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“Secure Password Managers” and
 “Military-Grade Encryption” on
   Smartphones: Oh, Really?

         Andrey Belenko and Dmitry Sklyarov
                Elcomsoft Co. Ltd.
    {a.belenko,d.sklyarov} @ elcomsoft.com


                                              1
Agenda

• Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone
• Threat Model
• BlackBerry Password Managers
• iOS Password Managers
   • Free
   • Paid
• Summary & Conclusions


                                        2
Authentication: PC
• Trusted Platform Module



• Biometrics



• SmartCard + PIN



• Password/Passphrase

                                      3
Authentication: Smartphone
• Trusted Platform Module



• Biometrics



• SmartCard + PIN



• Password/Passphrase

                               4
Authentication: Smartphone


        Password is the only option
            on the smartphones

       “Lock patterns” are essentially
             numeric passcodes

              (1-4-2-5-6-9-8)



                                         5
Password Typing
                         PC:
                         • Full-sized keyboard,
                           motor memory
                         • Long and complex
                           passwords are easy

Smartphone:
• Touch keyboard
• Long and complex
  passwords are hard

                                                  6
Password Typing



It is fair to assume that passwords on the
   smartphones are shorter than their PC
                  counterparts




                                             7
Password Cracking
Smartphone:
• Relatively slow CPU
• Complex password-
  to-key transforms will
  impact usability

                           PC:
                           • Fast CPU
                           • Can do complex
                             password-to-key
                             transforms
                                               8
Password Handling
           Password Cracking




Offline attacks can utilize GPUs for attackers’
                  advantage
                                                  9
Authentication Wrap Up
           PC                    Smartphone
Password entered not       Password entered every
too often (usually just    time you need access
after unlocking console)   data (after switching
                           applications or after
                           short time-out)

•Handling passwords on smartphone is more
 difficult than on PC
•Smartphone requires stronger password
 protection than PC but provides less
 capabilities for doing so!
                                                    10
Agenda

• Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone
• Threat Model
• BlackBerry Password Managers
• iOS Password Managers
   • Free
   • Paid
• Summary & Conclusions


                                        11
Threat Model
Assumptions:
1. Attacker has:
 • Physical access to the device, or
 • Backup of the device, or
 • Access to password manager database file
2. Attacker wants to:
 • Recover master password for password
   manager(s) on the mobile device
 • Extract passwords stored by those
   managers
    Are those assumptions fair at all?
                                              12
Physical Access
                         Computers are relatively
                         big. Thus, hard to steal
                                 or lose.
                          You know where it is
                         (well, most of the time).

Lots of phones go in wrong
hands every year. Many are
       left in the bars.
 Do you really know where
 exactly your phone is right
             now?
                                                     13
Someone’s just
  got physical
 access to the
       device




                 14
Device Backup

Apple iOS:
 • Need device passcode or iTunes pairing
 • Optional encryption (enforced by device)
   • PBKDF2-SHA1 with 10’000 iterations
BlackBerry:
  • Need device password
  • Optional encryption (not enforced)
    • PBKDF2-SHA1 with 20’000 iterations


                                              15
Database Files

Apple iOS:
 • Via afc (need passcode or iTunes pairing)
 • Via SSH (jailbroken devices)
 • Via physical imaging (up to iPhone 4)
BlackBerry:
  • Need device password




                                               16
Agenda

• Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone
• Threat Model
• BlackBerry Password Managers
• iOS Password Managers
   • Free
   • Paid
• Summary & Conclusions


                                        17
BlackBerry Applications


• BlackBerry Password Keeper
   • Included with OS 5
• BlackBerry Wallet
   • Version 1.0 (for OS <= 5)
   • Version 1.2 (for OS > 5)




                                       18
BlackBerry Password Keeper
• Key is calculated by PBKDF2-SHA1 with 3 iterations
• Encrypted payload is PKCS7-padded
  • Allows to quickly reject wrong keys (p ≈ 2-8)
  • Survived keys are checked by verifying SHA-1
              Encrypted payload

                     Data         SHA1 (Data)


• Password verification is fast
  • 3 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES-256
  • ~5M passwords/sec on a CPU, ~20M with GPU



                                                       19
PKCS7 Padding
Plaintext padded to completely fill last block
 • Done even if block size divides plaintext length
 • Padding value == number of bytes appended
     PKCS7 padding bytes

    7 7 7 7 7 7 7                    3 3 3
       6 6 6 6 6 6                       2 2
          5 5 5 5 5                          1
              4 4 4 4      D a t a B y   t   e 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
        Block size                               PKCS7 padding bytes



