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Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation Systems
                                        Kuan-Ta Chen (Chun-Yang Chen) , Cheng-Chun Lou , Polly Huang , and Ling-Jyh Chen
                                                                                                                     1                                                            2                             2                                           1
                                                                          1
                                                                              Academia Sinica, 2National Taiwan University
Background                                                                Hypothesis                                                                                                                                Votee-Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection
• MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games)               • The most voters of legitimate players are likely collusion cluster                                                                      The relationship of victim group is stronger than random votee cluster
  have become extremely popular                                           • In case if a collusion cluster attacks for several times
                                                                                                                                                                                                                    First take the votees with more common voters
                                                                              1. Collusion Cluster has more common votees than random
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         • form the victim group
• Game bots                                                                      voter cluster
   ○ Auto-playing game clients                                                2. Victims have more common voters than random votee cluster                                                                          Then take union of the voters of the victim group
   ○ One of the greatest threats of MMORPGs                                                                                                                                                                            • form the collusion cluster candidate
                                                                          • Based-on                                                                                                                                Apply Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection
• Detection of Game Bots                                                      ○ The voters & votees id of each player
   ○ Manual detection (game master) [1]                                   • Note
   ○ Traffic analysis approach [2]                                            ○ When not attack, a collusive player acts as a legitimate player                                                                     Performance Evaluation Results
   ○ Voting-based system [3]                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Voter-Based      Votee-Voter-Based        Comparison
       - Each player votes the suspicious player as a game bot            Voter-Based Collusion Cluster Detection                                                                                                    # of Attack
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     (Single CC or Multiple CC)
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    More attacks  higher accuracy       Votee-Voter > Voter

                                                                          The relationship of collusion cluster is stronger than random voter cluster                                                                                              No influence     Need more than 3
Motivation                                                                Take the voters with more common votees between each other
                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Collusion Cluster Size
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  high accuracy     high accuracy
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         Voter > Votee-Voter

                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Prob. of Collusive Player
                                                                             • form the collusion cluster.                                                                                                           Attack Vote
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    Higher Prob.  higher accuracy       Votee-Voter > Voter
• Problem in voting-based system
  General Case                         Malicious Case                                          3                                                                                  ID   Votee List
                                                                                                                                           4
                                                                                                                                                                            1     1    11, 12, 13, 14, 17           Voter-Based scheme:
                                                                                                                                                           5
                                                                                                        4                    2
                                                                                                                                                                                  2    11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18       Robust to the size of collusion cluster
                                                                                  1                                              4                                                3    9, 13, 14, 15
                                                                                                        4                3                     3
                                                                                                                                                                                  4    11, 12, 13, 14               Voter-Votee-Based scheme:
                  BOT




                                                          BOT




                                                                                                                                                                    1                                               Robust to the number of attacks
         BO
                        BO
                                               BO
                                                                 BO                            2                                      4                                 1         5    12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 60
                                                                           1
                          T                                         T
           T                                      T
                                                                                                                             2                                 1                  9    17, 25, 30

        BO T                                   B OT
                                                                                      1
                                                                                                            3
                                                                                                                                           3
                                                                                                                                                                   18
                                                                                                                                                                                  10   17, 18, 50, 56               Conclusion
                                                                              10                                                                                                  11   17, 18, 70, 44               • Two mechanisms to detect the collusion cluster
                 BOT                                     User
                                                                                                                     1                     1
                                                                                                                                                                                  12   17, 20, 35                       ○ Based on the voting history
                                                                                                                                                       1
• Collusion                                                                                                                      13
                                                                                                                                                                                  13   40, 45, 50                       ○ Single cluster or multiple clusters
                                                                                                                1                                                                 14   55, 80, 90
   ○ A secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent,
                                                                                          17
                                                                                                                                                            9
                                                                                                                                 1
      illegal, or deceitful purpose [4]                                                                     1                                  1
                                                                                                                                                                                  15   20, 30, 40                   • Accuracy
         - Unfairly low ratings – bad mouthing
                                                                                                   14
                                                                                                                                                   1        1
                                                                                                                                                                                  17   1                                ○ Attack more than three times: 83%+
                                                                                      1
         - Unfairly high ratings – ballot stuffing                                                                                                                                18   17, 60                           ○ Attack more than five times: 97%+
                                                                                                                                      15       1       12
                                                                                                                11                                                          Weight (A, B): # of common
• Only can vote negatively (game bot)                                         1                                                                                             votees of A and B                       • Adjust other experimental factors
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ○ Only collusion cluster size and prob. of collusive player attack vote
   ○ This study focuses on bad-mouthing                 attacks           < Algorithm >
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         have the obvious influence to the accuracy
                                                                          while ( edge(G ) ∉ Φ )
Problem Formulation                                                         Take the edge with the largest weight

