1. KCL Model United Nations
Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council:
Nuclear Weapons in North Korea

2. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
1
Table of Contents
Topic introduction ................................................................................................ 2
Brief country history.............................................................................................. 3
Weapons of Mass Destruction ................................................................................... 5
Current situation .................................................................................................. 7
Further reading .................................................................................................... 8

3. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
2
Topic introduction
In October of 2006, the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea
joined the ranks of the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France,
China, Israel, India and Pakistan when it successfully tested its first
nuclear weapon. It is an anomaly on the list – in a group comprised mostly
of the world’s wealthiest and most influential states, the DPRK stands out
as the only member to have recently suffered from a nationwide famine,
the only member to separate its economy totally from the rest of the
world, and the only member to shroud all government action in total
secrecy. However, with another round of weapons testing in 2009, no
seeming interest in dismantling its nuclear program, a very effective
counterintelligence program, and infamously unpredictable foreign
policy, it is not a country to be ignored. Though its ascent to prominence
may have been bizarre and the nature of its power unprecedented, North
Korea now represents a legitimate and alarming threat to peace. Most
attempts to reconcile the situation diplomatically have faltered, but that
does not mean that all hope is lost. The DPRK is currently engaged in a
period of transition – ruler Kim Jong Il being gone, his son Kim Jong Un is
trying to consolidate his inherited power into effective control over the
state apparatus, and with the upcoming centenary of the birth of the
country’s first President, Kim Il Sung, Pyongyang has pledged to place
reinvigorated focus on economic development. These shifts could
represent only nominal gestures, but could also be genuine opportunities
to use international diplomatic leverage to reverse the state’s nuclear
ambitions, and perhaps even bring it into the international fold. The
obligation is on you as delegates to take full advantage of the present
situation.

4. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
3
Brief country history
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was born of several decades
of abused, vague and frequently redefined sovereignty. After spending
centuries operating as a united and independent Kingdom, Korea fell
under Japanese occupation in 1905, when it was used for strategic
positioning in the Russo-Japanese war. Five years after that, Japan
strengthened its hold and formally annexed the entire peninsula, an era
that ended with Japan’s defeat at the end of World War II.
Following the end of the war, the allied powers split Korea into North and
South, with the USSR placing a communist regime in charge of all
territories north of the 38th parallel, and the United States handling the
South. This was in line with the plans that the powers had made two
years previous, when they released the Cairo Declaration, pledging
independence “in due course.” Neither occupying power permitted full
independence for a time, with the Soviet Union allowing only communist
rule, and the United States asserting the certitude of military
government. Eventually, in 1948, the South and the North issued their
own constitutions and proclaimed themselves the Republic of Korea (ROK)
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), respectively. In
the meantime, various attempts at unification of the two Koreas flailed
and floundered.
The situation was further complemented by the international significance
of the divide – the United States still had considerable military presence
in the south, and the Soviet Union refused to accept the legitimacy of the
ROK, declaring the North to be the only valid government on the
peninsula. However, the balance of power shifted between 1948 and
1950, with America withdrawing troops from the ROK while the Soviet
Union provided heavy assistance for the People’s Army of the DPRK.
The result was that when the north declared war, it relished in a series of
decisive victories, and took Seoul quickly, decimating much of the ROK’s
army. Tables turned with the entrance of the United States, and again
with that of China. Eventually millions of foreign troops had become
embroiled in the war, and the brief conflict proved very costly. A
ceasefire was negotiated in 1951, with an armistice following two years
later. This solidified the segregation of Korea into two states, and marks
the start of the present era of Korean sovereignty.
Kim Il Sung, who had been placed in power several years earlier,
continued to preside as the ruler of the DPRK. The 1950s and 60s
witnessed the cultivation of North Korea’s policies of extreme
isolationism, as Kim scaled back his allegiances to Beijing and Moscow,
and directed his government’s attention inwards. What followed were a
series of major economic failures and an ambitious prioritization of the
development of heavy industry and other military technologies at great
cost to quality of living. Population skyrocketed, increasing threefold be-
tween 1953 and 1993, which compounded resource scarcity in leading to

5. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
4
major food shortages. Political oppression abounded, and borders were
closed for all intensive purposes.
At the same time, changes in the international political landscape
necessitated that the DPRK ease some policies. Where it had once been
able to depend solely on the USSR and the PRC, the downfall of the
former and the advent of diplomatic relations between the latter and the
ROK weakened Kim’s ability to hold out on some fronts. Most notably,
North Korea had to accept its southern neighbor’s right to join the United
Nations. This spurred a kick-start in diplomatic ties that reversed as soon
as Seoul received word of Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. Towards the
end of his rein, Kim Il Sung groomed Son Jong Il to inherit his near-total
control of the government. When Sung died in 1994, Jong Il assumed
power and has remained in office until his death of illness in December
2011. He has presided over a country plagued by many serious issues and
has adhered to most of the doctrines set in place by his father. In
addition to the nuclear dilemma detailed below, Kim’s Korea has also
come under heavy international criticism for human rights abuses, and
has suffered from chronic and widespread malnutrition and a very low
standard of living.

6. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
5
Weapons of Mass Destruction
In the aftermath of the Korean War, serious security concerns began to
take hold of then-leader Kim Il Sung, and at this time he kicked off the
country’s first serious nuclear ambitions. Having learned than Gen.
Douglas MacArthur had considered a nuclear attack on against his country,
and perturbed by the strengthening American presence in the region as
well as the thawing relations between neighbors Japan and the Republic
of Korea, Kim concluded that his country needed a nuclear deterrent.
He turned first to ideological allies Russia and China, but neither power
saw the situation with the same urgency as Kim. As the politics of
paranoia descended on Pyongyang and the era of isolationism began, the
DPRK accelerated efforts to develop their own nuclear technology.
However, it took several decades to actualize these ambitions – decades
riddled with diplomatic failures on behalf of the rest of the world to
prevent such an outcome.
After testing missile delivery systems that could conceivably be used to
deliver nuclear payloads throughout the 1990s and 2000s, North Korea
conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, quickly proclaiming itself a
nuclear power. Following a flurry of diplomatic fervor, heightened
sanctions and near-universal condemnation, Pyongyang’s nuclear fever
lulled for a few years before having a resurgence in April of 2009, when
scientists detonated a second, more powerful device. This met with more
condemnations and sanctions that seem to have had no visible effect.
Reactors in the DPRK remain operational, and Robert Gates recently
warned that the country might be only a few years away from compacting
their weaponry such that it could be used to strike the United States.
However, as schizophrenic as North Korean foreign policy can be, these
events did not come out of nowhere. For quite some time, North Korea’s
nuclear plans were among the worst kept secrets in international politics.
As early as the 1980s, American satellites observed the construction of
reactors, and by the 1990s the CIA hypothesized that the DPRK might
already have a warhead or two at their disposal. While the exact
locations and status of specific reactors was often kept secret, Pyongyang
has on many occasions stated its interests in establishing itself as a
superpower with the capabilities of nuclear warfare, and their weapon
tests have been quite public. The ease with which news of their nuclear
progress has been disseminated has triggered widespread speculation that
Kim wants to use their potential arsenal to command the attention of the
rest of world and as a bar- gaining chip in negotiations with other states,
notably America. It is worth noting that since the fall of the Soviet Union,
the DPRK has attempted, with varying subtlety, to cultivate a relationship
with the US, but that these efforts have been largely rebuffed. Policy in
Washington D.C. towards Pyongyang has vacillated considerably between
administrations, but could never be described as friendly. The most
notable progress occurred in 1994 when the Clinton administration
brokered a pact to halt the development of nuclear technology, but this
was voided less than a decade later under President Bush.

7. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
6
Most if not all UN efforts to mitigate the situation have gone unheeded,
or worse, provoked Pyongyang to cause more public mayhem. Six-party
talks (featuring the PRC, Russia, Japan, South Korea and the US) have
arguably proved the most fruitful, though almost all diplomacy has met
with tepid responses at best.

8. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
7
Current situation
Seen in context, the DPRK’s nuclear scare is just another facet of its
eccentric international personality and series of national insecurities. A
nuclear stockpile represents an eccentricity that poses considerably more
threat to the rest of the world than Pyongyang’s other garish or
clandestine decisions, and as such it must be dealt with seriously and
delicately. However, it is still important to take into account the singular
character and narrative of the DPRK when discussing potential solutions
to the nuclear dilemma. North Korea has shown itself to be a highly
unusual state with highly unusual interests and motives. As such, it should
not come as a surprise that the usual responses of sanctions and
condemnations have failed to elicit the desired results.
Attempts to reason with Pyongyang diplomatically, by the UN and other
actors, have been almost as inconsistent as Pyongyang’s own behavior,
and have in retrospect often been fundamentally misguided. What a
sound policy will entail is up to you as delegates to determine, but the
past two decades have provided a plethora of examples of what not to
do.
Thus, we encourage you to be creative. For a number of reasons, we may
be looking over the precipice at a new era in North Korean history, which
merits a new type of solution. In this session, the UNSC has been
entrusted with the responsibility of addressing what could be the greatest
threat to world peace since the Cold War, and your decisions could pave
the path of integration to the global community, spurn another twenty
years of deadlock, or provoke nearly unprecedented international
calamity.

9. KCL Model United Nations Society 2011/2012
UN Security Council: “Nuclear Weapons in
North-Korea”
8
Further reading
North Korea’s Nuclear Program. The New York Times. 25 July 2011.
<http://
topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/nort
hkorea/ nuclear_program/index.html>
Nuclear Weapons Program. FAS. 16 November 2006.
<http://www.fas.org/ nuke/guide/dprk/nuke/index.html>
Q&A: North Korea Nuclear Talks. BBC World News. 20 December 2010.
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699>
North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program. CRS Report for Congress. 25
Octo- ber 2006.
<http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/74904.pdf>
North Korea. CIA World Factbook. 16 August 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kn.html>
South Korea. CIA World Factbook. 16 August 2011. <https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ks.html>
North Korea. Encyclopedia Brittanica. <http://www.britannica.com/EB-
checked/topic/322222/North-Korea>
Korea. Encyclopedia Brittanica.
<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/top- ic/693609/Korea>
North Korea Missile Tests Defy UN. BBC World News. 4 July 2009. <http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8134115.stm>
North Korea: Return of the Nukes. RT. 26 April 2009.
<http://rt.com/usa/news/north-korea-return-of-the-nukes>
N. Korea Says it Has Restarted Nuclear Facilities. Fox News. 25 April 2009.
<http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,517875,00.html>
N. Korea Conducts Powerful Nuclear Test, Reportedly Fires Short-Range
Missiles. Fox News. 25 May 2009. http://www.foxnews.com/sto-
ry/0,2933,521617,00.html