There are two leadership styles of President Bill Clinton - an initial style that pushes numerous policies with little priority or accommodation, and a later more measured style that focuses on a limited set of goals while considering political realities. Clinton's leadership combines a passion for policy details with strong political skills, driven by his intelligence and verbal abilities. However, his early style lacks discipline and focus, and fails to establish an effective organizational structure.

1. The Two Leadership Styles of William Jefferson Clinton
Author(s): Fred I. Greenstein
Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1994), pp. 351-361
Published by: International Society of Political Psychology
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2. Political Psychology, Vol. 15, No. 2, 1994
The Two Leadership Styles of William
Jefferson Clinton
Fred I. Greenstein
Princeton University
Readers of the governmentpublicationsthat record such official actions of
the Americanpresidencyas executive ordersand signed legislation will be aware
of two PresidentClintons-the chief executive namedWilliam J. Clinton, whose
name appearson such documents, and the Bill Clintonwho is picturedregularly
on television in a seemingly endless series of photo opportunities,informalpress
interviews, and formal addresses. My argumentin this accountof the leadership
style of PresidentClintonis thattherealso can be said to be two Bill Clintonsat a
far more politically significant level-the level of day-to-dayexecutive leader-
ship in the arena of governmentand politics. My furtherargumentis that it is
necessary to take account of both Bill Clintons to explain the striking up-and-
down performanceof the Clinton presidency.
The leadershipstyles of some political leaderstend to be all of a piece. This
appears to have been the case of PresidentJimmy Carter. As the declassified
recordof the Carterpresidencybegins to emerge, one sees a presidentwho in his
private counsels appearsto be very similar to the presidentwho was evident in
such public displays as news conferences and addresses to the nation, in both
contexts showing the same preoccupationwith the technical details of his poli-
cies and the same ratherstiff-necked insistence on the correctnessof his own
positions. Otherleadershipstyles are layered, as in the case of PresidentDwight
D. Eisenhower whose nonpartisanand homely outward persona concealed a
cool, analyticallydetachedpolitical strategist,who typically obtainedresults by
indirection(Greenstein, 1982).
The leadership style of William Jefferson Clinton appears to be neither
unitarynor layered, but ratherto change over time in an alternation between two
basic modalities-a no-holds-barred style of striving for numerouspolicy out-
comes with little attentionto establishingprioritiesor accommodating political
to
realities, and a more measured,pragmaticstyle of focusing on a limited number
351
0162-895X ? 1994 International
Society of Political Psychology
Publishedby Blackwell Publishers,238 Main Street, Cambridge,MA 02142, USA, and 108 Cowley
Road, Oxford, OX4 1JF, UK.

3. 352 Greenstein
of goals and attendingclosely to the politics of selling his program.I speak of an
alternationin Bill Clinton's leadership style ratherthan an evolution because
there is a strikingsimilaritybetween the course of Mr. Clinton'spolitical actions
in the state of Arkansasand his actions duringthe period that has so far elapsed
of his first year in the White House.
In Arkansas, after being elected in 1978 as the nation's youngest governor,
Clinton moved too fast and too far for the political temper of his state and was
defeatedtwo years later, but then spent the next two years stumpingthe state and
promising to remedy his ways. He was returnedto office, and thereafterhis
political comportmentwas by all accounts far more measuredand responsive to
political realities, enabling him to remainas governorfor a furtherdecade (Ifill,
1982; Kolbert, 1992). Similarly,the first 100 days of the Clintonpresidencywere
an exercise in political excess. Having promised to focus "like a laser" on the
economy, Clintonconfrontedthe Washington political communitywith a scatter-
gun of stimuli-gays in the military,a succession of problematicappointments,
and a procession of other distractionswhich negated the positive effects of his
occasional tour-de-forceperformances,such as the much-acclaimed,ad lib pre-
sentationof his economic programto a joint session of Congresson February17.
By the 100-daysmarkClintonhad a record-lowapprovalratingin the polls.
