Attention structures the phenomenology of consciousness by imparting a hierarchical structure to experience. The appearance view holds that phenomenal character is exhausted by how the world appears, but this is incorrect because it misses phenomenal structure - how experiences are built from attentional parts that can be more central or peripheral. While attention can affect appearances, its primary contribution is to determine the relative prominence of different aspects of experience. This structural aspect is missing from theories that focus only on appearances.

1. +
How Attention Structures Consciousness
Sebastian Watzl

2. 1. Posner Cuing
+ 2. Visual Search
3. Dichotic Listening

3. Garden ofAppearances

4. [E]xperience is supposed to be of something simply
given. Attention, implying a degree of reactive
spontaneity, would seem to break through the circle of
pure receptivity which constitutes „experience,‟ and
hence must not be spoken of under penalty of
interfering with the smoothness of the tale. But the
moment one thinks of the matter, one sees how false a
notion of experience that is which would make it
tantamount to the mere presence to the senses of an
outward order. […] Without selective interest,
experience is utter chaos. Interest alone gives accent
and emphasis, light and shade, background and
foreground – intelligible perspective, in a word. (James
1890/1981, p. 402)

5. First Part
+
Argue that a central aspect of
consciousness is missing in the
garden of appearances

6. +
The Counterpart Argument
 Attention episodes have counterparts that present the same
appearances without attention.
 These counterparts are phenomenally different from the
attention episodes.
 So, the phenomenal character of attention episodes is not
exhausted by how the world appears to the subject.

7. Second Part
+
Provide an account of what is
missing the in garden of
appearances

8. +
Phenomenal Structure
 Aside from phenomenal qualities(which are given by appearances)
there is phenomenal structure.
 Phenomenal structure concerns how complex experiences
are built from their parts. It concerns what is central in a
complex experience and what is peripheral.

9. +
What is the appearance view?

10. +
The view that phenomenal
character (at least of perceptual
experience) is exhausted by
appearances

11. +
The Appearance View
The world appears some way to S.
The way the world is present(ed) to S.
The way things look (in vision).

12. +
The Appearance View
 For the case of attention
“[The] changes in the phenomenology of
perception [due to attention and observed by
Carrasco et al.] manifest themselves in
experience as differences in apparent contrast,
apparent color saturation, apparent size, apparent
speed, apparent time of occurrence and other
appearances.” (Block 2010, p. 23).
All
phenomenaleffectsofattentionare
like that!

13. +
The Appearance View
 Appearance Properties = those properties of an experience that
contribute to the way the world appears to the subject of that
experience.
 Phenomenal properties = those properties of an experience that
contribute to what it is like for the subject of that experience.
The Phenomenal Properties supervene on the
Appearance Properties.

14. +
The Appearance View and
Intentionalism
 Shared between intentionalists and many non-intentionalists
about perceptual experience*
*suchas the theory of appearing, direct realism, Johnston‟s “awareness view”, Peacocke‟s
sensationalism, or Block‟s mental paint view.
 Appearance Intentionalism
1. The Appearance View
2. Appearance Properties = (or supervene on) Intentional Properties (the
bearing of intentional attitudes towards contents)
 Opponents of intentionalism tend to reject 2., but tend to accept
1.

15. +
The Appearance View and Attention
 A phenomenal contribution of attention in experience e = a
phenomenal property P of e whose instantiation is explained by the
subject‟s distribution of attention (in e).
The phenomenal contributions of attention
supervene on the appearance properties

16. +
The Appearance View and Attention
 No assumption(of my argument) that attention would have to make the
same phenomenal contribution in all cases.
 No assumption(of my argument) that attention (sometimes) does not affect
appearances (unlike in Nickel 2007, Speaks 2010). It does:
 Increasesapparentcontrast(Carrasco, Ling and Read 2004), increases apparent size (Tsal and Shalev
1997; Gobell and Carrasco 2005; Anton-Erxleben, Heinrich and Treue 2007), increases color
saturation (Fuller and Carrasco 2006), increased apparentbrightness(Tse 2005), has complex effects
on apparentspatial relations (Liverence and Scholl 2011), decreases spatial distance (Rubin
1915/2001, Driver and Baylis 1996, Matsuura and Ichikawa 2003), complex effects on apparent scene
segmentation/edge assignment (Driver and Baylis 1996; Vecera 2000, Vecera, Flevaris and Filapek
2004, Wagatsuma, Shimizu and Sakai 2008, Kimchi 2009), enhances spatial resolution (Yeshurun and
Carrasco 1998), degrades temporal resolution (Yeshurun and Levy 2003)
 No assumption(of my argument) that the focus of attention is not
sometimes required to become aware of certain objects, properties
or events at all (as in the “Gorilla” experiment, and other inattentional blindness
results)
 It is not always required (evidenced by the literature just cited).

17. +
The Appearance View and Attention
Look to have the same contrast
Unattended higher contrast
Attended lower contrast
marisacarrasco
From Carrasco, Ling and Read 2004

18. +
Why is the appearance view
false?

