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How-to attack a computer
        network
          Lecture 2
       Raja M. Khurram Shahzad
The Internet
  The elements of the Internet:
                                                     Router PCs, workstation
  •    A lot of hardware and software
                                                     Server        Mobile      International
  Hosts, end-systems                                                               ISP
  • Millions of interconnected
    computing devices all over the                 Apartments
    world (a global network) ë                                 Local ISP
             PCs, workstations, servers…
                                                                            National ISP
             PDAs, phones, TV-boxes…
  •    Hosts runs Network applications
                s
             WWW
             email
                                                                     Company
             file transfer
                                                                     network
             remote login
             multimedia
             …                                                                                 2




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                 ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
The Internet
   Routers
                                                       Router PCs, workstation
      • Interconnects hosts and networks
      • switching devices (nodes)                      Server        Mobile      International
      • forward data packets between                                                 ISP
           hosts through the networks                Apartments
      • Store and forward technique                              Local ISP
   Other network nodes:                                                       National ISP
      •    Bridges
      •    Switches
      •    Repeaters
                                                                       Company
      •    Amplifiers                                                  network
      •    ... different functionality and
           degree of intelligence
                                                                                                 3




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
The Internet
  Protocols
  • All communicating devices on the
                                                        Router PCs, workstation
     Internet run protocols
                                                        Server        Mobile      International
  • Protocols controls the sending and
                                                                                      ISP
     receiving of information
      - Ex: TCP, IP, HTTP, FTP…                       Apartments
  • The collection of Internet                                    Local ISP
     protocols: TCP/IP
                                                                               National ISP
      - Are implemented in all devices
        on the Internet (all or part
        of it)
      - hosts, routers…
                                                                        Company
                                                                        network
  ISPs (Internet Service Providers)
  •    selling communication- and access services
                                                                                                  4
       to end users and networks

FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                    ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
The Internet
 The Internet
 • A global “network of networks”                       Router PCs, workstation
      - Both public and private networks of
         different technologies and performance                                   International
                                                        Server        Mobile
 IP-protocol:                                                                         ISP
      • carries “everything” (applications/
         services)                                    Apartments
      • over “anything“ (different network
                                                                  Local ISP
         technologies)
      • ..half truth !? (high quality multimedia,                              National ISP
         real-time applications is still a pain!?)
 • Packet switching
      • no dedicated resources in the network
      • …shared!                                                        Company
 • Best-effort services
                                                                        network


                                                                                                  5




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                    ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
The Internet

 What holds the Internet together?                     Router PCs, workstation
 •The “glue”
                                                       Server        Mobile      International
     Addressing
                                                                                     ISP
               how to refer to a device
     Routing                                         Apartments

               how to get there                                  Local ISP
     IP-protocol                                                              National ISP
               what to speak to be understood


 Internet standards                                                    Company
                                                                       network
   RFC: Request for comments
   IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force
                                                                                                 6




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
The Internet
  The structure of Internet
  •     Loosely hierarchical                             Router PCs, workstation
  •     Hosts are connected to local ISPs
        through access networks                          Server        Mobile      International
         -    dial phone line: modem, ADSL,                                            ISP
              ISDN, cable-modem…
                                                       Apartments
         -    company/campus network
                                                                   Local ISP
         -    leased lines
  •     Local ISPs connected to national ISPs                                   National ISP
  •     National ISPs connected to international
        (global) ISPs
  •     The main point is :
                                                                         Company
         -    new hosts and networks can be
              added…without changing the                                 network
              existing implementation of Internet
              (should scale!?)
                                                                                                   7




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                     ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Protocols in the TCP/IP Suite




                                                         8




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON           ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
PDUs in TCP/IP




                                                  11




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON    ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Information Gathering

     •    Find out initial information
                Open Source: general information about a company that anyone can
                obtain
                whois (unix), sam spade (third-party tool for windows)
                nslookup

     •    Find out address range of the network

                ARIN (American registry for Internet numbers) http://www.arin.net
                     – whois -h rs.arin.net arin-net

                Traceroute

     •    Find active machines:

                ping

                                                                                    12




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                             ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Information Gathering cont.