The press commentaryon his presidencywas suffusedwith the images of failure
and whateverpolitical capital his periodic strong performanceshad earned him
was squandered.Then, ratheras if the punditryoccasioned by the arbitrary100-
day markhad providedthe same wake-up call furnishedby defeat after his first
as governor, Clinton correctedsharply,moved to the center, signalled his will-
ingness to bargain and negotiate, and even conspicuously added to his staff
the former Republican White House aide David Gergen. Ironically, Gergen
had been chargedwith the public relationsaspects of enacting PresidentRonald
Reagan's 1981 tax cut, which produced the mounting deficit that President
Clinton's 1993 economic programwas designed to combat.
Because my concern is with the outer aspects of the Clinton leadership-
with his style ratherthan his characterand personality-I will not attempt to
arrive at an answer to the puzzling question of why Clinton appearsto require
external correction in order to modify his style in ways that are plainly in his
interest. Rather, I will focus on the particularelements of his leadership that
combine in different ways at differentperiods to account for his two political
modes.
CLINTON'S LEADERSHIP QUALITIES
The account that follows of the components of Bill Clinton's oscillating
political style takes the form of nine somewhatarbitrary
clustersof observations.
While it has something of the atomized, static characterof trait-psychology

4. Symposium: Two Leadership Styles 353
inventories of personal attributes,I will set it forth in the form of a continuous
narrativethat is meant to suggest how these components fit together and come
into play under varying circumstances.
1. Policy Concerns
High on any listing of the qualitiesBill Clintonbringsto his leadershipis his
passionate interestin public policy, more particularly domestic policy. Clinton is
preoccupied with policy not just in the broad sense of having general policy
aims, but also in the narrowersense of being fascinatedby the specific details of
particularpolicies. Beginning in the Trumanyears when the practice of the
presentationby presidentsof an annuallegislative programcame into being, all
presidents have promulgatedpolicies as part of their official responsibilities
(Neustadt, 1954). But only a few presidentsappearto have had much intrinsic
interest in the detailed rationalesfor alternativepolicies.
Dwight Eisenhowerbroughtto his presidencya deep concernwith the logic
of nationalsecurity,which went back to his early careeras a militaryplannerand
staff officer. JohnKennedydevelopeda curiosityaboutthe logic of policies while
he was in office, largely as a consequence of his interactionswith his more
specialized advisers. And Jimmy Carterwas notable for his preoccupationwith
the details of his own policies. But Clinton is an aficionado of policy in and of
itself, and not just the policies of his own administration,so much so that his
rhetoricon the stump sometimes has more of the ring of the public policy school
than of the political arena.
Interestingly,for a presidentwho is so deeply fascinatedwith the rationale
for and mechanics of his domestic policies, Clintonseemed for much of his first
half-yearin office to be almost oblivious to foreign policy. Neither his formative
experiences as a Vietnam war protester,nor his dozen years as goveror of a
small Southernstate appearto have led him to addresshimself in any sustained
way to the largerworld. Apartfrom occasional brief periods of intense involve-
ment in foreign affairs on the occasions of his meeting with Soviet President
Boris Yeltsin and his participationin the Tokyo economic summit, he appears
almost to have delegated the largerworld to his foreign policy team for much of
his first year, only stepping into the commander-in-chief role in October, when
events in Somalia and Haiti made it evident that, like it or not, he is commander
in chief and head of state and he cannot confine himself to leadership in the
domestic sphere.
