Guest lecture for undergraduate class in contemporary maritime security.

1. THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY
5 APRIL 2010
MATTHEW GILLIS
MA CANDIDATE, POLITICAL SCIENCE, DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH ASSISTANT, CENTRE FOR FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

2. OBJECTIVES
 TO DEMONSTRATE THE NEED FOR A TYPOLOGY OF
NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIPS.
 TO ESTABLISH A TYPOLOGY OF NAVY/COAST GUARD
RELATIONSHIPS WORLD-WIDE.
 TO OFFER POLICY OPTIONS FOR NAVY/COAST GUARD
REFORM IN CANADA AS THEY ARE PRODUCED BY
THIS TYPOLOGY.
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

3. 1. WHY A T YPOLOGY?
 THE [RE]EMERGING NEED FOR A PRESENCE IN
CANADA‟S „THIRD OCEAN.‟
“...the Canadian Forces must have the capacity to exercise control over
and defend Canada‟s sovereignty in the Arctic. New opportunities are
emerging across the region, bringing with them new challenges. As
activity in northern lands and waters accelerates, the military will play
an increasingly vital role in demonstrating a visible Canadian presence
in this potentially resource-rich region...”
Canada First Defence Strategy, 8, emphasis added
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

4. 1. WHY A T YPOLOGY?
 PROBLEM: THE CANADIAN FORCES HAVE THE
MANDATE FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE IN
INTERNAL/TERRITORIAL CANADIAN WATERS,
BUT LACK THE EXPERIENCE OR EQUIPMENT
NECESSARY FOR A SUSTAINED ARCTIC
PRESENCE.
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

5. 1. WHY A T YPOLOGY?
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

6. 1. WHY A T YPOLOGY?
 THE CANADIAN COAST GUARD (CCG) HAS THE
EXPERIENCE AND THE EQUIPMENT...
“It is the CCG that annually sends its most capable units into the high
Arctic, including Canada's largest icebreaker, CCGS Louis S. St. Laurent.
Each summer, up to eight CCG icebreakers provide not only scientific
research platforms, search-and-rescue capability, pollution response
capacity, support for commercial shipping engaged in the annual
„sealift,‟ and occasionally „platform‟ support for the RCMP and Armed
Forces, but the big red and white hulls are also the main element in
Canada's sovereignty presence in these waters...”
Former deputy commissioner of CCG Michael Turner, “Guarding Canada's northern coast,” Ottawa Citizen, 13
July 2007.
...BUT NOT THE MANDATE.
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

7. 1. WHY A T YPOLOGY?
 SO WHY NOT AN ENFORCEMENT MANDATE FOR THE CCG?
“A fairly widespread belief exists that the Canadian Coast Guard should undertake all the
domestic maritime security roles in a similar manner to the US Coast Guard. This is more
easily said than done. The US Coast Guard is very different from the Canadian Coast Guard in
being a paramilitary (non-unionized) force with a broad maritime enforcement mandate that
draws in responsibilities that in Canada are shared between several government
departments. Although such a change could be authorized with the stroke of a pen, making
the related operational transformation would be costly and time consuming.
Moreover, one has to ask if the coast guard people would be prepared to work on a basis of
continual (24/7) availability or accept far broader responsibilities with the associated
personal risk – the unlimited liability criteria under which the military serves. Does the
present coast guard structure include people to maintain and operate such things as complex
electronic systems, weapons and helicopters? Can an existing coast guard ship muster and
land an armed force, albeit limited in capability, to provide a government presence ashore in
a remote area in the face of a crisis? Could the Canadian Coast Guard undertake the
essential data management task presently done by the navy?”
Commander (Ret‟d) Peter Haydon, “Do We Really Need a Canadian Navy?”, Canadian Naval Review 5:3.
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

8. 2. BUILDING A T YPOLOGY
 THE UNITED STATES IS NOT THE ONLY OTHER NATION
WITH A COAST GUARD.
 OF THE APPROXIMATELY 150 NATIONS WITH A
COASTLINE, 72 HAVE COAST GUARDS.
 SO, HOW IS EVERYONE ELSE RUNNING BUSINESS?
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

9. 2. BUILDING A T YPOLOGY
 GENERATING SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIPS
BETWEEN COAST GUARDS AND NAVIES...
1. MANY NATIONS, INCLUDING CANADA AND THE U.S., HAVE BOTH A
COAST GUARD AND A NAVY.
2. SOME NATIONS, LIKE MEXICO AND DENMARK, HAVE NO COAST GUARD
– ONLY A NAVY.
3. EVEN A FEW NATIONS, LIKE ICELAND AND JAMAICA, HAVE NO NAVY –
ONLY A COAST GUARD.
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

10. 2. BUILDING A T YPOLOGY
 GENERATING SOME OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE ENFORCEMENT
MANDATES OF COAST GUARDS...
1. ONLY TWO NATIONS, CANADA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, HAVE
CIVILIAN COAST GUARDS (I.E., NO ENFORCEMENT MANDATE).
2. MANY NATIONS (52) HAVE COAST GUARDS WITH A LIMITED
PARAMILITARY ENFORCEMENT MANDATE.
3. SOME NATIONS, LIKE THE U.S., INDIA, AND EGYPT, EMPOWER THEIR
COAST GUARDS WITH A MILITARY ENFORCEMENT MANDATE.
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

