My presentation at the Dutch Royal Academy of Arts & Sciences masterclass on New Authoritarianism. The presentation (which is theses of a research paper) is dedicated to how the Ukraine's Orange Revolution influenced strategy and policies of Putin's regime.

1. Orange Reaction:
What the Kremlin Learned
(and What It Didn’t Learn)
from the Orange Revolution
Oleg Kozlovsky
The “New Authoritarianism”:
Russia and China in Comparative Perspective
Amsterdam, 2013-11-27

2. Russia and Ukraine in 2004
• “Managed democracy” looks firm and well-established
in both countries, with the
opposition, media, business, judiciary largely under
government control
• Attempt to rig elections in favor of PM Viktor
Yanukovich causes mass protest in Kiev’s
Maidan, leading to Yanukovich’s defeat
• The Kremlin supports Yanukovich’s bid and
underestimates the threat of protests until it is too late
• Orange Revolution shows vulnerability of the Russian
model of authoritarianism, forces the Putin’s regime to
react

3. Use of Propaganda
• Orange Revolution is represented as Westerninstigated, nationalistic, anti-Russian, chaotic, bloody, etc.
• Anti-Westernism and Anti-Americanism adopted as key propaganda
concepts: The West is trying to weaken and destroy Russia
• Putin’s rule is claimed to have brought about much-needed political and
economical stability that has to be preserved at all costs
• Concept of “sovereign democracy” is used to repel criticism of Russian
political system from abroad
• Constant public attacks against leading opposition figures and
organizations ensure that there will be no “Russian Yuschenko” capable of
winning elections
• The regime increasingly contests the opposition on the Internet by training
and hiring bloggers, investing in online media, use of hackers etc.

4. Political Organizing
• Nashi and similar groups absorb socially active
youth using many “Orange” techniques
• Both the police and pro-Kremlin youth groups
are used to deny physical space to the
opposition, with varying effectiveness
• Attacks are carried out against the
opposition, both online and offline

5. Legislation and Policies
• Electoral reform: Shutting down 2/3 of political
parties, banning of electoral blocs, putting
remaining parties under stricter control
• Passing of “anti-extremist” laws, which allow to
target both groups and individuals for a broad
range of political activities
• Wider use of coercive agencies to persecute
opposition and human rights activists, especially
before elections

6. Post-2011 Perspective
• By 2011, Kremlin’s policies had discredited most political
institutions – elections, the Parliament, parties, courts, etc. –
and eventually eroded trust in the government
• Russian civil society was maturing despite all these
measures, which became apparent in December 2011 when
mass protests erupted in Moscow and other cities
• Kremlin’s contingency plan failed; Putin’s model turned out
not to be immune to the “Orange virus”
• After the White Ribbon protests, the sophisticated system of
“sovereign democracy” was largely replaced with a more
straightforward, traditional form of authoritarianism

7. Oleg Kozlovsky
oleg@kozlovsky.ru
@kozlovsky
facebook.com/kozlovsky
Skype: okozlovsky