A series of military maps showing events leading up to the Battle of Waterloo, depicting the main stages of the campaign.

1. The
Waterloo
Project
military
strategy
in
the
campaign
of
June
1815

2. Aim
This
collec<on
of
military
maps
aims
to
convey
the
course
of
events
during
the
series
of
ba@les
that
culminated
in
the
ba@le
of
Waterloo,
which
ended
the
revolu<onary
era,
the
Napoleonic
wars
and
forced
peace
on
western
Europe
for
almost
half
a
century.
Without
it,
Britain
would
not
have
been
able
to
establish
her
prominence
in
world
affairs
and
the
course
of
the
European
colonial
period
might
have
been
very
different.
These
maps
will
therefore
tell
the
story
of
the
final
stages
of
the
struggle
between
two
generals;
Arthur
Wellesley,
1st
Duke
of
Wellington,
and
Napoleon
Bonaparte,
Emperor
of
France.
The
scale
used
does
not
permit
accurate
depic<on
of
individual
subsidiary
units
or
the
complex
interac<on
between
opposing
units
in
direct
contact.

3. Military
symbols
Most
contemporary
military
maps
of
Waterloo
and
its
associated
ba@les
show
Allied
forces
in
red
and
the
French
in
blue.
Here
we
use
current
NATO
conven<on
that
iden<fies
enemy
forces
in
red,
and
friendly
units
in
blue.
Colours
such
as
orange
or
black
have
different
uses,
and
are
not
used
here
to
depict
Dutch
or
German
Allies.
Current
military
symbol
conven<on
(frames,
modifiers)
is
used
to
show
unit
type,
size,
posi<on
and
command.

4. Prepara<ons
Wellington placed his
three main corps to
defend Brussels and his
supply route to the ports
of Ostend and Antwerp,
west of a line of
demarcation with
Blucher’s army which ran
along the Roman road
from Maastricht to Ligny.
He considered his long
lines of supply the most
likely target of
Napoleon’s advance
from his concentration
point for the Army of the
North near Mauberge.
Wellington also prepared
for a less likely French
attack on Brussels.

5. Napoleon’s
first
move
The French entered the
Netherlands at dawn on 15th
June. They took Charleroi
from its Prussian defenders
by noon. Blucher had
already decided to
concentrate his forces
around Sombreffe, near
Ligny. Wellington wanted to
be sure this was not a
diversionary preparation for
an attack via Mons on his
supply lines, and waited for
more news.

6. Napoleon’s
strategy
unveiled
Napoleon exploited
Wellington’s hesitation and
split the Army of the North into
three with Marshal Ney
commanding the left, and
Marshal Grouchy taking the
right. His aim was to defeat
Blucher first, then take on
Wellington. Napoleon brought
up the rear with a strategic
reserve in order to deliver the
decisive blow to whichever of
his opponents was left.
Wellington ordered a general
advance to Nivelles when he
realised Napoleon was
advancing on both sides of
the Brussels road.

7. th
June
Quatre
Bras,
16
Two brigades of
Perponcher’s Netherlands
Division held their position
until Wellington could bring
up reinforcements from his
5th and 3rd Divisions.
Marshal Ney hesitated, then
only attacked with his
Second Corps. Napoleon
ordered Ney’s uncommitted
reserve under d’Erlon to
support Grouchy against
Blucher in Ligny. But Ney
recalled his reserve when
he struggled to take Quatre
Bras. D’Erlon arrived too
late to take part in the battle
from which Ney had already
withdrawn.

8. th
June
Ligny,
16
Meanwhile, Blucher’s three
corps came under heavy
attack around Ligny from
Grouchy’s units, starting with
a fierce artillery barrage. His
centre gave way. But the
reinforcements Napoleon
organised caused confusion
by arriving on the French left,
and then turning back to
Quatre Bras on Ney’s orders.
Grouchy was unable to turn
victory into rout. Blucher,
unhorsed in an unsuccessful
cavalry charge, regained
command and ordered a
retreat northwards towards
Wavre, on Wellington’s left.