     •    Find open ports or access points:

                Nmap http://www.insecure.org/nmap for UNIX
                ScanPort http://www.dataset.fr/eng/scanport.html for Windows
                War Dialers: Programs that find modems on a network
                     – THC-Scan for Windows

     •    Figure out the operating system

                Queso
                Nmap




                                                                               13




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                      ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Information Gathering cont.

     •    Map out the network

                Cheops http://www.marko.net/cheops/
                Visual ping http://www.visualware.com/visualroute/
                Traceroute

     •    Figure out which services are running on each port

                Default port and OS
                Telnet
                Vulnerability scanners: programs that can be run against a site that
                give a hacker a list of vulnerabilities on the target host
                     – SAINT http://www.wwwdsi.com/saint/
                     – NESSUS http://www.nessus.org




                                                                                       14




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                        ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
TCP three-way handshake




                             SYN with ISNa

                        ACK ISNa and SYN with ISNb

                             ACK ISNb
                              Connection
                              Connection




                                                        15




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON          ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Types of Nmap scans

  •    TCP Connect Scan:
              Attempts to complete the TCP three-way handshake and set up a connection
              Easy to detect
  •    TCP SYN Scans: “half-open scans”
              Sends a SYN to each target port. Target sends SYN-ACK if the port is open.
              The attacker send a RESET packet to abort the connection.
              Hard to detect, only routers or firewalls will log (if enabled) the attackers IP.
  •    FIN Scan:
              Violate the TCP specification by sending unexpected packets at the start of a
              connection
              Attacker sends FIN packet, if the target port is closed a RESET packet is
              sent back, if open nothing is sent back.
  •    Ack Scan:
              Sends an ACK packet to targets port. If RESET comes back from target
              Nmap will classify the port as “unfiltered” otherwise “filtered”
                                                                                                  16




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                      ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Types of Spoofing

  •    IP spoofing: An attacker uses an IP address of another computer to
       acquire information or gain access


  •    Email spoofing: In essence, the email looks like it came from John, but
       in reality, John didn’t send the email. Someone who was impersonating
       John send it.


  •    Web spoofing: Whenever an entity has to be trusted, the opportunity for
       spoofing arises.


  •    Non-technical spoofing: These types of attacks concentrate on
       compromising the human element of a company.This is done through
       social engineering techniques.

                                                                                 17




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON              ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
IP Spoofing.

    •    The intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address
         indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host.

    •    A hacker must find an IP address of a trusted host and then modify
         the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming
         from that host.

                                    From ad
                                            dress: 1
   Attacker                         To addre          0.10.20.
                                             ss: 10.1          20
                                                      0.5.5
   10.40.40.40


                             Replies sent back to 10.10.20.20

                                                                    John
             Spooft adress                                          10.10.5.5
             10.10.20.20
                                                                                18




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Denial of Service Attack.

     •    DoS: A type of attack on a network that is designed to bring the
          network to its knees by flooding it with useless traffic.

     •    Two general types of DoS attacks:
           1. Crashing a system or a network:
                     The attacker can send a victim data or packets it is not expecting
                     This attack requires little to perform and human interaction to fix

           2. Flooding the system or network with so much information that it cannot
                 respond:
                     This attack requires more energy from the attacker, recovering requires
                     minimal human intervention



                                                                                               19




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                        ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Distributed Denial of Service Attack.