 • After decryption padding verified and removed
 • Decryption with random key produces valid padding
   with p ≈ 2-8 (0.4%)
                                                                       20
BlackBerry Wallet
      “Designed for BlackBerry smartphones,
      BlackBerry Wallet helps make mobile,
      online purchasing faster and easier”


Version 1.0
• Stores SHA-256 (SHA-256 (Password))
• Password verification requires 2 x SHA-256
• Very fast: ~6M on CPU, ~300M on GPU
• No salt: Rainbow Tables may be built

                                               21
BlackBerry Wallet
       “Designed for BlackBerry smartphones,
       BlackBerry Wallet helps make mobile,
       online purchasing faster and easier”
Version 1.2
• Similar to BB Password Keeper, but...
• Password initially hashed with SHA-512
• PBKDF2-SHA1 uses random number (50..100)
  of iterations
• Password verification requires 1xSHA-512 +
  100xPBKDF2-SHA1 + 1xAES-256
• Est. 200K p/s on CPU, 3200K on GPU
                                               22
Agenda

• Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone
• Threat Model
• BlackBerry Password Managers
• iOS Password Managers
   • Free
   • Paid
• Summary & Conclusions


                                        23
iOS Free Apps
Search App Store for “Password Keeper” and
pick a few from top 20 free apps

• Safe – Password (x3)
• iSecure Lite
• Secret Folder Lite
• Ultimate Password Manager Free
• My Eyes Only™ - Secure Password Manager
• Keeper® Password & Data Vault
• Password Safe – iPassSafe free version
• Strip Lite - Password Manager
                                             24
[un]Safe Triplets
“FINALLY! THE SAFEST APP TO PROTECT
YOUR ALL PASSWORDS, BANK ACCOUNT,
  CREDIT CARD, WEB LOGINS AND ETC.”

Safe – Password
by The Best Free, Lite and Pro Edition


Awesome Password Lite
by Easy To Use Products


Password Lock Lite
by chen kaiqian

                                            25
[un]Safe Triplets

• All three are identical (except for names and
  background images)
• Store data in SQLite database at
  Documents/Password_Keeper.sqlite
• Master password is always 4 digits
• No data encryption is involved at all
• Master password is stored in plaintext

 SELECT ZPASSWORD FROM ZDBCONFIG;
                                                  26
iSecure Lite - Password
                                 Manager
                “You data is extremely secure, even you
                        have lost your device or stolen”
by Roland Yau



• Stores data in SQLite database at
  Documents/app_creator.sqlite
• Master Password of any length/chars
• No data encryption is involved at all
• Master Password is stored in plaintext

 SELECT passcode FROM preference;
                                                           27
Secret Folder Lite
                      “The BEST AND MOST ADVANCED
                    PHOTO & VIDEO PRIVACY APP in the
  by chen kaiqian                    App Store today”

 • Password-protect access to media files
 • Stores data in SQLite database at
   Documents/privatephototwo.sqlite
 • No data encryption is involved at all
 • All passwords are stored in plaintext

SELECT ZDISPLAYNAME,ZPASSWORD FROM ZDBFILE;
                                                        28
Ultimate Password Manager
                                     Free
                          “The free version has the following
                            limitations over the paid version:
by Jean-Francois Martin                  - no data encryption”

• Stores data in binary Property List at
 Library/Preferences/com.tinysofty.upmfree.plist
• Master password is stored in plaintext

         Are you interested in password manager
           intentionally designed to be insecure,
                       even if it’s free?
                                                                 29
My Eyes Only™ - Secure
                           Password Manager
                        “...allows personal information to be
                        stored on iPhones, iPods and iPads
                           without the threat of unauthorized
by Software Ops LLC
                                      access if lost or stolen”
• Stores data in NSKeyArchiver files at
  Documents/*.archive, encrypted with RSA
• Master password, public and private RSA keys
  are stored in keychain with attribute
  kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked

 Wow, RSA looks impressive for a password
              keeper, isn’t it?
                                                                  30
My Eyes Only™ - Secure
               Password Manager
• 512-bit RSA modulus: factorization is easy
• Documents/MEO.archive holds RSA-
  encrypted master password
• RSA private key is stored in the same file
• Yes, RSA private key is stored along with
  encrypted data
• Master password and everything else can be
  instantly decrypted


                                               31
Keeper® Password & Data
                                      Vault
                     “With Keeper’s military-grade encryption,
                       you can trust that no one else will have
  by Callpod Inc   access to your most important information”

