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Network Security

           Intruders and Viruses




                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        1
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Password Management
 Part Two - Cracking




           Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                  2
            Security Course, CSC290A
Intrusion Techniques

Objective: Gain access to a system
Frequent Goal: Acquiring a user
password
Most systems have a file that maps
a password to each user
Password file protection:
    one-way encryption
    access control

               Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                      3
                Security Course, CSC290A
Password Learning
              Techniques
g    1. Try default passwords used with standard
u       accounts shipped with the system
e    2. Exhaustive try of all short passwords
s    3. Try words in system’s dictionary or list of
s       likely passwords (hacker bulletin boards)
a
     4. Collect information about users (full names,
t
        names of spouses and children, pictures and
t
        books in their office, related hobbies)
a    5. Try users’ phone numbers, social security
c       numbers, room numbers
k    6. Try all legitimate license plate numbers
     7. Use a trojan horse
     8. Tap the line between a remote user and the
        system
                     Hofstra University – Network
    05/01/06                                           4
                      Security Course, CSC290A
Password Protection
Unix password scheme threats:
  Gain access through a guest
  account and run a password cracker
  Obtain a copy of the password file
  and run a password cracker

Goal: Run a password cracker
 Rely on people choosing easily
 guessable passwords!
             Hofstra University – Network
 05/01/06                                   5
              Security Course, CSC290A
Password Cracking




            Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                   6
             Security Course, CSC290A
Password Cracking
Unix Password File (/etc/passwd):
 daemon:x:1:1::/:
 bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin:
 sys:x:3:3::/:
 nobody:x:60001:60001:Nobody:/:
 eric:GmTFg0AavFA0U:1001:10:Eric Schwartz:/export/home/eric:/bin/ksh
 temp:kRWegG5iTZP5o:1002:10:IP Administration:/export/home/ipadmin:/bin/ksh
 jfr:kyzKROryhFDE2:506:506::/home/jfr:/bin/csh




 Results of the password cracker:
 $ john passwd
 Loaded 3 passwords with 3 different salts (Standard DES [24/32 4K])
 temp             (temp)
 jenny            (eric)
 solaris1         (jfr)



                              Hofstra University – Network
     05/01/06                                                             7
                               Security Course, CSC290A
Password Crackers




                Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                       8
                 Security Course, CSC290A
Virus and Related
                Threats




                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        9
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Malicious Programs

       Two categories:
         Those that need a host program
         – fragments of programs -
         parasitic
         Those that are independent – self
         contained
       Some replicate – used as a
       differentiator
                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        10
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Taxonomy of Malicious
        Programs




           Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                  11
            Security Course, CSC290A
Malicious Programs
  Logic Bombs: logic embedded in a
  program that checks for a set of
  conditions to arise and executes
  some function resulting in
  unauthorized actions
  Trapdoors: secret undocumented
  entry point into a program, used to
  grant access without normal
  methods of access authentication
  (e.g.,War Games)
              Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                     12
               Security Course, CSC290A
Trojan Horse




              Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                     13
               Security Course, CSC290A
Malicious Programs

  Trojan Horse: secret undocumented
  routine embedded within a useful
  program, execution of the program
  results in execution of the routine
  Common motivation is data
  destruction



              Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                     14
               Security Course, CSC290A
Malicious Programs

       Zombie: a program that secretly
       takes over an Internet attached
       computer and then uses it to
       launch an untraceable attack
       Very common in Distributed
       Denial-Of-Service attacks



                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        15
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Viruses




           Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                  16
            Security Course, CSC290A
Viruses
A virus is a
submicroscopic parasitic
particle that infects cells
in biological organisms.
Viruses are non-living
particles that can only
replicate when an
organism reproduces
the viral RNA or DNA.
 Viruses are considered
non-living by the
majority of virologists
www.virology.net
                    Hofstra University – Network
 05/01/06                                          17
                     Security Course, CSC290A
Viruses
   Viruses: code embedded within a
   program that causes a copy of
   itself to be inserted in other
   programs and performs some
   unwanted function
   Infects other programs
   Code is the DNA of the virus


              Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                     18
               Security Course, CSC290A
Worms




           Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                  19
            Security Course, CSC290A
Worms

