This document discusses the framework for cooperative security in Africa and challenges therein. It provides context around increased regional cooperation in the late 1980s/early 1990s due to various global and local factors. It examines ECOWAS as the leading example in West Africa, outlining the institutions and mechanisms it has established like the Mediation and Security Council, Defence and Security Commission, and ECOMOG forces. However, it notes ongoing challenges including issues of sovereignty, differing regional interests, donor dependence, and lack of a shared security vision among some member states. The example of Cote d'Ivoire highlights the need for frameworks to go beyond structures to enable timely, credible action on humanitarian crises.

1. Framework for Cooperative Security in a Region in Transition:
Challenges and Prospects1
By
J. ’Kayode Fayemi2
Introduction
The concept of cooperative security is not new in international politics. From its
origins in the 1815 Concert of Europe, to the end of the Cold War when it assumed
wider popularity, cooperative security has become almost a one size, fits all response
to the problems of insecurity and instability in the world. Yet cooperative security
remains essentially a ‘contested concept’ meaning different things to different people
– from the traditional meaning of collective security and collective defence with the
nation state as the primary unit of analysis to the more recent and broader meanings of
individual security (human security) and stability promotion in a new world order.
Since the end of the cold war, the desirability of shifting from a state- and elite
focused view of security to one that places individuals at the centre of the security
equation has gained increasing acceptance in Africa, and indeed in many parts of the
world. While protecting the state and its citizens from external aggression remains a
consideration, the most serious threats facing countries on the African continent at the
beginning of the 21st century tend to be those that either derive from internal causes or
are trans-national and collective in nature. To many in Africa, a safe and secure
environment is a necessary condition for sustainable, poverty-reducing development.
This broader conception that articulates security in a manner that the individual, the
group as well as the state may relate to its fundamental objectives of promoting and
ensuring the right to life and livelihood in an uncertain world underscores the
importance of cooperative security arrangement in Africa. Yet, given the popularity of
1
Being notes prepared for presentation at the African Centre for Strategic Studies’ Southern Africa
Sub-regional Seminar in Maputo, Mozambique on September 26, 2002. Please do not quote without the
author’s permission.
2
Executive Director, Centre for Democracy & Development (Lagos & London) kfayemi@cdd.org.uk
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2. the trend in international security, cooperative security deserves a more nuanced
analysis, one that brings out regional dimensions and common characteristics in order
for it to be relevant to the security concerns of the African continent.
This presentation attempts to develop a framework for cooperative security in Africa,
looking at the record of Africa in the post cold war decade, the context of regional
cooperation, the challenges to regional security cooperation, the example of
cooperative security in West Africa and ending with some recommendations for
cooperative security in Africa.
Context of Regional Security Cooperation in the late 1980s
Whilst regionalism is not new in Africa, a number of factors seem to have promoted
the virtues of regionalism amongst African leaders and peoples in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The peculiar context of the 1990s definitely redefined the nature of both
politics and conflict. Triggered by both external and internal factors, the crisis of
hegemony and legitimacy of the average African state found refuge in the attempt to
seek a common response to the problems at home.
• Shifts in global and geo-political power relations, in particular the end of the
cold war and the retraction of the imperial security umbrella, allowed former
client regimes to be challenged in ways unimaginable in the past;
• The retreat of the superpowers placed greater prominence on the role of and
competition between regional powers in conflict and conflict management;
• Conflict parties (both governments and rebel groups) previously supported by
superpowers had to turn to new sources of funding, including the exploitation
of natural resources and criminal activity (drugs, etc) making them potentially
less amenable to external pressure;
• New particularistic forms of political consciousness and identity, often
structured around religion and ethnicity, replaced the extant ‘universalistic’
debates between ‘capitalism’ and ‘socialism’ that had underpinned the Cold
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3. War, reinforcing the erosion of a sense of common citizenship fostered by
state contraction and popular disillusionment with politics;
• Erosion of the institutional capacity of the average African state, the most
profound aspect of which was the decomposition of the security apparatuses,
affecting the ability of the state to ensure the security of the state as well as
that of the community.