19. +
The counterpart argument

20. +
The Counterpart Argument
The Counterpart Claim
There is an attention episodeαsuch that, possibly, there exists a
counterpart α* (where either the subject does not have the
capacity for attention or where her attention is evenly distributed)
such that α and α* are appearance indiscernible.
The Difference Claim
Some attention episode α is phenomenally discernible from its
counterpart α*.

21. +
The Counterpart argument
Central Idea
 Can “mimic” any effect on appearances by changing the world
or your non-attentional relation to it (Counterpart Claim)
 Can‟t ”mimic” an aspect of the phenomenal contribution of
attention in this way (Difference Claim)

22. +
Defense of The Counterpart Claim
1. Edenic Worlds
Consider an Edenic scenario (without attention) (Chalmers 2004): a
world that is exactly how it appears to the subject.
In such an Edenic scenario attention plays no role for appearances.
Rather, appearances are the result of a pre-established harmony
between world and subject.
If Edenic scneario are possible, the counterpart claim follows.
 Where objects look to have higher contrast with attention, in the Edenic world
they have higher contrast.
 Where objects looks bigger with attention, in the Edenic world they are bigger.
 …
 Most known effects of attention on appearances can obviously be mimicked in
such ways.

23. +
Defense of The Counterpart Claim
2. What about Resolution/Determinacy (Nanay 2010, Stazicker
2011)?
 Not even actually specific to attention.
 Can be replicated by affecting the (non-attentional) subject-environment
relation.
Might have to
partial
includedistortions in
theperceptual systems
(achieved by filters in
partially theperceptual organs) that lead
to
partiallyindeterminateappearan
cesof a determinate world (see
Tye onblurryvision)

24. +
Defense of The Counterpart Claim
3. What about attended appearances, appearing salient etc.
(appearances explicitly defined in terms of attention)?
 Can‟t just define appearances that resist the counterpart claim into
existence.
 Must show that such are properties ways the world appears to the
subject(they don‟t, after all, seem to characterize “the way things look”)
 Suggestion: must be experienced as “out there” or “in or on the perceived
object”*(like a white wall might look yellow-ish in certain lightning conditions, or the air might look
rainbow colored (prob. he same for after-images)**)
 If they are, attention cannot be essential to them, since attention is not an
aspect of the world (as it appears to the subject).
 Hence: must think of attention as fixing reference to such appearances (if
they exist), not as being essential to them.
*Shoemaker 2006 **Philips forthcoming

25. +
Defense of the Difference Claim
1. Intuitive Obviousness
 Most people (including me) find it intuitively obvious that attention scenarios
differ phenomenally from their counterparts.
 This intuitive judgment resembles others that philosophers have given
weight in their argumentation:
 Consider the phenomenal contrast between ”seeing stars” and actually
seeing stars; between moving your limbs and having your limbs passively
moved
 By itself, though, the intuitive judgment is not decisive.

26. +
Defense of the Difference Claim
2. Argument to the best epistemic explanation
Noticability
A subjects is in a position to notice whether she is in α or in α*.
Noticability-Phenomenology-Link
A subject is in a position to notice whether she is undergoing
mental episode e or e* only if e is phenomenally discernible
from e*.

27. +
The Counterpart Argument
The Counterpart Claim
There is an attention episodeαsuch that, possibly, there exists a
counterpart α* (where either the subject does not have the
capacity for attention or where her attention is evenly distributed)
such that α and α* are appearance indiscernible.
For most appearances letα* be an Edenic scenario exactly how it appears to the subject.
For determinacy adjust visual resolution by other means, or create appropriate filters.
For saliency (and generally) consider that attention is not part of the experienced world.
The Difference Claim
Some attention episode α is phenomenally discernible from its
counterpart α*.
Intuitivelyas obvious as otherphenomenalcontrast cases.
 The argument to thebest epistemicexplanation.

28. +
What is the appearance view
missing?

29. +
The structure of experience

30. +
Where to start?
 Do we need attentional qualia? Or attentional sense-data?
 Would make no connection between the phenomenal contributions
of attention of attention, and the role it plays for us.
 Would leave mysterious why the appearance view is threatened by
attention, and what was correct about it.
 Better:
 Start with the role attention plays for us: it prioritizes some aspects
of our mental lives over others.
 In doing so, it affects the subject‟s point of view.

31. +
Structuralism
Attention structures the subject‟s stream of
consciousness so that some of its parts are more central
than others

32. +
Building Experiences
E = a complex experience
An experience of
the songs of the
birds.
An experience of the
waterfall.

33. +
Building Experiences
+
+
Mereology
E = e1 + e2 +
+
e3 + …

34. +
Building Experiences
An experience of
the songs of the
birds.
Conjunction
in Content
E=
experiencing(c
1 & c2 & …)
An experience of the
waterfall.

