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DDoS	
  the	
  problem?	
  

  john.crain@icann.org	
  
What	
  is	
  DDoS?	
  
•  “Distributed	
  Denial	
  of	
  Service	
  A>ack”	
  
   –  Uses	
  mulBple	
  hosts	
  on	
  the	
  Internet	
  to	
  focus	
  traffic	
  
      against	
  one	
  or	
  	
  more	
  targets.	
  
   –  MulBple	
  can	
  mean	
  100’s	
  of	
  machine	
  but	
  could	
  
      also	
  mean	
  millions	
  
   –  Generates	
  more	
  traffic	
  than	
  the	
  target	
  can	
  handle,	
  
      hence	
  denying	
  service	
  to	
  legiBmate	
  traffic	
  
Source:	
  www.sans.org	
  
Just	
  a	
  small	
  sample	
  of	
  targets	
  
•    2002	
  Root	
  Servers	
  a>acked	
  
•    ……	
  
•    2006	
  CafePress	
  
•    2007	
  Estonia	
  
•    2008	
  Scientology	
  
•    2009	
  Twi>er	
  
•    2010	
  Austalia’s	
  Parliament	
  House	
  
•    2011	
  …..	
  ?	
  ?	
  ?	
  
BotNets	
  are	
  a	
  big	
  Problem	
  
•  You	
  can	
  not	
  talk	
  about	
  DDoS	
  without	
  
   menBoning	
  the	
  hijacked	
  machines	
  that	
  are	
  
   used	
  in	
  the	
  a>acks!	
  

•  Viruses/Worms	
  etc.	
  are	
  used	
  to	
  enable	
  control	
  
   of	
  poorly	
  secured	
  machines.	
  	
  
•  Can	
  be	
  spread	
  in	
  numerous	
  ways.	
  
How	
  big	
  is	
  the	
  BotNet	
  Problem?	
  
•  We	
  don’t	
  really	
  know	
  	
  
    –  Seriously!	
  That	
  is	
  a	
  sign	
  of	
  how	
  bad	
  it	
  is..	
  

•  One	
  BotNet	
  is	
  Conficker:	
  
    –  We	
  can	
  measure	
  +/-­‐	
  6	
  million	
  unique	
  IP	
  addresses	
  
       showing	
  conficker	
  infecBons	
  globally….	
  	
  
    –  However	
  that	
  does	
  not	
  count	
  individual	
  infecBons	
  
       behind	
  firewalls..	
  The	
  Chinese	
  say	
  that	
  they	
  see	
  18	
  
       million	
  conficker	
  infecBons	
  every	
  month!	
  

  Source:	
  h>p://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/	
  and	
  h>p://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm	
  
Can	
  you	
  defend	
  against	
  this?	
  
•  You	
  can	
  provision	
  to	
  deal	
  with	
  low	
  level	
  
   a>acks.	
  (bandwitdth,	
  system	
  resources)	
  
•  You	
  can	
  have	
  processes	
  in	
  place	
  to	
  push	
  back	
  
   on	
  a>acks.	
  (Filtering	
  at	
  upstreams)	
  

•  This	
  is	
  an	
  arms	
  raise,	
  one	
  where	
  we	
  pay	
  for	
  
   our	
  resources	
  but	
  the	
  “bad	
  guys”	
  don’t	
  	
  
•  Infected	
  machines	
  are	
  not	
  just	
  used	
  for	
  DDoS,	
  	
  
    -­‐  Also	
  used	
  to	
  collect,	
  store	
  and	
  move	
  data.	
  
         -­‐  (Including	
  peoples	
  IdenBBes,	
  money	
  and	
  other	
  
              sensiBve	
  data)	
  


•  If	
  someone	
  owns	
  your	
  machine	
  they	
  can	
  do	
  
   anything	
  with	
  it	
  that	
  you	
  can	
  do	
  including	
  
   some	
  things	
  you	
  would	
  never	
  think	
  of	
  doing	
  
 	
  	
  	
  	
  “fight	
  the	
  disease	
  not	
  the	
  symptoms”	
  
•  We	
  cannot	
  remove	
  the	
  threat	
  of	
  DDoS	
  unless	
  
   we	
  tackle	
  the	
  issues	
  that	
  allow	
  for	
  BotNets.	
  