• African states were subjected to multiple sources of pressure that eroded their
sovereignty: from above, the cooption of crucial areas of policy initiative by
the IFIs and a variety of donor agencies: from below – the activation of civil
society and the increasing power and resources controlled by the non-
governmental sector
• Loss of centrality of the state as a consequence of contracting resources and
capacity to deliver essential services, with various implications for its ability
to act as the centre of social cohesion as well as for perceptions of citizenship;
• State militarism, which became the progenitor of the psychology of militarism,
loss of a culture of dialogue, implanting a culture of violence, and
discouraging peaceful conflict-resolution and process of change.
• The increasing availability and privatisation of the instruments of violence,
transforming the military balance between state and society. Massive
retrenchment and growing surplus of military assets globally, simultaneously
with a breakdown in supply-side and demand side controls on global arms
markets and (locally) recycling of decommissioned weaponry as most of the
wars of the 1980s wound down.
• New forms of violent national and trans-national crime.
An African Balance Sheet in the 1990s Decade
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4. • Democratic transition in Africa has produced a medley of results ranging from
consolidating democracies (South Africa, Botswana, Mauritius, Ghana,
Senegal, Mali, Mozambique), a variety of ‘semi’, ‘liberal’, ‘virtual’ and
‘lapsing’ democracies (Kenya, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Malawi), authoritarian
and/or militarised states (Cote d’Ivoire, Togo, Sudan,) and conflict torn
societies and post conflict societies (Liberia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Rwanda,
Burundi and Sierra Leone).
• Values and norms of governance have become more prevalent in Africa
• While the economic situation remains fragile, overall economic performance
in Africa has actually improved marginally, relative to the 1980s
• Regionalism has taken much firmer root, crowned recently by the launch of
the African Union and introduction of NEPAD
• Regional and sub-regional conflict management mechanisms put in place as
Africans strive to develop an autonomous capacity to handle their conflicts in
spite of the inherent challenges of regionalism (West Africa is a pioneer in the
field);
• In spite of some form of international assistance, Africans are increasingly at
the centre of the emerging geo-political realities – with ACRI, RECAMP and
other supporting initiatives acting as back up – ANAD merger with ECOWAS
on the security field is an indication of the need to harmonise often confusing
and duplicating mechanisms; the sense of an Anglo-French rivalry in West
Africa seems to be disappearing; equally the prevalent perception of a Franco-
Nigerian rivalry is beginning to disappear although there are still governments
and actors keen to promote these ‘divisions’. The evidence both in trade and
security terms seem to suggest otherwise but the perception of regional
hegemony still persists with Nigeria and South Africa often put in the
‘hegemon’ box.
• There is now a widespread acceptance of the need to re-conceptualise
‘security’ in a more responsive direction with a move away from the
traditional emphasis on national/state security to a focus on ‘human security’,
with an expansion, concomitantly in the scope of the concept from its
minimalist meaning (as in physical security) to include access to the means of
life, the provision of essential goods, a clean and sustainable environment, as
well as to human rights and democratic freedoms. A key aspect of this is the
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5. increasing linkage drawn between security and development, on the one hand
rooting insecurity in conditions of underdevelopment, and on the other, the
recognition that security is an essential precondition and component of
development – as well as a growing tendency to see defence and security as
both a public policy and a governance issue (thus broadening the range of
constituencies that can participate legitimately in this formally highly
restricted arena.
Challenges of Regional Cooperative Security
• Legacy of Westphalian sovereignty
• Regionalism without common values
• Notions of regional hegemony
• Regionalism as leaderism in which regional integration is only happening at the
level of leaders without permeating the consciousness of the people;
• Regionalism as formalism in which a wide array of institutions have been created
with little or no capacity to manage them
• Regionalism as an externally driven, not a people driven project
Institutionalising Regional Cooperative Security: The West African example
It can be reasonably argued that ECOWAS in West Africa represents the best
example in Africa of a process of institutionalising cooperative security on the
continent. Established in 1975 to promote cooperation and development in all fields
of economic activities among its 16 member states, ECOWAS entered into
cooperative security from a primarily regional economic integration objective in 1990
when it went into Liberia to restore peace. Although a Mutual Assistance in Defence
Protocol was signed in 1981, ECOWAS’ first foray into the collective security arena
in 1990 was ad-hoc and capricious. Indeed, it is fair to state that the experience
garnered in the first peacekeeping mission launched in Liberia in has enabled
ECOWAS to pursue an institutional framework for cooperative security following the
bitter lessons that accompanied a mission that was largely driven through the goodwill
and commitment of a regional hegemon, Nigeria. The lack of clarity over mandate,
political acceptance, composition, military capability and accountability of the
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6. mission affected what was otherwise a well-intentioned regional project with little or
no backing from the international community.
