1. Mainstreaming Conflict
Report for DFID Nigeria
Fatima Adamu
Akin Akinteye
Kayode Fayemi
Lanre Obafemi
Tony Vaux (Team Leader)
February 2004

2. Mainstreaming Conflict
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Purpose, background and methodology
The purpose of this report is to advise DFID in Nigeria how to take account of the issue
of conflict in all its activities and programmes –in other words to ‘mainstream conflict’.
In 2002-3 DFID and other donors supported a process of conflict analysis conducted by
the Institute of Peace and Conflict Resolution, part of the Presidency. As required by
DFID, that report (Strategic Conflict Assessment –Nigeria) forms the basis of the
analysis of conflict used by the current team, and in fact all the team members had been
associated with that process. The timing of the mission was focused around DFID’s
revision of its Country Assistance Plan for Nigeria.
The basis of the methodology for the team during two weeks working together in Nigeria
was interview with DFID staff, other donors, government and civil society. The mission
included visits out of Abuja to Jigawa, Kano and Benue States.
DFID’s strategic review
As part of its strategy review, DFID has already undertaken extensive research which has
been brought together into a synthesis report- ‘Drivers of Change’. Overall the team
considered that this report presented an over-optimistic view of change processes in
Nigeria today, tending to assume that different entities and levels in society would work
together, whereas conflict analysis indicates that there are profound divisive forces at the
heart of governance and these influences spread out into practically all other issues. In
other words conflict is endemic to the Nigerian situation but DFID has not yet
internalised conflict sufficiently in its strategic planning.
Programme Level Conflict Assessment
The mission developed a set of Conflict Guidelines that DFID could apply to any
activity. By observing this set of twelve principles, and reviewing them at different stages
of the project cycle, DFID should be able to ensure that it takes account of conflict and
integrates an understanding of conflict in its programmes. The headings are-
1. Focus on Governance
2. Inclusion and Exclusion
3. Politicisation of Issues
4. Impartiality and Neutrality
5. Aid in a competitive environment
6. Local Leadership
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3. Mainstreaming Conflict
7. Women’s Leadership
8. Direct Delivery
9. The Private Sector
10. Assessment
11. Transparency
12. Accountability
The main weakness found in the sample of DFID programmes was a failure to support
women’s representation. Since women are likely to play a positive role in relation to
conflict, considerably greater efforts in this are called for.
Applying the Guidelines to Strategy
The critical issue for DFID in relation to conflict, especially when considering where it
should work in the future, is ‘Inclusion and Exclusion’. DFID should not simply consider
those who will be helped by its programme, but also those who are or might feel
excluded. In a context of fierce competition for resources and political corruption (as
modelled in the SCA) they may seek to weaken or undermine DFID’s work. Boundaries
are a particularly notorious source of conflict in Nigeria and the choice of a particular
State inevitably implies the rejection of another.
Therefore, in choosing where it works DFID should seek to minimize such negative
outcomes by working in a fluid regional manner across a selection of States. It should
focus on issues rather than boundaries, and it should identify possible risks and threats by
conducting a regional conflict analysis using the above Guidelines.
Similarly, the choice of one partner implies the rejection of others. In all its work DFID
should seek to consult widely, identify those who may feel excluded and avoid hard and
fast distinctions between partners and non-partners.
Applying the Guidelines to direct conflict response
Unfortunately the response to conflict in Nigeria has often made matters worse because
of an over-emphasis on military activity and the politicisation of government aid. This
leaves an opening for DFID to take a preventive and mitigating role. It should support
Early Warning mechanisms in Nigeria and develop its own impartial response. Such a
two-track approach, perhaps undertaken in collaboration with the Institute for Peace and
Conflict Resolution, might enable DFID to influence government positively.
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4. Mainstreaming Conflict
Recommendations
• DFID Nigeria should re-model its understanding of the processes of change to
take better account of conflicting elements and interests.
• The Conflict Guidelines should be considered as the basic recommendations of
this mission and should be reflected in strategy, programme management and
procedures.
• Particular attention should be paid to conflict analysis in the design of new
programmes. Programme Level Conflict Assessment (PLCA) should be applied in
a methodical manner then and at each stage of the project cycle.
• As part of a long-term strategy related to conflict DFID should develop a
programme to support women’s capacities for peace through education, skills
development and leadership.
• DFID should examine the extent to which the school curriculum and local
teaching practice may exacerbate conflict.
• In choosing its future areas of operation DFID should adopt an issues-based
approach as far as possible and delineate its activities by region rather than by
States.
• Before embarking on such a regional programme DFID should undertake a
Strategic Conflict Assessment.
• DFID should focus on support to Early Warning systems and prevention rather
than responses after conflict. It may be appropriate to work with IPCR on these
issues, offering capacity building as necessary.
• Where direct responses are necessary, the aim should be to work with others to
reduce biases that may exacerbate the causes of conflict.
• Conflict mediation should be viewed with caution and must be aligned to long-
term rather than short-term solutions.
February 2004
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5. Mainstreaming Conflict
Mainstreaming Conflict: Report for DFID Nigeria
January 2004
FULL REPORT
CONTENTS
Acronyms
Introduction
Section One: Change and Conflict in Nigeria
Section Two: Conflict Guidelines for DFID Nigeria
Section Three: Implications of the Guidelines for Country Strategy
Section Four: Implications for Responses
Section Five: Conclusions and Recommendations
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Annex 1: Conflict Guidelines for Nigeria: basic text
Annex 2: Programme Level Conflict Assessment –a proposed methodology
Annex 3: Specific DFID Projects
Acknowledgement
We would particularly like to thank Jasmine Nsofor and Richard Butterworth for
providing all possible assistance to the mission.
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6. Mainstreaming Conflict
Acronyms
CAP Country Assistance Plan
DFID Department for International Development
IPCR Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution
JIR Joint Inception Review
JWL Joint Wetlands Livelihoods Programme
PLCA Programme Level Conflict Assessment
SCA Strategic Conflict Assessment
SLGP State and Local Government Project
TOR Terms of Reference
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7. Mainstreaming Conflict
Introduction
1. The mission coincided with the later stages of developing a new Country Assistance
Plan (CAP) for DFID in Nigeria. The Joint Inception Review (JIR), being finalised
during the mission, recommends ‘an integrated strategy that sets out how programmes
can enhance positive impact across a range of areas, including conflict reduction’1.
