This document summarizes the Chinese strategic view of the Asia-Pacific region. It outlines that China sees American military presence and alliances as enduring vulnerabilities. China's fundamental strategy is to lower American political will to intervene militarily and reduce regional states' reliance on the US for protection. China aims to achieve this by demonstrating its ability to impose high military or economic costs, and by gradually increasing control over disputed areas in a manner that does not provoke a military response each time.

1. Sir
Richard
Williams
Founda2on
Air
Combat
Opera2ons
–
2025
and
beyond
John
Lee
1

2. Summary
of
the
Chinese
strategic
view
of
the
region
• All
things
being
equal,
and
assuming
no
disrup5ve
developments
to
regional
trends,
America
is
here
to
stay
strategically
and
militarily
for
the
reasons
that
I
gave.
• China’s
enduring
vulnerability
is
not
its
sovereignty
territory
but
its
inability
to
secure
unfe>ered
access
to
the
commons
by
itself,
and
inability
to
defend
its
unfe>ered
access
to
the
commons.
• These
vulnerabili5es
will
persist
whilst
America
and
its
system
of
alliances
and
security
rela5onships
remain
in
Asia.
And
these
rela5onships
seem
to
be
robust
and
enduring.
2

3. China’s
fundamental
strategy…
Lower
American
poli5cal
will
to
intervene
in
a
military
conflict;
or
lower
the
poli5cal
will
for
regional
states
to
resort
to
reliance
on
American
military
assistance
and
protec5on.
3

4. How
do
you
achieve
it?
• You
create
the
credible
expecta5on
that
you
can
impose
prohibi5ve
military
costs
on
American
military
assets;
or
that
you
can
impose
prohibi5ve
costs
on
the
military
assets
of
the
American
ally
with
or
without
American
a>empts
at
interven5on.
• You
create
the
reasonable
expecta5on
that
any
significant
military
conflict
with
China
will
cause
severe
disrup5on
to
economic
prosperity
in
the
region
–
thereby
lowering
the
poli5cal
will
in
Washington
or
other
regional
capitals
to
contemplate
military
interven5on
in
the
first
place.
• You
improve
your
military
capacity
to
seize
disputed
islands
before
an
organised
and
effec5ve
military
counter-­‐response
is
possible.
In
doing
so,
you
raise
the
chances
that
any
counter-­‐response
once
territory
has
already
been
seize
will
be
prohibi5ve.
• You
gradually
exercise
de
facto
sovereignty
and
control
over
disputed
areas
in
the
East
and
South
China
Sea
in
a
manner
in
which
each
individual
move
is
never
extreme
enough
to
provoke
a
military
response.
4

5. Two
inferences
from
the
Chinese
view…
• They
don’t
have
to
be
able
to
win
the
ba>le,
let
alone
the
war,
to
achieve
their
poli5cal
and
strategic
objec5ves
–
just
be
able
to
impose
prohibi5ve
military
and/or
economic
costs.
• They
don’t
need
military
capabili5es
to
defend
all
their
economic
interests
such
as
commercial
shipping
into
China
through
SLOCs
which
is
impossible.
They
just
need
enough
military
capability
to
cause
prohibi5ve
damage
to
commercial
shipping
for
other
countries
–
a
far
more
feasible
tac5c.
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