SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 31
OpenStack Security A Primer
Me: 			Joshua McKenty Twitter: 			@jmckenty Email: 		joshua@pistoncloud.com Former Chief Architect, NASA Nebula Founding Member, OpenStack OpenStack Project Policy Board
“If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t understand the problems and you don’t understand the technology.” – Bruce Schneier
The Three Pillars of Security
“Bonus” Security Pillar Forensics
Real Security Assume everything goes wrong, even impossible things.
FIPS 199 Definition: Confidentiality Integrity Availability Defining Security
Defining Vulnerability
Build on “Shared Nothing” to achieve “Trust No One” Also known as “Defense in Depth” AUTOMATE EVERYTHING “Fat Fingers” == Plausible Deniability Automated == non-repudiable change control  Build to the OSI 7-layer model
Layer 1
Lock your doors Do your background checks Use separate physical networks for admin Network model and management Use RFC 1918 address space when appropriate Use VLANs if necessary Firewall every machine (ebtables, iptables) Border firewalls (port and protocol level) Layer 1, 2 and 3
Never assume it’s bilateral
Control system access Best case: no host-based shell access AT ALL. Second-best: federated AUTH with 2-factor, keys only Worstcase: Host-level root login with passwords Run IDS – on hosts and guests Scan Continuously – hosts and guests, on all networks Proactively defend – Fail2Ban, etc. ( F2B-a-a-S) Layer 4, 5, 6 and 7
Don't trust the hypervisor (TXT / TPM) Conversely, don't trust the VM (blue-pill exploits, etc.) Host-based FW within the VM (CloudPassage "Halo") Access-control for VMs – same approaches apply (Auth-as-a-Service) Layer ‘V’
“Proof” and Policy In God We Trust – All Others, Bring Data.
Classic best practices – redundant, off-site log servers Log aggregation and analysis / event detection Logging-as-a-Service Log early, log often
Make and verify your assertions (Coming soon…) CloudAudit
Did you remember to delete his account?
Security Theatre “Given enough hand-waving, all systems are secure.”
Crypto is useless – if keys are stored with the data Private networks are useless – if doors aren’t locked Certification only proves that you’re doing, what you said you were going to do. You can still be wrong. Forget “Trust, but verify”. Just don’t trust. Don’t get confused!
Bonus: Forensics It’s not an “If” – it’s a “When”
Have a chaos-monkey of compromise Can you perform forensics and remediation, without impacting other users of your cloud? Spanning ports and extra storage “Graveyard” for recently deleted images, instances Bonus Section: Forensics
What’s in the CloudPipe? “We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.” – Alan Turing
The Machine Aka “Sneaky Monkey” Continuous Integration of penetration and vulnerability testing.
We’re doing “stuff” No… really. Hardening
Outfoxing the fox Intel is working with many companies within OpenStack, including Piston. Trusted Execution
Questions?
Matt Linton – Nebula CSO Jesse Andrews – AnsoLabs Founder Soo Choi – 7120.7 Nazi Matt Chew- Spence – FIPS 199 Guru Keith Shackleford and James Williams Chris Kemp Bobby Cates, Dave Swagger, E. Lopez, Grace De Leon, Guy with Gun #1, Guy with Gun #2… Credits

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...CODE BLUE
 
QAing the security way!
QAing the security way!QAing the security way!
QAing the security way!Amit Gundiyal
 
vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security way
vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security wayvodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security way
vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security wayvodQA
 
How to protect your business from Wannacry Ransomware
How to protect your business from Wannacry RansomwareHow to protect your business from Wannacry Ransomware
How to protect your business from Wannacry RansomwareKaspersky
 

Mais procurados (6)

7 cloud security tips
7 cloud security tips7 cloud security tips
7 cloud security tips
 
Top 10 Encryption Myths
Top 10 Encryption MythsTop 10 Encryption Myths
Top 10 Encryption Myths
 
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
Practical network defense at scale Or: Protecting the “Eierlegende Wollmichsa...
 