2. Political Propensity
Clinton also stands out in the extent to which he is a political animal,
although, in a universe that includes FranklinRoosevelt, Lyndon Johnson, and

5. 354 FredI. Greenstein
RichardNixon, his preoccupation with politics is less distinctivethanhis passion
for policy. He is political both in the public sense of batteningon the responsesof
the mass public and in the privatesense of reveling in the artsof persuasionand
cajolery. Moreover, he seems to have exhibitedthese qualities, at least in antici-
patoryform, from his earliestyears. As the editorand compilerof a collection of
reminiscencesof citizens of Arkansaswho knew Clinton at various points in his
development puts it:
Few Americansever had the exteriorgifts of the politician in such abundance.Bill
Clinton was handsome, loquacious, and tireless. He always exhibited a boundless opti-
mism. He met people with grace and facility, and a prodigious memory never let him
forget them. He had what seemed to be a compulsive need to meet people, to know them,
to like them, to have them like him. These are the instinctsof the calculatingpolitician,
but they long preceded Clinton's political impulses. Bill Clinton's is the case where a
man's deepest human instinct perfectly matched, maybe even gave rise to, his most
abiding ambition. (Dumas, 1993, p. xvi)
There is no obvious precedentin the moder presidencyfor a chief execu-
tive who combines a concern for and interestin politics and policy to the extent
that Clintondoes. It is as if the more cerebralside of JohnF. Kennedy'sapproach
to leadershipwere writ large and amalgamated with LyndonJohnson'sproclivity
to press the flesh, find ways to split the difference with his opponents, and
otherwise practice the art of the possible.
3. Verbal Facility and Proclivity
The link between Clinton's policy and political orientations is his intel-
ligence and formidable verbal facility. The record abounds with evidence of
Clinton'sseemingly effortlessabilityto elaborateat length abouthis policies with
modificationsof emphasisfrom audienceto audience. The perfectlygrammatical
100-odd-wordsentences Clinton is able to spin out extemporaneously could not
be more unlike the fractured prose of George Bush. Indeed, he sometimes spins
out statementsof extraordinary complexity with seemingly effortlessspontaneity,
as in the following vintage utteranceto the WallStreetJournal staff membersto
whom he granted his first interview after taking office, which juxtaposes two
pairs of if-then propositions:
The people who say that if I want to go to a four-yearphased-incompetition model [in
connection with health care reform]and that won't save any tax money on the deficit in
the first four years, but will save huge tax money on the deficit in the next four years, miss
the main point, which is that if we have a system now which begins to move health care
costs down towardinflation, and thereforelowers healthcare as a percentageof the GNP
in the years ahead, the main beneficiariesby a factor of almost two to one will be in the
private sector. (Clinton, 1992)
As exceptional as Clinton's verbal intelligence is, however, it is not clear
how able he is to make the kinds of sound, balancedjudgmentsthat commonly

6. TwoLeadership
Symposium: Styles 355
are summarizedin the term"commonsense," and it is not certainwhetherhe has
a fundamentallyanalytic cast of mind that leads him to search for evidence that
would lead him to accept or reject the assumptionsbehind the formulationshe
can verbalize with such facility. (On multiple intelligences, see Gardner,1983.)
Moreover,precisely because he is so facile, so well-informed,and so profoundly
political, it is difficult for others (and perhaps Clinton himself) to be sure of
when and whetherhe is advancinga policy on the basis of its intrinsicmerit and
when and whether he is trimming.
4. Dynamism and Ebullience
Other elements of the Clinton amalgam are an energy, exuberance, and
optimismof trulyremarkable proportions.Even when he was deeply beleaguered
at the time of the New Hampshireprimary,Clintonexhibitedan optimism remi-
niscent of FDR's capacity to radiate confidence under conditions of extreme
adversity.But unlike Roosevelt, he has no war or Depression as a foil for these
qualities, and unlike Roosevelt he is not a naturaldramatist.More fundamen-
tally, he appearsto lack a comprehensivestrategic sense about how to present
himself to the public and advance his policies.