     •    DDoS: Several machines are coordinated to launch an attack
          against a target machine or network at the same time



                                         Attacker




                                   System in
                                                             System in   System in
 System in                           Kina
                                                               USA         Iran
  Europe




                                                                                     20
                                               Victim

FREDRIK ERLANDSSON               ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
DoS

     •    Ping of Death
     •    SSPing
     •    Land
     •    Smurf
     •    Win Nuke
     •    CPU Hog
     •    SYN Flood




                                                      21




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON        ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Buffer overflow

   #include <stdio.h>
   sample_function(char *string){
         char buffer[16];                      Local buffer can hold 16 characters
         strcpy(buffer, string);
                                           strcpy loads characters into buffer until it
         return;}
                                           finds the end of the string
   main (){                                Create buffer that can hold 256 characters
         char big_buffer [256]; int i;
         for (i=0; i<255; i++){
         big_buffer[i]='A'; }              Shove the character A into the buffer 255
                                           times
         sample_function (big_buffer);


                                                Sent big_buffer to sample_function
                                                                                          22




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Buffer Overflow Attack

     •    A buffer overflow attack is when an attacker tries to store too much
          information in an undersized receptacle.
     •    Most of the newest exploits are based on buffer overflow attack

     •    Takes advantage of applications that do not adequately parse input
          by stuffing too much data into undersized receptacles.

     •    Can cause attacks against all three areas to security:
           1. Attack against availability
           2. Attack against integrity
           3. Attack against confidentiality




                                                                                 23




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                    ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
How does it work?

                                       Fill direction                        .
                           .
 Bottom                                                                      .
                           .
Of memory                                                                    .
                           .
                                              Buffer overwritten       Machine Code
                          Buffer               with instructions       execv /bin/sh

                     Saved frame PTR                                  Saved frame PTR

                                                Return Pointer       New PTR to EXEC code
                       Return PTR                     is
                                                 overwritten            Function Call
                      Function Call
                                                                         Arguments
                       Arguments
                                                                             .
                          .
   Top                                                                       .
                          .
Of memory                                                                    .
                          .



                                                                                            24




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                       ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Example
     •    Some different buffer overflow attacks:
                 NetMeeting Buffer Overflow
                 Outlook Buffer Overflow
                 Linuxconf Buffer Overflow
                 IIS 4.0/5.0 Phone Book Server Buffer Overflow


  char shellcode[] =
  "xebx1fx5ex89x76x08x31xc0x88x46x07x89x46x0cxb0x0b"
  "x89xf3x8dx4ex08x8dx56x0cxcdx80x31xdbx89xd8x40xcd"
  "x80xe8xdcxffxffxff/bin/sh";
  void main() {
    int *ret;
    ret = (int *)&ret + 2;
    (*ret) = (int)shellcode;}

                                                                       25




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                         ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Sniffing

     •    A program that gather traffic from the local network
     •    Used by both attackers and network administrators
     •    Gathers packets at the Data Link layer
     •    An attacker must haven account on a machine in order to run the
          sniffer program.
     •    Sniffing tools available:
                 tcpdump http://www.tcpdump.com
                 windump netgroup-serv.polito.it/windump
                 Wireshark (ethereal)
                 Dsniff




                                                                            26




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                      ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Passive Sniffing




                                                           et
                                                       a ck
                                                      p


                     packet
                                     HUB                    packet



                                                                pa
                                                                     ck
                                                                       et




                                                                            27




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON              ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Active Sniffing

     •    Two methods for sniffing data from a switched LAN
           1. MAC flooding
           2. Spoofed ARP Messages




                        packet
                                       Switch



                                 packet



                                   Default              packet
                                   router                        Internet

                                                                            28




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Spoofed ARP Message
                                                                      Configure IP Forwarding
                                                                       to send packets to the
                                                                           default router
                         Send fake ARP response
                        to remap default router IP
                            adressto attacker´s                         Attacker sniffs the traffic
                               MAC address


                                             Switch
                                                                 Packets are forwarded from the
   Victim traffic destined
                                                                 attackers machine to the actual
   For the outside world.
                                                                 default router for delivery to the
   Based on the poisoned
                                                                 outside world
   ARP table, traffic is really
   sent to the attackers MAC              Default
   address                                router                             Internet

