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Sybil Attacks - MobiSys Seminar

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Neal Lathia
Neal Lathia

This document proposes monitoring recommender systems over time to detect sybil attacks. It suggests distrusting newcomers to force sybils to draw out their attacks. It recommends monitoring at the system, user, and item levels by learning normal temporal behavior and flagging anomalies. The key contributions are forcing sybils to reveal attacks through prolonged activity and monitoring a wide range of attacks over time.

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detecting temporal sybil attacks n. lathia, s. hailes & l. capra mobisys seminar, sept. 29 2009
the web is based on cooperation...
the web is crowd-sourced... ratings: recommender, retrieval systems captchas: digitising text wikis: knowledge repositories
crowd-sourcing is cooperation... my ratings compute your recommendations. your reviews inform my decisions. your links help search engines to respond to my queries.
cooperation is policed by reputation and trust ebay: online trade and markets #followfriday on twitter ? trust ratings, ratings, ratings...
...we cooperate without knowing each other people are (nearly) anonymous why could this be a problem?
for example, recommender systems: recommendations → people → rate items → classification algorithms → recommendations → people...
problem with anonymity: recommendations → people → rate items → classification algorithms → recommendations → people... can you trust them? are they real people? are they rating honestly?
sybil attacks: ...when an attacker tries to subvert the system by creating a large number of sybils—pseudonymous identities—in order to gain a disproportionate amount of influence...
sybil attacks: why? how? random: inject noise, ruin the party for everyone targetted: promote/demote items. make money? APIs: rate content automatically.
recommender system sybil attack: shilling, profile injection, ... “honest” ratings attacker's ratings
each sybil rates: target, selected, filler items target: item that attacker wants promoted/demoted selected: similar items, to deceive the algorithm filler: other items, to deceive humans
how to defend a recommender system?
a) treat it as a classification problem where are the sybils? “honest” ratings attacker's ratings
problems with classification approach: when is your system under attack? when to run classifier?
problems with classification approach: when are sybils damaging your recommendations? wait until they have all rated?
proposal: b) monitor recommender system over time
contributions: 1. force sybils to draw out their attack 2. learn normal temporal behaviour 3. monitor for wide range of attacks 4. force sybils to attack more intelligently
1. force sybils to draw out their attack rather than appear, rate, disappear how? distrust newcomers
distrust newcomers prediction shift → time →
distrust newcomers prediction shift → time →
distrust newcomers prediction shift → time →
1. force sybils to draw out their attack how? distrust newcomers sybils are forced to appear more than once
examining temporal attack behaviour single sybil – – – – group of sybils target, target, filler, filler, selected selected, but also:
group size and dynamics how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
how can they behave? (many, few) (many, many) how many sybils? (few, few) (few, many) how many ratings per sybil?
how can does this affect the data? impact = how much malicious data how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
how to measure attacks? precision, recall, impact tp tp #sybil ratings pr = re = imp = tp + fp tp + fn #ratings
how to detect these attacks? monitor! item-level system-level how many sybils? user-level how many ratings per sybil?
how to detect these attacks? monitor! system-level how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
overview of the methodology 1. monitor: look at how data changes over time 2. flag: look at how data changes under attack
1. system level
1. system level - attack
(system) avg ratings per user 1. monitor: exp. weighted moving avg. mut = (β mut-|w|) + ((1-β) Rt/Ut) 2. flag: incoming ratings above moving threshold Rt/Ut > mut + (αg σt) (parameters α, β updated automatically)
1. system level - evaluation simulated data: play with data variance, attack amplitude
1. system level - evaluation simulated data: play with data variance, attack amplitude
1. system level - evaluation real data: netflix ratings (+ timestamps)
1. system level - evaluation real data: netflix ratings (+ timestamps)
item-level system-level how many sybils? user-level how many ratings per sybil?
(user-level) similar monitor/flag solution 1. monitor: a. how many high-volume raters? b. how much do high-volume raters rate? 2. flag: group size-ratings above threshold file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/User/Desktop/misc/documents/19%20attacks/wsdm_2010/img/highVolume.jpg file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/User/Desktop/misc/documents/19%20attacks/wsdm_2010/img/highRatings.jpg
(user-level) evaluation: real data how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
(user-level) evaluation: real data how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
(user-level) evaluation: real data item-level system-level how many sybils? user-level how many ratings per sybil?
(item-level) slightly different context 1. the item is rated by many users define many? using how other items were rated 2. the item is rated with extreme ratings define extreme? what is avg item mean? 3. (from a + b) the item mean ratings shifts nuke or promote? flag: if all three conditions broken. Why? 1 → popular item. 2 → few extreme ratings. 3 → cold start item 1 + 2 but not 3 → attack doesn't change anything
3. evaluate: simulated attacks on real data
what next? attackers can defeat these defenses the ramp-up attack
but...
conclusions: 1. force sybils to draw out their attack 2. learn normal temporal behaviour 3. monitor system, users, items 4. force sybils to attack more intelligently