Interestingly,Roosevelt, like Clinton, faced a "character issue" during the
period when he was seeking the presidency.Part of the concern was about his
very outgoing and cheerful qualities-his critics dismissed him as lacking in
presidentialstature,in large partbecauseof whatEdmundWilson once described
as his "unnatural sunniness." But such skepticism was forgottenin the wake of
his magisterial assumptionof power in March 1933 (Maney, 1992). Clinton's
assumptionof power, however, was anythingbut magisterial.Indeed, duringthe
transitionperiod between his election and his inauguration,Clinton received a
quite favorablepress for his performancein an economic "summitconference"
he convened in Little Rock, Arkansas, and for such initial presentationsas his
interview with the WallStreetJournal. During that period his support, as mea-
sured in public opinion polls, was quite high. But by the time the first polls
were conductedafter he enteredthe White House, his administration exper-
had
ienced a series of gaffes thatsignificantlylowered his supportlevels (Greenstein,
1993).
5. Lack of Discipline; Failure to Focus
Related to Clinton's energy, enthusiasm,intelligence, and devotion to poli-
cy is a cluster of more problematictraits-absence of self-discipline, hubristic
confidence in his own views and abilities, and difficulty in narrowinghis goals,

7. 356 Greenstein
ordering his efforts, and devising strategies for advancing and communicating
the ends he seeks to achieve.
6. Insensitivity to Organization
Another of Clinton's traits is a predilection to take on large numbers of
personal responsibilities and to do little to establish structuresof delegation
which divide the labor of his presidency and avail him with overall strategic
advice. The paradoxicalresult is that it is difficultfor his administration move
to
on more than one trackat a time, but at the same time he has a Jimmy Carter-like
tendency to overload the national political agenda. This is the case in spite of
Clinton's many statements, during the transition,of his intention to avoid Car-
ter's difficulties and emulate Ronald Reagan in the single-minded pursuit of a
limited numberof major goals.
Because Clinton takes on so many responsibilities, his administration has
been slow to make appointments,many of which are held up for clearancein the
Oval Office (Pearl, 1993). In general, Clinton's exceptional talents are in great
need of managementlest he fly off in all directions,but he is not easily managed.
Moreover,he appearsnot to have given much thoughtto problemsof creatingan
effective staff. In this, he is a striking contrastwith Eisenhower, who entered
office with a well-developed view of the staff needs of the presidency and for
whom effective delegation was an article of faith (Greenstein, 1984).
Given his energy and intelligence, Clintonprobablydid not need to be very
attentiveto staffingin Little Rock, but he plainly does in Washington.He is said
to be a student of the presidency and of American history, but he shows little
awarenessof the uses some presidentshave made of well-designed formal orga-
nization (Burke, 1992). Indeed, he has acknowledgedthat he enteredthe White
House with no plan for White House organization,whetherat the informalor the
formal level, and initially peopled his staff with aides who had little Washington
experience and who lacked the statureto help him to control his own centrifugal
tendencies (Nelson & Donovan, 1933; Watson, 1993). This, of course, was the
early story of his White House. Then he turned(with seemingly good results) to
such Washingtoninsidersas veteranRepublicanWhite House aide David Gergen
for staff assistance (Frisby, 1993).
7. The Not-So-Great Communicator
As articulateas Clinton is, his record of communicatinghis aims to the
public has been poor. Paradoxically, fluency serves him poorly. He finds it all
his
too easy to deluge the public with details, and it appearsto be difficult for him to
transcendpolicy mechanics and convey the broadprinciples and values behind

8. Symposium: Two Leadership Styles 357
his programs. Here, of course, he is the antithesisof Ronald Reagan, who was
notoriously innocent of policy specifics, but gifted at evoking larger themes.
8. Personal Charm
At the personal level, Clinton appearsto be one of the more ingratiating
incumbentsof the Oval Office. In spite of being ratherthin-skinnedand having a
quick temper,which occasionally is evident in public, he is fundamentallyamia-
ble, sometimes to the point where this is counterproductive. Thus, like Franklin
Roosevelt, his congeniality sometimes leaves those who consult with him the
false impression that he has accepted their views, when he intends only to
acknowledge that he has heard them.