•  If	
  we	
  are	
  seeing	
  millions	
  of	
  machines	
  infected	
  
   then	
  clearly	
  the	
  way	
  we	
  are	
  currently	
  doing	
  
   things	
  is	
  not	
  working	
  	
  	
  
 	
  	
  	
  User	
  awareness	
  and	
  computer	
  hygiene	
  needs	
  
               to	
  be	
  drasBcally	
  improved.	
  That	
  means	
  more	
  
               educaBon	
  and	
  be>er	
  user	
  tools.	
  

  	
  We	
  must	
  find	
  ways	
  to	
  make	
  cybercrime	
  less	
  
      rewarding	
  and	
  	
  much	
  higher	
  risk.	
  

  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  This	
  is	
  no	
  different	
  to	
  real	
  world	
  crime	
  problems!	
  
Thank	
  You	
  

John	
  Crain	
  
Senior	
  Director,	
  	
  
Security	
  Stability	
  and	
  Resiliency	
  
ICANN	
  
john.crain@icann.org	
  

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CTO-Cybersecurity-Forum-2010-JohnCrain-Ddos

  • 1. DDoS  the  problem?   john.crain@icann.org  
  • 2. What  is  DDoS?   •  “Distributed  Denial  of  Service  A>ack”   –  Uses  mulBple  hosts  on  the  Internet  to  focus  traffic   against  one  or    more  targets.   –  MulBple  can  mean  100’s  of  machine  but  could   also  mean  millions   –  Generates  more  traffic  than  the  target  can  handle,   hence  denying  service  to  legiBmate  traffic  
  • 4. Just  a  small  sample  of  targets   •  2002  Root  Servers  a>acked   •  ……   •  2006  CafePress   •  2007  Estonia   •  2008  Scientology   •  2009  Twi>er   •  2010  Austalia’s  Parliament  House   •  2011  …..  ?  ?  ?  
  • 5. BotNets  are  a  big  Problem   •  You  can  not  talk  about  DDoS  without   menBoning  the  hijacked  machines  that  are   used  in  the  a>acks!   •  Viruses/Worms  etc.  are  used  to  enable  control   of  poorly  secured  machines.     •  Can  be  spread  in  numerous  ways.  
  • 6. How  big  is  the  BotNet  Problem?   •  We  don’t  really  know     –  Seriously!  That  is  a  sign  of  how  bad  it  is..   •  One  BotNet  is  Conficker:   –  We  can  measure  +/-­‐  6  million  unique  IP  addresses   showing  conficker  infecBons  globally….     –  However  that  does  not  count  individual  infecBons   behind  firewalls..  The  Chinese  say  that  they  see  18   million  conficker  infecBons  every  month!   Source:  h>p://www.confickerworkinggroup.org/  and  h>p://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7093508.htm  
  • 7. Can  you  defend  against  this?   •  You  can  provision  to  deal  with  low  level   a>acks.  (bandwitdth,  system  resources)   •  You  can  have  processes  in  place  to  push  back   on  a>acks.  (Filtering  at  upstreams)   •  This  is  an  arms  raise,  one  where  we  pay  for   our  resources  but  the  “bad  guys”  don’t    
  • 8. •  Infected  machines  are  not  just  used  for  DDoS,     -­‐  Also  used  to  collect,  store  and  move  data.   -­‐  (Including  peoples  IdenBBes,  money  and  other   sensiBve  data)   •  If  someone  owns  your  machine  they  can  do   anything  with  it  that  you  can  do  including   some  things  you  would  never  think  of  doing  
  • 9.          “fight  the  disease  not  the  symptoms”   •  We  cannot  remove  the  threat  of  DDoS  unless   we  tackle  the  issues  that  allow  for  BotNets.   •  If  we  are  seeing  millions  of  machines  infected   then  clearly  the  way  we  are  currently  doing   things  is  not  working      
  • 10.        User  awareness  and  computer  hygiene  needs   to  be  drasBcally  improved.  That  means  more   educaBon  and  be>er  user  tools.    We  must  find  ways  to  make  cybercrime  less   rewarding  and    much  higher  risk.            This  is  no  different  to  real  world  crime  problems!  
  • 11. Thank  You   John  Crain   Senior  Director,     Security  Stability  and  Resiliency   ICANN   john.crain@icann.org