Yuriy Matsiyevsky Presentation prepared for the Center for European Studies University of Florida, Gainesville, January 24, 2012

1. Why Ukraine has not
succeeded in democratization
under Yushchenko?
Yuriy Matsiyevsky
Presentation prepared for the Center for European
Studies
University of Florida,
Gainesville, January 24, 2012

2. Major questions
 Why after the "Orange Revolution" political
process did not go toward the establishment of
democratic rules, but rather accompanied by
unregulated political rivalry that eventually led to
the defeat of the "orange team" in presidential
and local elections in 2010?
 Why, after the power change in 2004
political agreement were not kept as well
as before 2004.?
 What impact has the practice of "game without
rules" in the political process in the recent past
and now, and where the causes for the
devolution of constitutionalism in Ukraine?

3. Basic concept
 Institutional trap – ineffective, but durable norms,
which all major players are not interested to
change.
 Operating code of political culture, following G.
Meyer, is a set of the dominant rules and norms,
attitudes and patterns of behavior that determine
the actual functioning of politics at the level
of elites and masses.
 Involution of constitutionalism is a process of
the systematic violation of the principle of rule of
law that is manifested in selective use of law and
violation of both the laws and procedures for
their approval.

4. Scenarios of elite conflicts
Balance of Coercion cheaper Cooperation cheaper
recourses/ cost than than
of strategies cooperation coercion
Even distribution “War of all against “Struggle according to
of recourses all” the rules” (institutional
among actors compromise)
One-sided “Winner takes all” “Cartel-like deal”
prevalence of (co-optation of
resources subordinated
actors by the dominant

5. Factors influencing the players’
behavior
 High uncertainty (inability to predict he outcome of the action taken)
 Shifting balance of recourses (formal and informal influence, public
support) and hidden information determine the cost of strategies
 Having limited recourses, players tend to play a zero-sum game.
The deals they have reached were rather tactical calculations in
pursuing “the winner takes all” strategies
 All of the above cause the commitment problem. A deal, even after
being reached, has low chances to be fulfilled.
 By downgrading the Constitution, players deprived themselves of
the mechanism to enforce commitments.

6. The traits of the “Bad” or informal pacts
 while good pacts are based upon mutual acceptance of
competition among elites, bad pacts are designed to
avoid elite competition.
 while good pacts provide institutional guarantees for
participants that are enforced by formal institutions, bad
pacts are based upon informal institutional arrangements
or uncertain procedures
 while "good pact" are public contracts, "bad pact", even
if they become public, contain a significant component of
the informal nature, which rarely becomes known to
public. Therefore, these covenants I call informal pacts.
 Finally, while "good pact" promote democratic political
culture of elites that can be considered as
their added social value, "bad pacts" are reached
exclusively for the survival of political players and bear

7. Informal pacts during the
Yushchenko’s presidency
 Dec.8, 2004- changes to Constitution in exchange of revote of the
second round and election of V.Yushchenko a President.
 Consequences: Detrimental for the legitimate procedure of
overcoming the political crisis, this ‘’Deal’ resulted in
systematic escalation of key issues arising in political process.
 Constitutional reform, which entered into force on 01/01/2006 has
significantly reduced the power of the newly elected president,
who obviously did not want to bear it and continued to act as if he
had the same prerogatives as before.
 Tensions that existed at the personal level between
Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have intensified an unclear division
of power between the president and the prime minister .
 After working for eight months, on 09/ 08/2005 the Tymoshenko’s
government was forsed by Yushchenko to resignation. It was done
due to still existing presidential power, but mostly for preventing the
shift of power in favor of Premiere.

8. The rivalry with Tymoshenko and a
“Deal” with Yanukovuch
 Memorandum of Understanding between the
government and opposition was signed two weeks after
Tymoshenko’s dismissal on Sep.22, 2005
 Consequences: Yushchenko received additional
parliamentary support, but bear 50% loss in public
support (from 30% in Aug.2005 to 14% in Nov.2005)
 Yanukovych and his PofR were given a lift into a power
play on the eve of parliamentary election
 After winning the election with 34 % of the votes and
41% of seats PofR forget about the deal and formed an
“anti-crisis coalition” with socialists and communists.

9. A pact (Universal) of National Unity
 Loosing parliamentary support Yushchenko suggested a new deal
that was signed by all faction’s leaders, besides Tymoshenko, on
Aug.3, 2005
 The President secured 5 ministers in the new government in
exchange for nominating Yanukovych for the post of prime-minister.
 PofR has received a dominant position in parliament and
Yanukovych has received access to the sate recourses.
 “Orange camp” was disunited and appeared in ambivalent position
in Parliament.
 In case of securing a constitutional majority in Parliament a coalition
could effectively overcome the Presidents’ veto and threaten
Yushchenko by impeachment.
 After a new law on the cabinet of ministers (Dec.21, 2006) that
enable a Prime Minister to dismiss the presidential ministers,
Yushchenko had to wage a war on two fronts and situation in
Ukraine became a war of all against all.

10. Political crisis and dismissal of the Rada
 Threatened by the growing number of a new coalition,
Yushchenko issued a decree to dismiss the parliament
on Apr.2, 2007.
 On Apr.3, Rada adopted a law preventing the national
bank to finance the election.
 On Apr.25 Yushchenko issued another decree,
confirming the dismissal of the Rada and established a
parliamentary election for June 24, 2007.
 On Apr.26 the faction of PofR announced the readiness
to initiate the procedure of impeachment of the
President.
 The crisis was resolved by a new deal on May 4, 2007
between the President, Prime-Minister and the speaker
of parliament O.Moroz
 On June 5 Yushechenko issued a new decree that
stopped the former edicts and, finally, on July 31 issued
the fourth decree in which a date of the pre-term
elections was established on Sep. 30, 2007.

11. Tymoshenko – Yakukovych deal on
the new Constitution (2008-2009)
 The deal had several objectives:
 to lessen uncertainty over the result of
presidential elections
 To secure their control over executive and
legislative power by introducing a parliamentary
system.
 What prevent the deal?
 Lack of credible commitments in both parties
 Leak of information to the press

12. Devolution of constitutionalism and
its implications
 The former discussion present the case of
devolution of constitutionalism
 Political expediency subverted procedural
requirements
 High uncertainty, caused by the disrespect for
democratic decision-making procedures pushed
all key players to resolve conflicts by negotiating
informal pacts, which further intensified
uncertainty and complicated the choice of
"playing by the rules."

13. Institutional Trap in Ukraine’s
politics
 Devolution of constitutionalism brought
Ukrainian elites to "institutional trap" – they
realised malignancy of informal agreements
but continued to use them in the hope of
winning over the opponents.
 Trying to beat one another in a game of
two against one in a triangle of president, prime
minister and speaker with permanent change of
sides, prevented the elites form initiating
structural reforms in Ukraine and distanced it
from the democratic standards of policy making.

14. Final remarks
 The first two imply structural and the last two procedural
constrains of Ukraine’s transition that are rarely
discussed in scholarly researches
 informal pacts have become an integral part of
the "operational code"of political culture of
Ukrainian elites
 In Ukraine, both elites and citizens have substantive
rather than procedural attitude to good governance that
was once called “momentocracy”. In other words, if
the end justifies the means, the question of compliance
with the rules is less important.
 Inability to predict the consequences of their actions is a
distinct feature of unprofessionalism of Ukrainian elites.
 Personal sympathies/antipathies have become a front
line in Ukrainian politics in post-orange period. This led
some observers to conclude that Ukraine belongs to
Byzantine rather than European political tradition.

15. Model of devolution of
constitutionalism