3. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person
Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
2/8
4. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person
Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);
Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
2/8
5. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person
Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);
Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;
Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
2/8
6. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person
Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);
Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;
Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
2/8
7. Introductory
Administrative issues
Theme for this week: Objections to Descartes’s Conception of the Person
Hume on personal identity (also on e-Commons!);
Strawson, “Self, Mind and Body”;
Baier (defending Descartes) “Cartesian Persons”
Midterm: next Friday
Study Guide will go up this weekend
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
2/8
8. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
9. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
10. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
11. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
12. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
Proportion (mountain)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
13. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
Proportion (mountain)
Gradualness (erosion)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
14. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
Proportion (mountain)
Gradualness (erosion)
Common purpose (ship)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
15. Hume on Personal Identity
Hume on identity in general
Strictly speaking, identity is quantitative
Our talk of identity is usually “fictitious”
That is to say, we create it for convenience’s sake
Principles of identity
Proportion (mountain)
Gradualness (erosion)
Common purpose (ship)
sympathy of ends (organism)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
3/8
16. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
17. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
18. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
19. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
20. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
21. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
22. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
23. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
24. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
Other ideas do too, and so also count.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
25. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
26. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
Am I the same person I was last week?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
27. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
Am I the same person I was last week?
Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
28. Hume on Personal Identity
The Self (per Hume)
What conditions lead us to “fabrication” of personal identity in specific?
Associative mental principles: contiguity (ignore), resemblance,
cause-and-effect
Resemblance (via memory)
More importantly: causal relations amongst ideas: your impressions don’t
cause my ideas
Role of memory
Memory displays causal relations amongst ideas
But memory thereby reveals our identity, rather than constituting it
What we are saying is that these ideas (which we remember) stand in the
appropriate causal relationship.
Other ideas do too, and so also count.
In what sense is the idea of myself a “fiction”?
Am I the same person I was last week?
Well, sure, but what that means is just that these ideas are appropriately
causally related to those ones. There is no persisting entity.
Note again Hume’s dualism. This is just about “mental” identity
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
4/8
29. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
30. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
31. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
32. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;
when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
33. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;
when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
34. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;
when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the
relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
35. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;
when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the
relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
36. Strawson on the Person
Anti-Cartesianism
Two different ways of thinking of “mind-body unity”
“two one-sided things”; “one two-sided thing”
Cartesianism: mind and body are two distinct things, which come together to
form a “person”, a plural entity (consisting of a mind, together with a body).
Anti-Cartesianism: the person is the fundamental category here, and when we
think solely of persons’ mental properties we are thinking about their “minds”;
when we think solely of physical properties we are thinking about their bodies.
The Anti-Cartesian analysis
Think of the relationship between the obverse and the reverse of a coin; or the
relationship between a game and its score, or a table and its top surface.
Minds relate to people (so says Strawson) as scores relate to games.
Our question, then: how to decide between Cartesianism and
anti-Cartesianism?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
5/8
37. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
38. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe believes in God
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
39. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe believes in God
Joe is 6 ft. tall
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
40. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe believes in God
Joe is 6 ft. tall
Joe wants to be taller
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
41. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
42. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
43. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
44. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
45. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
46. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
47. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
But this gets harder and harder.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
48. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
But this gets harder and harder.
This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicate
of minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
49. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
But this gets harder and harder.
This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicate
of minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
50. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
But this gets harder and harder.
This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicate
of minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind
that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
51. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
But this gets harder and harder.
This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicate
of minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind
that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysically
misleading.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
52. Strawson on the Person
The Predicate-side objection
Consider the following kinds of speech:
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
Joe
believes in God
is 6 ft. tall
wants to be taller
intends to get a haircut
is writing a letter
wrote in his diary about a crazy dream he had last night
Analyze these in terms of “mind”, “body”
The first two examples are clearly “mind” and “body” respectively
More complex: Joe-the-mind wants Joe-the-body to be taller
But this gets harder and harder.
This is at least a prima facie embarrassment for the “Cartesian”. What we
predicate of people does not seem to analyze out into the things we predicate
of minds and things we predicate of bodies.
Cartesian reply
Formally adequate analysis: “This body is doing such and such, and the mind
that is peculiarly intimately connected with it is thinking so-and-so.”
Why can’t we create this analysis? Because our language is metaphysically
misleading.
But that’s no surprise—common discourse is for common purposes.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
6/8
53. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
54. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
55. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
56. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
57. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
58. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Two examples
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
59. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Two examples
Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
60. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Two examples
Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison
momentary soul-substances
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
61. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Two examples
Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison
momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just one
thinking thing
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
62. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Two examples
Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison
momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just one
thinking thing
The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
63. Strawson on the Person
Subject side
Subjects and Predicates
In our examples, we’ve been worried about how to split up the predicate.
What about the subject?
In the proposed Cartesian analysis, the subject is represented by this phrase:
“the mind that is peculiarly intimately connected. . . ”
“The” implies just one
With what right, “the”?
Two examples
Prof. X and 1000 souls thinking in unison
momentary soul-substances
These suggest that the Cartesian has no right to claim there is just one
thinking thing
The Cartesian hasn’t told us what a thinking thing is!
For if he had, we would be able to tell when we have one, when many.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
7/8
64. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
65. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
66. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
“I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
67. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
“I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
68. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
“I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
69. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
“I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
surface : table :: mind : person
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
70. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
“I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
surface : table :: mind : person
So, surface : table :: body : person as well.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
71. Strawson on the Person
Diagnosis
The difference between meditation and ordinary life
Meditation is a solitary activity
“I” is a word primarily used to distinguish speaker from audience.
Speakers and audiences are embodied. But when we ignore the audience, we
can ignore our own body too.
So, does Strawson think I am my body?
surface : table :: mind : person
So, surface : table :: body : person as well.
No real distinction between mind and body, not because body is fundamental,
but because person is.
Prof. Hicks
Phil 11
February 5
8/8