11. 2. BUILDING A T YPOLOGY
 NAVY/COAST GUARD ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE
CLASSIFIED UNDER TWO HEADINGS:
Coast Guard Mandate Navy/Coast Guard Relationship
Civilian Full Coast Guard
Paramilitary Divided Responsibility
Military Full Military
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

12. 2. BUILDING A T YPOLOGY
Navy/Coast Guard Relationship
Full Coast Guard Divided Responsibility Full Navy
Civilian
(0) Canada, United Kingdom (2)
Algeria, Argentina, Australia*, Azerbaijan*, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Bulgaria*, Djibouti*, Ecuador,
Equatorial Guinea, Estonia*, Finland, France, Brazil, Brunei, Cambodia,
Georgia, Germany, Greece, Indonesia*, Iran*, Cameroon, Colombia, Croatia,
Coast Guard Mandate
Ireland, Israel, Italy*, Ivory Coast*, Japan, Kenya*, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea,
Paramilitary
Lebanon*, Lithuania, Madagascar*, Malaysia, Gabon, Guatemala, Honduras,
Burundi, Costa Rica,
Mauritania*, Morocco*, Myanmar, Netherlands, Laos, Malawi, Mexico,
Iceland, Mauritius,
Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, PRC, Philippines, Poland*, Montenegro, North Korea,
Panama, Seychelles (6)
Republic of Korea, Russia*, Saudi Arabia, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay,
Singapore*, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, Portugal, Romania, Senegal,
Thailand, Tunisia*, Turkey, Ukraine*, United Arab Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria,
Emirates, Yemen (52) Venezuela, Vietnam (27)
* = no dedicated coast-guarding org.
Military
Cape Verde, Jamaica, Chile, Egypt, India, Kuwait, Norway, Peru, Tanzania,
Trinidad and Tobago (3) United States, Uruguay (9)
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

13. 2. BUILDING A T YPOLOGY
 THE CANADIAN ARRANGEMENT, AS A
CIVILIAN/DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY CASE, IS UNIQUE.
Personnel Strength
Active Naval Navy % Nav. Res. Nav. Res. Coast Guard CG % of
Strength Strength of Active Strength % of Navy Strength Navy
Canada 64,000 11,100 17.3 4,200 37.8 9,350 84.2
USA 1,498,157 341,588 22.8 128,293 37.6 40,500 11.9
Global
196,860 24,612 12.5 8,696 35.3 4,837 19.7
Average
Less USA 178,531 20,148 11.3 6,702 33.3 4,026 20.0
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

14. 3. POLICY OPTIONS
Navy/Coast Guard Relationship
Full Coast Guard Divided Responsibility Full Navy
Eliminate the Navy
Civilian
Status Quo
Keep the Coast Guard as is
Coast Guard Mandate
Paramilitary
Eliminate the Navy Keep the Navy as is
Eliminate the Coast Guard
Give Coast Guard Security Mandate Give the Coast Guard Security Mandate
Assign coast-guarding duties
to Navy
Keep the Navy as is
Eliminate the Navy
Military
Give the Coast Guard Military Mandate
Give Coast Guard Military Mandate
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

15. 3. POLICY OPTIONS
 EACH OPTION IMPLIES A VARIETY OF NEEDED
REFORMS, COSTS, AND BENEFITS.
 EXAMPLE: PARAMILITARY COAST GUARD / DIVIDED
RESPONSIBILITY MODEL
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

16. 3. POLICY OPTIONS
 PARAMILITARY COAST GUARD / DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY:
 NEEDED REFORMS
 REVISIT EXISTING LEGISLATION, E.G. OCEANS ACT
 PROVIDE CCG WITH NECESSARY TRAINING/ARMAMENTS.
 RE-BALANCE NAVY‟S COMMITMENTS
 COSTS
 FINANCIAL COSTS
 ADDED RISKS/RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CCG
 BENEFITS
 AMELIORATES THE MANDATE/EXPERIENCE DEFICIT IN THE ARCTIC.
 NAVY‟S RETURN TO MORE TRADITIONAL HOMELAND DEFENCE/OVERSEAS
DEPLOYMENTS?
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010

17. WHICH OPTION FOR CANADA?
Navy/Coast Guard Relationship
Full Coast Guard Divided Responsibility Full Navy
Eliminate the Navy
Civilian
Status Quo
Keep the Coast Guard as is
Coast Guard Mandate
Paramilitary
Eliminate the Navy Keep the Navy as is
Eliminate the Coast Guard
Give Coast Guard Security Mandate Give the Coast Guard Security Mandate
Assign coast-guarding duties
to Navy
Keep the Navy as is
Eliminate the Navy
Military
Give the Coast Guard Military Mandate
Give Coast Guard Military Mandate
QUESTIONS?
THE GLOBAL NAVY/COAST GUARD RELATIONSHIP J.M. GILLIS
A MANDATE-BASED T YPOLOGY 5 APRIL 2010