• Bad-Mouthing
                                                                            while (not termination condition )                                                                                                      Furture Work
                                                                                Take the outlier edge with the largest weight                                                                                       Detecting players who participate in multiple collusion clusters
    ○ A malicious group deliberately vote a legitimate player as a          end while
      game bot                                                              output                                                                                                                                  [1] I. MacInnes and L. Hu, “Business models and operational issues in the chinese online game
• Terms                                                                   end while                                                                                                                                 industry,” Telematics and Informatics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 130-144, 2007
    ○ Collusion Cluster: a bad-mouthing group                                                                                                                                                                       [2] K.-T. Chen, J.-W. Jiang, P. Huang, H.-H. Chu, C.-L. Lei, and W.-C. Chen, “Identifying mmor-
                                                                          Terminal Condition:
    ○ Victim: the legitimate players who are under bad-mouthing attacks   ∑{weight (u,v) | u, v ⊂ S ' } − ∑{weight (u,v) | u, v ⊂ S} < a                                                                            pg bots: A traffic analysis approach,” in Proceedings of ACM SIGCHI ACE, 2006
• Goal                                                                                                                       S                                                                                      [3] Blizzard, http://www.blizzard.com/war3/
   To Detect the Collusion Clusters                                                                                                                                                                                 [4] http://www.answers.com/collusion?cat=biz-fin

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Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation Systems

  • 1. Detecting Bad Mouthing Behavior in Reputation Systems Kuan-Ta Chen (Chun-Yang Chen) , Cheng-Chun Lou , Polly Huang , and Ling-Jyh Chen 1 2 2 1 1 Academia Sinica, 2National Taiwan University Background Hypothesis Votee-Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection • MMORPGs (Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games) • The most voters of legitimate players are likely collusion cluster The relationship of victim group is stronger than random votee cluster have become extremely popular • In case if a collusion cluster attacks for several times First take the votees with more common voters 1. Collusion Cluster has more common votees than random • form the victim group • Game bots voter cluster ○ Auto-playing game clients 2. Victims have more common voters than random votee cluster Then take union of the voters of the victim group ○ One of the greatest threats of MMORPGs • form the collusion cluster candidate • Based-on Apply Voter-based Collusion Cluster Detection • Detection of Game Bots ○ The voters & votees id of each player ○ Manual detection (game master) [1] • Note ○ Traffic analysis approach [2] ○ When not attack, a collusive player acts as a legitimate player Performance Evaluation Results ○ Voting-based system [3] Voter-Based Votee-Voter-Based Comparison - Each player votes the suspicious player as a game bot Voter-Based Collusion Cluster Detection # of Attack (Single CC or Multiple CC) More attacks  higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter The relationship of collusion cluster is stronger than random voter cluster No influence Need more than 3 Motivation Take the voters with more common votees between each other Collusion Cluster Size high accuracy high accuracy Voter > Votee-Voter Prob. of Collusive Player • form the collusion cluster. Attack Vote Higher Prob.  higher accuracy Votee-Voter > Voter • Problem in voting-based system General Case Malicious Case 3 ID Votee List 4 1 1 11, 12, 13, 14, 17 Voter-Based scheme: 5 4 2 2 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18 Robust to the size of collusion cluster 1 4 3 9, 13, 14, 15 4 3 3 4 11, 12, 13, 14 Voter-Votee-Based scheme: BOT BOT 1 Robust to the number of attacks BO BO BO BO 2 4 1 5 12, 13, 14, 15, 25, 60 1 T T T T 2 1 9 17, 25, 30 BO T B OT 1 3 3 18 10 17, 18, 50, 56 Conclusion 10 11 17, 18, 70, 44 • Two mechanisms to detect the collusion cluster BOT User 1 1 12 17, 20, 35 ○ Based on the voting history 1 • Collusion 13 13 40, 45, 50 ○ Single cluster or multiple clusters 1 14 55, 80, 90 ○ A secret agreement between two or more parties for a fraudulent, 17 9 1 illegal, or deceitful purpose [4] 1 1 15 20, 30, 40 • Accuracy - Unfairly low ratings – bad mouthing 14 1 1 17 1 ○ Attack more than three times: 83%+ 1 - Unfairly high ratings – ballot stuffing 18 17, 60 ○ Attack more than five times: 97%+ 15 1 12 11 Weight (A, B): # of common • Only can vote negatively (game bot) 1 votees of A and B • Adjust other experimental factors ○ Only collusion cluster size and prob. of collusive player attack vote ○ This study focuses on bad-mouthing attacks < Algorithm > have the obvious influence to the accuracy while ( edge(G ) ∉ Φ ) Problem Formulation Take the edge with the largest weight • Bad-Mouthing while (not termination condition ) Furture Work Take the outlier edge with the largest weight Detecting players who participate in multiple collusion clusters ○ A malicious group deliberately vote a legitimate player as a end while game bot output [1] I. MacInnes and L. Hu, “Business models and operational issues in the chinese online game • Terms end while industry,” Telematics and Informatics, vol. 24, no. 2, pp. 130-144, 2007 ○ Collusion Cluster: a bad-mouthing group [2] K.-T. Chen, J.-W. Jiang, P. Huang, H.-H. Chu, C.-L. Lei, and W.-C. Chen, “Identifying mmor- Terminal Condition: ○ Victim: the legitimate players who are under bad-mouthing attacks ∑{weight (u,v) | u, v ⊂ S ' } − ∑{weight (u,v) | u, v ⊂ S} < a pg bots: A traffic analysis approach,” in Proceedings of ACM SIGCHI ACE, 2006 • Goal S [3] Blizzard, http://www.blizzard.com/war3/ To Detect the Collusion Clusters [4] http://www.answers.com/collusion?cat=biz-fin