                                                                                                  29




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Island Hopping Attack
Passwords

     •    Most common weaknesses in a company
           1. weak passwords
           2. uncontrolled modems on the network
     •    Most systems and software have default passwords!
     •    Characteristics of a strong password
                 Changes every 45 days
                 Minimum length of 10 characters
                 Contain at leas one alpha, one number and one special character
                 Cannot contain dictionary words
                 Cannot reuse the previous five passwords
                 Minimum password age of 10 days
                 After 5 failed logon attempts, password is locked for serveral hours


                                                                                        31




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                     ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Passwords cont.

  •    System maintain a file that associates a password with each authorised
       user.
  •    Password file can be protected with:
             One-way encryption
             Access Control


  •    Techniques for guessing passwords:
             Try default passwords.
             Try all short words, 1 to 3 characters long.
             Try all the words in an electronic dictionary (60,000).
             Collect information about the user’s hobbies, family names, birthday, etc.
             Try user’s phone number, social security number, street address, etc.
             Try all license plate numbers (MUP103).
             Use a Trojan horse
             Tap the line between a remote user and the host system.

                                                                                          32




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                    ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
UNIX passwords

  •    Stored in file /etc/passwd is world readable (any user who was on the
       system had access to read the file i.e. more /etc/passwd )
              usernamen:password:UID:GID:full name:home directory:shell
              sch:OZFGkH258h8yg:1013:10:Stefan Chevul:/home/sch/:/bin/csh


  •    Latest UNIX versions split the passwd file into 2 files. The /etc/passwd file
       still exists, it contains everything except the encrypted passwords. This is
       stored in the /etc/shadow file.
              usernamen:password:last:min:max:warning:expire:disable
              sch:OZFGkH258h8yg:::::::




                                                                                  33




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
ypcat passwd

    gymsjo:PgiEmZuEHpmY2:3227:3200:STEFAN JOHANSSON:/home/
      dogmatix/gym/gymsjo:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

    frpe03:EoFPa/t0McqN6:470078:20031:FREDRIK PERSSON:/home/
       dogmatix/students/20031/frpe03:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

    etmf01:Ck34HVjHPI3gQ:740030:20011:Etienne Mfoumou:/home/
       dogmatix/students/20011/etmf01:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

    rope05:i/mTnW1jL7vmM:490146:20051:ROBIN PERSSON:/home/
       obelix/students/20051/rope05:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

    nasc04:HfcXJTuIB7Bh2:500001:20041:Nadzida Saric:/home/obelix/
      students/20041/nasc04:/usr/local/bin/tcsh

                                                                    34




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON          ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
cat passwd

    root:x:0:0:Super-User:/:/sbin/sh
    daemon:x:1:1::/:
    bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin:
    sys:x:3:3::/:
    adm:x:4:4:Admin:/var/adm:
    lp:x:71:8:Line Printer Admin:/usr/spool/lp:
    uucp:x:5:5:uucp Admin:/usr/lib/uucp:
    smmsp:x:25:25:SendMail Message Submission Program:/:
    nobody:x:60001:60001:Nobody:/:
    noaccess:x:60002:60002:No Access User:/:




                                                           35




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON          ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Salt

       •    The salt serves three purposes:
                     Prevents duplicate passwords.
                     Effectively increases the length of the password.
                     Prevents the use of hardware implementations of DES




                                                                           36




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                       ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
UNIX Password Scheme I



                     salt               password
                                                                     Password File
                        12 bits              56 bits             User id   salt E(pwd, [salt, 0])



                                                                                     •
                                                         Load                        •
                            crypt (3)
                                         11 characters                               •




                                           (a) Loading a new password


                                                                                                    37




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                           ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
UNIX Password Scheme II




                                  38



      ET2437 - Network Security
Passwords cracking

     •    Password cracking = guessing someone´s password from the
          encrypted password
     •    General algorithm used for automated password cracking:
           1. Find valid user IDs
           2. Find the encryption algorithm used
           3. Obtain encrypted passwords
           4. Create a list of possible passwords
           5. Encrypt each word
           6. See if there is a match for each user ID
           7. Repeat steps 1 through 5




                                                                     39




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Why is Passwords cracking important?