It is however a tribute to ECOWAS leaders that they drew strongly on the lessons of
Liberia and Sierra Leone and decided to institutionalise a conflict mechanism in the
broader scheme of things within the regional economic community. A raft of
agreements - The ECOWAS Revised treaty of 1993, the Protocol relating to the
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security approved in 1999 and the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy & Good
Governance endorsed by the Heads of State in December 2002 all demonstrate the
fact that a great deal of local thinking is propelling the institutionalisation of a
collective security architecture in West Africa with assigned roles for governments
and civil society.
In spite of the changes that have occurred and the structures put in place, the product
is still a long way away from where it should be. If ECOWAS declarations of intent
are indeed turned into substance as the Heads of Government and the Executive
Secretariat are determined to achieve, it is possible for cooperative security to take a
much firmer root in West Africa in time to come. In terms of institutions, the
Mechanism established several institutions, organs and strategies, all with defined
responsibilities and aims that address peace and security in the sub-region. The most
critical institutions are:
• The Mediation and Security Council – The Council operates at the level of heads
of state and government, ministers and ambassadors, charged with the
responsibilities of taking decisions that impact on peace and security, including
authorising deployment of missions;
• The Defence and Security Commission – Made up of Defence chiefs and security
officials charged with the responsibilities of dealing with the technicalities of
military intervention;
• ECOMOG, the erstwhile ad-hoc force now formally established as a multi-
purpose stand-by force ready for immediate deployment. ECOMOG is described
as multi-purpose in the sense that it can assume one of several functions of
observation, monitoring and peacekeeping. More significantly, it can be deployed
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7. for humanitarian intervention or the enforcement of sanctions. It can also
undertake policing activities in order to control fraud and/or organised crime;
• An early warning system, in the form of a regional observation network has been
created. Established within the secretariat and also in four zones within the
Community, the observation centres are charged with collecting data on states
ranging across economic, political, security and social sectors to be analysed with
a view to detecting early warning signals that may signify potential conflicts
which could then inform region-wide conflict prevention strategies;
• A Council of Elders is also proposed as a mechanism for injecting traditional
conflict resolution mechanism to assume a role in mediation, conciliation and
negotiation. This is made up of 32 eminent persons drawn from within and
outside the region with a mandate for preventive diplomacy and it is convened as
and when required by the Executive Secretariat.
As Figure 1 below shows, the Executive Secretariat plays a central role in ensuring
that the Conflict Mechanism functions adequately. As stated above, the Executive
Secretary has the responsibility to deploy the Council of Elders in any given situation.
More importantly, the newly created office of Political Affairs, Defence and
Security(PADS) headed by a Deputy Executive Secretary is primarily charged with
the implementation of the mechanism, supervision of the Early warning operations
and the zonal observation centres, servicing of the Defence and Security Commission
and policy formulation and implementation of all peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations.
The Mechanism and its supplementary protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
also take a broader view of security, stressing the importance of human security and
democratic governance in the security sector, including roles for civil society. The
Protocol also covers institutional capacity building in the community in order to
provide humanitarian assistance in conflict or disaster area and provides a framework
for action by the community in the critical area of peace-building.
Whilst the ECOWAS mechanism offers a good approach to designing a framework
for cooperative security, it also remains work in progress. Indeed, the Community
also demonstrates commitment to revising and improving the document based on new
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8. information. For example, it is now considering approaches to involving the
ECOWAS Parliament in the implementation of the Mechanism and the
Supplementary Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy through the revision of
the Protocol that established the Parliament. In the protocol establishing the
Parliament, it is essentially a forum, composed of delegations from national
parliaments, whose ‘opinion may be sought on matters concerning the Community’
on a range of areas prior to their adoption by the Council’ with little or no supra-
national legislative powers. This is clearly seen as a system that suffers from a ‘huge
dose of democratic deficit’ since parliamentarians are the only direct representatives
of the citizens in the Community. Yet, true as this is, the history of trans-national
legislatures the world over is one of evolution, usually from delegations from national
parliaments to directly elected representation. It is also the case that the powers of
trans-national parliaments gradually evolve from being largely consultative
assemblies to genuine decision-making legislatures, both in scope and in powers.