Clinton's impulse to be agreeablefeeds the familiarcharge that he seeks to
be all things to all people and reinforcesthe "Slick Willie" epithet that is turned
against him by his enemies. Yet he made surprisinglylimited use of his charm
and persuasive powers in the early months of his presidency,perhapsbecause,
like many bright, self-confident people, he is impatientwith those who do not
share his views and ill-disposed to take them seriously. Thus, he overestimated
his ability to win support by appealing directly to the public through cable
television and failed to cultivatethe press. And he did little duringthe transition
to win over such key Washingtonactors as Senators Sam Nunn and Daniel
Patrick Moynihan. And once in office, he was slow to do much to enlist the
supportof Republicanmoderatesand Democraticconservatives.
9. Resilience; Capacity to Take Correction
I have left for last what seem to me to be Clinton'smost redeemingtraits-
ones that bode favorablyfor his leadershipin the long, if not the short, run:his
remarkable capacityto reboundin the face of adversity,his fundamentalpragma-
tism and his capacity (in spite of his thin-skinnedtendencies) to admit his own
failings. This cluster of traitshelps accountfor the commonly made observation
that he is incapable of sustainederror.
THE CLINTON SYNTHESES
Most of the componentsof Clinton'sleadershipstyle are not distinctive, but
the magnitude of some of them and the way they fit together are. As I have
suggested, there appearto be two Clinton syntheses. Under some circumstances
his traits combine to form an undisciplined, have-it-all approach, and under
others they converge in a more focused, accommodatingstyle. When he is in the

9. 358 Greenstein
first mode, as he was in his initial termas governorof Arkansas,as well as in his
first months in the White House, Clinton is animatedby his policy enthusiasm,
his boundless energy, and his impatience with the views of those who do not
share his policy vision. Even when he is in the first mode, however, he is no
Woodrow Wilson, capable of bringing his own programto defeat by insisting
that the Congress take its medicine. But when he pulls back after overreaching
himself, his compromises are likely to have a disheveled, rear-guard quality, as
was the case of his prolonged negotiationsover gays in the military.
As I noted earlier, Clinton's second, more pragmaticand focused mode of
operationappearsto come intoplay only afteroutsideforces haveconstrained him.
It is not clear why such an intelligent, politically awareleader, who knows in his
heartthathe shouldbe laser-likein his focus, begins his presidencyin a scattered
fashion, or why he is so dependenton externalcorrection.My task of examining
Clinton'sstyle does not requirethatI reacha settledconclusionaboutthis andother
questions that bear on his inner workings, including questions bearing on the
continuinguncertainty over who the "real"Bill Clintonis. Some answersarevery
likely to be found in his upbringing.Clintonand his aides have themselves drawn
attentionto his alcoholic stepfather,suggesting that his almost unsettling good
cheer reflects the exaggeratedneed to be agreeablefound in children (and step-
children) of alcoholics (Kaufman& Pattison, 1982; Cruse, 1989). It is also the
case that his younger step-brother had a substanceabuse problem.
Clinton's backgroundin a family in which addictionsplayed a significant
parthas an obvious bearingon his tendency to leave people with the misleading
impression that he accepts their views. But his lack of self-discipline would
appearto have other roots. At a minimum, Clinton, whose outwardcharacteris-
tics seem almost to have been custom-madeto illustrateJames David Barber's
active-positive charactertype, shows the difficulty of categorization, in that
much of what is puzzling about him stems from inner complexities that do not
figure in Barber's(and perhapsany other) classification (Barber, 1992).
More to the point may be the political psychology of RichardNeustadt, in
which the accent is on "political"ratherthan "psychology."Neustadt's 1960
book nicely anticipatesmany of Clinton'sproblems. Neustadt, it will be remem-
bered, stressed the fundamental weakness of the Americanchief executive in an
era in which the nation's problems are huge, but there is little readiness on the
part of the other members of the Washingtoncommunity, whose support is
needed to bring the president'sprograminto being, to transcendpolitical advan-
tage and rally around him. The president, Neustadt argues, has two basic re-
sources with which to accomplish his purposes above and beyond his executive
powers and his ability to use these to bargain-his reputationwith other policy-
makers as a skilled, determined player and their perception that he has the
supportof the public. (Neustadt's1960 accountremainsfundamentally unaltered
in its 1990 incarnation.See also the elaborationon Neustadt's formulationby
Sperlich, 1975.)