Consequently, although the Terms of Reference (TOR) include both backward-
looking (evaluation) and forward-looking (policy) elements, the team was requested
to focus almost entirely on the latter and to evaluate current programmes only in so
far as that was useful in relation to future policy. Accordingly the Review Team has
focused mainly on developing a set of guidelines that DFID can apply to any current
or future activity in order to ensure that it is sensitive to issues of conflict in Nigeria.
2. The Team undertook interviews with a wide range of government, donors and civil
society representatives and conducted a number of focus groups with stakeholders
including village heads, representatives of traditional authority and NGOs. We have
also drawn on extensive experience within the team itself, all of whom have been
involved in the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) and in extensive work on
conflict issues. The Team comprised-
• Dr Fatima L. Adamu, Usmanu Dan Fodiyo University, Sokoto
• Honourable Akin Akintaye, Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University
of Ibadan (former Member of the House of Assembly)
• Dr J. Kayode Fayemi, Centre for Democracy and Development (Lagos and
Abuja)
• Mr Lanre Obafemi, Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, the Presidency
• Mr Tony Vaux, Humanitarian Initiatives UK (Team Leader)
3. The first week was spent in Abuja, after which the team divided into two groups for
visits to Jigawa, Kano and Benue States.
4. The mission was requested not to make a new analysis of conflict in Nigeria but to
base its work on the SCA published by IPCR2. Accordingly the Team has conducted
only a limited review of the literature on conflict in Nigeria but focused instead on
policy documents and practice. The essence of the SCA analysis is contained in the
following model (which unfortunately became distorted in the final published version
of the report). Note that ‘political crisis’ is a euphemism for ‘political corruption’.
1
TOR p2
2
IPCR (2003) –see bibliography
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8. Mainstreaming Conflict
Model of Conflict in Nigeria
Ethnic Tension
Indigene/Settler tensions
International Economic Pressures
Historical Factors
Inequality
Injustice
Political Crisis Resource
Competition
Political Violence
Youth Alienation
Religious Tension
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9. Mainstreaming Conflict
Section One: Change and Conflict in Nigeria
1.1. Updating the SCA
5. Since the SCA process conducted in 2002 the situation has not improved. The
elections in mid-May 2003 were seriously flawed and there is evidence that
democracy is under considerable strain and human rights are widely abused3. Violent
conflict has continued to erupt throughout the country following the usual lines of
religious, ethnic and territorial division underscored by political corruption.
6. The economic situation continues to be precarious. A high exchange rate for the
Naira, boosted by oil revenues, is coupled with political corruption to create a
situation in which fortunes are made through imports and local industry, employment
and production declines. Nigeria seems unable to avoid ‘Dutch Disease’ and the
results are translated into levels of poverty that are appalling even by the standards of
sub-Saharan Africa. In short, all the various contributory factors in relation to conflict
are at least as strong as they were at the time of the SCA.
7. Recognising the disappointing results in terms of poverty alleviation following
Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, DFID has undertaken a thorough review of
change processes4. DFID recognises that its expectations after the end of direct
military government in 1999 were too optimistic, but the mission considers that DFID
still continues to be too optimistic in its analysis of processes of change. Put bluntly
there is no reason to expect positive forces to prevail.
8. In the current Nigerian context conflict is inevitable. It may have positive as well as
negative outcomes, but change will not occur without conflict. Hopefully such
conflict will be non-violent but where the obstacle is the entrenched interests of a
corrupt elite it is hard to envisage a process that will be entirely peaceful. DFID’s task
is not to seek to reduce conflict in all cases, but to manage the issue of conflict in
order to achieve MDGs.
1.2. The mission’s approach
9. Following discussions with Richard Butterworth, Governance Adviser, the team has
taken an approach that focuses on ‘mainstreaming the issue of conflict’ rather than
‘mainstreaming conflict prevention’ or ‘conflict reduction’. In doing so we have
avoided an absolute distinction between ‘conflict’ and ‘violent conflict’ because it is
impossible to predict with certainty when the one will transform into the other.
3
See Human Rights Watch (2003)
4
See Heymans and Pycroft (2003)
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10. Mainstreaming Conflict
10. The general theory behind the SCA is that the transformation from conflict to violent
conflict is likely to occur when one issue becomes embroiled with another, and
especially when corruption is involved. The SCA emphasises that religion, ethnicity,
settler-indigene tensions, youth unemployment and so on are not really the causes of
conflict in Nigeria but rather the issues over which political power struggles are
contested. The root of the problem is the flow of oil money through channels that are
incapable of managing those resources fairly. Conflict cannot be eradicated until
governance is placed on a firmer footing.
11. When politicians play out their competition for resources over issues such as religion,
ethnicity and land tenure people are placed under extreme pressures that they may
feel unable to escape except by violent means. In this delicate and volatile situation,
donors have a responsibility to ensure that their interventions are weighed up not only
against the outward manifestations of struggle but also against the underlying balance
of power between corrupt elites and poor people excluded from the nation’s wealth.
Poverty reduction will only be achieved when poor people are empowered to assert a
stronger influence over the political system. But in this struggle, the negative forces
are currently better organised and stronger than the positive ones.
1.3. ‘Drivers of Change’ and the Country Assistance Plan5
12. DFID’s study ‘Drivers of Change’ focussed on deepening the understanding of
Nigeria’s political economy – looking at the linkages between structures, processes,
institutions and agents. In so doing, its conclusions questioned earlier assumptions
that informed DFID’s work in Nigeria and proffered new assumptions that should
assist the development of the new Country Assistance Plan (CAP). These include:
a) advancing structural reform to enable fundamental change;
b) ensuring that change agents are anchored to institutional change;
c) noting that structural blockages are so profoundly negative for the poor that
capacity improvement will make no serious difference;
d) recognising that broad-based constituencies of support are key to creating a critical
mass of support for change, and;
e) recognising that strategic alliances and issue driven networks are necessary for
change.
13. On the basis of the above, the interim CAP seeks to focus on government as well as
other actors through thematic, issue based approaches by strengthening
accountability, improving service delivery and promoting pro-poor growth,
Specifically, the medium term conflict strategy seeks to integrate conflict within the
overall strategy by-
a) promoting safety and security for communities;
b) ensuring access to justice,
c) strengthening the institutional capacity to analyse and address the structural causes
of conflict and
5
This section was written by Kayode Fayemi
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11. Mainstreaming Conflict
d) professionalising the Nigerian Armed Forces for a more effective peacekeeping
role in the region.
