SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 19
SCADA security Positive Hack Days.  Industrial systems.  Threats GLEG ltd -  SCADA+  Pack for CANVAS developer [email_address] http:// www.gleg.net
SCADA security Plan ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SCADA security SCADA — events timeline  ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SCADA security SCADA ON THE WEB THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF SCADA SYSTEMS ALREADY EXPOSED TO INTERNET! Let us show «banners» for two SCADA systems, And SHODAN search results for them....
SCADa SCX SCADa e.g. SCX SCADA: SCX ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION SOFTWARE ...the integrated SCX Web server is a standard component of the SCX product.  Web Clients have access to all SCADA system functions...
SCADA SCX SCADA banner 1) “SCXWebServer” **************************** HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Encoding: deflate Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 19:09:52 GMT Expires: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 19:09:52 GMT Cache-Control: no-cache Server:  SCXWebServer/6.0 —  here is banner Content-Type: text/xml Content-Length: 1504 *********************** Search results for this:
 
SCADA security Codesys ENI server exploit CoDeSys Eni server: In this case the banner looks like:  «ENIServer» (though there are many same kind servers available from different SCADA developers... all seems to be based on codesys...?) Again,  let's search it on the web ...and show how it could be exploited using SCADA+ Pack 0day exploit for CoDeSys Eni Server.
 
SCADA SCADA Video of exploitation: http://pentesting.ru/eniserver.rar
SCADA security Postexploitation: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SCADA security SCADA vulns ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
 
SCADA SCADA attack This could be helpfull for hacker... you could exloit some buffer overfow,  enable Rdesktop and have fun with SCADA devices
SCADA security SCADA Current tools has limited Functionality for SCADA... e.g.  Shodan — searches only 80, 21, 22, 161, 5060 ports... But, e.g. Realwin has vuln services on 910, 912 port In that case you will need to search yourself... but as long as there are dozens of scanners — this is not a problem. Also you could write your own.
Безопасность АСУ Measures: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SCADA security CounterMeasures: ,[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object],[object Object]
SCADA security Resume: We have shown that SCADA systems ARE ALREADY AVAILABLE FROM THE INTERNET... and some could be exploited right now...
SCADA Positive Hack Days.  Thanks for your attention [email_address] http:// www.gleg.net

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses
[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses
[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses
OWASP
 
ubantu mod security
ubantu mod securityubantu mod security
ubantu mod security
Kunal gupta
 

Mais procurados (12)

Insecurity-In-Security version.1 (2010)
Insecurity-In-Security version.1 (2010)Insecurity-In-Security version.1 (2010)
Insecurity-In-Security version.1 (2010)
 
Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)
Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)
Insecurity-In-Security version.2 (2011)
 
Solving the Open Source Security Puzzle
Solving the Open Source Security PuzzleSolving the Open Source Security Puzzle
Solving the Open Source Security Puzzle
 
Nodevember 2015
Nodevember 2015Nodevember 2015
Nodevember 2015
 
Advanced OSSEC Training: Integration Strategies for Open Source Security
Advanced OSSEC Training: Integration Strategies for Open Source SecurityAdvanced OSSEC Training: Integration Strategies for Open Source Security
Advanced OSSEC Training: Integration Strategies for Open Source Security
 
[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses
[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses
[OPD 2019] Side-Channels on the Web:
Attacks and Defenses
 
rsa_usa_2019_paula_januszkiewicz
rsa_usa_2019_paula_januszkiewiczrsa_usa_2019_paula_januszkiewicz
rsa_usa_2019_paula_januszkiewicz
 
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth TakingTop 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
Top 10 Ways To Make Hackers Excited: All About The Shortcuts Not Worth Taking
 
Basic detection tests of McAfee ENS + MVISION Insights usage for SunBurst threat
Basic detection tests of McAfee ENS + MVISION Insights usage for SunBurst threatBasic detection tests of McAfee ENS + MVISION Insights usage for SunBurst threat
Basic detection tests of McAfee ENS + MVISION Insights usage for SunBurst threat
 
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
RSA 2018: Adventures in the Underland: Techniques against Hackers Evading the...
 
ubantu mod security
ubantu mod securityubantu mod security
ubantu mod security
 
Cisco adaptive security appliance (asa) firewalls lifeline of today’s data ce...
Cisco adaptive security appliance (asa) firewalls lifeline of today’s data ce...Cisco adaptive security appliance (asa) firewalls lifeline of today’s data ce...
Cisco adaptive security appliance (asa) firewalls lifeline of today’s data ce...
 

