of Rootkit Technologies and Their Impact on Digital Forensics
 
Source Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers Viewpoint
Source Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers ViewpointSource Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers Viewpoint
Source Boston 2009 - Anti-Debugging A Developers Viewpoint
 
Source Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part Deux
Source Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part DeuxSource Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part Deux
Source Boston 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries Part Deux
 
Software Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Software Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesSoftware Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Software Developers Forum 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
 
Raleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Raleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the BerriesRaleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
Raleigh ISSA 2010 - The Monkey Steals the Berries
 
Static Detection of Application Backdoors
Static Detection of Application BackdoorsStatic Detection of Application Backdoors
Static Detection of Application Backdoors
 
Blackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned Software
Blackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned SoftwareBlackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned Software
Blackhat Europe 2009 - Detecting Certified Pre Owned Software
 
Anti-Debugging - A Developers View
Anti-Debugging - A Developers ViewAnti-Debugging - A Developers View
Anti-Debugging - A Developers View
 
Praetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile Privacy
Praetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile PrivacyPraetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile Privacy
Praetorian Veracode Webinar - Mobile Privacy
 
Owasp Ireland - The State of Software Security
Owasp  Ireland - The State of Software SecurityOwasp  Ireland - The State of Software Security
Owasp Ireland - The State of Software Security
 
IT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks
IT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone AttacksIT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks
IT Hot Topics 2010 - The Coming Wave of Smartphone Attacks
 
iSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile Spyware
iSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile SpywareiSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile Spyware
iSec Forum NYC - Smartphone Backdoors an Analysis of Mobile Spyware
 
IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?
IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?
IQT 2010 - The App Does That!?
 
Triangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and Devices
Triangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and DevicesTriangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and Devices
Triangle InfoSecCon - Detecting Certified Pre-Owned Software and Devices
 
GovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The Berries
GovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The BerriesGovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The Berries
GovCert.NL - The Monkey Steals The Berries
 

Último

Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLScyllaDB
 
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project SetupStreamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project SetupFlorian Wilhelm
 
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr BaganFwdays
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationSafe Software
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek SchlawackFwdays
 
Training state-of-the-art general text embedding
Training state-of-the-art general text embeddingTraining state-of-the-art general text embedding
Training state-of-the-art general text embeddingZilliz
 
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Patryk Bandurski
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsMark Billinghurst
 
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)Wonjun Hwang
 
The Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdf
The Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdfThe Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdf
The Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdfSeasiaInfotech2
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfRankYa
 
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024Stephanie Beckett
 
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr LapshynFwdays
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Enterprise Knowledge
 
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024The Digital Insurer
 
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level pieceStory boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piececharlottematthew16
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxhariprasad279825
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Mattias Andersson
 
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache MavenDevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache MavenHervé Boutemy
 

Último (20)

Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQLDeveloper Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
Developer Data Modeling Mistakes: From Postgres to NoSQL
 
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project SetupStreamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
Streamlining Python Development: A Guide to a Modern Project Setup
 
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
"ML in Production",Oleksandr Bagan
 
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry InnovationBeyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
Beyond Boundaries: Leveraging No-Code Solutions for Industry Innovation
 
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
"Subclassing and Composition – A Pythonic Tour of Trade-Offs", Hynek Schlawack
 
Training state-of-the-art general text embedding
Training state-of-the-art general text embeddingTraining state-of-the-art general text embedding
Training state-of-the-art general text embedding
 
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
Integration and Automation in Practice: CI/CD in Mule Integration and Automat...
 
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR SystemsHuman Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
Human Factors of XR: Using Human Factors to Design XR Systems
 
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
Bun (KitWorks Team Study 노별마루 발표 2024.4.22)
 
The Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdf
The Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdfThe Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdf
The Future of Software Development - Devin AI Innovative Approach.pdf
 
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdfSearch Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
Search Engine Optimization SEO PDF for 2024.pdf
 
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
What's New in Teams Calling, Meetings and Devices March 2024
 
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
"Federated learning: out of reach no matter how close",Oleksandr Lapshyn
 
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special EditionDMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
DMCC Future of Trade Web3 - Special Edition
 
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
Designing IA for AI - Information Architecture Conference 2024
 
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
My INSURER PTE LTD - Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level pieceStory boards and shot lists for my a level piece
Story boards and shot lists for my a level piece
 
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptxArtificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
Artificial intelligence in cctv survelliance.pptx
 
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
Are Multi-Cloud and Serverless Good or Bad?
 