     •    From a security standpoint, password cracking can help you build
          and maintain a more secure system.
     •    Reasons why password cracking is useful
                 To audit the strength of passwords
                 To recover forgotten / unknown passwords
                 To migrate users
                 To use as a checks and balance system
     •    Main types of password cracking attacks:
                 Dictionary attacks
                 Brute force attacks
                 Hybrid attacks



                                                                             40




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                     ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Types of Passwords Attacks



                                 Dictionary       Brute Force      Hybrid
                                   attack           attack         attack


                 Speed of the      Fast                Slow       Medium
                    attack

                     Amount of   Finds only        Finds every    Finds only
                     passwords     words            password     passwords
                                                                 that have a
                      cracked                                     dictionary
                                                                 word as the
                                                                     base




                                                                               41




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                   ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Passwords cracking programs

     •    NT password cracking programs:
                 L0phtcrack
                 NTSweep
                 NTCrack
                 PWDump2
     •    UNIX password crackers:
                 Crack
                 John the Ripper
                 XIT
                 Slurpie




                                                               42




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                 ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
Covering the Tracks

     •    After an attacker has gained access and accomplished what he
          wanted to do, one of the last steps he performs is covering his
          tracks, hiding evidence that he was ever there.


     •    To do this there are 4 main areas an attacker is concerned with:
           1. Log files
           2. File information
           3. Additional files
           4. Network traffic




                                                                             43




FREDRIK ERLANDSSON                  ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY

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Lecture2 network attack

  • 1. How-to attack a computer network Lecture 2 Raja M. Khurram Shahzad
  • 2. The Internet The elements of the Internet: Router PCs, workstation • A lot of hardware and software Server Mobile International Hosts, end-systems ISP • Millions of interconnected computing devices all over the Apartments world (a global network) ë Local ISP PCs, workstations, servers… National ISP PDAs, phones, TV-boxes… • Hosts runs Network applications s WWW email Company file transfer network remote login multimedia … 2 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 3. The Internet Routers Router PCs, workstation • Interconnects hosts and networks • switching devices (nodes) Server Mobile International • forward data packets between ISP hosts through the networks Apartments • Store and forward technique Local ISP Other network nodes: National ISP • Bridges • Switches • Repeaters Company • Amplifiers network • ... different functionality and degree of intelligence 3 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 4. The Internet Protocols • All communicating devices on the Router PCs, workstation Internet run protocols Server Mobile International • Protocols controls the sending and ISP receiving of information - Ex: TCP, IP, HTTP, FTP… Apartments • The collection of Internet Local ISP protocols: TCP/IP National ISP - Are implemented in all devices on the Internet (all or part of it) - hosts, routers… Company network ISPs (Internet Service Providers) • selling communication- and access services 4 to end users and networks FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 5. The Internet The Internet • A global “network of networks” Router PCs, workstation - Both public and private networks of different technologies and performance International Server Mobile IP-protocol: ISP • carries “everything” (applications/ services) Apartments • over “anything“ (different network Local ISP technologies) • ..half truth !? (high quality multimedia, National ISP real-time applications is still a pain!?) • Packet switching • no dedicated resources in the network • …shared! Company • Best-effort services network 5 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 6. The Internet What holds the Internet together? Router PCs, workstation •The “glue” Server Mobile International Addressing ISP how to refer to a device Routing Apartments how to get there Local ISP IP-protocol National ISP what to speak to be understood Internet standards Company network RFC: Request for comments IETF: Internet Engineering Task Force 6 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 7. The Internet The structure of Internet • Loosely hierarchical Router PCs, workstation • Hosts are connected to local ISPs through access networks Server Mobile International - dial phone line: modem, ADSL, ISP ISDN, cable-modem… Apartments - company/campus network Local ISP - leased lines • Local ISPs connected to national ISPs National ISP • National ISPs connected to international (global) ISPs • The main point is : Company - new hosts and networks can be added…without changing the network existing implementation of Internet (should scale!?) 7 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 8. Protocols in the TCP/IP Suite 8 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 9.
  • 10.
  • 11. PDUs in TCP/IP 11 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 12. Information Gathering • Find out initial information Open Source: general information about a company that anyone can obtain whois (unix), sam spade (third-party tool for windows) nslookup • Find out address range of the network ARIN (American registry for Internet numbers) http://www.arin.net – whois -h rs.arin.net arin-net Traceroute • Find active machines: ping 12 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 13. Information Gathering cont. • Find open ports or access points: Nmap http://www.insecure.org/nmap for UNIX ScanPort http://www.dataset.fr/eng/scanport.html for Windows War Dialers: Programs that find modems on a network – THC-Scan for Windows • Figure out the operating system Queso Nmap 13 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 14. Information Gathering cont. • Map out the network Cheops http://www.marko.net/cheops/ Visual ping http://www.visualware.com/visualroute/ Traceroute • Figure out which services are running on each port Default port and OS Telnet Vulnerability scanners: programs that can be run against a site that give a hacker a list of vulnerabilities on the target host – SAINT http://www.wwwdsi.com/saint/ – NESSUS http://www.nessus.org 14 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 15. TCP three-way handshake SYN with ISNa ACK ISNa and SYN with ISNb ACK ISNb Connection Connection 15 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 16. Types of Nmap scans • TCP Connect Scan: Attempts to complete the TCP three-way handshake and set up a connection Easy to detect • TCP SYN Scans: “half-open scans” Sends a SYN to each target port. Target sends SYN-ACK if the port is open. The attacker send a RESET packet to abort the connection. Hard to detect, only routers or firewalls will log (if enabled) the attackers IP. • FIN Scan: Violate the TCP specification by sending unexpected packets at the start of a connection Attacker