9. Calm
before
the
storm
The
17th
June
was
a
missed
opportunity
for
Napoleon.
Ney
did
not
return
to
Quatre
Bras
with
reinforcements.
Grouchy
went
a[er
Blucher,
who
managed
to
give
him
the
slip.
Wellington
used
the
<me
to
prepare
a
strong
defensive
posi<on
on
a
ridge
immediately
south
of
Mont
St
Jean.
A
narrow
front
allowed
him
to
defend
in
depth,
providing
he
protected
his
supply
lines
to
the
right
and
rear,
and
was
joined
by
Blucher
at
his
le[.
It
was
a
gamble
between
a
great
defensive
general,
and
his
opponent;
the
leading
offensive
strategist
of
his
day.

10. The
Ba@le
of
Waterloo
As Sunday 18th June, 1815 dawned, the
Allies and the French formed up on two
ridges south of Mont St Jean.
Wellington placed most of his army
under shelter from French artillery on
the reverse slope, but manned two
forward strong points on his right and
centre: the Chateau of Hougoument and
the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte. A
smaller position at Papelotte was on his
left. Artillery was scattered among his
divisions. Napoleon did not see the
imbalance in the opposing forces and
deployed two corps on either side of the
Brussels road, with one corps in reserve
at the rear. Most of his artillery formed
up in a grand battery in the centre of his
position.

11. Hougoument
The French attack began with an
artillery barrage on Allied
positions around the chateau,
followed up by Reille’s 2nd Corps.
The surrounding woods were
cleared by Allied artillery, but the
French pressed on and briefly
entered the chateau before being
pushed back. Though fewer in
number, the troops holding the
position were some of
Wellington’s best. Hougoument
never fell to French forces and
became the anvil on which
Wellington beat his opponent into
a manageable shape.

12. La
Haye
Sainte
The Allied position at La Haye
Sainte came under fire from the
Grand Battery where a brigade
from Perponcher’s Division was
attacked by the leading units of
d’Erlon’s First Corps. His
instructions had been to attack the
Allied left in echelon, leading from
the right, but he did the opposite
and missed an opportunity to
expose the weaker Allied left.
Instead he took La Haye Sainte
and the outpost of Papelotte. The
forward Netherlands brigade had to
withdraw to a less isolated position.

13. Allied
cavalry
charge
Seeing the Allied centre weakening,
Wellington’s second in command sent
his Household and Union cavalry
brigades to counterattack. Their charge
routed several French infantry brigades,
but overreached and got as far as the
French artillery before a counter charge
by French lancers and two light cavalry
divisions. It was a costly action for the
Allies who had significantly less cavalry
than the French. This action put the
Allied cavalry out of action for most of
the remainder of the battle. Meanwhile,
light horse units of Blucher’s Fourth
Corps approached from the East.

14. Ney’s
cavalry
charge
Marshal Ney also saw an opportunity in
the Allied centre and sent 5000 horse
charging towards the gap between
Hougoument and La Haye Sainte. But
his cavalry advanced without infantry
support. Wellington’s infantry formed
squares and held their ground, his
gunners firing at the French, then
dashing for safety within the squares.
Ney was unable to spike the Allied guns
they overran during the charge.
Meanwhile, the Prussians had entered
Placenoit at the rear of the French right
flank and were seen north of La Haie on
the Allied left. Napoleon sent part of his
reserve to protect his flank.

15. Napoleon’s
last
move
After his failed massed cavalry charge,
Ney rallied the rest of Reille’s and
d’Erlon’s Corps and some horse artillery
for an all-out attack on the Allied centre,
starting with La Haye Sainte. Faced with
von Bulow’s Fourth Corps in Placenoit
on his right flank, Napoleon sent
additional Imperial Guard units to retake Placenoit from the Prussians. He
personally led the remainder of his
Guard towards La Haye Sainte where
he handed them over for an all-ornothing attack on the Allied infantry
before more Prussian reinforcements
arrived. But Wellington had
strengthened his centre-right with an
Anglo-Dutch brigade from BraineL’Alleud, a cavalry brigade, and placed
his guards units along the ridge. Here,
the Imperial Guard were turned back.

16. Why
the
Allies
won
It
was
not
Wellington’s
greatest
victory.
He
started
the
campaign
badly.
He
was
indecisive
and
failed
to
read
Napoleon’s
intent.
He
did
not
trust
key
subordinates
like
Uxbridge;
his
cavalry
commander.
He
took
considerable
personal
risks
on
the
ba@lefield,
by
directly
supervising
troop
deployments
within
range
of
the
French.
But
he
chose
his
ground
well
so
that
he
could
defend
in
depth,
made
use
of
the
early
Allied
success
at
Quatre
Bras
to
regain
the
<me
he
lost
earlier
in
the
campaign,
and
kept
in
touch
with
the
Prussian
command.
On
the
field,
he
used
his
best
units
to
good
effect
and
made
his
opponent
pay
heavily
for
errors
of
judgment.
But
in
the
final
analysis,
none
of
this
would
have
been
enough
without
the
<mely
arrival
of
von
Bulow’s
IV
Corps
and
von
Ziethen’s
1
Corps.