 Worms: program that can replicate
 itself and send copies to computers
 across the network and performs
 some unwanted function
 Uses network connections to spread
 from system to system



             Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                    20
              Security Course, CSC290A
Bacteria
    Bacteria: consume resources by
    replicating themselves
    Do not explicitly damage any files
    Sole purpose is to replicate
    themselves
    Reproduce exponentially
    Eventually taking up all processors,
    memory or disk space

               Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                      21
                Security Course, CSC290A
Nature of Viruses

Four stages of virus lifetime
 Dormant phase: virus idle
 Propagation phase: cloning of virus
 Triggering phase: virus activation
 Execution phase: unwanted
 function performed



                Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                       22
                 Security Course, CSC290A
Virus Structure
     program V:=

     {goto main:
         1234567;           special marker determines if infected
             subroutine infect-executable :=
                 {loop:
                 file:= get-random-executable-file;
                 if (first-line-of-file = 1234567)
                 then goto loop
                 else prepend V to file;}

             subroutine do–damage :=
                 {whatever damage is to be done}
             subroutine trigger-pulled :=
                 {return true if some condition holds}

     main:   main-program :=
             {infect-executable;
             if trigger-pulled then do-damage;
             goto next;}
     next:         transfer control to the original program
     }

                          Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                                            23
                           Security Course, CSC290A
Avoiding Detection

   Infected version of program is
   longer than the corresponding
   uninfected one
   Solution: compress the executable
   file so infected and uninfected
   versions are identical in length



                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        24
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Avoiding Detection




                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        25
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Compression Program




infected   uninfected


                        Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                               26
                         Security Course, CSC290A
Types of Viruses
  Parasitic Virus: attached to
  executables, replicates when
  program is executed
  Memory-resident virus: part of a
  resident system program, affects
  every program executed
  Boot sector virus: infects a master
  boot record and spreads when
  system is booted from infected
  disk
                Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                       27
                 Security Course, CSC290A
Types of Viruses
  Stealth virus: virus designed to
  hide itself from detection by
  antivirus software (compression,
  interception of I/O logic)
  Polymorphic virus: mutates with
  every infection making detection
  by “signature” impossible
  (mutation engine)
  Macro virus: infects Microsoft Word
  docs; 2/3’s of all viruses
                Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                       28
                 Security Course, CSC290A
Macro Viruses

    2/3s of all viruses
    Mainly Microsoft products –
    platform independent
    Affect documents not executables
    Easily spread by e-mail
    Autoexecuting macro is the culprit


               Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                      29
                Security Course, CSC290A
Worms

     Uses network connections to
     spread from system to system
     Similar to a virus – has same
     phases: dormant, propagation,
     trigger and execution
     Morris Worm – most famous
     Recent: OSX.Leap.A, Kama
     Sutra,Code Red

               Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                      30
                Security Course, CSC290A
Buffer Overflow
 Program attempts to write more
 data into buffer than that buffer can
 hold…
 …Starts overwriting area of stack
 memory
 Can be used maliciously to cause a
 program to execute code of
 attackers choose
 Overwrites stack point
               Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                      31
                Security Course, CSC290A
Mechanics of stack-based buffer
           overflow
 Stack is like a pile of
 plates                                                      0X0692

 When a function is                                          0X0691
 called, the return              return
                                                    0X0123   0X0690
 address is pushed on           function
 the stack                                           0      0X0689
 In a function, local
                                  local               s      0X0688
 variables are written on
                                 stack
 the stack                      memory                y      0X0687
 Memory is written on                                 s      0X0686
 stack
                                                             0X0685
    char username[4]
    reserved 4 bytes of                                      0X0684
    space on stack
                     Hofstra University – Network
   05/01/06                                                     32
                      Security Course, CSC290A
Mechanics of stack-based buffer
           overflow
 When function copies                                       0X0692
 too much on the stack...
                                                            0X0691
 ...the return pointer is
 overwritten               return
                                                   0X0123
                                                   0X0689   0X0690
                          function
 Execution path of                                   X      0X0689
 function changed when
 function ends              local                    X      0X0688
 Local stack memory has stack                        X      0X0687
 malicious code           memory
                                                     X      0X0686