14. As they relate to conflict, the new assumptions in ‘Drivers of Change’ are subject to
differing interpretations. On the one hand, it could be argued that they have glossed
over the inevitability or likelihood of conflict in a civilian dispensation. Many of the
respondents to our questions believe that democratic change ought to assume a certain
level of conflict and do not necessarily see the various conflicts in the country as
evident signs of democratic deficit. Instead, many take a long term view of conflict as
a sign that democracy is maturing through the ‘opening up’ of previously ‘closed’
space for conflict generation, mediation, negotiation and resolution in the move from
transition to transformation. To this end, it seems to us worthwhile to see strategic
alliances as conflict generating as well as conflict resolving in the quest for
democratic reform for pro-poor growth.
15. Although the new assumptions are subject to differing interpretations, their
implications are profound and potentially conflictual. The readiness to accept that
structural blockages need to be tackled assumes an equal resolve on DFID’s part to
mainstream conflict in a manner that might be unpalatable to beneficiaries of the
current structural gaps. It is useful to reflect on the implications of this assumption
and build complex scenarios for change, including the impact on conflict-averse poor
communities likely to be affected by elite capture of the structural reform agenda.
16. The first such implication for conflict mainstreaming is the need for more flexible,
long term intervention modalities that are de-linked from funding pressures. This will
require a Country Assistance Programme that treats security of the person as well as
the state as inextricably interwoven as well as being a pre-requisite for development
and poverty reduction. A programme that aims at strengthening demand as well as
supply will be a priority in this respect.
17. At the present time, there is a disjuncture in DFID’s programming aimed at
promoting the necessary linkages between its support for the security of the
individual and support for state security. On the one hand, our review of the current
programmes reveals an ‘Access to Justice’ initiative that aims to localise security
through the promotion of community policing and traditional justice mechanisms. On
the other is the medium term conflict strategy which is more concentrated on
strengthening Nigeria’s armed forces’ capacity for peacekeeping. There is an urgent
need for synergy between the two programming areas which recognises the critical
importance of supporting institutions, strengthening local responses and making
social investments to reduce poverty, strengthen governance and promote security.
18. The above requires not only a practical reformulation of programmes and projects; it
calls firstly for a conceptual rethink around the best way to achieve pro-poor
development without generating violent conflict in its wake. The core assumption
that wealth would automatically be created through macro-economic stability when
free market gains ascendancy has not been borne out by the Nigerian experience to
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12. Mainstreaming Conflict
date. Foreign investment has come in droves; debt burdens continue; commodity
prices fluctuate; environmental degradation proceeds and industrialisation fails to
occur. Instead, policies such as privatisation have not created local self sufficiency,
but locked the poor further into relative powerlessness - creating conditions for
conflict.
19. A more complex understanding based on a nuanced analysis of complicated choices
is still needed, one which stresses democratic governance as conflict management
without exaggerating the impact likely to accompany effective democratic
governance. In our view, even with the best management, DFID must recognise that
Nigeria is a poor country, that ought to be treated as a state in conflict or emerging
out of conflict, and thus in need of massive post-conflict reconstruction assistance if
the MDGs are to be realised.
20. It is commendable therefore that the interim CAP identifies the improvement of
service delivery as a key strategic objective. As a conflict sensitive approach, we will
suggest that DFID and HMG should pay greater emphasis on social safety nets and
equity in addition to displaying greater sensitivity to the distributional impacts of all
projects as a means of broadening the alliance for the structural reforms that are
necessary.
21. High quality information and analysis is critical to conflict sensitive approaches. The
interim CAP correctly aims to support ‘Nigerian capacity to analyse and address the
structural causes of conflict.’ To an extent, this information and analysis exists at
various points within Nigeria and the SCA has tried to bring together the bulk of that
information. However, significant gaps still exist because of the compartmentalisation
of knowledge of conflict between issues and amongst professions.6 To address this,
there is a need to support a range of institutions that can engage in serious and path-
breaking information gathering and analysis at all levels - governmental, non-
governmental and community level. As a complement to the above, there is an
additional need to support the establishment of a forum that brings together all
stakeholders (governmental, non-governmental, development partners and
community actors) for sharing conflict analysis on a regular basis – helping to
develop a dynamic analysis of conflict that all actors can feed on an on-going basis
into respective strategy and programming.
22. Beyond the stated assumptions guiding ‘Drivers of Change’, we did not get the
impression on the field that DFID is keen to move away from the lowest common
denominator of ‘do no harm’ in its quest for conflict mainstreaming. We believe
DFID needs to display greater tolerance for risk-taking by developing and supporting
projects which combine high risk opportunities with its base line ‘do no harm’
approaches in recognition of the relationship between conflict and governance.
6
For example, our visit to Benue State revealed the inter-connected nature of conflict triggers in the Benue
valley – including Benue, Taraba, Plateau, Nasarawa, and demonstrates the need to develop regional
conflict complexes in response to common problems, a factor which received insufficient attention in the
SCA.
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13. Mainstreaming Conflict
1.4. Modelling the process of change
23. Instead of a model that focuses simply on the process of positive change as in the
‘Drivers of Change’ model7 we propose a more complex model that includes negative
(anti-poor) as well as positive (pro-poor) forces-
Figure: Change process in Nigeria
Positive Positive
Agents Institutions
Positive
Structural Features
Negative
Negative Negative
Agents Institutions
24. The above model positions ‘Structural Features’ at the centre of the picture and
presents a system that is difficult to change because the positive and negative factors
are likely to balance each other out rather than lead, as in DFID’s more optimistic
model, in a positive direction. Indeed, things may have to get worse before they begin
to improve.
25. The model also leaves open the possibility of conflict at the interface between the
positive and negative agents and institutions. The overall concept is one of poor
7
Heymans and Pycroft p3
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14. Mainstreaming Conflict
people in alliance with others, but ranged against them are alliances of more negative
forces. Both ‘sides’ struggle to turn the ‘Structural Features’ to their interest.
26. Because of the obstacles to change as shown in the model, conflict cannot be viewed
as an intrinsic evil. Where it represents an attempt by poor people to increase their
power, conflict may be necessary. This means that the concept of conflict prevention
is problematic in Nigeria today. At this stage a certain amount of conflict is necessary
to transform the state, but conflict that goes beyond certain limits (and generally this
means where it involves violence) will be counter-productive for poor people.