Semelhante a Positive Hack Days. Gurkin. Zero Day for SCADA (0-day)

Scada Strangelove - 29c3
Scada Strangelove - 29c3Scada Strangelove - 29c3
Scada Strangelove - 29c3
qqlan
 
DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?
DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?
DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?
DefCamp
 
Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]
Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]
Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]
RootedCON
 
SCADA Security Training
SCADA Security TrainingSCADA Security Training
SCADA Security Training
Bryan Len
 

Semelhante a Positive Hack Days. Gurkin. Zero Day for SCADA (0-day) (20)

ICS Threat Scenarios
ICS Threat ScenariosICS Threat Scenarios
ICS Threat Scenarios
 
Why the cloud is more secure than your existing systems
Why the cloud is more secure than your existing systemsWhy the cloud is more secure than your existing systems
Why the cloud is more secure than your existing systems
 
Scada Strangelove - 29c3
Scada Strangelove - 29c3Scada Strangelove - 29c3
Scada Strangelove - 29c3
 
DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?
DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?
DefCamp 2013 - Are we there yet?
 
SOCstock 2021 The Cloud-native SOC
SOCstock 2021 The Cloud-native SOC SOCstock 2021 The Cloud-native SOC
SOCstock 2021 The Cloud-native SOC
 
Attacking SCADA systems: Story Of SCADASTRANGELOVE
Attacking SCADA systems: Story Of SCADASTRANGELOVEAttacking SCADA systems: Story Of SCADASTRANGELOVE
Attacking SCADA systems: Story Of SCADASTRANGELOVE
 
1.3. (In)security Software
1.3. (In)security Software1.3. (In)security Software
1.3. (In)security Software
 
SAST_QSDL
SAST_QSDLSAST_QSDL
SAST_QSDL
 
Gluing the IoT world with Java and LoRaWAN
Gluing the IoT world with Java and LoRaWANGluing the IoT world with Java and LoRaWAN
Gluing the IoT world with Java and LoRaWAN
 
BruCON 2015 - Pentesting ICS 101
BruCON 2015 - Pentesting ICS 101BruCON 2015 - Pentesting ICS 101
BruCON 2015 - Pentesting ICS 101
 
Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]
Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]
Joxean Koret - Database Security Paradise [Rooted CON 2011]
 
Introduction to Industrial Control Systems : Pentesting PLCs 101 (BlackHat Eu...
Introduction to Industrial Control Systems : Pentesting PLCs 101 (BlackHat Eu...Introduction to Industrial Control Systems : Pentesting PLCs 101 (BlackHat Eu...
Introduction to Industrial Control Systems : Pentesting PLCs 101 (BlackHat Eu...
 
Статический анализ кода в контексте SSDL
Статический анализ кода в контексте SSDLСтатический анализ кода в контексте SSDL
Статический анализ кода в контексте SSDL
 
Eclipse NeoSCADA 0.3
Eclipse NeoSCADA 0.3Eclipse NeoSCADA 0.3
Eclipse NeoSCADA 0.3
 
Future Prediction: Network Intrusion Detection System in the cloud
Future Prediction: Network Intrusion Detection System in the cloudFuture Prediction: Network Intrusion Detection System in the cloud
Future Prediction: Network Intrusion Detection System in the cloud
 
SCADA Security Training
SCADA Security TrainingSCADA Security Training
SCADA Security Training
 
Portuguese Cloud Computing Architects - 2nd Meeting
Portuguese Cloud Computing Architects - 2nd MeetingPortuguese Cloud Computing Architects - 2nd Meeting
Portuguese Cloud Computing Architects - 2nd Meeting
 
Docker, Linux Containers, and Security: Does It Add Up?
Docker, Linux Containers, and Security: Does It Add Up?Docker, Linux Containers, and Security: Does It Add Up?
Docker, Linux Containers, and Security: Does It Add Up?
 