• Stores data in SQLite database at
  Documents/keeper.sql
• MD5 of master password is stored in database
• SHA1 of master password is used as AES key
• Very fast password verification: 1 x MD5
  • ~60M p/s on CPU, 6’000M p/s on GPU
• No salt: MD5 Rainbow Tables can be used
                                                                  32
Password Safe - iPassSafe
                                    free version
                         “iPassSafe - To Be True Protected.
                        AES-256 Double Encryption Layers”
by Netanel Software




• Stores data in SQLite database at
  Documents/iPassSafeDB.sqlite
• Prevents usage of “weak” passwords:
  0000 1234 2580 1111 5555
  0852 2222 1212 1998 5683


                                                              33
Password Safe - iPassSafe
                                     free version
                          “iPassSafe - To Be True Protected.
                         AES-256 Double Encryption Layers”
 by Netanel Software


• Random master key (Mk)is used for encryption
• Mk is encrypted with master password as a key
   • Password not hashed, only null-padded
   • PKCS7 padding allows to reject wrong keys
• Very fast password verification: 1 x AES-256
  • ~20M on CPU, haven’t done AES on GPU yet :)
  • Rainbow Tables may be built
                                                               34
Strip Lite -
                       Password Manager
                  “highly rated Password Manager and
                  Data Vault. Strip has been protecting
                        sensitive information on mobile
 by Zetetic LLC
                                devices for over 12 yrs.”

• Stores data in SQLite database at
  Documents/strip.db
• Whole database file is encrypted using
  open-source component sqlcipher
  developed by Zetetic

                                                            35
Strip Lite -
                   Password Manager

• Database encryption key is derived from
  master password using PBKDF2-SHA1 with
  4’000 iterations
   • By far the most resilient app to password
     cracking
• Password validation requires
  4000 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES-256
• Est. 5K p/s on CPU, 160K on GPU


                                                 36
Agenda

• Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone
• Threat Model
• BlackBerry Password Managers
• iOS Password Managers
   • Free
   • Paid
• Summary & Conclusions


                                        37
iOS Paid Apps
Google “Top Password Keepers for iOS” and
pick a few from various reviews

• SafeWallet - Password Manager
• DataVault Password Manager
• mSecure - Password Manager
• LastPass for Premium Customers
• 1Password Pro for iPhone
• SplashID Safe for iPhone

                                            38
SafeWallet -
       $3.99
                                 Password Manager
                          “Password Manager is the most secure
                               and easy to use way to store your
by SBSH Mobile Software
                            passwords and sensitive information”

   • Versions for Win, Mac, iOS, Android, BB…
   • Database format common for all platforms
   • Master key encrypted with master password
   • Data encrypted with AES-256, PKCS7
   • Password verification is fast
     •10 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES-256
     • Est. 1500K p/s on CPU, 20M on GPU
                                                                   39
DataVault Password
    $9.99
                                    Manager
                   “Leading Password Manager for iPhone,
                     iPad & iPod Touch ☆ AES Encryption”
  by Ascendo Inc


• Data encrypted by the master password and
  stored in device keychain
   • Master password not hashed, only padded
• SHA-256 of master password is stored in the
  keychain

Keychain is used, so it should be hard to get
hash to brute force master password, right?
                                                       40
DataVault Password
                              Manager

• In iOS 4 keychain is a SQLite database
  • Data column is supposed to store passwords
    and is always encrypted
  • Other item attributes are not encrypted
• Password hash stored as a ‘Comment’ attribute
• Still, this is better than storing hash in a file

Wait, I’ve heard iOS 5 encrypts all attributes in
         the keychain. Does that help?
                                                      41
DataVault Password
                              Manager

• iOS 5 encrypts all keychain items’ attributes
  • But it stores SHA-1 hash of original attribute
    to facilitate search/lookup
• So we have SHA-1 (SHA-256 (password))
• Very fast password verification:
  • 1 x SHA-256 [+ 1 x SHA-1 in iOS 5]
  • 7M p/s on CPU, 500M on GPU
  • No salt: Rainbow Tables can be built

                                                     42
mSecure -
      $9.99
                                Password Manager
                                  “used by almost a million users
                         worldwide, providing secure solution for
by mSeven Software LLC
                              storing your important information”

 • Stores data in NSKeyArchiver files at
   Documents/msecure.db.plist
 • Data encrypted with Blowfish
 • Master key is SHA-256 of master password
 • Fixed string encrypted on master key is
   stored for password verification

                                                                    43
mSecure -
      $9.99
                                Password Manager
                                  “used by almost a million users
                         worldwide, providing secure solution for
by mSeven Software LLC
                              storing your important information”



