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Technical Workshop - Win32/Georbot Analysis
Introduction

•   Based in Montreal
•   Studies in computer engineering at Ecole Polytechnique
•   Malware analysis
•   Focus on investigation and understanding trends
Labs’ Objectives

• Gain hands-on knowledge on malware analysis
   • Obfuscation
   • Persistence
   • C&C traffic
• This case is *NOT* cutting edge but a good summary of common
  things we see nowadays
Win32/Georbot

• One of our analyst reported an interesting string in a binary
  (.gov.ge)
• Started investigation, we thought it was time sensitive and involved
  3 guys for 3 days.
• Interesting feature
   • Document stealing
   • Audio / Video capture
   • Etc
Win32/Georbot

• Further analysis showed thousands of variants
• We were able to track the evolution of the features
• Track AV evasion techniques
Win32/Georbot
Workshop Outline

1.   Data obfuscation
2.   Control flow obfuscation
3.   API call obfuscation
4.   Answer basic malware analysis questions
5.   C&C network protocol
Tools Required

1. IDA 6.x (you can use the demo)
2. Python interpreter w/ some modules for web server
3. Immunity Debugger / Olly Debugger
IDA Python

•   Automate repetitive tasks in IDA
•   Read data (Byte, Word, Dword, etc)
•   Change data (PatchByte, PatchWord, PatchDword, etc)
•   Add comments (MakeComm)
•   Add cross references
•   User interaction
•   Etc.
Data Obfuscation

• Where’s all my data?!
• Debug the malware (in a controlled environment), do you see
  something appear? (0x407afb)
• What happened? Find the procedure which decodes the data
• Understand obfuscation
• Implement deobfuscation with IDA Python
Data Obfuscation
Control Flow Obfuscation
Control Flow Obfuscation

•   Identify common obfuscation patterns
•   Find a straight forward replacement
•   Implement substitutions with IDA Python
•   Reanalyze program, does it look better?
Control Flow Obfuscation


Obfuscated                     Deobfuscated
push <addr>; ret               Jmp <addr>
Push <addr>                    Call <addr> (will return to addr)
jmp <addr>
API Call Obfuscation

• Where are all my API calls?
• Find and understand hashing function
• Brute force API calls and add comments to IDB using IDA Python
API Hashing Function
Let’s understand what’s going on!

•   Can multiple instances of the malware run at the same time?
•   Is the malware persistent? How?
•   What is the command and control server?
•   What is the update mechanism for binaries?
•   Is there a C&C fallback mechanism?
Additional work

• Write a detection mechanism for an infected system
• Implement a cleaner for this malware
   • Kill the process
   • Remove persistence
• At what time interval does the malware probe its C&C server?
0x403AFD - cpuid




http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPUID
C&C Protocol Analysis

•   What’s the chain of event in the communication
•   What is the information provided by the bot
•   What type of answer is the bot expecting?
•   What are the different actions?
C&C Commands

    0A029h ; find
    1675h ; dir
    0A8FEh ; load?
    22C4C1h ; upload
    42985 ; main?
    0A866h ; list?
    1175972831 ; upload_dir
    9C9Ch ; ddos
    0B01Dh ; scan
    47154 ; word
    2269271 ; system
    9FCCh ; dump
    310946 ; photo
    440F6h 18FEh ; rdp
    4F5BBh ; video
    3D0BD7C6h ; screenshot
    741334016 ; password
    0DA8B3Ch ; history
FALLBCK.com

• What is this DNS query?
• What can we do with it?
GUID

• What is at 0x0040A03D, how is it used in program?
Conclusions

• The set of questions to answer is often similar.
• Don’t focus on details, remember your objective, its easy to get lost.
• A mix of dynamic and static analysis is often the best solution for
  quick understanding of a new malware family.
Thank You

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Technical Workshop - Win32/Georbot Analysis

  • 1. Technical Workshop - Win32/Georbot Analysis
  • 2. Introduction • Based in Montreal • Studies in computer engineering at Ecole Polytechnique • Malware analysis • Focus on investigation and understanding trends
  • 3. Labs’ Objectives • Gain hands-on knowledge on malware analysis • Obfuscation • Persistence • C&C traffic • This case is *NOT* cutting edge but a good summary of common things we see nowadays
  • 4. Win32/Georbot • One of our analyst reported an interesting string in a binary (.gov.ge) • Started investigation, we thought it was time sensitive and involved 3 guys for 3 days. • Interesting feature • Document stealing • Audio / Video capture • Etc
  • 5. Win32/Georbot • Further analysis showed thousands of variants • We were able to track the evolution of the features • Track AV evasion techniques
  • 7.
  • 8. Workshop Outline 1. Data obfuscation 2. Control flow obfuscation 3. API call obfuscation 4. Answer basic malware analysis questions 5. C&C network protocol
  • 9. Tools Required 1. IDA 6.x (you can use the demo) 2. Python interpreter w/ some modules for web server 3. Immunity Debugger / Olly Debugger
  • 10. IDA Python • Automate repetitive tasks in IDA • Read data (Byte, Word, Dword, etc) • Change data (PatchByte, PatchWord, PatchDword, etc) • Add comments (MakeComm) • Add cross references • User interaction • Etc.
  • 11. Data Obfuscation • Where’s all my data?! • Debug the malware (in a controlled environment), do you see something appear? (0x407afb) • What happened? Find the procedure which decodes the data • Understand obfuscation • Implement deobfuscation with IDA Python
  • 14. Control Flow Obfuscation • Identify common obfuscation patterns • Find a straight forward replacement • Implement substitutions with IDA Python • Reanalyze program, does it look better?
  • 15. Control Flow Obfuscation Obfuscated Deobfuscated push <addr>; ret Jmp <addr> Push <addr> Call <addr> (will return to addr) jmp <addr>
  • 16. API Call Obfuscation • Where are all my API calls? • Find and understand hashing function • Brute force API calls and add comments to IDB using IDA Python
  • 18. Let’s understand what’s going on! • Can multiple instances of the malware run at the same time? • Is the malware persistent? How? • What is the command and control server? • What is the update mechanism for binaries? • Is there a C&C fallback mechanism?
  • 19. Additional work • Write a detection mechanism for an infected system • Implement a cleaner for this malware • Kill the process • Remove persistence • At what time interval does the malware probe its C&C server?
  • 21. C&C Protocol Analysis • What’s the chain of event in the communication • What is the information provided by the bot • What type of answer is the bot expecting? • What are the different actions?
  • 22. C&C Commands 0A029h ; find 1675h ; dir 0A8FEh ; load? 22C4C1h ; upload 42985 ; main? 0A866h ; list? 1175972831 ; upload_dir 9C9Ch ; ddos 0B01Dh ; scan 47154 ; word 2269271 ; system 9FCCh ; dump 310946 ; photo 440F6h 18FEh ; rdp 4F5BBh ; video 3D0BD7C6h ; screenshot 741334016 ; password 0DA8B3Ch ; history
  • 23. FALLBCK.com • What is this DNS query? • What can we do with it?
  • 24.
  • 25. GUID • What is at 0x0040A03D, how is it used in program?
  • 26. Conclusions • The set of questions to answer is often similar. • Don’t focus on details, remember your objective, its easy to get lost. • A mix of dynamic and static analysis is often the best solution for quick understanding of a new malware family.