27. For DFID the emphasis should be on ‘conflict management’, rather than ‘conflict
prevention’. By implication this means that Security Sector Reform should be less
prominent than envisaged in DFID’s current ‘medium term conflict strategy’8.
Conflict in Nigeria will not be addressed simply by improving the security response.
The root causes can only be reached by fundamental change; greater efficiency in
restraining public concerns could even be counter-productive.
28. In conclusion, we feel that DFID’s current understanding is still too optimistic, and
too much based on consensus and cooperation rather than struggle to change the
balance of power. In terms of programme planning we recommend greater efforts to
inform, empower and mobilise poor people to oppose poverty. JWL is an example of
this kind of approach, but we are concerned that unless it is backed by a wider
organisational analysis it may founder when real challenges occur. While this may
seem a radical approach it is based on the view that less radical approaches have been
tried, tested and failed.
8
Country Assistance Plan Headlines August 2003 p31
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15. Mainstreaming Conflict
Section Two: Conflict Guidelines for Nigeria
29. The particular set of Conflict Guidelines developed for Nigeria are not the same as
would be used in a country without such underlying problems. They focus strongly on
issues of inclusion and exclusion because of the exclusive nature of current Structural
Features. They encourage strategies that transfer power towards poor people in
alliance with other more favourable elements but always recognise that neutralising
the negative forces is just as important as seeking alliances with positive ones.
30. The following are the Conflict Guidelines proposed for Nigeria with an explanation
and commentary on them9. Although written with DFID in mind they are expressed in
a form that may be applicable to other aid agencies. The Guidelines are divided into
three sections- Strategy, Programme Responses and Processes-
STRATEGY
Guideline One: Focus on Governance
In accordance with the government’s Strategic Conflict Assessment, the strategic focus
should be to address the interaction of ‘political crisis’ and ‘competition for resources’
that lies at the heart of most conflicts in Nigeria -rather than its manifestations in social
and economic issues. It should be recognised that change may be impossible without a
level of conflict.
31. As DFID policy analysis indicates, the current context of Nigeria is highly
unsatisfactory. The root cause of poverty as well as conflict lies in the political
malaise. MDGs will not be attained without improvements in governance but these
improvements will entail considerable shifts in power and resources that are unlikely
to take place without conflict. The aim therefore is not to eradicate conflict per se but
to avoid those manifestations in which poor people fight against each other and
channel energies around those that advance the position of the poor in relation to the
exclusive elite.
32. In general this means a strategic focus on empowering poor people rather than
making adjustments between elite groups. Aid agencies must be aware of their
limitations. If there is little alternative to ‘direct action’, the aid agency must not
become an obstacle. This should not deter agencies from engaging in controversial
and sensitive issues, but there must be an ‘exit strategy’ whereby they can hand over
to other actors without distorting or undermining processes of change. NGOs in
particular may have considerably fewer limitations in respect of these issues than
bilateral donors.
9
For the basic text of the Guidelines (only) see Annex 1
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16. Mainstreaming Conflict
Box 1: Mobilisation in the wetlands of Jigawa
Because of bureaucratic inefficiencies and fierce political competition the people of
the wetlands suffer unnecessarily from flood and drought. Sometimes channels silt
up, blocking the flow of water and causing loss of crops. But the people are not
supposed to open them without the permission of the authorities.
One group of villagers was so frustrated that they were considering ‘direct action’ –
opening up the channel by their own voluntary labour. They came to the JWL project
and were advised to work closely with the traditional leaders, and by that means
secure support from the river basin authority.
The issue became tense because of communication problems and mistrust, but at
the time of our visit it seemed likely that the authority would take the necessary
action. But the question remains –at what point is ‘direct action justified and what is
the position of DFID if the people feel that they must go outside the strict parameters
of the law?
Tony Vaux
Guideline Two: Inclusion and Exclusion
Competition for power and resources has become particularly fierce in the current
context of political corruption. Those who feel excluded are likely to take action to assert
their interests. Therefore any strategy for change must fully recognise the negative as
well as the positive forces.
33. Conflict is likely to arise because of perceptions of injustice in the allocation of
resources. Such conflicts are endemic to Nigeria because the flow of oil funds raises
the stakes considerably and makes government behave like a ‘donor’ rather than an
accountable institution. This leaves the field open for intense competition and
manipulation among the recipients. Much of this competitive behaviour is designed to
undermine opponents rather than make a positive case.
34. Similar processes affect aid funds. Donors have a heavy responsibility to ensure not
only that they are transparent and accountable but, more fundamentally that the
resources are clearly ‘owned’ by poor people rather than elites. But above all donors
must recognise the role of negative forces in spreading rumour, disinformation and in
extreme cases conflict as ways to undermine rivals.
35. Donors cannot and should not handle such issues on their own. Instead they should
seek to support and empower poor people. Poor people should be involved in
decision-making concerning any project that affects them. But the crucial issue is that
negative forces should be recognised and included in programme strategy. Those who
may perceive themselves to be ‘excluded’ should be identified and if possible kept
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17. Mainstreaming Conflict
within the scope of the project. But in the extreme case those who manipulate the
concerns of poor people should be challenged.
Box 2: WRAPA’s experience with religious leaders
In trying to start a program to support women’s legal rights Women’s Rights
Advancement and Protection Alternative (WRAPA) visited a community and briefed
the community head and Imam about the program and sought for their cooperation.
Despite his support, space to rent for the program became a problem. A few weeks
into the program an influential man in the community got up after Friday prayer
accusing the community leaders of a sell-out and of denigrating Islam by allowing
the program to take place. He called it ‘a program brought by lesbians’.
The audience in the mosque was charged and ready to take action, but the
community leader stood up and asked for time to invite WRAPA officials to defend
themselves and for people to judge. The WRAPA officials went back to the
community armed with their Islamic knowledge. After a lengthy debate using
Islamic literature the community members were convinced about the sincerity of
WRAPA officials and the program.
Many lessons can be drawn from this case. Problems had been created because
WRAPA had excluded an influential man who then wanted to cause trouble and
undermine the program. But their early inclusion of the community head and Imam
were crucial in averting a crisis. Secondly, it had been very important for WRAPA
officials to be able to defend themselves through knowledge of Islam. Otherwise the
situation could have degenerated into conflict and brought an end to the program.
Fatima Adamu
Guideline Three: Politicisation of Issues
Ethnic, religious, territorial and other disputes should always be related to the
underlying malaise. As these are issues around which the perceptions of ordinary people
are manipulated and distorted, DFID should focus on a counter-strategy to inform and
empower poor people.