                                                            0X0685

                                                            0X0684


                    Hofstra University – Network
  05/01/06                                                     33
                     Security Course, CSC290A
Antivirus Approaches

       Detection – determine that it has
       occurred and locate the virus
       Identification – identify the specific
       virus
       Removal – remove all traces and
       restore the program to its original
       state

                  Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                         34
                   Security Course, CSC290A
Generations of Antivirus
       Software
       First: simple scanners (record of
       program lengths)
       Second: heuristic scanners
       (integrity checking with
       checksums)
       Third: activity traps (memory
       resident, detect infected actions)
       Fourth: full-featured protection
       (suite of antivirus techniques,
       access control capability)
                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                        35
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Advanced Techniques

     Generic Decryption
     Digital Immune System
     Behavior-Blocking Software




               Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                      36
                Security Course, CSC290A
Generic Decryption
  Easily detects even most complex
  polymorphic virus
  No damage to the personal
  computer
  Contains following elements:
       CPU emulator – software based virtual
       computer
       Virus signature scanner – scans target
       code for known signatures
       Emulation control module – control
       execution of target code
                  Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                         37
                   Security Course, CSC290A
Digital Immune System
  Pioneered by IBM
  Response to rate of virus
  propagation
       Integrated mail systems - Outlook
       Mobile program systems – ActiveX,
       Java
  Expands the use of program
  emulation
  Depends on a central virus
  analysis machines
                  Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                         38
                   Security Course, CSC290A
Digital Immune System




           Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                  39
            Security Course, CSC290A
Behavior-Blocking
               Software
  Monitors program behavior in real-time
  for malicious actions – part of OS
  Look for well defined requests to the
  OS: modifications to files, disk formats,
  mods to scripts or macros, changes in
  config settings, open network
  connections, etc.
  IPS – Intrusion Prevention Systems



                Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                       40
                 Security Course, CSC290A
Malicious Code Protection
     Types of Products
Scanners - identify known malicious code -
search for signature strings
Integrity Checkers – determine if code has
been altered or changed – checksum based
Vulnerability Monitors - prevent
modification or access to particularly
sensitive parts of the system – user defined
Behavior Blockers - list of rules that a
legitimate program must follow – sandbox
concept

                Hofstra University – Network
 05/01/06                                      41
                 Security Course, CSC290A
Important URLs
http://www.cert.org/
Originally DARPA’s computer emergency
response team. An essential security site
http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/
IBM’s site on virus information. Very good
papers – a little outdated
http://www.afsa.org/fsj/sept00/Denning.cfm
Hacktivism: An Emerging Threat to Diplomacy,
another Denning term along with Information
Warfare
http://csrc.nist.gov/virus/Computer Security
Resources Center – Virus information and alerts


                 Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                          42
                  Security Course, CSC290A
Important URLs
http://www.ciac.org/ciac/
Computer Incident Advisory Capability -another
bookmark-able site to visit regularly
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-42/NIST

Guideline on Network Security Testing – covers
password cracking
http://www.openwall.com/john/
Very good password cracker, “John the Ripper”
http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-36/NIST

Guide to Selecting Information Security
Products
http://www.xensource.com/
Xen Source - Hottest Area In Virtualization
                  Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                         43
                   Security Course, CSC290A
… enough!




             Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                    44
              Security Course, CSC290A
...coming to the end!

Take Home Final Exam – On
Website
Due Next Class
Return Papers
Any Problems, Please Email Or Call
Good Luck

            Hofstra University – Network
05/01/06                                   45
             Security Course, CSC290A