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache MavenDevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
DevoxxFR 2024 Reproducible Builds with Apache Maven
 

Dirty Little Secret - Mobile Applications Invading Your Privacy

  • 1. Dirty Little Secret Mobile Applications Invading Your Privacy
  • 3. Are Mobile Applications Really Invading My Privacy?
  • 4. Mobile Device Risks at Every Layer  APPLICATION: Apps with vulnerabilities and malicious code have access to your data and device sensors » Your device isn’t rooted but all your email and pictures are stolen, your location is tracked, and your phone bill is much higher than usual.  OS: Defects in kernel code or vendor supplied system code » iPhone or Android jailbrakes are usually exploiting these defects  HARDWARE: Baseband layer attacks » Memory corruption defects in firmware used to root your device » Demonstrated at CCC/Black Hat DC 2011 by Ralf-Philipp Weinmann  NETWORK: Interception of data over the air. » Mobile WiFi has all the same problems as laptops » GSM has shown some cracks. Chris Paget demo DEFCON 2010
  • 5. Mobile Device Risks at Every Layer  APPLICATION: Apps with vulnerabilities and malicious code have access to your data and device sensors » Your device isn’t rooted but all your email and pictures are stolen, your location is tracked, and your phone bill is much higher than usual.  OS: Defects in kernel code or vendor supplied system code » iPhone or Android jailbrakes are usually exploiting these defects  HARDWARE: Baseband layer attacks » Memory corruption defects in firmware used to root your device » Demonstrated at CCC/Black Hat DC 2011 by Ralf-Philipp Weinmann  NETWORK: Interception of data over the air. » Mobile WiFi has all the same problems as laptops » GSM has shown some cracks. Chris Paget demo DEFCON 2010
  • 6. 10.9 billion mobile apps downloaded in 2010, according to IDC Expected to rise to 76.9 billion apps by 2014
  • 7. 3rd Party Applications … and account for most of Process Most of the Data… the vulnerabilities 3rd Party Application processing of PII, critical and % of Vulnerability Disclosures Attributed to Top Ten confidential data Vendors March 2009 online Forrester survey of 204 Application and Risk Management Professionals. IBM X-Force® 2008 Trend and Risk Report
  • 8. Software Value Chain Complexity Makes it Impossible to Develop Secure Software Crowd Sourced Current Solutions Inadequate Internal Teams Developers Dev Site A Dev Site B Security Consultants • Very expensive • In short supply iPhone • Time to results too long Dev Site C Apps Crowd Internal Sourcing Tools • Do not scale across sites Open 3rd Party • Very high noise ratio Source Open Software Software Vendors • Can not test 3rd party code Source SYMC MSFT • Separation of duties issue Outsourced Developers Offshore • Do not know how to write Oracle secure code Provider • Prioritize time-to-ship, functionality over security Processes • Difficult to implement Eastern China • Years to fine tune Europe India • Low adoption (< 1% of US Contractors companies CMMI Level 5 certified) Unknown Skills
  • 9. Case Study – Pandora Radio 9
  • 10. WSJ Breaks Story on Pandora Investigation “Federal prosecutors in New Jersey are investigating whether numerous smartphone applications illegally obtained or transmitted information about their users without proper disclosures” 10
  • 11. Static Analysis  Analysis of software performed without actually executing the program  Full coverage of the entire source or binary  In theory, having full application knowledge can reveal a wider range of bugs and vulnerabilities than the “trial and error” of dynamic analysis  Impossible to identify vulnerabilities based on system configuration that exist only in the deployment environment
  • 18. Android Manifest Permissions  ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES  DISABLE_KEYGUARD  RECEIVE_SMS  ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION  DUMP  RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH  ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION  EXPAND_STATUS_BAR  RECORD_AUDIO  ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMAN  FACTORY_TEST  REORDER_TASKS DS  FLASHLIGHT  RESTART_PACKAGES  ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION  FORCE_BACK  SEND_SMS  ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE  GET_ACCOUNTS  SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER  ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER  GET_PACKAGE_SIZE  SET_ALARM  ACCESS_WIFI_STATE  GET_TASKS  SET_ALWAYS_FINISH  ACCOUNT_MANAGER  GLOBAL_SEARCH  SET_ANIMATION_SCALE  AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS  HARDWARE_TEST  SET_DEBUG_APP  BATTERY_STATS  INJECT_EVENTS  SET_ORIENTATION  BIND_APPWIDGET  INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER  SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS  BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN  INSTALL_PACKAGES  SET_PROCESS_LIMIT  BIND_INPUT_METHOD  INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW  SET_TIME  BIND_REMOTEVIEWS  INTERNET  SET_TIME_ZONE  BIND_WALLPAPER  KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES  SET_WALLPAPER  BLUETOOTH  MANAGE_ACCOUNTS  SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS  BLUETOOTH_ADMIN  MANAGE_APP_TOKENS  SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES  BRICK  MASTER_CLEAR  STATUS_BAR  BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED  MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS  SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ  BROADCAST_SMS  MODIFY_PHONE_STATE  SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_WRITE  BROADCAST_STICKY  MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS  SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW  BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH  MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS  UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS  CALL_PHONE  NFC  USE_CREDENTIALS  CALL_PRIVILEGED  PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY  USE_SIP  CAMERA  PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS  VIBRATE  CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STA  READ_CALENDAR  WAKE_LOCK TE  READ_CONTACTS  WRITE_APN_SETTINGS  CHANGE_CONFIGURATION  READ_FRAME_BUFFER  WRITE_CALENDAR  CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE  READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS  WRITE_CONTACTS  CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE  READ_INPUT_STATE  WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE  CHANGE_WIFI_STATE  READ_LOGS  WRITE_GSERVICES  CLEAR_APP_CACHE  READ_PHONE_STATE  WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS  CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA  READ_SMS  WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS  CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES  READ_SYNC_SETTINGS  WRITE_SETTINGS  DELETE_CACHE_FILES  READ_SYNC_STATS  WRITE_SMS  DELETE_PACKAGES  REBOOT  WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS  DEVICE_POWER  RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED  DIAGNOSTIC  RECEIVE_MMS
  • 19. Permissions Requested by Pandora Application  Network Communication  Phone Calls » Full Internet Access » Read Phone State and Identity » Create Bluetooth Connections » View Network State  System Tools » View Wi-Fi State » Modify Global System Settings » Prevent Device From Sleeping  Your Personal Information » Bluetooth Administration » Read Contact Data » Change Wi-Fi State » Add or Modify Calendar Events and » Change Network Connectivity Send Email To Guests » Automatically Start at Boot https://market.android.com/details?id=com.pandora.android&feature=search_result – 4/25/2011 19
  • 20. Just A Bit Deeper... Google purchases AdMob for $750 million dollars. Closed May, 2010 20
  • 21. ESPN, CBS Interactive, Geico, Starbucks… 100,000 – 500,000 installations Permissions: • FINE (GPS) LOCATION • COARSE (NETWORK-BASED) LOCATION • FULL INTERNET ACCESS 5,000,000 – 10,000,000 installation Permissions: • RECORD AUDIO • CHANGE YOUR AUDIO SETTINGS • FINE (GPS) LOCATION • COARSE (NETWORK-BASED) LOCATION • FULL INTERNET ACCESS • MODIFY/DELETE USB STORAGE CONTENTS MODIFY/DELETE SD CARD CONTENTS • PREVENT DEVICE FROM SLEEPING Permissions retrieved from official Android Marketplace on 4/25/2011 21
  • 24. Taking a Proactive Stance “… the popular Internet radio service is removing third-party advertising platforms, including Google, AdMeld and Medialets.” 24
  • 25. What Can Be Reliably Detected?  The problem is determining intent  FP/FN tradeoffs with “unauthorized” behaviors » e.g. Is it good or bad that the app uses GPS?  Actual vulnerabilities are more straightforward  Think differently – behavioral profiling?
  • 26. Best Practice: Embed Security Acceptance Testing into Contracts  Software contracts typically focus on features, functions, maintenance and delivery timeframes  Enterprises can embed security language into contracts » New purchases or maintenance renewals are optimal times to introduce security  Security testing is not functional testing, the contract should specify: » Specific security measures (for example, static analysis (code review), dynamic testing, penetration testing) » Specific process that should be used for testing » Acceptance thresholds for testing » Vulnerability correction rules
  • 27. Best Practice: Purchase from Rated-Approved COTS Vendors  Make security a formal part of your vendor/product selection criteria  Involve Vendor Relations/Procurement  Purchase from COTS vendors that have established security certifications and independent ratings  Look for security related certifications to indicate vendor commitment: » Common Criteria » FIPS-140-2 » PA-DSS (Visa PABP) » VerAfied Mark
  • 28. Best Practice: Leverage the Power of Community  Pooling the purchasing power of peer organizations to create demand for secure software  Vendors will react to fill a market need  Creating a community » User Groups » Customer Advisory Boards » Vendor Relations/Procurement