36. Many conflicts in Nigeria are directly caused by events relating to traditional rulers
and religious leaders. As the SCA indicates, such leaders may often play a
moderating role and the real cause of conflict is likely to be a struggle for power and
resources. The reality is that traditional and religious authority cannot and should not
be bypassed, but also that such authority has to some extent been drawn into the
general malaise10.
10
See for example Egwu (1998) for a detailed study of the relationship of agrarian, ethnic and religious
issues with political manipulation.
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18. Mainstreaming Conflict
37. Western donors should be particularly careful because their involvement in any
contentious issue may be seen as a modernising influence in opposition to tradition. It
should be recognised that poor people may support non-state leadership because the
state has failed. This is not a sign of positive adherence to old-fashioned ways but
rather as a mark of frustration with the corruption of modernising tendencies. The role
of such leaders as protectors of the poor in relation to a corrupted state must be
recognised. They will remain ‘gatekeepers’ until the state is transformed and any
attempt to ignore or marginalise them may have serious consequences.
Box 3: Sharia and Conflict
The issue of Shariah was not new in the Nigerian political system. However, the
current politicization of the issue in the Nigerian political terrain by the pro and anti
Shariah factions in the media, academics, politicians and those in authority has
closed the possibility of dialogue on the issue. This lack of dialogue breeds
misunderstanding and disrespect for one another often leading to conflict. A
stakeholders’ workshop on Shariah in Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi states in August
2003 sponsored by the World Bank underscored this politicization and how Shariah
conflicts in such states as Kano, Kaduna, Kebbi, Zamfara etc could have been
averted through dialogue.
Fatima Adamu
Guideline Four: Impartiality and Neutrality
DFID must ensure that its choices about the allocation of resources are not only fair but
seen to be fair, especially in relation to policy that derives from outside the Nigerian
context
.
38. A group of extremist youths are reported to have named themselves ‘Taliban’ and
called a village that they claim to control ‘Afghanistan’. Although the ‘War on
Terror’ has not yet featured prominently in the interventions of the international
community in Nigeria there is an increasing risk that it may do so, with potentially
serious consequences in relation to conflict. Donors should be careful to see through
these disturbing outward manifestations into the heart of the problem in the failure of
the state. Unemployed youths engaging in violence often represent a reaction to
political failure. Similarly donors should not allow their attention to be diverted
towards ‘Muslim Fundamentalism’ and away from the basic problem of governance.
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19. Mainstreaming Conflict
39. Similarly donors should recognise the highly critical discourse that associates oil
companies with conflict in the oil-producing regions.
PROGRAMME RESPONSES
Guideline Five: Aid in a competitive environment
Following Guideline Two, DFID should develop responses that address negative forces
as well as positive ones. This is particularly important in the case of building coalitions.
40. In relation to conflict it must be recognised that actors are not necessarily working in
synergy. Although donors like to create coalitions this almost always has an impact
on the status and power of the constituent elements. If an organisation is given
resources this may alter their relationship with others. Rivalry and envy play
important roles in coalition-building. By ignoring conflict between constituent
agencies, donors have funded coalitions in a manner that has caused more harm than
good.
Box 4: Effects of aid on the CRESNET coalition
Conflict Resolution Stakeholders’ Network (CRESNET) was formed by professionals
in the field of conflict transformation and peace-building from all over Nigeria. They
wanted to build a coalition and pursue issues with donor agencies. However, what
started as an idea from the NGOs was soon taken over by USAID in order to pursue
its own interests. USAID sponsored most of the meetings and so the members began
to wait for payment before attending meetings. Unfortunately, the process completely
eroded the fundamental principles behind the formation of the organization to the
effect that after the end of USAID’s support departure from Nigeria, the network
became almost moribund. Efforts are now being put together by its stakeholders to
revert to the initial principles behind the formation of the network.
Akin Akinteye
41. Even among the programmes of donor agencies there may be separatist tendencies
and the need for integration may need to be addressed firmly but sensitively.
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20. Mainstreaming Conflict
Guideline Six: Local Leadership
Recognising the complexity and sensitivity of conflict issues in Nigeria, and the long-term
need for bottom-up rather than top-down processes, DFID should seek to decentralise
decision-making and ensure that staff from as near to the locality as possible make the
decisions.
.
42. A key finding of the SCA is that conflict arises from highly complex and localised
interactions that are unlikely to be understood by outsiders. The proper management
of conflict can only be undertaken by local people with an intimate knowledge of
culture and power –and particularly of the negative interests that may have to be
taken into account. This means that it is extremely important for DFID to ensure the
highest possible levels of local representation, and this applies not only at local but
also at national level.
43. A second reason for this Guideline is that the long-term process of change must be
led by Nigerians and the process of pro-poor development must be led by the poor.
Accordingly, DFID should seek to build the capacity of local institutions rather than
treat them as sub-contractors of expatriate institutions. In research projects, for
example, Nigerian institutions should be given every possible opportunity to lead the
process rather than simply be treated as sources of material. Where international
NGOs are used as intermediaries, the risk of neo-colonial relationships that
undermine local initiative should be taken into account. At the local level, Nigerians
from different parts of the country may be regarded as part of the problem rather than
part of the solution.
44. In view of these sensitivities, DFID should constantly review its expatriate/local and
insider/outsider representation, maintaining explicit records. Similarly it should be
proactive in monitoring the representation of women in leadership positions (see
Guideline Seven).
Guideline Seven: Women’s Leadership
Recognising the potentially positive role that women can play in relation to conflict,
DFID should be proactive in developing women’s skills and opportunities to take
leadership roles.
45. Because of their gender roles in society women in Nigeria develop special skills as
negotiators at the family level. Arguably these gender roles reinforce genetic
advantages over men in relation to social skills. It seems likely that such skills could
be transferred from the family to wider social issues, although the opportunities may
have been too scanty for the point to be proven beyond doubt. This means that
women represent a largely untapped resource of skills in relation to conflict
negotiation11. Although there are differences between different groups it is widely
11
For a useful presentation of different perspectives on this issue see de Waal (Ed) (2002) pp101-107
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21. Mainstreaming Conflict
found that women can play positive roles in relation to conflict across Africa and
across religious distinctions12.