 • Password verification:
   •1 x SHA-256 + 1 x Blowfish
   •300K p/s on CPU, no Blowfish on GPU yet



                                                                    44
LastPass for Premium
                                Customers
   $12/yr.          “...password data on your PC and your
                 iPhone seamlessly synced. Encrypted by
                          AES-256 which is used by the US
   by LastPass     Government for Top Secret documents”

• ‘Cloud’ service, local storage created after first login
• Master key computed by 500* x PBKDF2-SHA256
• Hash of master key is encrypted with AES-256
  using master key and stored for verification
• Off-line password validation is very fast:
   • 500* x PBKDF2-SHA256 + 1 x AES-256
   • 12K p/s on CPU, 600K on GPU
                                                             45
1Password Pro for iPhone
    $14.99
                       “1Password Pro is a special edition of the
                      award-winning 1Password application with
                           more than 1 million users worldwide”
  by Agilebits Inc.




• Versions for Mac, Win, iOS, Android
• Two protection levels: master PIN and master
  password
• Data encrypted with AES-128, key derived from
  master PIN or master password

                                                                46
1Password Pro for iPhone
Read EncDatabaseKey and EncValidator from Database
KEK := MD5 (Password + Salt)
IV := MD5 (KEK + Password + Salt)
DatabaseKey := AES-128-CBC (KEK, IV, EncDatabaseKey)
Validator := AES-128-CBC (DatabaseKey, NULL, EncValidator)
If Validator = DatabaseKey Then password is correct


• Database key encrypted on itself is stored for
  PIN or password verification
   • PKCS7 padding allows to reject wrong keys
• Password/PIN verification is very fast
   • 1 x MD5 + 1 x AES-128
   • 15M p/s on CPU, 20M p/s on GPU
                                                             47
1Password Pro for iPhone

Version 3.6.5 released on 09 April 2012 has new
protection:
  • 10’000 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES
  • 2’000 p/s on CPU, 65K p/s on GPU
  • Only applies to master password (not PIN!)




                                                  48
SplashID Safe for iPhone
   $9.99         “the award-winning password manager with
                       over 500’000 users worldwide, is now
                    available for iPhone! The all new iPhone
 by SplashData   version 5 makes SplashID better than ever”

• Versions for Win, Mac, iOS, Android, BB…
• On iOS stores data in SQLite database at
  Documents/SplashIDDataBase.db
• All sensitive data is encrypted with Blowfish
• Master password is used as a Blowfish key
• Master password is encrypted with...
                                                           49
SplashID Safe for iPhone

• ...a random key (as per XKCD definition)




• ‘Random’ key is g.;59?^/0n1X*{OQlRwy
• Master password can be decrypted instantly

• This is now fixed (ver 6.1 released on 24 Apr)
                                                   50
Agenda

• Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone
• Threat Model
• BlackBerry Password Managers
• iOS Password Managers
   • Free
   • Paid
• Summary & Conclusions


                                        51
iOS Passcode
• Starting with iOS 4 passcode is involved in
  encryption of sensitive data
• Passcode key derivation is slowed down by
  doing 50’000 iterations
  • Each iteration requires talking to hardware AES
  • 6 p/s on iPhone 4
• Can’t be performed off-line and scaled

  Checking all 6-digit passcodes will take
           more than 40 hours

                                                      52
Cracking Passwords
             Name                          Complexity               CPU p/s   GPU p/s   Len/24h

Keeper® Password & Data Vault                 1x MD5                 60 M     6000 M     14.7
Password Safe - iPassSafe Free              1x AES-256               20 M      N/A       12.2
Strip Lite - Password Manager    4000x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256      5000     160 K      10.1
SafeWallet - Password Manager     10x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256      1500 K     20 M      12.2
DataVault Password Manager             1x SHA-256 + 1x SHA-1         7M       500 M      13.6
mSecure - Password Manager           1x SHA-256 + 1x Blowfish       300 K      N/A       10.4
LastPass for Premium Customers       2x SHA-256 + 1x AES-256         5M        20 M      12.2
                                    500*x PBKDF2-SHA256 + 1x
LastPass for Premium Customers                                       12K       600K      10.7
                                             AES-256
1Password Pro                           1x MD5 + 1x AES-128          15 M      20 M      12.2
1Password Pro                    10’000x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256    2000      65K        9.7
BlackBerry Password Keeper         3x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256       5M        20 M      12.2
BlackBerry Wallet 1.0                       2x SHA-256               6M       300 M      13.4
                                 1x SHA-512 + 100x PBKDF2-SHA1 +
BlackBerry Wallet 1.2                       1x AES-256               200K     3200 K     11.4

iOS passcode                        50000 iterations with HW AES      6         0         5.7