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Csc290 ch10

  • 1. Network Security Intruders and Viruses Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 1 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 2. Password Management Part Two - Cracking Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 2 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 3. Intrusion Techniques Objective: Gain access to a system Frequent Goal: Acquiring a user password Most systems have a file that maps a password to each user Password file protection: one-way encryption access control Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 3 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 4. Password Learning Techniques g 1. Try default passwords used with standard u accounts shipped with the system e 2. Exhaustive try of all short passwords s 3. Try words in system’s dictionary or list of s likely passwords (hacker bulletin boards) a 4. Collect information about users (full names, t names of spouses and children, pictures and t books in their office, related hobbies) a 5. Try users’ phone numbers, social security c numbers, room numbers k 6. Try all legitimate license plate numbers 7. Use a trojan horse 8. Tap the line between a remote user and the system Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 4 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 5. Password Protection Unix password scheme threats: Gain access through a guest account and run a password cracker Obtain a copy of the password file and run a password cracker Goal: Run a password cracker Rely on people choosing easily guessable passwords! Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 5 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 6. Password Cracking Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 6 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 7. Password Cracking Unix Password File (/etc/passwd): daemon:x:1:1::/: bin:x:2:2::/usr/bin: sys:x:3:3::/: nobody:x:60001:60001:Nobody:/: eric:GmTFg0AavFA0U:1001:10:Eric Schwartz:/export/home/eric:/bin/ksh temp:kRWegG5iTZP5o:1002:10:IP Administration:/export/home/ipadmin:/bin/ksh jfr:kyzKROryhFDE2:506:506::/home/jfr:/bin/csh Results of the password cracker: $ john passwd Loaded 3 passwords with 3 different salts (Standard DES [24/32 4K]) temp (temp) jenny (eric) solaris1 (jfr) Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 7 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 8. Password Crackers Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 8 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 9. Virus and Related Threats Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 9 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 10. Malicious Programs Two categories: Those that need a host program – fragments of programs - parasitic Those that are independent – self contained Some replicate – used as a differentiator Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 10 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 11. Taxonomy of Malicious Programs Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 11 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 12. Malicious Programs Logic Bombs: logic embedded in a program that checks for a set of conditions to arise and executes some function resulting in unauthorized actions Trapdoors: secret undocumented entry point into a program, used to grant access without normal methods of access authentication (e.g.,War Games) Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 12 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 13. Trojan Horse Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 13 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 14. Malicious Programs Trojan Horse: secret undocumented routine embedded within a useful program, execution of the program results in execution of the routine Common motivation is data destruction Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 14 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 15. Malicious Programs Zombie: a program that secretly takes over an Internet attached computer and then uses it to launch an untraceable attack Very common in Distributed Denial-Of-Service attacks Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 15 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 16. Viruses Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 16 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 17. Viruses A virus is a submicroscopic parasitic particle that infects cells in biological organisms. Viruses are non-living particles that can only replicate when an organism reproduces the viral RNA or DNA. Viruses are considered non-living by the majority of virologists www.virology.net Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 17 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 18. Viruses Viruses: code embedded within a program that causes a copy of itself to be inserted in other programs and performs some unwanted function Infects other programs Code is the DNA of the virus Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 18 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 19. Worms Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 19 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 20. Worms Worms: program that can replicate itself and send copies to computers across the network and performs some unwanted function Uses network connections to spread from system to system Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 20 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 21. Bacteria Bacteria: consume resources by replicating themselves Do not explicitly damage any files Sole purpose is to replicate themselves Reproduce exponentially Eventually taking up all processors, memory or disk space Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 21 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 22. Nature of Viruses Four stages of virus lifetime Dormant phase: virus idle Propagation phase: cloning of virus Triggering phase: virus activation Execution phase: unwanted function performed Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 22 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 23. Virus Structure program V:= {goto main: 1234567; special marker determines if infected subroutine infect-executable := {loop: file:= get-random-executable-file; if (first-line-of-file = 1234567) then goto loop else prepend V to file;} subroutine do–damage := {whatever damage is to be done} subroutine trigger-pulled := {return true if some condition holds} main: main-program := {infect-executable; if trigger-pulled then do-damage; goto next;} next: transfer control to the original program } Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 23 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 24. Avoiding Detection Infected version of program is longer than the corresponding uninfected one Solution: compress the executable file so infected and uninfected versions are identical in length Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 24 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 25. Avoiding Detection Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 