46. As a long-term strategy in relation to conflict, donors should seek to enable women at
the community level to extend their influence from the family to the social and
political spheres. Girls’ education should have a long-term impact on conflict by
increasing women’s influence –although many other factors are involved, of course.
47. Donors should aim to ensure that women are equally represented with men in their
programmes. This may entail setting a quota and monitoring progress (Guideline
Six). Women should be given every possible support to extend their influence in
positions of leadership. This may involve a special programme of capacity-building
focused on women staff and applied in partner projects as well as in the donor
agency.
Box 5: Conflict prevention roles of women in farmer-pastoralist tensions
Women’s gender roles in the society have given them skills that are relevant in
conflict management and prevention. The role of women as agents of peace was
reiterated by almost every group we met in Jigawa state. A representative of the
Herdsmen association pinpointed not only the negotiating skills of the women, but
also the influence they have over children who are sent graze livestock, which may
then enter a farm and cause damage to the crops. This is one of the most common
causes of disputes and conflict between farmers and pastoralists. This special
position of women in the society that enable them to play crucial roles in the peace of
a community should be sourced, tapped and utilized by development projects for
conflict prevention and resolution as well as conflict management.
Fatima Adamu
48. Budgets for all projects should be examined to ensure that as a minimum they benefit
women proportionately and include provision for capacity-building to develop
women’s leadership skills.
Guideline Eight: Service Delivery and Change
Recognising that most Nigerians already experience severe poverty, that political change
will be slow and that the process of change rests on the empowerment of poor people, aid
programmes should include a substantial element of service delivery in such a way as to
involve poor people in a dialogue around practical problems.
12
See for example Salihu (2002)
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22. Mainstreaming Conflict
49. Poor people need direct support if they are to give their attention to long-term
processes of change. They also need to be engaged in the practical problems that face
them rather than theoretical issues. Moreover, the proportion of aid that does not
reach poor people is likely to strengthen elites. Accordingly, donors should set a
minimum level for the resources in any project that must reach to the level of poor
people. We suggest that this should be 70%.
50. But this service delivery element must be harnessed as a basis for learning and
advocacy. This will greatly enhance the impact of attempts to bring about change at
other levels.
Box 6: Transforming the legal system: Involving the poor and vulnerable
In a society where corruption and inefficiency is endemic, empowering the poor to
question and demand from the political and legal systems is absolutely necessary for
the transformation of such systems. A project that focuses on the political system and
structures must have direct deliverable services to the poor. The Access to Justice
project focusing on legal reform may strengthen the elites of the system but offers
little service to the poor. Taking up some of the legal cases of the poor ought to be
taken by the project to provide the framework through which the legal system is
challenged and transformed.
Fatima Adamu
Guideline Nine: The Private Sector
Recognising that private companies are likely to pursue their interests by favouring
specific groups and that this may alienate others, donors should be cautious about
entering into engagements with the private sector that are not overseen by publicly
accountable bodies.
51. While opportunities to secure support for poor people from the private sector are to be
encouraged, it should be recognised that the primary interests of companies may not
always coincide with those of the poor. The allocation of jobs and other benefits by
companies, especially in the oil sector, has been a common source of conflict.
Particular problems occur where businesses try to combine their commercial interests
with public beneficence. This may lead to the alienation of excluded groups, or
wasteful allocation of resources. USAID reported a case of three different oil
companies building jetties in the same village. Donors that enter co-funding
arrangements may find themselves drawn into controversy.
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23. Mainstreaming Conflict
52. In order to avoid such problems donors should encourage companies to pool funds
with other sources and allocate those funds through public representative bodies. A
good example is Educational Tax Fund (see box). This will increase the level of
public confidence –and hence reduce the risk of conflict.
Box 7: Pooled Resources –the case of the ETF
Corporations contribute a percentage of their profits of the Education Trust Fund,
which is managed by a board consisting of representatives of all stakeholders
including government, the corporations and academia. Pooling together resources
and decision making in this kind of fund prevents the suspicions and antipathy that
often accompany this kind of collaboration.
Lanre Obafemi
PROCESSES
Guideline Ten: Assessment
Recognising the complexity of conflict issues and the risk that aid may exacerbate
conflict, donors should require every substantive programme and partner to undertake
Conflict Impact Assessment on a regular basis.
53. The SCA indicates that conflict arises from the interaction of political corruption with
competition for resources. Because the aid process is concerned with the allocation of
resources it will be subject to competition in which political corruption may play a
critical role in introducing conflict. There is a significant risk that any intervention
could cause or exacerbate conflict. In the current situation powerful elites will try to
‘capture’ the benefits of projects and use them to reinforce their own positions.
Failing that they may deliberately try to undermine the project, possibly using conflict
as a tool.
54. Accordingly, every major aid activity should be subjected to a Programme Level
Conflict Assessment (PLCA)13 focused on power relations. As a minimum this should
include-
• History of conflict in the area
13
This is the terminology generally used by DFID –see DFID (2002)
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24. Mainstreaming Conflict
• Division of causes into security, political, economic and social factors at local,
national and external levels
• Identification of key stakeholders to include those indirectly affected and
those who may feel excluded or marginalized
• Model of power relationships
• Impact of the project on power relations (gainers and losers)
• Possible outcomes and risks
• Opportunities for strengthening the power of poor people
• Opportunities for advocacy
• Proposed modifications to project design
55. For a more developed methodology of Programme Level Conflict Assessment
(PLCA), proposed by Akin Akintaye (team member) see Annex 2. Another useful
model is the World Bank’s ‘Conflict Impact Assessment’ (draft November 2003).
56. The assessment should be carried out in a participatory manner to include as wide a
range of stakeholders as possible. This should help to uncover any negative interests
in relation to the project and will lead to greater accuracy. In a climate often
dominated by negative intentions, it is important to recognise the importance of
perception, rumour and deliberate misinformation.
57. The process should be repeated during the project cycle. For long-term projects the
PLCA should take place during the initial phases (scoping and design) and should
then be repeated during the inception and implementation phases. It should not be
regarded as a ‘check’ but as an integral part of the project cycle, feeding back into
project design and orientation.