Circumstances dictate these inevitable transitions and the performance of the
parliament to date gives the impression that its powers will certainly grow in
consonance with the quality of representation in the Parliament.
Second, there are problems of hegemonic regionalism, leaderism, formalism and
donor driven institutionalisation. Many of the institutions created by the Mechanism
for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security owe
their survival not to the commitment of member states in terms of their financial
contribution, but to the generosity of the European Union, the United States and a
number of Nordic countries. This obviously raises a fundamental question of
accountability and strategic interests especially when those interests conflict. Various
attempts are however being made to address this problem, but none to date has proved
to be successful in getting states to meet their assessed contributions to the
Community, leaving the wealthiest and most populous State to underwrite the
expenses of the organisation, with accusations of domination in its wake.
A third, perhaps most critical problem with the ECOWAS framework is that of the
lack of agreement on a common understanding on security and stability. Although the
protocols referred to above were signed with fanfare by most of the Heads of
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9. government and their representatives, nation-building peculiarities make it difficult
for member states to exhibit a shared understanding of a common future.
In spite of the progress described above, a sense of disillusionment is still widespread
in West Africa with the current state of regional security cooperation. Indeed, the
unfortunate occurrence in Cote d’Ivoire seems to be promoting the view in some
circles that despotic peace may be better than democratic freedom. Coupled with the
impression that the gains of the last decade is being eroded in the post 9/11 period, it
is important for the United States and other international actors in Africa to be clear
about the message that is being promoted. It would be sad if the view were to gain
widespread acceptance that despotic peace is better than problematic democratic
freedom. The fact that the ECOWAS has not been quick off the mark in responding to
the Ivorien crisis underscores the need for a framework that goes beyond the creation
of institutions and structures, but one that also possesses the capacity and the
credibility to act on the side of humanitarian intervention and restoration of order.
This seminar is thus important as it offers the United States the opportunity to be clear
about its strategic interests whilst also offering the space to listen to the African
counterparts address questions of ownership and accountability of the agenda.
Towards a Framework for Regional Security Cooperation: Recommendations
Although what the West African experience demonstrates is that cooperative security
is possible, even among states that lack common values, the future success of
cooperative security depends not only on spreading values that promote human
security, but also on developmental regionalism that intensifies economic ties even in
the quest to foster a sense of a ‘security community’ that serves the interest of all its
members. The closer the ties among states and their citizens in the socio-economic
spheres, the more they will find ways to further their security cooperatively.
Hence, given the context of regionalism described above and the challenges to
cooperative security in Africa, a number of factors are, in my own view, central to the
success or otherwise of the process of entrenching cooperative security in any
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10. regional bloc, if we are to move beyond the formalism of the moment. They include,
but are not necessarily limited to the following key elements:
• Understanding the nature of the post-colonial state and the nation-building
prospects in Africa;
• Subscription to and institutionalisation of core regional values and norms;
• Focusing on deepening democratic and open governance and preventing violent
conflicts through political processes;
• Promoting long term conditions for security and development by using human
security as a bedrock for peace;
• Developing an integrated peacebuilding approach to human security – through the
promotion of governmental and non-governmental approaches and treating
peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict transformation in a continuum;
• Entrenching democratic governance of the security sector by establishing a clear
role definition for security services whilst enhancing professionalism of the sector;
• Building the capacity of African institutions for early warning, as well as
enhancing their capacity to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts;
• Strengthening developmental regionalism as a means of addressing the negative
aspects of globalisation;
• Establishing the parameters of genuine continental and global partnership –
including role clarification between sub-regional bodies, African Union, United
Nations etc.
Whilst it is difficult to be prescriptive about the framework for security cooperation in
Africa, it is gratifying to note that most of what I have stated here are fully reflected
as the key responsibilities of the new African Union Peace and Security Council
approved at the African Union Summit in Durban, especially in relation to NEPAD
and in the sub-regional mechanisms with which I am most familiar, ECOWAS.
The challenge is one of achieving and promoting the values of ownership,
participation, open and transparency accountability, fundamental freedoms and the
rule of law and implementation of agreed principles, rather than structures. The
overriding importance of responsible politics and responsive leadership in building
regional security cooperation is evident from the above. Until we get both, the best
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11. that can be hoped for remains hegemonic regionalism, which may keep the peace, but
hardly promotes fundamental values of ownership.
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