AWS User Group - Security & Compliance
AWS User Group - Security & ComplianceAWS User Group - Security & Compliance
AWS User Group - Security & Compliance
 
Total E(A)gression defcon
Total E(A)gression   defconTotal E(A)gression   defcon
Total E(A)gression defcon
 

Mais de Positive Hack Days

Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»
Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»
Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»
Positive Hack Days
 
Эвристические методы защиты приложений
Эвристические методы защиты приложенийЭвристические методы защиты приложений
Эвристические методы защиты приложений
Positive Hack Days
 
Уязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на грабли
Уязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на граблиУязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на грабли
Уязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на грабли
Positive Hack Days
 
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET CoreМеханизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Positive Hack Days
 

Mais de Positive Hack Days (20)

Инструмент ChangelogBuilder для автоматической подготовки Release Notes
Инструмент ChangelogBuilder для автоматической подготовки Release NotesИнструмент ChangelogBuilder для автоматической подготовки Release Notes
Инструмент ChangelogBuilder для автоматической подготовки Release Notes
 
Как мы собираем проекты в выделенном окружении в Windows Docker
Как мы собираем проекты в выделенном окружении в Windows DockerКак мы собираем проекты в выделенном окружении в Windows Docker
Как мы собираем проекты в выделенном окружении в Windows Docker
 
Типовая сборка и деплой продуктов в Positive Technologies
Типовая сборка и деплой продуктов в Positive TechnologiesТиповая сборка и деплой продуктов в Positive Technologies
Типовая сборка и деплой продуктов в Positive Technologies
 
Аналитика в проектах: TFS + Qlik
Аналитика в проектах: TFS + QlikАналитика в проектах: TFS + Qlik
Аналитика в проектах: TFS + Qlik
 
Использование анализатора кода SonarQube
Использование анализатора кода SonarQubeИспользование анализатора кода SonarQube
Использование анализатора кода SonarQube
 
Развитие сообщества Open DevOps Community
Развитие сообщества Open DevOps CommunityРазвитие сообщества Open DevOps Community
Развитие сообщества Open DevOps Community
 
Методика определения неиспользуемых ресурсов виртуальных машин и автоматизаци...
Методика определения неиспользуемых ресурсов виртуальных машин и автоматизаци...Методика определения неиспользуемых ресурсов виртуальных машин и автоматизаци...
Методика определения неиспользуемых ресурсов виртуальных машин и автоматизаци...
 
Автоматизация построения правил для Approof
Автоматизация построения правил для ApproofАвтоматизация построения правил для Approof
Автоматизация построения правил для Approof
 
Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»
Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»
Мастер-класс «Трущобы Application Security»
 
Формальные методы защиты приложений
Формальные методы защиты приложенийФормальные методы защиты приложений
Формальные методы защиты приложений
 
Эвристические методы защиты приложений
Эвристические методы защиты приложенийЭвристические методы защиты приложений
Эвристические методы защиты приложений
 
Теоретические основы Application Security
Теоретические основы Application SecurityТеоретические основы Application Security
Теоретические основы Application Security
 
От экспериментального программирования к промышленному: путь длиной в 10 лет
От экспериментального программирования к промышленному: путь длиной в 10 летОт экспериментального программирования к промышленному: путь длиной в 10 лет
От экспериментального программирования к промышленному: путь длиной в 10 лет
 
Уязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на грабли
Уязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на граблиУязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на грабли
Уязвимое Android-приложение: N проверенных способов наступить на грабли
 
Требования по безопасности в архитектуре ПО
Требования по безопасности в архитектуре ПОТребования по безопасности в архитектуре ПО
Требования по безопасности в архитектуре ПО
 
Формальная верификация кода на языке Си
Формальная верификация кода на языке СиФормальная верификация кода на языке Си
Формальная верификация кода на языке Си
 
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET CoreМеханизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
Механизмы предотвращения атак в ASP.NET Core
 