58. Especially in the case of projects at the federal level, an assessment should focus on
the risk that the allocation of resources between States and regions may become as
source of contention. It is also important to ensure that allocation of resources to
particular institutions does not trigger conflict with other institutions (See Box)
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25. Mainstreaming Conflict
Box 8: Local Government Reform in Benue State
The need for a comprehensive conflict assessment was exemplified by our findings in Benue
State. The Establishment and Management Services Unit under the Permanent Secretary
was not represented in the State Public Service Reform Committee of DFID’s State and Local
Government Programme (SLGP), but all circulars and directives on establishment matters
emanates from, and are given under his signature. Feeling excluded from the SLGP process,
the Permanent Secretary initiated his own reform process. SLGP is likely to suffer
antagonism and non-cooperation from this important segment of the establishment.
Lanre Obafemi
Guideline Eleven: Transparency
Reflecting a strategy of empowering poor people in relation to predatory elites,
transparency should be directed towards enabling poor people to participate in
processes of change rather than feeding information to elite groups. Transparency should
be focused at the community level and use appropriate communication strategies.
59. Glossy brochures circulating in Abuja are not a satisfactory indication of
transparency. Donors should ensure that all stakeholders, including poor people, have
access to basic information about any activity affecting them. They should ensure that
their partners, whether NGO or government, observe the same standard of
transparency.
60. The information must be presented in a way that disaggregates what affects a
particular community from the total scope of the project. As a minimum this must
include-
• Criteria for selection of communities, States and project areas
• Objective of the project (general and for that community)
• Financial Resources (ditto)
• Ratios of Spending (Guideline Eight)
• Project management (i.e. who is involved)
61. Wherever possible the latter point should be further disaggregated to show how
different interests are represented (see Guideline Five). This may include-
• Breakdown by ethnicity, religion and sex
• The balance between local and external staffing
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26. Mainstreaming Conflict
62. As a general rule, donors should undertake to inform and debate with stakeholders
every 6 months and at a minimum once a year. They should also ensure that
programme design is flexible enough to allow for changes that arise from this process
to be fed into the project cycle.
63. In order to communicate with poor people appropriate media must be used including
local languages and verbal rather than written communication. Radio may be
particularly suitable. Financial information can be posted in schools and teachers
trained to present it. Donors should be proactive in creating public debate about their
projects, seeking out opportunities to present their work in interviews and subject it to
public scrutiny.
Guideline Twelve: Accountability
DFID should use the practice of accountability as a mechanism for empowering poor
people.
64. DFID is accountable in a number of directions -to parliament and taxpayers in the UK
as well as to Federal and State governments for the implementation of contractual
agreements in Nigeria. In relation to conflict, donors should focus their accountability
on poor people and make it part of an empowering process.
65. Regrettably it is often the case that faults in project implementation are often
identified too late. In Nigeria this could mean that projects may actually fuel conflict.
The World Bank funded Fadama 1 Project is now thought to have caused
considerable tensions and possibly conflict between local communities but this only
came to light when a new Fadama 2 project was being planned14. Because the
consequences of such unintended side-effects could be so serious in the Nigeria
context (Guideline Two refers), project monitoring should be both intensive and far-
ranging to enable non-beneficiaries to express their views.
66. A further issue is that corruption has spread widely through both government and
civil society including NGOs15. This makes it important to monitor projects,
especially their use of funds, more closely than might otherwise be the case. If donors
are seen to fuel corruption this could in itself be a source of tension and possible
conflict.
67. Therefore, in addition to the practices already suggested under the Guideline Eleven
(Transparency), donors should-
• Monitor project performance and finances by independent on-site visits at
least once a year
• Include ratios of spending (Guideline Eight) in this process
• Set up mechanisms for feedback and complaints that are appropriate and
accessible to poor people
14
Interview with Sarah Lyons of World Bank
15
Nigeria ranks second worst offender on Transparency International’s global index of corruption
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27. Mainstreaming Conflict
• Undertake capacity building to enable poor people to monitor project and
national budgets. budgets
Box 9: Complaints mechanism in Dutse
The Access to Justice Programme put ‘complaints boxes’ in the courts but the
response was extremely low. The project could have found out much more about the
problems faced by poor people by getting involved in a few test cases and linking
these to capacity-building with local groups.
The complaints system was a very limited form of accountability in an area in which
traditional loyalties are powerful, and confidence in government structures is low.
Tony Vaux
68. Although formal complaints systems may be useful in some cases, it is generally
better to focus on the representation of the people in project management so that
views can be expressed in a less antagonistic manner.
69. Poor people are not necessarily equipped to hold projects accountable and may need
assistance to do so. As part of its overall strategy of improving governance, each
project should include plans to develop the ability of poor people and civil society
representatives to monitor not only project budgets but also associated state budgets.
In accordance with Guideline Seven a special focus should be placed on women.
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28. Mainstreaming Conflict
Section Three: Implications for State and Project Selection
70. DFID is currently engaged in a strategic review that includes the issue of where to
work. The mission was asked to advise on the implications in relation to conflict.
71. The Conflict Guideline particularly relevant to this issue is the one on Inclusion and
Exclusion (Guideline Two). Any choice that DFID makes will result in a separation
of ‘included’ and ‘excluded’ elements. There will be consequent possibilities for
tensions and conflict. As already observed, the Nigerian context has been formed by
intense competition for resources derived from oil and focused on the state. This has
resulted not only in corruption but also intense rivalry that makes different elements
and functions of society work in opposition to each other rather than harmoniously.
72. It would not be surprising if DFID were subjected to sophisticated ‘special pleading’
in its process of selecting areas of work. Rumour and disinformation is likely to be
manipulated to suit the interests of different parties. The final decision may not put an
end to this. DFID may find that its objectives are undermined by continued rivalries
and non-cooperation.
73. Every effort should be made to avoid or mitigate such negative behaviour. This can
be done by-
• Opting for fluid regional programmes rather than those based on specific
States
• Involving stakeholders who may be excluded in order to assess and mitigate
their concerns and plan damage-limitation strategies
• Making the criteria and process transparent
74. A regional approach may have many advantages other than conflict reduction. The
advantages of treating water management in the North-West as a regional level are
immediately apparent. In a strictly State-based approach DFID would probably do
little more than transfer a problem from one area to another. In the case of the JWL,
for example, social mobilisation that achieved benefits in one State could easily have
very negative consequences for another State, with possible repercussions in terms of
violent conflict.
75. While it is recognised that DFID seeks to maximise its impact by concentrating its
work in specific areas, the negative effects of exclusion are particularly severe in
Nigeria where it compounds an existing problem of rivalry rather than cooperation.
Impact will be better achieved by setting tight objectives around a specific issue
rather than around a geographic entity.