10. Symposium: Two Leadership Styles 359
WHITHER THE CLINTON PRESIDENCY?
In the early monthsof his presidency,Bill Clintonmanagedto diminishboth
of the resources Neustadt sees as the levers of presidentialpower. His political
and policy propensitiesoften convergedin a mannerthatled him to be perceived
by othermembersof the political communityas inconstantand disingenuous,not
only because he departedfrom previously held positions, but also because his
departures often seemed effortless. It would not mattermuch to membersof the
Washingtoncommunitythat a presidentseemed insincere("Whatelse is new?"),
if he were seen as havingthe public behindhim. But Clintonwas conspicuousfor
his failure to capturethe imaginationand enthusiasmof the American people.
Before he modified his style, Clinton was more Carter-likethan Jimmy
Carterin his seeming assumptionthat once elected he could put politics behind
him. In fact, he made even less effort than Carterto establish a favorablepublic
persona. Once in office, his tendency was to confine himself to impersonaland
distinctly noninspirationalmessages on such themes as the need to "grow the
economy," and he and his associates did little to humanizehis presidency. (For
discussions of what citizens appear to expect of their presidents and of the
of
presidentas interpreter public aspirations,see Greenstein, 1977, and Stuckey,
1991.) Then, at aboutthe mid-pointof his first year in office, he enteredinto the
transformation noted above.
Once he moved to his second, more strategic mode in the summer of his
first year in office, Clinton not only became more focused and accommodating,
but also appearedto have realized that he needed to find ways to simplify and
dramatizehis appeals to the public. Strikingdeals with dissident Democrats, he
brokeredthrough a deficit reductionmeasure in the summer of 1993 and then
departedon a vacation that some felt was as needed by the Washingtonpolicy
communityas by the presidentand his staff. He returned from vacationwith what
seemed to be an impossiblydemandingpolitical agenda-comprehensive reform
of the nation's health system, the controversial North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA), and the gimmicky sounding"reinventionof government"
proposals. But he used the latterfor a remarkably effective set of well-publicized
photo opportunities, that for once showed his administration a favorablelight;
in
he made a tour-de-forcepresentationof his health programto a joint session of
Congress, shrewdly associatinghimself more with its general aims than with its
specific provisions. And he largely delegatedthe promotionof NAFTA to others
until almost the eleventh hour, when he engaged in a whirlwindof promotional
and bargainingactivity, achieving a victory in the House of Representativesthat
for the momentput to rest the view thatClintonwould never be able to adapthis
leadership skills to the complexities of politics in the nation's capital.
The Clinton presidency seemed emphaticallyto be on a roll by the end of
November 1993, reinforcing accounts in the media two months earlier of a
remarkable"turn" Clinton'sfate (e.g., Barnes, 1993). Such claims had barely
in

11. 360 Greenstein
been made on the earlieroccasion, however, when Clintonencountereda succes-
sion of blows from the international environment-media images of the bodies
of Americansoldiers being draggedby mobs on the streetsof Mogadishuand of
similarly ominous mob action preventingthe landingof Americanpeace keepers
in Haiti-reminders that the jury is still out on the Clinton presidency.
Still, there was little doubt that, whether by dint of his own far-reaching
policy aspirationsor the very power of the modernpresidentto shape the nation's
political agenda, the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton had directed the
nation, at least in its domestic policies, toward ends which would probablynot
even have been envisioned if the electorate had returnedGeorge Bush for a
second term in November 1992.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
My work on this paperwas supportedby grantsfrom the Lynde and Harry
BradleyFoundationand the JohnJ. Sherrerd Oliver LangenbergFundsof the
and
Center of International
Studies, PrincetonUniversity.
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