                                                                                                  53
Conclusions

• None of the tested password keepers offer
  reliable protection on top of OS security
• Using them on improperly configured device
  may expose sensitive data
• Paid apps are not necessarily more secure
  than free ones




                                               54
Our Wishlist
Users:
 • Use passcode
 • Set backup password (complex one!)
 • Do not connect your phone to untrusted
   devices
Developers:
 • Use built-in OS security services
 • Don’t reinvent or misuse crypto
 • Really, don’t reinvent or misuse crypto

                                             55
THANK YOU


     Andrey Belenko and Dmitry Sklyarov
            Elcomsoft Co. Ltd.
{a.belenko,d.sklyarov} @ elcomsoft.com



                                          56

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“Secure Password Managers” and “Military-Grade Encryption” on Smartphones: Oh, Really?

  • 1. “Secure Password Managers” and “Military-Grade Encryption” on Smartphones: Oh, Really? Andrey Belenko and Dmitry Sklyarov Elcomsoft Co. Ltd. {a.belenko,d.sklyarov} @ elcomsoft.com 1
  • 2. Agenda • Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone • Threat Model • BlackBerry Password Managers • iOS Password Managers • Free • Paid • Summary & Conclusions 2
  • 3. Authentication: PC • Trusted Platform Module • Biometrics • SmartCard + PIN • Password/Passphrase 3
  • 4. Authentication: Smartphone • Trusted Platform Module • Biometrics • SmartCard + PIN • Password/Passphrase 4
  • 5. Authentication: Smartphone Password is the only option on the smartphones “Lock patterns” are essentially numeric passcodes (1-4-2-5-6-9-8) 5
  • 6. Password Typing PC: • Full-sized keyboard, motor memory • Long and complex passwords are easy Smartphone: • Touch keyboard • Long and complex passwords are hard 6
  • 7. Password Typing It is fair to assume that passwords on the smartphones are shorter than their PC counterparts 7
  • 8. Password Cracking Smartphone: • Relatively slow CPU • Complex password- to-key transforms will impact usability PC: • Fast CPU • Can do complex password-to-key transforms 8
  • 9. Password Handling Password Cracking Offline attacks can utilize GPUs for attackers’ advantage 9
  • 10. Authentication Wrap Up PC Smartphone Password entered not Password entered every too often (usually just time you need access after unlocking console) data (after switching applications or after short time-out) •Handling passwords on smartphone is more difficult than on PC •Smartphone requires stronger password protection than PC but provides less capabilities for doing so! 10
  • 11. Agenda • Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone • Threat Model • BlackBerry Password Managers • iOS Password Managers • Free • Paid • Summary & Conclusions 11
  • 12. Threat Model Assumptions: 1. Attacker has: • Physical access to the device, or • Backup of the device, or • Access to password manager database file 2. Attacker wants to: • Recover master password for password manager(s) on the mobile device • Extract passwords stored by those managers Are those assumptions fair at all? 12
  • 13. Physical Access Computers are relatively big. Thus, hard to steal or lose. You know where it is (well, most of the time). Lots of phones go in wrong hands every year. Many are left in the bars. Do you really know where exactly your phone is right now? 13
  • 14. Someone’s just got physical access to the device 14
  • 15. Device Backup Apple iOS: • Need device passcode or iTunes pairing • Optional encryption (enforced by device) • PBKDF2-SHA1 with 10’000 iterations BlackBerry: • Need device password • Optional encryption (not enforced) • PBKDF2-SHA1 with 20’000 iterations 15
  • 16. Database Files Apple iOS: • Via afc (need passcode or iTunes pairing) • Via SSH (jailbroken devices) • Via physical imaging (up to iPhone 4) BlackBerry: • Need device password 16
  • 17. Agenda • Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone • Threat Model • BlackBerry Password Managers • iOS Password Managers • Free • Paid • Summary & Conclusions 17
  • 18. BlackBerry Applications • BlackBerry Password Keeper • Included with OS 5 • BlackBerry Wallet • Version 1.0 (for OS <= 5) • Version 1.2 (for OS > 5) 18