SOC для КИИ: израильский опыт
SOC для КИИ: израильский опытSOC для КИИ: израильский опыт
SOC для КИИ: израильский опыт
 
Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security Lab & Services Center
Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security Lab & Services CenterHoneywell Industrial Cyber Security Lab & Services Center
Honeywell Industrial Cyber Security Lab & Services Center
 
Credential stuffing и брутфорс-атаки
Credential stuffing и брутфорс-атакиCredential stuffing и брутфорс-атаки
Credential stuffing и брутфорс-атаки
 

Último

EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
Earley Information Science
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
vu2urc
 
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of ServiceCNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
giselly40
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
Enterprise Knowledge
 

Último (20)

Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptxEIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
EIS-Webinar-Prompt-Knowledge-Eng-2024-04-08.pptx
 
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slideHistor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
Histor y of HAM Radio presentation slide
 
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Tata AIG General Insurance Company - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptxFactors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
Factors to Consider When Choosing Accounts Payable Services Providers.pptx
 
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
Mastering MySQL Database Architecture: Deep Dive into MySQL Shell and MySQL R...
 
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organizationScaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
Scaling API-first – The story of a global engineering organization
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
What Are The Drone Anti-jamming Systems Technology?
 
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdfUnderstanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
 
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
Axa Assurance Maroc - Insurer Innovation Award 2024
 
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path MountBreaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
Breaking the Kubernetes Kill Chain: Host Path Mount
 
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
08448380779 Call Girls In Greater Kailash - I Women Seeking Men
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
 
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of ServiceCNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
CNv6 Instructor Chapter 6 Quality of Service
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI SolutionsIAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
IAC 2024 - IA Fast Track to Search Focused AI Solutions
 
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
A Year of the Servo Reboot: Where Are We Now?
 

Positive Hack Days. Gurkin. Zero Day for SCADA (0-day)

  • 1. SCADA security Positive Hack Days. Industrial systems. Threats GLEG ltd - SCADA+ Pack for CANVAS developer [email_address] http:// www.gleg.net
  • 2.
  • 3.
  • 4. SCADA security SCADA ON THE WEB THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF SCADA SYSTEMS ALREADY EXPOSED TO INTERNET! Let us show «banners» for two SCADA systems, And SHODAN search results for them....
  • 5. SCADa SCX SCADa e.g. SCX SCADA: SCX ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL AUTOMATION SOFTWARE ...the integrated SCX Web server is a standard component of the SCX product. Web Clients have access to all SCADA system functions...
  • 6. SCADA SCX SCADA banner 1) “SCXWebServer” **************************** HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Encoding: deflate Date: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 19:09:52 GMT Expires: Tue, 14 Dec 2010 19:09:52 GMT Cache-Control: no-cache Server: SCXWebServer/6.0 — here is banner Content-Type: text/xml Content-Length: 1504 *********************** Search results for this:
  • 7.  
  • 8. SCADA security Codesys ENI server exploit CoDeSys Eni server: In this case the banner looks like: «ENIServer» (though there are many same kind servers available from different SCADA developers... all seems to be based on codesys...?) Again, let's search it on the web ...and show how it could be exploited using SCADA+ Pack 0day exploit for CoDeSys Eni Server.
  • 9.  
  • 10. SCADA SCADA Video of exploitation: http://pentesting.ru/eniserver.rar
  • 11.
  • 12.
  • 13.  
  • 14. SCADA SCADA attack This could be helpfull for hacker... you could exloit some buffer overfow, enable Rdesktop and have fun with SCADA devices
  • 15. SCADA security SCADA Current tools has limited Functionality for SCADA... e.g. Shodan — searches only 80, 21, 22, 161, 5060 ports... But, e.g. Realwin has vuln services on 910, 912 port In that case you will need to search yourself... but as long as there are dozens of scanners — this is not a problem. Also you could write your own.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18. SCADA security Resume: We have shown that SCADA systems ARE ALREADY AVAILABLE FROM THE INTERNET... and some could be exploited right now...
  • 19. SCADA Positive Hack Days. Thanks for your attention [email_address] http:// www.gleg.net