76. We therefore recommend that DFID should adopt an issues-based approach covering
two or three sub-regions rather than choosing between States. Having chosen its sub-
regions, Strategic Conflict Assessments should be conducted using the DFID
methodology.
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29. Mainstreaming Conflict
77. In relation to the choice of issues the mission had only limited opportunity to explore
the relationship between DFID’s current themes and conflict and our observations are
limited.
78. Although HIV/Aids is often associated with conflict this is not especially the case in
Nigeria except in relation to the peace-keeping forces. In civilian life the problem is
more related to social and economic tensions that cause migration rather than
violence and displacement.
79. DFID’s focus on education, especially for girls, does relate quite closely to our
analysis of conflict. Firstly, by increasing the voice of women in society we expect
conflict to be reduced in the long-term. But not all education is conducive to such a
proposition16 and it may be that what is taught in schools under the name of history
and general studies may exacerbate internal tensions of an ethnic or religious
character. We propose that DFID should examine this question further.
Section Four: Implications for Responses to Conflict
80. During the course of the mission the team was asked to advise on the issue of
practical responses to conflict. Although this is not directly referred to in the Terms of
Reference it is clearly an issue of concern to State Coordinators. As the SCA points
out there has generally been too much focus on responding to conflict with military
force rather than giving early warning through local monitoring, or on preventing
conflict by working to reduce tensions and rivalries by strategic means. This has been
the focus of our main report –and with justification. But low-level conflict occurs
quite frequently in Nigeria and recent reports indicate that the trend may be
worsening17. The issue cannot be ignored.
81. Again the critical Guideline is on Inclusion and Exclusion. Regrettably it is often the
case that the distribution of relief materials following violent conflict exacerbates the
underlying problem by discriminating between the parties. This may occur because
the aid organisations are linked to particular groups. More disturbingly aid from
government often follows political biases representing the interests of senior officials.
82. Provision of mediation services is controversial. Although considerable claims have
been made by organisations such as Academic PeaceWorks other commentators
express scepticism about the permanence of their achievements. Bringing the sides
together for discussions without resolving underlying problems is likely to lead only
to temporary solutions. In many cases mediation achieves little more than a short
respite.
16
See DFID Issues Paper- ‘Education, Conflict and International Development’ -bibliography
17
In its report for 2003 Human Rights Watch refers to ‘a sharp increase in political violence’.
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30. Mainstreaming Conflict
83. A second critique, relevant to our overall report, is that mediation tends to reinforce
the power of elites. It is often a process brokered between the elites which have
caused conflict and may reflect their interests rather than those of the poor –who are
likely to suffer the worst consequences. This reinforcement of traditional and elite
power could make matters worse in the long term.
84. We recommend that-
• DFID should focus on mainstreaming conflict into all activity rather than
isolating it as a response after the event.
• However, DFID has a responsibility to respond following violent incidents
affecting its programme stakeholders
• Its primary concern in such circumstances should be to ensure that
humanitarian aid is not allocated in such a way as to increase the problem.
• Mediation processes, if funded, should be rooted in the area, reflect
underlying causes and empower poor people
• DFID should engage critically with other aid actors.
Section Five: Conclusions and Recommendations
85. Violent conflict appears to be on the increase in Nigeria. It is a manifestation of a
profound malaise in governance which may be summarised as an interaction of
political corruption with fierce competition for resources. Another way of describing
this is to say that substantial resources, primarily derived from oil, flow through
corrupt systems causing intense rivalries and sometimes violent conflict.
86. For much of Nigeria’s history as an independent nation this corruption was
institutionalised in the form of military dictatorship18. This has left a legacy in the
form of a militarized society that will take years if not generations to change.
87. At this stage the process of change must be regarded as inherently conflictual.
Competition and conflict lie at the heart of the political system. Resources provided
from outside, such as donor funding, enters the same system and is subjected to the
same intense rivalries. DFID should recognise that for every cooperating element
there may be many that will seek to undermine and subvert the course of progress.
88. If democracy and poverty alleviation are taken as fundamental goals it follows that
the empowerment of poor people is a central part of any process. In Nigeria this is the
only long-term solution. It is also an efficient solution. Poor people are experts on
poverty. If their voice is heard more clearly projects and programmes can be
considerably improved. Above all in Nigeria, the voice of women has been silenced
or ignored. Thus, at least half the poor people have no say. And their voice is an
18
The roots of the problem go back into colonialism, of course.
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31. Mainstreaming Conflict
important one because they have special perceptions of poverty within the household,
and also they may have special skills in addressing the problems.
89. Donors have tended to view empowerment as a localised and abstract concept rather
than part of an overview that recognises a process of struggle between elites and those
who are marginalised. DFID’s model of cooperation between different levels or tiers
in society does not reflect the reality.
90. Mainstreaming conflict is really the acceptance of a view that Nigeria is in a state of
profound tensions. Change will not be achieved by cooperation and consensus as
much as by struggle and assertiveness. Conflict is often a means by which competing
elites achieve their ends. They manipulate ethnicity and religion in particular in order
to achieve their objectives. Conflict divides poor people and makes them even less
able to assert an influence on the allocation of resources, let alone to engage in the
struggle for power.
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32. Mainstreaming Conflict
Recommendations
91. The Mainstreaming Conflict Team recommends that-
• DFID Nigeria should re-model its understanding of the processes of change to
take better account of conflicting elements and interests.
• The Conflict Guidelines should be considered as the basic recommendations of
this mission and should be reflected in strategy, programme management and
procedures.
• Particular attention should be paid to conflict analysis in the design of new
programmes. Programme Level Conflict Assessment (PLCA) should be applied in
a methodical manner then and at each stage of the project cycle.
• As part of a long-term strategy related to conflict DFID should develop a
programme to support women’s capacities for peace through education, skills
development and leadership.
• DFID should examine the extent to which the school curriculum and local
teaching practice may exacerbate conflict.
• In choosing its future areas of operation DFID should adopt an issues-based
approach as far as possible and delineate its activities by region rather than by
States.
• Before embarking on such a regional programme DFID should undertake a
Strategic Conflict Assessment.
• DFID should focus on support to Early Warning systems and prevention rather
than responses after conflict. It may be appropriate to work with IPCR on these
issues, offering capacity building as necessary.
• Where direct responses are necessary, the aim should be to work with others to
reduce biases that may exacerbate the causes of conflict.
• Conflict mediation should be viewed with caution and must be aligned to long-
term rather than short-term solutions.
February 2004
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