25 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 26. Compression Program infected uninfected Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 26 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 27. Types of Viruses Parasitic Virus: attached to executables, replicates when program is executed Memory-resident virus: part of a resident system program, affects every program executed Boot sector virus: infects a master boot record and spreads when system is booted from infected disk Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 27 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 28. Types of Viruses Stealth virus: virus designed to hide itself from detection by antivirus software (compression, interception of I/O logic) Polymorphic virus: mutates with every infection making detection by “signature” impossible (mutation engine) Macro virus: infects Microsoft Word docs; 2/3’s of all viruses Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 28 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 29. Macro Viruses 2/3s of all viruses Mainly Microsoft products – platform independent Affect documents not executables Easily spread by e-mail Autoexecuting macro is the culprit Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 29 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 30. Worms Uses network connections to spread from system to system Similar to a virus – has same phases: dormant, propagation, trigger and execution Morris Worm – most famous Recent: OSX.Leap.A, Kama Sutra,Code Red Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 30 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 31. Buffer Overflow Program attempts to write more data into buffer than that buffer can hold… …Starts overwriting area of stack memory Can be used maliciously to cause a program to execute code of attackers choose Overwrites stack point Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 31 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 32. Mechanics of stack-based buffer overflow Stack is like a pile of plates 0X0692 When a function is 0X0691 called, the return return 0X0123 0X0690 address is pushed on function the stack 0 0X0689 In a function, local local s 0X0688 variables are written on stack the stack memory y 0X0687 Memory is written on s 0X0686 stack 0X0685 char username[4] reserved 4 bytes of 0X0684 space on stack Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 32 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 33. Mechanics of stack-based buffer overflow When function copies 0X0692 too much on the stack... 0X0691 ...the return pointer is overwritten return 0X0123 0X0689 0X0690 function Execution path of X 0X0689 function changed when function ends local X 0X0688 Local stack memory has stack X 0X0687 malicious code memory X 0X0686 0X0685 0X0684 Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 33 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 34. Antivirus Approaches Detection – determine that it has occurred and locate the virus Identification – identify the specific virus Removal – remove all traces and restore the program to its original state Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 34 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 35. Generations of Antivirus Software First: simple scanners (record of program lengths) Second: heuristic scanners (integrity checking with checksums) Third: activity traps (memory resident, detect infected actions) Fourth: full-featured protection (suite of antivirus techniques, access control capability) Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 35 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 36. Advanced Techniques Generic Decryption Digital Immune System Behavior-Blocking Software Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 36 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 37. Generic Decryption Easily detects even most complex polymorphic virus No damage to the personal computer Contains following elements: CPU emulator – software based virtual computer Virus signature scanner – scans target code for known signatures Emulation control module – control execution of target code Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 37 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 38. Digital Immune System Pioneered by IBM Response to rate of virus propagation Integrated mail systems - Outlook Mobile program systems – ActiveX, Java Expands the use of program emulation Depends on a central virus analysis machines Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 38 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 39. Digital Immune System Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 39 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 40. Behavior-Blocking Software Monitors program behavior in real-time for malicious actions – part of OS Look for well defined requests to the OS: modifications to files, disk formats, mods to scripts or macros, changes in config settings, open network connections, etc. IPS – Intrusion Prevention Systems Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 40 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 41. Malicious Code Protection Types of Products Scanners - identify known malicious code - search for signature strings Integrity Checkers – determine if code has been altered or changed – checksum based Vulnerability Monitors - prevent modification or access to particularly sensitive parts of the system – user defined Behavior Blockers - list of rules that a legitimate program must follow – sandbox concept Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 41 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 42. Important URLs http://www.cert.org/ Originally DARPA’s computer emergency response team. An essential security site http://www.research.ibm.com/antivirus/ IBM’s site on virus information. Very good papers – a little outdated http://www.afsa.org/fsj/sept00/Denning.cfm Hacktivism: An Emerging Threat to Diplomacy, another Denning term along with Information Warfare http://csrc.nist.gov/virus/Computer Security Resources Center – Virus information and alerts Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 42 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 43. Important URLs http://www.ciac.org/ciac/ Computer Incident Advisory Capability -another bookmark-able site to visit regularly http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-42/NIST Guideline on Network Security Testing – covers password cracking http://www.openwall.com/john/ Very good password cracker, “John the Ripper” http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-36/NIST Guide to Selecting Information Security Products http://www.xensource.com/ Xen Source - Hottest Area In Virtualization Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 43 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 44. … enough! Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 44 Security Course, CSC290A
  • 45. ...coming to the end! Take Home Final Exam – On Website Due Next Class Return Papers Any Problems, Please Email Or Call Good Luck Hofstra University – Network 05/01/06 45 Security Course, CSC290A