Presentation by Col. Macgregor to House of Representatives
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Presentation by Col. Macgregor to House of Representatives
- 1. Finding a New War Forward in Afghanistan A Presentation for Selected Members of the House of Representatives A presentation by Douglas Macgregor, PhD Colonel (ret) US Army Lead Partner Potomac League LLC
- 2. “ The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish by that test the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War , Book 1, Chap. 1, Sect 27, page 100. “ Karzai is very dirty by all accounts, but I am not sure you could replace him with someone who isn’t. Plus, it’s not our place to choose an Afghan head of state (as we did this one). The more I think about it the more I think we need to talk seriously about leaving.” A former CIA officer with extensive experience in the Middle East and Afghanistan recently returned from Afghanistan. Bottom line up front: Understand what it is you are trying to accomplish with military power! What’s the purpose, appropriate method and desired, attainable end state in Afghanistan?
Notas do Editor
- In 2000 Condoleezza Rice told Foreign Affairs , "American values are universal." That four-word sentence summarizes the problem. American values are not universal. They are Western, primarily English-speaking values rooted in English common law, including respect for private property and minority rights. These values are not exportable at gunpoint as demonstrated repeatedly in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Tom Barnett sees a "core" and a "gap," but there is no such thing. There was no such gap in the late 19th century (the Second Age of Empire). There are several competing cores -- at least three: North America, the continental Europeans, and the Chinese; there are several discrete disconnected gaps, too: Latin America, unsuccessful former WP/SU E. European states, Muslim Africa, southern Africa, Near/Mid-East & SW Asia, SE Asia -- each with unique aspects. The "Cores" cannot police the "Gap(s)" because the latter do NOT want to resubmit to imperialism, and have the sheer manpower and will to kill to make the cost of imposing hegemony far too high and the benefits too low. How much is it costing the US Tax payer to buy up the accidental guerrillas in Iraq? Tthe illusion that if we Americans in uniform can just find the magic formula, we can nation build everywhere and forever needs to go away. In truth, we are buying off enemies who are strategically irrelevant in a place where Western-style governance has no chance of surviving. Like all of the non-European places where we’ve invested blood and treasure – Philippines, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Vietnam, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans - the underlying cultural dynamics will reassert themselves rendering American investments null and void.
- The amount of aid necessary to "rebuild" the never-existing "modern Afghanistan" is beyond any conceivable amount of US spending -- we cannot make Afghanistan into Turkey or Indonesia, much less into a secular, capitalist democracy. Lyautey's plan achieved limited success in Algeria -- but the French people lost patience, the French government was out of money and the Arabs did not want the French in their country. Americans have less patience, no more money and no interest.
- The use of general purpose ground forces to occupy part of Iraq imposed severe human and economic costs on the United States, its allies, and even our friends inside these states. Any attempt to repeat this approach in Afghanistan will be economically ruinous and politically unsustainable.
- Here is the latest from an officer on the ground in Iraq: “ I can tell you from first hand experience and discussions with a number of other advisor team chiefs that we are accomplishing nothing with our presence here any longer, and our advisor mission is something dangerously close to a sham… Based on the observations of a number of my major brethren in team chief positions and confirmed by numerous Iraqi civilians, former military members, and others, the Iraqi military members, police members, and border guards don't want us here advising them on anything.” The combination of air and naval power in the conduct of operations against so-called “irregular forces” offers flexibility in terms of when, where, who and what can be targeted for operations ranging from intelligence collection to direct action employing special forces, special operations forces, conventional forces or stand-off attack systems. Because air and naval power are largely out-of-sight and out-of-reach for most state and non-state opponents, it is easier for these forces to conceal their movement, intent and capabilities. "Rent-a-Pashtun" is really just a recapitulation of the despised (by the Pashtuns, at least) divide-and-conquer strategy practiced by the imperial British forces in the 19th Century. While that strategy worked for a time in India, it never worked very well in the Hindu Kush. The only people likely to buy into this kind of propaganda are its writers. This leaves the problem of Greater Pashtunstan unresolved -- solution would have to sort out Pakistan AND Afghanistan, and we lack the massive resources and long-term commitment necessary to manage an area with nearly 200 million population & areas comparable to the eastern CONUS. Like all of the non-European places where we’ve invested blood and treasure – Philippines, Cuba, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Vietnam, Haiti, Somalia, the Balkans - the underlying cultural dynamics will reassert themselves rendering American investments null and void.
- Pakistan has alwas asserted it does not accept the old Curzon line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan, and has sought to manipulate the situation in its northwestern neighbor to ensure that it remains divided and weak. In this way, Afghanistan serves as a buffer zone between Islamabad's weak and minimally governed western frontier and the Iranians, Russians, and Turkic peoples beyond. Pakistan has never effectively governed the deeply reactionary, insular, and tribal Pashtuns or Pathans, and will not allow Afghanistan to do so either for fear that a unified, Pashtun-dominated Afghanistan would draw the allegiance of the Pashtuns and other disaffected tribal peoples away from Islamabad. Pakistan, whether ruled by the military or civilians, by Islamists or populist-Leftist, will NOT meaningfully or consistently cooperate with the US in trying to create a stable, pro-US, majority-ruled Afghanistan. Whether the Shiite dictatorship can contain the territorial ambitions of the de facto Kurdish State in Northern Iraq is open to debate. It seems certain that the Kurdish Peshmurga; a battle hardened force stronger and more capable than Iraq’s Security Forces, will reassert Kurdish control of Kirkuk and the Northern oil fields in the aftermath of U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq’s cities next summer. The possibility that these events will trigger Turkish military intervention to prevent oil revenues from funding Kurdish terrorism against Turkey should not be underestimated. Bottom line: As long as U.S. Forces are in Iraq, the probability of American military confrontation with the forces struggling for power inside Iraq, even the Turks if they intervene, will be high. US will probably need to intervene in Mexico and other Caribbean littorals with SF, may need to intervene with SOF and covert operations as well. This region is a critical concern for US -- unlike S/SW Asia which is an ocean and thousands of miles away, we have a far-too-permeable land border and all-but-unguarded Gulf sea frontier with Mexico and the Caribbean; PR & USVI even more exposed. ASD/SOLIC and Joint Staff need to start thinking about possible need for massive, rapid shift of available SF & SOF to Western hemisphere priority missions BEFORE, not after, things fall apart.