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Sybil Attacks - MobiSys Seminar

  • 1. detecting temporal sybil attacks n. lathia, s. hailes & l. capra mobisys seminar, sept. 29 2009
  • 2. the web is based on cooperation...
  • 3. the web is crowd-sourced... ratings: recommender, retrieval systems captchas: digitising text wikis: knowledge repositories
  • 4. crowd-sourcing is cooperation... my ratings compute your recommendations. your reviews inform my decisions. your links help search engines to respond to my queries.
  • 5. cooperation is policed by reputation and trust ebay: online trade and markets #followfriday on twitter ? trust ratings, ratings, ratings...
  • 6. ...we cooperate without knowing each other people are (nearly) anonymous why could this be a problem?
  • 7. for example, recommender systems: recommendations → people → rate items → classification algorithms → recommendations → people...
  • 8. problem with anonymity: recommendations → people → rate items → classification algorithms → recommendations → people... can you trust them? are they real people? are they rating honestly?
  • 9. sybil attacks: ...when an attacker tries to subvert the system by creating a large number of sybils—pseudonymous identities—in order to gain a disproportionate amount of influence...
  • 10. sybil attacks: why? how? random: inject noise, ruin the party for everyone targetted: promote/demote items. make money? APIs: rate content automatically.
  • 11. recommender system sybil attack: shilling, profile injection, ... “honest” ratings attacker's ratings
  • 12. each sybil rates: target, selected, filler items target: item that attacker wants promoted/demoted selected: similar items, to deceive the algorithm filler: other items, to deceive humans
  • 13. how to defend a recommender system?
  • 14. a) treat it as a classification problem where are the sybils? “honest” ratings attacker's ratings
  • 15. problems with classification approach: when is your system under attack? when to run classifier?
  • 16. problems with classification approach: when are sybils damaging your recommendations? wait until they have all rated?
  • 18. contributions: 1. force sybils to draw out their attack 2. learn normal temporal behaviour 3. monitor for wide range of attacks 4. force sybils to attack more intelligently
  • 19. 1. force sybils to draw out their attack rather than appear, rate, disappear how? distrust newcomers
  • 23. 1. force sybils to draw out their attack how? distrust newcomers sybils are forced to appear more than once
  • 24. examining temporal attack behaviour single sybil – – – – group of sybils target, target, filler, filler, selected selected, but also:
  • 25. group size and dynamics how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
  • 26. how can they behave? (many, few) (many, many) how many sybils? (few, few) (few, many) how many ratings per sybil?
  • 27. how can does this affect the data? impact = how much malicious data how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
  • 28. how to measure attacks? precision, recall, impact tp tp #sybil ratings pr = re = imp = tp + fp tp + fn #ratings
  • 29. how to detect these attacks? monitor! item-level system-level how many sybils? user-level how many ratings per sybil?
  • 30. how to detect these attacks? monitor! system-level how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
  • 31. overview of the methodology 1. monitor: look at how data changes over time 2. flag: look at how data changes under attack
  • 33. 1. system level - attack
  • 34. (system) avg ratings per user 1. monitor: exp. weighted moving avg. mut = (β mut-|w|) + ((1-β) Rt/Ut) 2. flag: incoming ratings above moving threshold Rt/Ut > mut + (αg σt) (parameters α, β updated automatically)
  • 35. 1. system level - evaluation simulated data: play with data variance, attack amplitude
  • 36. 1. system level - evaluation simulated data: play with data variance, attack amplitude
  • 37. 1. system level - evaluation real data: netflix ratings (+ timestamps)
  • 38. 1. system level - evaluation real data: netflix ratings (+ timestamps)
  • 39. item-level system-level how many sybils? user-level how many ratings per sybil?
  • 40. (user-level) similar monitor/flag solution 1. monitor: a. how many high-volume raters? b. how much do high-volume raters rate? 2. flag: group size-ratings above threshold file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/User/Desktop/misc/documents/19%20attacks/wsdm_2010/img/highVolume.jpg file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/User/Desktop/misc/documents/19%20attacks/wsdm_2010/img/highRatings.jpg
  • 41. (user-level) evaluation: real data how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
  • 42. (user-level) evaluation: real data how many sybils? how many ratings per sybil?
  • 43. (user-level) evaluation: real data item-level system-level how many sybils? user-level how many ratings per sybil?
  • 44. (item-level) slightly different context 1. the item is rated by many users define many? using how other items were rated 2. the item is rated with extreme ratings define extreme? what is avg item mean? 3. (from a + b) the item mean ratings shifts nuke or promote? flag: if all three conditions broken. Why? 1 → popular item. 2 → few extreme ratings. 3 → cold start item 1 + 2 but not 3 → attack doesn't change anything
  • 45. 3. evaluate: simulated attacks on real data
  • 46. what next? attackers can defeat these defenses the ramp-up attack
  • 48. conclusions: 1. force sybils to draw out their attack 2. learn normal temporal behaviour 3. monitor system, users, items 4. force sybils to attack more intelligently