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The Hidden XSS
          Attacking the Desktop & Mobile Platforms



Kos (Kyle Osborn)
@theKos
alert(self)

» ToorCon Seattle,      » Oh, and this guy
  BlackHat, BSidesLV
  & DefCon

» Red Team guy (or so
I
  pretend)

» Pentester

» http://kos.io/
XSS within the browser

» Usually considered a web browser based attack.
» Users fire up their web browsers
 » Navigate to website with persistent XSS
 » Open up link with payload in the URL
    (bank.com?XSS)
 » iFrame with embedded vulnerable website
 » etc., etc.

» But... not really browser specific...
XSS

Definition for xss:

Cross-site scripting is a security hazard that allows crackers to
interfere with your program’s logic by inserting their own
logic into your HTML. ....
http://oreilly.com/ruby/excerpts/ruby-learning-rails/ruby-glossary.html
XSS without the browser 

» So what's the big deal?

» Not really able to steal cookies.

» Phishing doesn't make sense.

» Content spoofing?

» Ad injection?

» Meh...
XSS without the browser 

» Local filesystem access?


» XMLHttpRequest()


» WebKit does not block XHR requests to file:///

» OS X, iOS, Android versions of WebKit
  » Except for Chrome
So... the fun stuff

» Demos!
Demo #1
» Skype (5.0.x to <= 5.0.914) on Mac OS X
» HTML not filtered in
  an instance, allowing
  an attacker to inject
  malicious JavaScript.


» http://kos.io/skype
  for more info
Demo #2

» Adium <= 1.4.2 (OS X)

» Unfiltered HTML in file transfer dialogue.

» Almost the same as Skype.



» http://www.noptrix.net/advisories/adium_inject.txt
Demo #3

» Skype on iOS 3.0.1 (Fixed as of 3.0.2)

» Again, basic Cross Site Scripting

» Discovered by while testing Skype on OS X



» More info at
https://superevr.com/2011/xss-in-skype-for-ios/
Demo #3
Introducing WebOS

» Truly web-driven
  operating system
» Easy application
  development
» Posed to compete
  with iOS / Android



» Oh yeah, apps
are HTML5 /
JavaScript
WebOS

» WebOS. Because most apps are HTML/JS, many
  are susceptible to attacks.

» However... actually more secure than previous
vulns.

» Security (kind-of) done right on it.
Demo #5

» Android's GMail app

» Reported a few months ago...

» Android (like iOS) uses separate users per
  application, limiting what each app can reach.
Demo #5 - Continued

» GMail.apk allows HTML files to be downloaded.

» Handles it in "HTML Viewer" properly, without JS.

» However, XSS inside Gmail.app allows attacker
to
   force download file.

» Then force browser to open file:///..../attack.html
For my next trick...  Choose an OS

» Linux

» Windows

» OS X

» iOS
Demo #6

» Google Earth

» Multi-platform - OS X, iOS, Linux & Windows

» Payloaded KML file (Google Earth XML file)

» Uses HTML for info-boxes

» Uses vulnerable WebKit versoin
Tool!

» To make it easier, wrote a tool.

» JSON arrays for
    discovery functions() [what users, app]
    and files

» base64 encodes & exfiltrates
Tool!
fileList['mac']= { // How do we discover users? "discover" :'/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist', // Okay, we found them,
what do we pillage? "post" :{ 'bashHistory':'.bash_history', 'sshHosts':'.ssh/known_hosts', 'sshKeys':'.ssh/id_rsa.pub', } }

fileList['android']= { // Instead of how, just figure out the currently in use appi "discover" :'/proc/self/status', // Okay, we found them,
what do we pillage? "post" :{               'browser_data':'/data/data/com.android.browser/databases/webview.
db',             'browser_data2':'/data/data/com.android.browser/databases/browser.db',                     'gmail_accounts':'/data/data/com.
google.android.gm/shared_prefs/Gmail.xml',                   'dolpin_data':'/data/data/mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser/databases/webview.
db',             'dolpin_data2':'/data/data/mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser/databases/browser.db',                       'chromeBookmarks':'.
config/chromium/Default/Bookmarks' } }
Conclusion 

» XSS is bad, mkay?

» Developers don't know how / aren't trained to filter
  client side.

» Easy to exploit.