sends FIN packet, if the target port is closed a RESET packet is sent back, if open nothing is sent back. • Ack Scan: Sends an ACK packet to targets port. If RESET comes back from target Nmap will classify the port as “unfiltered” otherwise “filtered” 16 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 17. Types of Spoofing • IP spoofing: An attacker uses an IP address of another computer to acquire information or gain access • Email spoofing: In essence, the email looks like it came from John, but in reality, John didn’t send the email. Someone who was impersonating John send it. • Web spoofing: Whenever an entity has to be trusted, the opportunity for spoofing arises. • Non-technical spoofing: These types of attacks concentrate on compromising the human element of a company.This is done through social engineering techniques. 17 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 18. IP Spoofing. • The intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP address indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host. • A hacker must find an IP address of a trusted host and then modify the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming from that host. From ad dress: 1 Attacker To addre 0.10.20. ss: 10.1 20 0.5.5 10.40.40.40 Replies sent back to 10.10.20.20 John Spooft adress 10.10.5.5 10.10.20.20 18 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 19. Denial of Service Attack. • DoS: A type of attack on a network that is designed to bring the network to its knees by flooding it with useless traffic. • Two general types of DoS attacks: 1. Crashing a system or a network: The attacker can send a victim data or packets it is not expecting This attack requires little to perform and human interaction to fix 2. Flooding the system or network with so much information that it cannot respond: This attack requires more energy from the attacker, recovering requires minimal human intervention 19 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 20. Distributed Denial of Service Attack. • DDoS: Several machines are coordinated to launch an attack against a target machine or network at the same time Attacker System in System in System in System in Kina USA Iran Europe 20 Victim FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 21. DoS • Ping of Death • SSPing • Land • Smurf • Win Nuke • CPU Hog • SYN Flood 21 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 22. Buffer overflow #include <stdio.h> sample_function(char *string){ char buffer[16]; Local buffer can hold 16 characters strcpy(buffer, string); strcpy loads characters into buffer until it return;} finds the end of the string main (){ Create buffer that can hold 256 characters char big_buffer [256]; int i; for (i=0; i<255; i++){ big_buffer[i]='A'; } Shove the character A into the buffer 255 times sample_function (big_buffer); Sent big_buffer to sample_function 22 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 23. Buffer Overflow Attack • A buffer overflow attack is when an attacker tries to store too much information in an undersized receptacle. • Most of the newest exploits are based on buffer overflow attack • Takes advantage of applications that do not adequately parse input by stuffing too much data into undersized receptacles. • Can cause attacks against all three areas to security: 1. Attack against availability 2. Attack against integrity 3. Attack against confidentiality 23 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 24. How does it work? Fill direction . . Bottom . . Of memory . . Buffer overwritten Machine Code Buffer with instructions execv /bin/sh Saved frame PTR Saved frame PTR Return Pointer New PTR to EXEC code Return PTR is overwritten Function Call Function Call Arguments Arguments . . Top . . Of memory . . 24 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 25. Example • Some different buffer overflow attacks: NetMeeting Buffer Overflow Outlook Buffer Overflow Linuxconf Buffer Overflow IIS 4.0/5.0 Phone Book Server Buffer Overflow char shellcode[] = "xebx1fx5ex89x76x08x31xc0x88x46x07x89x46x0cxb0x0b" "x89xf3x8dx4ex08x8dx56x0cxcdx80x31xdbx89xd8x40xcd" "x80xe8xdcxffxffxff/bin/sh"; void main() { int *ret; ret = (int *)&ret + 2; (*ret) = (int)shellcode;} 25 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 26. Sniffing • A program that gather traffic from the local network • Used by both attackers and network administrators • Gathers packets at the Data Link layer • An attacker must haven account on a machine in order to run the sniffer program. • Sniffing tools available: tcpdump http://www.tcpdump.com windump netgroup-serv.polito.it/windump Wireshark (ethereal) Dsniff 26 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 27. Passive Sniffing et a ck p packet HUB packet pa ck et 27 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 28. Active Sniffing • Two methods for sniffing data from a switched LAN 1. MAC flooding 2. Spoofed ARP Messages packet Switch packet Default packet router Internet 28 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 29. Spoofed ARP Message Configure IP Forwarding to send packets to the default router Send fake ARP response to remap default router IP adressto attacker´s Attacker sniffs the traffic MAC address Switch Packets are forwarded from the Victim traffic destined attackers machine to the actual For the