  • 19. BlackBerry Password Keeper • Key is calculated by PBKDF2-SHA1 with 3 iterations • Encrypted payload is PKCS7-padded • Allows to quickly reject wrong keys (p ≈ 2-8) • Survived keys are checked by verifying SHA-1 Encrypted payload Data SHA1 (Data) • Password verification is fast • 3 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES-256 • ~5M passwords/sec on a CPU, ~20M with GPU 19
  • 20. PKCS7 Padding Plaintext padded to completely fill last block • Done even if block size divides plaintext length • Padding value == number of bytes appended PKCS7 padding bytes 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 3 3 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 1 4 4 4 4 D a t a B y t e 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 Block size PKCS7 padding bytes • After decryption padding verified and removed • Decryption with random key produces valid padding with p ≈ 2-8 (0.4%) 20
  • 21. BlackBerry Wallet “Designed for BlackBerry smartphones, BlackBerry Wallet helps make mobile, online purchasing faster and easier” Version 1.0 • Stores SHA-256 (SHA-256 (Password)) • Password verification requires 2 x SHA-256 • Very fast: ~6M on CPU, ~300M on GPU • No salt: Rainbow Tables may be built 21
  • 22. BlackBerry Wallet “Designed for BlackBerry smartphones, BlackBerry Wallet helps make mobile, online purchasing faster and easier” Version 1.2 • Similar to BB Password Keeper, but... • Password initially hashed with SHA-512 • PBKDF2-SHA1 uses random number (50..100) of iterations • Password verification requires 1xSHA-512 + 100xPBKDF2-SHA1 + 1xAES-256 • Est. 200K p/s on CPU, 3200K on GPU 22
  • 23. Agenda • Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone • Threat Model • BlackBerry Password Managers • iOS Password Managers • Free • Paid • Summary & Conclusions 23
  • 24. iOS Free Apps Search App Store for “Password Keeper” and pick a few from top 20 free apps • Safe – Password (x3) • iSecure Lite • Secret Folder Lite • Ultimate Password Manager Free • My Eyes Only™ - Secure Password Manager • Keeper® Password & Data Vault • Password Safe – iPassSafe free version • Strip Lite - Password Manager 24
  • 25. [un]Safe Triplets “FINALLY! THE SAFEST APP TO PROTECT YOUR ALL PASSWORDS, BANK ACCOUNT, CREDIT CARD, WEB LOGINS AND ETC.” Safe – Password by The Best Free, Lite and Pro Edition Awesome Password Lite by Easy To Use Products Password Lock Lite by chen kaiqian 25
  • 26. [un]Safe Triplets • All three are identical (except for names and background images) • Store data in SQLite database at Documents/Password_Keeper.sqlite • Master password is always 4 digits • No data encryption is involved at all • Master password is stored in plaintext SELECT ZPASSWORD FROM ZDBCONFIG; 26
  • 27. iSecure Lite - Password Manager “You data is extremely secure, even you have lost your device or stolen” by Roland Yau • Stores data in SQLite database at Documents/app_creator.sqlite • Master Password of any length/chars • No data encryption is involved at all • Master Password is stored in plaintext SELECT passcode FROM preference; 27
  • 28. Secret Folder Lite “The BEST AND MOST ADVANCED PHOTO & VIDEO PRIVACY APP in the by chen kaiqian App Store today” • Password-protect access to media files • Stores data in SQLite database at Documents/privatephototwo.sqlite • No data encryption is involved at all • All passwords are stored in plaintext SELECT ZDISPLAYNAME,ZPASSWORD FROM ZDBFILE; 28
  • 29. Ultimate Password Manager Free “The free version has the following limitations over the paid version: by Jean-Francois Martin - no data encryption” • Stores data in binary Property List at Library/Preferences/com.tinysofty.upmfree.plist • Master password is stored in plaintext Are you interested in password manager intentionally designed to be insecure, even if it’s free? 29
  • 30. My Eyes Only™ - Secure Password Manager “...allows personal information to be stored on iPhones, iPods and iPads without the threat of unauthorized by Software Ops LLC access if lost or stolen” • Stores data in NSKeyArchiver files at Documents/*.archive, encrypted with RSA • Master password, public and private RSA keys are stored in keychain with attribute kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked Wow, RSA looks impressive for a password keeper, isn’t it? 30
  • 31. My Eyes Only™ - Secure Password Manager • 512-bit RSA modulus: factorization is easy • Documents/MEO.archive holds RSA- encrypted master password • RSA private key is stored in the same file • Yes, RSA private key is stored along with encrypted data • Master password and everything else can be instantly decrypted 31