QAing the security way!
QAing the security way!QAing the security way!
QAing the security way!
 
vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security way
vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security wayvodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security way
vodQA(Pune) 2018 - QAing the security way
 
How to protect your business from Wannacry Ransomware
How to protect your business from Wannacry RansomwareHow to protect your business from Wannacry Ransomware
How to protect your business from Wannacry Ransomware
 

Destaque

The Space Penguin Odyssey
The Space Penguin OdysseyThe Space Penguin Odyssey
The Space Penguin OdysseyJoshua McKenty
 
OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -
OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -
OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -Joshua McKenty
 
Scale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStack
Scale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStackScale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStack
Scale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStackJoshua McKenty
 
Cloud Power - The Early OpenStack Architecture
Cloud Power - The Early OpenStack ArchitectureCloud Power - The Early OpenStack Architecture
Cloud Power - The Early OpenStack ArchitectureJoshua McKenty
 
WSTA Breakfast Seminar
WSTA Breakfast SeminarWSTA Breakfast Seminar
WSTA Breakfast SeminarJoshua McKenty
 
But What About Docker?
But What About Docker?But What About Docker?
But What About Docker?Joshua McKenty
 
OpenStack: Cloud's Big Tent
OpenStack: Cloud's Big TentOpenStack: Cloud's Big Tent
OpenStack: Cloud's Big TentJoshua McKenty
 
MSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of Guilder
MSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of GuilderMSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of Guilder
MSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of GuilderJoshua McKenty
 
vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101
vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101
vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101Joshua McKenty
 
OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014
OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014
OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014Joshua McKenty
 
Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012
Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012
Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012Joshua McKenty
 
OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)
OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)
OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)Joshua McKenty
 
Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015
Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015
Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015Joshua McKenty
 

Destaque (15)

Arista Piston Webinar
Arista Piston WebinarArista Piston Webinar
Arista Piston Webinar
 
The Space Penguin Odyssey
The Space Penguin OdysseyThe Space Penguin Odyssey
The Space Penguin Odyssey
 
OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -
OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -
OpenStackDC and Cloud Foundry Meetup -
 
Scale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStack
Scale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStackScale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStack
Scale-out Community: Lessons from OpenStack
 
Cloud Power - The Early OpenStack Architecture
Cloud Power - The Early OpenStack ArchitectureCloud Power - The Early OpenStack Architecture
Cloud Power - The Early OpenStack Architecture
 
WSTA Breakfast Seminar
WSTA Breakfast SeminarWSTA Breakfast Seminar
WSTA Breakfast Seminar
 
But What About Docker?
But What About Docker?But What About Docker?
But What About Docker?
 
OpenStack: Cloud's Big Tent
OpenStack: Cloud's Big TentOpenStack: Cloud's Big Tent
OpenStack: Cloud's Big Tent
 
MSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of Guilder
MSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of GuilderMSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of Guilder
MSST-2013 Openstack in the Land of Guilder
 
vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101
vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101
vGeek 2013 Tech Talk: Openstack-101
 
Open Stack DC
Open Stack DCOpen Stack DC
Open Stack DC
 
OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014
OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014
OpenStack Foundation Transparency Committee Update - January 2014
 
Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012
Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012
Wall-Street Technology Association (WSTA) Feb-2012
 
OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)
OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)
OpenStack: The evolution of computing (Credit Suisse Technology Summit)
 
Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015
Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015
Open stack + Cloud Foundry: Palo Alto Meetup February 2015
 

Semelhante a Open stack security emea launch

AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)
AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)
AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)Amazon Web Services
 
Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...
Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...
Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...NoNameCon
 
3.Secure Design Principles And Process
3.Secure Design Principles And Process3.Secure Design Principles And Process
3.Secure Design Principles And Processphanleson
 
Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01
Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01
Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01mcguireb
 
Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019
Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019
Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019MarcVilanova1
 
LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death Star
LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death StarLF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death Star
LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death StarLF_APIStrat
 
Hacking the future with USB HID
Hacking the future with USB HIDHacking the future with USB HID
Hacking the future with USB HIDNikhil Mittal
 
BSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be Hunted
BSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be HuntedBSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be Hunted
BSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be HuntedAlex Davies
 
How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...
How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...
How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...AbundioTeca
 
Chaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in Production
Chaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in ProductionChaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in Production
Chaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in ProductionKeet Sugathadasa
 
Using Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton Chuvakin
Using Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton ChuvakinUsing Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton Chuvakin
Using Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton ChuvakinAnton Chuvakin
 
Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009
Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009
Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009Jason Shen
 
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2Claus Cramon Houmann
 

Semelhante a Open stack security emea launch (20)

AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)
AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)
AWS re:Invent 2016: Cyber Resiliency – surviving the breach (SAC321)
 
Your First Guide to "secure Linux"
Your First Guide to "secure Linux"Your First Guide to "secure Linux"
Your First Guide to "secure Linux"
 
Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...
Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...
Nazar Tymoshyk et al - Night in Defense Workshop: Hunting for a needle in a h...
 