17. Why
the
Allies
won
So
it
was
not
just
Wellington’s
victory.
It
was
also
Blucher’s.
The
elderly
Prussian
general
suffered
a
serious
setback
at
Ligny
but
was
able
to
retreat
in
good
order,
regroup
at
Wavre
and
keep
the
French
under
Marshal
Grouchy
away
from
Waterloo
long
enough
to
deny
Napoleon
the
reinforcements
he
needed.
Blucher’s
Corps
commanders,
par<cularly
von
Bulow
(IV)
and
von
Ziethen
(I)
took
ba@le
to
the
French.
While
von
Ziethen
reinforced
the
weak
Allied
le[,
Von
Bulow
threatened
to
turn
the
French
right
flank.
These
coordinated
ac<ons
started
to
close
the
jaws
of
a
gigan<c
trap.
Grouchy
squeezed
a
victory
against
the
Prussians
at
Wavre,
but
it
was
too
late
to
be
of
any
use
to
Napoleon.

18. Why
Napoleon
lost
Napoleon
was
well
below
his
usual
form
at
Waterloo.
He
opened
hos<li<es
late
in
the
morning
in
order
to
let
the
ground
dry
for
heavy
ar<llery
and
cavalry.
He
therefore
ran
out
of
<me
when
the
Prussians
approached
on
his
right.
Napoleon
was
absent
at
key
stages
of
the
ba@le,
leaving
cri<cal
decisions
to
his
staff.
His
subordinates
were
not
the
best
from
his
previous
campaigns.
His
able
Chief-­‐of-­‐
staff,
Berthier,
was
already
dead
and
his
replacement,
Soult,
issued
ambiguous
orders
at
cri<cal
stages
in
the
ba@le.
Napoleon
delegated
much
of
the
decision-­‐making
to
Ney
who
made
a
series
of
tac<cal
errors
culmina<ng
in
his
wasteful
mass
cavalry
charge.
Grouchy
was
outmanoeuvred
by
Blucher
when
it
most
ma@ered.
D’Erlon
changed
his
axis
of
advance,
missing
a
cri<cal
opportunity
to
expose
the
weak
Allied
le[.
Taken
together,
these
tac<cal
errors
placed
Napoleon
at
a
disadvantage.
Napoleon’s
ar<llery
concentra<on
in
a
Grand
Ba@ery
lacked
the
mobility
and
flexibility
he
needed
to
press
home
the
advantage
of
early
successes.
He
overes<mated
Wellington,
didn’t
see
his
uneven
deployment
or
exploit
the
weak
Allied
le[
while
he
had
the
opportunity.
He
underes<mated
Blucher.

19. Sources
Informa<on
used
in
this
account
came
from
a
long
list
of
accounts
of
the
Waterloo
Campaign,
of
which
Saul
David’s
excellent
All
The
King’s
Men,
ISBN
978-­‐0-­‐141-­‐02793-­‐7,
Penguin
2013,
deserves
special
men<on.
Websites:
h@p://theba@leofwaterloo.org;
Wikipedia
-­‐
Ba@les
of
Waterloo,
Quatre
Bras
and
Ligny
Maps
were
drawn
from
contemporary
military
maps
of
the
ba@le,
civilian
poli<cal
maps
and
current
digital
maps
including
Google
Maps.
The
maps
included
here
are
meant
to
illustrate
key
stages
in
the
evolu<on
of
the
campaign
and
are
not
necessarily
accurate
in
geographic
detail.
They
do
not
depict
all
units
engaged
in
simultaneous
ac<ons.
This
presenta<on
is
circulated
for
educa<on
and
entertainment.
It
may
be
copied
and
distributed
on
a
not-­‐for-­‐profit
basis
without
further
permission,
providing
its
source
has
been
acknowledged.
The
Waterloo
Project;
TJJ
Inglis,
January,
2014.