» Ping me at
    @theKos
    kos@kos.io
    http://kos.io/

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The Hidden XSS - Attacking the Desktop & Mobile Platforms

  • 1. The Hidden XSS Attacking the Desktop & Mobile Platforms Kos (Kyle Osborn) @theKos
  • 2. alert(self) » ToorCon Seattle, » Oh, and this guy BlackHat, BSidesLV & DefCon » Red Team guy (or so I pretend) » Pentester » http://kos.io/
  • 3. XSS within the browser » Usually considered a web browser based attack. » Users fire up their web browsers » Navigate to website with persistent XSS » Open up link with payload in the URL (bank.com?XSS) » iFrame with embedded vulnerable website » etc., etc. » But... not really browser specific...
  • 4. XSS Definition for xss: Cross-site scripting is a security hazard that allows crackers to interfere with your program’s logic by inserting their own logic into your HTML. .... http://oreilly.com/ruby/excerpts/ruby-learning-rails/ruby-glossary.html
  • 5.
  • 6. XSS without the browser  » So what's the big deal? » Not really able to steal cookies. » Phishing doesn't make sense. » Content spoofing? » Ad injection? » Meh...
  • 7. XSS without the browser  » Local filesystem access? » XMLHttpRequest() » WebKit does not block XHR requests to file:/// » OS X, iOS, Android versions of WebKit » Except for Chrome
  • 8. So... the fun stuff » Demos!
  • 9. Demo #1 » Skype (5.0.x to <= 5.0.914) on Mac OS X » HTML not filtered in an instance, allowing an attacker to inject malicious JavaScript. » http://kos.io/skype for more info
  • 10. Demo #2 » Adium <= 1.4.2 (OS X) » Unfiltered HTML in file transfer dialogue. » Almost the same as Skype. » http://www.noptrix.net/advisories/adium_inject.txt
  • 11. Demo #3 » Skype on iOS 3.0.1 (Fixed as of 3.0.2) » Again, basic Cross Site Scripting » Discovered by while testing Skype on OS X » More info at https://superevr.com/2011/xss-in-skype-for-ios/
  • 13.
  • 14. Introducing WebOS » Truly web-driven operating system » Easy application development » Posed to compete with iOS / Android » Oh yeah, apps are HTML5 / JavaScript
  • 15. WebOS » WebOS. Because most apps are HTML/JS, many are susceptible to attacks. » However... actually more secure than previous vulns. » Security (kind-of) done right on it.
  • 16.
  • 17.
  • 18.
  • 19.
  • 20. Demo #5 » Android's GMail app » Reported a few months ago... » Android (like iOS) uses separate users per application, limiting what each app can reach.
  • 21.
  • 22.
  • 23. Demo #5 - Continued » GMail.apk allows HTML files to be downloaded. » Handles it in "HTML Viewer" properly, without JS. » However, XSS inside Gmail.app allows attacker to force download file. » Then force browser to open file:///..../attack.html
  • 24. For my next trick...  Choose an OS » Linux » Windows » OS X » iOS
  • 25. Demo #6 » Google Earth » Multi-platform - OS X, iOS, Linux & Windows » Payloaded KML file (Google Earth XML file) » Uses HTML for info-boxes » Uses vulnerable WebKit versoin
  • 26. Tool! » To make it easier, wrote a tool. » JSON arrays for discovery functions() [what users, app] and files » base64 encodes & exfiltrates
  • 27. Tool! fileList['mac']= { // How do we discover users? "discover" :'/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow.plist', // Okay, we found them, what do we pillage? "post" :{ 'bashHistory':'.bash_history', 'sshHosts':'.ssh/known_hosts', 'sshKeys':'.ssh/id_rsa.pub', } } fileList['android']= { // Instead of how, just figure out the currently in use appi "discover" :'/proc/self/status', // Okay, we found them, what do we pillage? "post" :{ 'browser_data':'/data/data/com.android.browser/databases/webview. db', 'browser_data2':'/data/data/com.android.browser/databases/browser.db', 'gmail_accounts':'/data/data/com. google.android.gm/shared_prefs/Gmail.xml', 'dolpin_data':'/data/data/mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser/databases/webview. db', 'dolpin_data2':'/data/data/mobi.mgeek.TunnyBrowser/databases/browser.db', 'chromeBookmarks':'. config/chromium/Default/Bookmarks' } }
  • 28. Conclusion  » XSS is bad, mkay? » Developers don't know how / aren't trained to filter client side. » Easy to exploit. » Ping me at @theKos kos@kos.io http://kos.io/