3.Secure Design Principles And Process
3.Secure Design Principles And Process3.Secure Design Principles And Process
3.Secure Design Principles And Process
 
Cloud trust
Cloud trustCloud trust
Cloud trust
 
Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01
Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01
Cloudtrust 091204053223 Phpapp01
 
In Cloud We Trust
In Cloud We TrustIn Cloud We Trust
In Cloud We Trust
 
Black ops 2012
Black ops 2012Black ops 2012
Black ops 2012
 
Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019
Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019
Incident Response Automation @ Netflix Q12019
 
LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death Star
LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death StarLF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death Star
LF_APIStrat17_Don't Build a Death Star
 
Hacking the future with USB HID
Hacking the future with USB HIDHacking the future with USB HID
Hacking the future with USB HID
 
BSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be Hunted
BSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be HuntedBSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be Hunted
BSides London 2017 - Hunt Or Be Hunted
 
Broken by design (Danny Fullerton)
Broken by design (Danny Fullerton)Broken by design (Danny Fullerton)
Broken by design (Danny Fullerton)
 
How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...
How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...
How to Avoid the Spying of EEUU & other Practical Solutions Computing: Protec...
 
Chaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in Production
Chaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in ProductionChaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in Production
Chaos Engineering - The Art of Breaking Things in Production
 
Using Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton Chuvakin
Using Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton ChuvakinUsing Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton Chuvakin
Using Logs for Breach Investigations and Incident Response by Dr Anton Chuvakin
 
Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009
Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009
Stanford Cybersecurity January 2009
 
Ethical Hacking
Ethical HackingEthical Hacking
Ethical Hacking
 
Windows network security
Windows network securityWindows network security
Windows network security
 
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
Presentation infra and_datacentrre_dialogue_v2
 

Último

Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Jeffrey Haguewood
 
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMECloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMESafe Software
 
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsArchitecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsWSO2
 
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In PakistanCNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistandanishmna97
 
Platformless Horizons for Digital Adaptability
Platformless Horizons for Digital AdaptabilityPlatformless Horizons for Digital Adaptability
Platformless Horizons for Digital AdaptabilityWSO2
 
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 AmsterdamDEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 AmsterdamUiPathCommunity
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...Zilliz
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfsudhanshuwaghmare1
 
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsMS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsNanddeep Nachan
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businesspanagenda
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerThousandEyes
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...
Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...
Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...apidays
 
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Bhuvaneswari Subramani
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...apidays
 
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Victor Rentea
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingEdi Saputra
 
Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)Zilliz
 
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor PresentationDBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor PresentationDropbox
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAndrey Devyatkin
 

Último (20)

Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
Web Form Automation for Bonterra Impact Management (fka Social Solutions Apri...
 
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FMECloud Frontiers:  A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
Cloud Frontiers: A Deep Dive into Serverless Spatial Data and FME
 
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native ApplicationsArchitecting Cloud Native Applications
Architecting Cloud Native Applications
 
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
+971581248768>> SAFE AND ORIGINAL ABORTION PILLS FOR SALE IN DUBAI AND ABUDHA...
 
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In PakistanCNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
CNIC Information System with Pakdata Cf In Pakistan
 
Platformless Horizons for Digital Adaptability
Platformless Horizons for Digital AdaptabilityPlatformless Horizons for Digital Adaptability
Platformless Horizons for Digital Adaptability
 
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 AmsterdamDEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
DEV meet-up UiPath Document Understanding May 7 2024 Amsterdam
 
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ..."I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
"I see eyes in my soup": How Delivery Hero implemented the safety system for ...
 
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdfBoost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
Boost Fertility New Invention Ups Success Rates.pdf
 
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectorsMS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
MS Copilot expands with MS Graph connectors
 
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire businessWhy Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
Why Teams call analytics are critical to your entire business
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...
Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...
Apidays New York 2024 - Passkeys: Developing APIs to enable passwordless auth...
 
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
Elevate Developer Efficiency & build GenAI Application with Amazon Q​
 
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
Apidays New York 2024 - The Good, the Bad and the Governed by David O'Neill, ...
 