35. +
Building Experiences
Structure
E = e1 < e2 <
e3 <… =
experiencing 1
more centrally
Higher attentional than 2 ...
priority

36. +
Building Experiences
Higher attentional
priority (converse: the
peripherality relation)

37. +
Building Experiences
PhenomenalQualities
covered by
theappearanceview

38. +
Building Experiences
PhenomenalStructure
Missing from
theappearanceview

39. +
Building Experiences
PhenomenalQualities
covered by the
appearanceview
PhenomenalStructure
Missing from
theappearanceview

40. +
Parts of Experience
 Experiential Episodes are events (or processes)
 As such they have parts. Some parts, for example, occur before
others.
 In general, events have a multi-dimensional part structure (there are
multiple ways an event can be partitioned into parts).
 The relevant parts of experience are just those of its aspects such
that attentional relations hold between them (no attention-
independent partitioning presupposed). E.g.
 An “experience” of figure L.
 An “experience” of the sound of the violin.
 An “experience” of red.
 An “experience” of roundness.
 Not presupposed that the parts are experiences. They might be
mere abstractions from the whole.

41. +
Some developments
 Let e 1 > e2 and e 1 > e3. Then e3 is more peripheral than e2 just if e 2 >
e3.
 Can be applied intermodally as well as intramodally.

42. +
Some developments
an object, event,
a part of experience property, process, ..
 a is the focus of attention in attention scenario α =Def it is not the
case that in α there exists an item x such that x a and ex > ea.
 e is at the center of a subject‟s mental life in attention scenario α =Def
it is not the case that in α there exists a part ex of α such that ex e and
ex>e.
 not every experience need to have a center/focus. E.g.:
 Attention is equally split between a and b in attention scenario α =Def
it is not the case that in α: (ea >ebor eb> ea)and for all items x: (if x a
and x b then ex > ea and ex >eb)

43. +
Some developments
 e is at the fringe of a subject‟s mental life in attention scenario α =Def
it is not the case that in α there exists a part ex of α such that ex e and
e> ex. (the dual of the center)
 prob. every mental life has a fringe.
 Center and fringe need not differ in appearances (though in most
actual cases they will).
 Attentional priority is correlated with a variety of effects on appearances (see above).
But it does not consist in those effects.
 Being central, peripheral or at the fringe are structural (and hence holistic) features of
the field of consciousness. One cannot specify what it is to be at the fringe of
consciousness without mentioning how one part of experience is related to all the other
parts).

44. +
Some developments
 Arguably any attention episode is peripherality connected:
An attention episodeαisperipherality connected =Def for all ex and
ey: if ex is a part of αandeyis a part of α, then there is a
peripherality path between ex and ey .
 An experiential episode that is peripherality connected will be
phenomenally unified. No further co-consciousness relation (or
phenomenal mereology) is needed.
 That unified experience consists in experiencing some things more
centrally than others.
 Arguably, a subject has a phenomenally unified total experience only if
and because that total experience is peripherality connected.
 need the fusion of a subject‟s experiences to be peripherality
connected.
 in this case each subject just has one conscious episode.
 might be argued for in part based on the role of attention in split brain
cases and hemineglect.

45. + In conclusion ....

46. + ... some more questions and
speculative answers.

47. +
Question 1
 Question: Why can‟t phenomenal structure (unlike
phenomenal qualities) not be reproduced without attention?
 Superficial Answer:
 Because phenomenal structure does not characterize how the world
appears to the subject.
 Deeper Question: if attention is a mechanism that causes
experience to be structured, then couldn‟t it be structured
without that cause?
 Deeper Answer:
 Attention is not such a mechanism. Attention is the process of
structuring. It stands to the structure like the process of holding a
pen stands to the state of a pen being held. Attention consists in
experiencing some things more centrally than others.

48. +
Question 2
 Question: how could subject‟s notice whether their experience
is structured?
 Answer:
 Would require a general theory of introspective knowledge. Many
such theories are compatible with subjects being in that epistemic
position.
 One option (which I like):
 Subjects are aware of the process of structuring, i.e. aware of
experiencing some things more centrally than others.
 This awareness is part of what makes her experiencing conscious (in line
with HOR or SOR theories).
 This awareness is not just postulated. Many Yoga practices for example
teach subjects to train this awareness of their attention (and thereby
control it).
 This awareness is the epistemic basis for introspective knowledge.

49. +
Question 3
 Question: how does all of this connect to James‟ idea that
attention implies “a degree of reactive spontaneity”?
 Answer:
 Experience, on my conception, has two aspects. Phenomenal
qualities and phenomenal structure.
 Experience is receptive/reactive insofar as in it the world
appears some way to the subject (phenomenal qualities).
 Experience is spontaneous/active insofar as the subject is able
to control the structure of her experience (by controlling her
attention).
 These two aspects are two inseparable sides of any (attentive)
experience.

50. +
Question 4
 Question: Is phenomenal structure an essential feature of
experience? Could there be experiences without it?
 Answer:
 I„m not sure.
 Maybe we can think of some kind of transcendental argument
relating to the role experience plays for objective knowledge, or the
idea that experience provides the subject with a point of view?

51. +
The End