  • 32. Keeper® Password & Data Vault “With Keeper’s military-grade encryption, you can trust that no one else will have by Callpod Inc access to your most important information” • Stores data in SQLite database at Documents/keeper.sql • MD5 of master password is stored in database • SHA1 of master password is used as AES key • Very fast password verification: 1 x MD5 • ~60M p/s on CPU, 6’000M p/s on GPU • No salt: MD5 Rainbow Tables can be used 32
  • 33. Password Safe - iPassSafe free version “iPassSafe - To Be True Protected. AES-256 Double Encryption Layers” by Netanel Software • Stores data in SQLite database at Documents/iPassSafeDB.sqlite • Prevents usage of “weak” passwords: 0000 1234 2580 1111 5555 0852 2222 1212 1998 5683 33
  • 34. Password Safe - iPassSafe free version “iPassSafe - To Be True Protected. AES-256 Double Encryption Layers” by Netanel Software • Random master key (Mk)is used for encryption • Mk is encrypted with master password as a key • Password not hashed, only null-padded • PKCS7 padding allows to reject wrong keys • Very fast password verification: 1 x AES-256 • ~20M on CPU, haven’t done AES on GPU yet :) • Rainbow Tables may be built 34
  • 35. Strip Lite - Password Manager “highly rated Password Manager and Data Vault. Strip has been protecting sensitive information on mobile by Zetetic LLC devices for over 12 yrs.” • Stores data in SQLite database at Documents/strip.db • Whole database file is encrypted using open-source component sqlcipher developed by Zetetic 35
  • 36. Strip Lite - Password Manager • Database encryption key is derived from master password using PBKDF2-SHA1 with 4’000 iterations • By far the most resilient app to password cracking • Password validation requires 4000 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES-256 • Est. 5K p/s on CPU, 160K on GPU 36
  • 37. Agenda • Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone • Threat Model • BlackBerry Password Managers • iOS Password Managers • Free • Paid • Summary & Conclusions 37
  • 38. iOS Paid Apps Google “Top Password Keepers for iOS” and pick a few from various reviews • SafeWallet - Password Manager • DataVault Password Manager • mSecure - Password Manager • LastPass for Premium Customers • 1Password Pro for iPhone • SplashID Safe for iPhone 38
  • 39. SafeWallet - $3.99 Password Manager “Password Manager is the most secure and easy to use way to store your by SBSH Mobile Software passwords and sensitive information” • Versions for Win, Mac, iOS, Android, BB… • Database format common for all platforms • Master key encrypted with master password • Data encrypted with AES-256, PKCS7 • Password verification is fast •10 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES-256 • Est. 1500K p/s on CPU, 20M on GPU 39
  • 40. DataVault Password $9.99 Manager “Leading Password Manager for iPhone, iPad & iPod Touch ☆ AES Encryption” by Ascendo Inc • Data encrypted by the master password and stored in device keychain • Master password not hashed, only padded • SHA-256 of master password is stored in the keychain Keychain is used, so it should be hard to get hash to brute force master password, right? 40
  • 41. DataVault Password Manager • In iOS 4 keychain is a SQLite database • Data column is supposed to store passwords and is always encrypted • Other item attributes are not encrypted • Password hash stored as a ‘Comment’ attribute • Still, this is better than storing hash in a file Wait, I’ve heard iOS 5 encrypts all attributes in the keychain. Does that help? 41
  • 42. DataVault Password Manager • iOS 5 encrypts all keychain items’ attributes • But it stores SHA-1 hash of original attribute to facilitate search/lookup • So we have SHA-1 (SHA-256 (password)) • Very fast password verification: • 1 x SHA-256 [+ 1 x SHA-1 in iOS 5] • 7M p/s on CPU, 500M on GPU • No salt: Rainbow Tables can be built 42
  • 43. mSecure - $9.99 Password Manager “used by almost a million users worldwide, providing secure solution for by mSeven Software LLC storing your important information” • Stores data in NSKeyArchiver files at Documents/msecure.db.plist • Data encrypted with Blowfish • Master key is SHA-256 of master password • Fixed string encrypted on master key is stored for password verification 43
  • 44. mSecure - $9.99 Password Manager “used by almost a million users worldwide, providing secure solution for by mSeven Software LLC storing your important information” • Password verification: •1 x SHA-256 + 1 x Blowfish •300K p/s on CPU, no Blowfish on GPU yet 44