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
Modular Monolith - a Practical Alternative to Microservices @ Devoxx UK 2024
 
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost SavingRepurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
Repurposing LNG terminals for Hydrogen Ammonia: Feasibility and Cost Saving
 
Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
Introduction to Multilingual Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG)
 
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor PresentationDBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
DBX First Quarter 2024 Investor Presentation
 
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of TerraformAWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
AWS Community Day CPH - Three problems of Terraform
 

Open stack security emea launch

  • 2. Me: Joshua McKenty Twitter: @jmckenty Email: joshua@pistoncloud.com Former Chief Architect, NASA Nebula Founding Member, OpenStack OpenStack Project Policy Board
  • 3. “If you think technology can solve your security problems, then you don’t understand the problems and you don’t understand the technology.” – Bruce Schneier
  • 4.
  • 5. The Three Pillars of Security
  • 7. Real Security Assume everything goes wrong, even impossible things.
  • 8. FIPS 199 Definition: Confidentiality Integrity Availability Defining Security
  • 10. Build on “Shared Nothing” to achieve “Trust No One” Also known as “Defense in Depth” AUTOMATE EVERYTHING “Fat Fingers” == Plausible Deniability Automated == non-repudiable change control Build to the OSI 7-layer model
  • 12. Lock your doors Do your background checks Use separate physical networks for admin Network model and management Use RFC 1918 address space when appropriate Use VLANs if necessary Firewall every machine (ebtables, iptables) Border firewalls (port and protocol level) Layer 1, 2 and 3
  • 13. Never assume it’s bilateral
  • 14. Control system access Best case: no host-based shell access AT ALL. Second-best: federated AUTH with 2-factor, keys only Worstcase: Host-level root login with passwords Run IDS – on hosts and guests Scan Continuously – hosts and guests, on all networks Proactively defend – Fail2Ban, etc. ( F2B-a-a-S) Layer 4, 5, 6 and 7
  • 15. Don't trust the hypervisor (TXT / TPM) Conversely, don't trust the VM (blue-pill exploits, etc.) Host-based FW within the VM (CloudPassage "Halo") Access-control for VMs – same approaches apply (Auth-as-a-Service) Layer ‘V’
  • 16. “Proof” and Policy In God We Trust – All Others, Bring Data.
  • 17.
  • 18. Classic best practices – redundant, off-site log servers Log aggregation and analysis / event detection Logging-as-a-Service Log early, log often
  • 19. Make and verify your assertions (Coming soon…) CloudAudit
  • 20. Did you remember to delete his account?
  • 21. Security Theatre “Given enough hand-waving, all systems are secure.”
  • 22.
  • 23. Crypto is useless – if keys are stored with the data Private networks are useless – if doors aren’t locked Certification only proves that you’re doing, what you said you were going to do. You can still be wrong. Forget “Trust, but verify”. Just don’t trust. Don’t get confused!
  • 24. Bonus: Forensics It’s not an “If” – it’s a “When”
  • 25. Have a chaos-monkey of compromise Can you perform forensics and remediation, without impacting other users of your cloud? Spanning ports and extra storage “Graveyard” for recently deleted images, instances Bonus Section: Forensics
  • 26. What’s in the CloudPipe? “We can only see a short distance ahead, but we can see plenty there that needs to be done.” – Alan Turing
  • 27. The Machine Aka “Sneaky Monkey” Continuous Integration of penetration and vulnerability testing.
  • 28. We’re doing “stuff” No… really. Hardening
  • 29. Outfoxing the fox Intel is working with many companies within OpenStack, including Piston. Trusted Execution
  • 31. Matt Linton – Nebula CSO Jesse Andrews – AnsoLabs Founder Soo Choi – 7120.7 Nazi Matt Chew- Spence – FIPS 199 Guru Keith Shackleford and James Williams Chris Kemp Bobby Cates, Dave Swagger, E. Lopez, Grace De Leon, Guy with Gun #1, Guy with Gun #2… Credits

Notas do Editor

  1. I have 30 minutes for a 2 hour talk, so I’ll cover this at a high level, and I’ll make myself available for more detailed questions afterwards.
  2. It’s not an “if” – it’s a “when”
  3. 80% of all security attacks come from current or former employees or contractors.Assume every host in your network is or will be compromised, and plan accordingly.
  4. (splunk, syslog-ng)