outside world. default router for delivery to the Based on the poisoned outside world ARP table, traffic is really sent to the attackers MAC Default address router Internet 29 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 31. Passwords • Most common weaknesses in a company 1. weak passwords 2. uncontrolled modems on the network • Most systems and software have default passwords! • Characteristics of a strong password Changes every 45 days Minimum length of 10 characters Contain at leas one alpha, one number and one special character Cannot contain dictionary words Cannot reuse the previous five passwords Minimum password age of 10 days After 5 failed logon attempts, password is locked for serveral hours 31 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 32. Passwords cont. • System maintain a file that associates a password with each authorised user. • Password file can be protected with: One-way encryption Access Control • Techniques for guessing passwords: Try default passwords. Try all short words, 1 to 3 characters long. Try all the words in an electronic dictionary (60,000). Collect information about the user’s hobbies, family names, birthday, etc. Try user’s phone number, social security number, street address, etc. Try all license plate numbers (MUP103). Use a Trojan horse Tap the line between a remote user and the host system. 32 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 33. UNIX passwords • Stored in file /etc/passwd is world readable (any user who was on the system had access to read the file i.e. more /etc/passwd ) usernamen:password:UID:GID:full name:home directory:shell sch:OZFGkH258h8yg:1013:10:Stefan Chevul:/home/sch/:/bin/csh • Latest UNIX versions split the passwd file into 2 files. The /etc/passwd file still exists, it contains everything except the encrypted passwords. This is stored in the /etc/shadow file. usernamen:password:last:min:max:warning:expire:disable sch:OZFGkH258h8yg::::::: 33 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 34. ypcat passwd gymsjo:PgiEmZuEHpmY2:3227:3200:STEFAN JOHANSSON:/home/ dogmatix/gym/gymsjo:/usr/local/bin/tcsh frpe03:EoFPa/t0McqN6:470078:20031:FREDRIK PERSSON:/home/ dogmatix/students/20031/frpe03:/usr/local/bin/tcsh etmf01:Ck34HVjHPI3gQ:740030:20011:Etienne Mfoumou:/home/ dogmatix/students/20011/etmf01:/usr/local/bin/tcsh rope05:i/mTnW1jL7vmM:490146:20051:ROBIN PERSSON:/home/ obelix/students/20051/rope05:/usr/local/bin/tcsh nasc04:HfcXJTuIB7Bh2:500001:20041:Nadzida Saric:/home/obelix/ students/20041/nasc04:/usr/local/bin/tcsh 34 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 35. cat passwd root:x:0:0:Super-User:/:/sbin/sh daemon:x:1:1::/: bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin: sys:x:3:3::/: adm:x:4:4:Admin:/var/adm: lp:x:71:8:Line Printer Admin:/usr/spool/lp: uucp:x:5:5:uucp Admin:/usr/lib/uucp: smmsp:x:25:25:SendMail Message Submission Program:/: nobody:x:60001:60001:Nobody:/: noaccess:x:60002:60002:No Access User:/: 35 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 36. Salt • The salt serves three purposes: Prevents duplicate passwords. Effectively increases the length of the password. Prevents the use of hardware implementations of DES 36 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 37. UNIX Password Scheme I salt password Password File 12 bits 56 bits User id salt E(pwd, [salt, 0]) • Load • crypt (3) 11 characters • (a) Loading a new password 37 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 38. UNIX Password Scheme II 38 ET2437 - Network Security
  • 39. Passwords cracking • Password cracking = guessing someone´s password from the encrypted password • General algorithm used for automated password cracking: 1. Find valid user IDs 2. Find the encryption algorithm used 3. Obtain encrypted passwords 4. Create a list of possible passwords 5. Encrypt each word 6. See if there is a match for each user ID 7. Repeat steps 1 through 5 39 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 40. Why is Passwords cracking important? • From a security standpoint, password cracking can help you build and maintain a more secure system. • Reasons why password cracking is useful To audit the strength of passwords To recover forgotten / unknown passwords To migrate users To use as a checks and balance system • Main types of password cracking attacks: Dictionary attacks Brute force attacks Hybrid attacks 40 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 41. Types of Passwords Attacks Dictionary Brute Force Hybrid attack attack attack Speed of the Fast Slow Medium attack Amount of Finds only Finds every Finds only passwords words password passwords that have a cracked dictionary word as the base 41 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 42. Passwords cracking programs • NT password cracking programs: L0phtcrack NTSweep NTCrack PWDump2 • UNIX password crackers: Crack John the Ripper XIT Slurpie 42 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY
  • 43. Covering the Tracks • After an attacker has gained access and accomplished what he wanted to do, one of the last steps he performs is covering his tracks, hiding evidence that he was ever there. • To do this there are 4 main areas an attacker is concerned with: 1. Log files 2. File information 3. Additional files 4. Network traffic 43 FREDRIK ERLANDSSON ET2437 - NETWORK SECURITY