  • 45. LastPass for Premium Customers $12/yr. “...password data on your PC and your iPhone seamlessly synced. Encrypted by AES-256 which is used by the US by LastPass Government for Top Secret documents” • ‘Cloud’ service, local storage created after first login • Master key computed by 500* x PBKDF2-SHA256 • Hash of master key is encrypted with AES-256 using master key and stored for verification • Off-line password validation is very fast: • 500* x PBKDF2-SHA256 + 1 x AES-256 • 12K p/s on CPU, 600K on GPU 45
  • 46. 1Password Pro for iPhone $14.99 “1Password Pro is a special edition of the award-winning 1Password application with more than 1 million users worldwide” by Agilebits Inc. • Versions for Mac, Win, iOS, Android • Two protection levels: master PIN and master password • Data encrypted with AES-128, key derived from master PIN or master password 46
  • 47. 1Password Pro for iPhone Read EncDatabaseKey and EncValidator from Database KEK := MD5 (Password + Salt) IV := MD5 (KEK + Password + Salt) DatabaseKey := AES-128-CBC (KEK, IV, EncDatabaseKey) Validator := AES-128-CBC (DatabaseKey, NULL, EncValidator) If Validator = DatabaseKey Then password is correct • Database key encrypted on itself is stored for PIN or password verification • PKCS7 padding allows to reject wrong keys • Password/PIN verification is very fast • 1 x MD5 + 1 x AES-128 • 15M p/s on CPU, 20M p/s on GPU 47
  • 48. 1Password Pro for iPhone Version 3.6.5 released on 09 April 2012 has new protection: • 10’000 x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1 x AES • 2’000 p/s on CPU, 65K p/s on GPU • Only applies to master password (not PIN!) 48
  • 49. SplashID Safe for iPhone $9.99 “the award-winning password manager with over 500’000 users worldwide, is now available for iPhone! The all new iPhone by SplashData version 5 makes SplashID better than ever” • Versions for Win, Mac, iOS, Android, BB… • On iOS stores data in SQLite database at Documents/SplashIDDataBase.db • All sensitive data is encrypted with Blowfish • Master password is used as a Blowfish key • Master password is encrypted with... 49
  • 50. SplashID Safe for iPhone • ...a random key (as per XKCD definition) • ‘Random’ key is g.;59?^/0n1X*{OQlRwy • Master password can be decrypted instantly • This is now fixed (ver 6.1 released on 24 Apr) 50
  • 51. Agenda • Authentication: PC vs. Smartphone • Threat Model • BlackBerry Password Managers • iOS Password Managers • Free • Paid • Summary & Conclusions 51
  • 52. iOS Passcode • Starting with iOS 4 passcode is involved in encryption of sensitive data • Passcode key derivation is slowed down by doing 50’000 iterations • Each iteration requires talking to hardware AES • 6 p/s on iPhone 4 • Can’t be performed off-line and scaled Checking all 6-digit passcodes will take more than 40 hours 52
  • 53. Cracking Passwords Name Complexity CPU p/s GPU p/s Len/24h Keeper® Password & Data Vault 1x MD5 60 M 6000 M 14.7 Password Safe - iPassSafe Free 1x AES-256 20 M N/A 12.2 Strip Lite - Password Manager 4000x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256 5000 160 K 10.1 SafeWallet - Password Manager 10x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256 1500 K 20 M 12.2 DataVault Password Manager 1x SHA-256 + 1x SHA-1 7M 500 M 13.6 mSecure - Password Manager 1x SHA-256 + 1x Blowfish 300 K N/A 10.4 LastPass for Premium Customers 2x SHA-256 + 1x AES-256 5M 20 M 12.2 500*x PBKDF2-SHA256 + 1x LastPass for Premium Customers 12K 600K 10.7 AES-256 1Password Pro 1x MD5 + 1x AES-128 15 M 20 M 12.2 1Password Pro 10’000x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256 2000 65K 9.7 BlackBerry Password Keeper 3x PBKDF2-SHA1 + 1x AES-256 5M 20 M 12.2 BlackBerry Wallet 1.0 2x SHA-256 6M 300 M 13.4 1x SHA-512 + 100x PBKDF2-SHA1 + BlackBerry Wallet 1.2 1x AES-256 200K 3200 K 11.4 iOS passcode 50000 iterations with HW AES 6 0 5.7 53
  • 54. Conclusions • None of the tested password keepers offer reliable protection on top of OS security • Using them on improperly configured device may expose sensitive data • Paid apps are not necessarily more secure than free ones 54
  • 55. Our Wishlist Users: • Use passcode • Set backup password (complex one!) • Do not connect your phone to untrusted devices Developers: • Use built-in OS security services • Don’t reinvent or misuse crypto • Really, don’t reinvent or misuse crypto 55
  • 56. THANK YOU Andrey Belenko and Dmitry Sklyarov Elcomsoft Co. Ltd. {a.belenko,d.sklyarov} @ elcomsoft.com 56