1. Slide #2:
‐On September 11, 2001, a total of 19 hijackers took control of four domestic airplanes.
‐These hijackers crashed two of these planes into the World Trade Center towers approximately eighteen
minutes apart. The third plane was crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth, and last plane, was crashed
into a rural field in Somerset County, Pennsylvania, after the hijackers were overtaken by a group of
passengers.
‐A total of 2,986 people died, including the 19 hijackers, as a result of the worse act of terrorism in
modern‐day history.
Slide #4:
• Phase 1: Post 9/11 Response
• Phase 2: Post 9/11 Issues for Consideration
• Phase 3: National Intelligence Agency Concept
Slide #8:
Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community…: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence & U.S. House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
‐The development of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS)‐based “all‐source terrorism
information fusion center.”
‐Legislation which would instill “jointness” throughout the Intelligence Community (IC).
‐There was a lack of information sharing between agencies due, in part, to the culture and history of
the IC.
‐There was an ineffective domestic intelligence capability and a failure to fuse information between
law enforcement and intelligence agencies.
‐The United States Government (USG) failed to properly prioritize terrorist threats and
counterterrorism efforts which resulted in insufficient analysis of
threats posed by terrorist organizations such as al‐Qaeda.
‐The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was not given proper authority to direct and enforce
policies within the IC.
‐The USG relied too heavily on foreign liaisons as a means of obtaining intelligence on al‐Qaeda and
failed to insert human assets to penetrate the terrorist
organization.
‐Recommended the creation of the position of Director of National Intelligence.
Slide #9:
9/11 Commission:

2. Quoted in a November 8, 2005, statement to the Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and
Terrorism Risk Assessment (Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives), former
Vice‐Chair of the 9/11 Commission, Lee H. Hamilton:
“Poor information sharing was the single greatest failure of
our government in the lead‐up to the 9/11 attacks. The
failure to share information adequately, within and across
federal agencies, and from federal agencies to state and
local authorities, was a significant contributing factor to our
government’s missteps in understanding and responding to
the growing threat of al Qaeda in the years before the 9/11
attacks. There were several missed opportunities to disrupt
the 9/11 plot. Most of them involved the failure to share
information”
In an August 2004 report, the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggested that the 9/11
Commission failed to address problems regarding the intelligence cycle (collection, processing and
analyzing), clandestine operations and information technology system capabilities.
The study asserts the following problems concerning the 9/11 Commission Report:
• The Commission used tunnel vision in its analysis of the overall weaknesses of the IC and did not
fully address the problems which are present within the IC.
• The analysis of problems related to counterterrorism capabilities were viewed as a separate issue
from the analysis into the problems of the IC.
• There was no analysis of the problems related to intelligence during military operations.
• While there are several recommendations, few of them are coupled with thorough cost/time
analysis. Also, the recommendations do not include the human capital and IT systems needed to
pursue those implementations.
• The Commission fails to understand and analyze how intelligence is received and used by the
policy makers. “It does not examine the flow of documentation and advice provided by the
policy level community or does enough to analyze how the policy level uses intelligence”
• The Commission fails to understand the amount of data which is collected by the IC and
therefore any failures by the IC are assumed by the policy level community to be fixable to a
certain extent. The policy level community does not realize that the vast amount of information
which is collected produces an infinite number of possible patterns which there is not sufficient
staffing to follow‐up on.
• While it was recommended that a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and a host of other reforms be implemented, the Commission
focused “on lines of coordination and authority, not on the intelligence process and intelligence
quality” (Cordesman, 2004, p.6). Furthermore these recommendations fail to take into the
consideration the bureaucratic impact and additional layers of administration which would be
formed as a result of these recommendations.
• The Commission focuses on the increase of information sharing and the centralization of the IC
but fails to address the fact that a majority of the intelligence budget is under the control of the
Department of Defense (DoD). Therefore, adding additional layers of bureaucracy will not
necessarily change some of the implementation problems present within the intelligence cycle.

3.
Slide #10:
The Senate Intelligence Committee (July 7, 2004) found that:
‐The IC suffered from “groupthink” which led to the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq,
issued in October 2002, to be either overstated or
unsupported due to a heavy reliance on intelligence gleaned from United Nations (UN)
inspectors and other foreign sources.
‐The Senate Intelligence Committee’s report revealed that the IC had no human assets inserted
in Iraq after 1998.
‐The main focus of the recommendations issued by the Senate Intelligence Committee (2004)
focused on more in‐depth analysis and use of human
assets for intelligence gathering instead of foreign services and report.
The Butler Committee Report: Lord Butler (2004) and his committee, issued the Review of Intelligence on
Weapons of Mass Destruction:
‐Recognized that the problems regarding groupthink and reliance on foreign services for
intelligence was not specific only to the United States IC
The WMD Commission Report:
‐The WMD Commission’s recommendations included the granting of more authority to the DNI.
‐Establishing a National Counterproliferation Center (NCPC)
‐Creation of an Open Source Directorate, long‐term and strategic analysis units within the
National Intelligence Council (NIC), a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)‐based National
Security Service (NSS) and the establishment of a National Intelligence University (NIU)
Slide #11:
National Security Act of 1947:
• Created the United States Department of Defense (DOD) headed by the
Secretary of Defense.
• Accomplished through the merger of the Department of War and Department
of the Navy.
• Separated the Air Force from the Army Air Forces.
• Created National Security Council (NSC).
• Meant as a central place of coordination for national security policy within the
Executive Branch of the United States Government.
• Created Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headed by the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI).
• Nation’s first peacetime intelligence agency.

4. DCI considered head of Intelligence Community acting under the direction of
•
the President & NSC.
Homeland Security Act of 2002:
• Creation of the Department of Homeland Security
• Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS): The HSAS was created on March 11, 2002
through the Homeland Security Presidential Directive‐3 (HSPD‐3). Though HSPD‐3 was
published prior to the passage of the HSA on November 25, 2002, responsibility of
administering the system was transferred from the United States Attorney General to
the Secretary of Homeland Security. The primary purpose of the HSAS was to be a
“universally understandable, consistent and reliable national threat notification
system”.
• Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC): HSOC was created to “serve as the
nation’s nerve center for information sharing and domestic incident management—
dramatically increasing the vertical coordination between federal, state, territorial,
tribal, local, and private sector partners” (DHS, 2004, p.1). Through the use of the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), HSOC “fuses information from a variety
of sources to help deter, detect, and prevent terrorist acts” by issuing advisories and
bulletins based on real‐time monitoring.
Slide #15:
Executive Order 13354:
• Authored by President George W. Bush on August 27, 2004.
• Ordered the establishment of NCTC headed up by the DCI.
• Built on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) model which had been developed
post‐9/11.
• The NCTC was developed on the Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) model and
created for the following reasons:
• To serve as the primary organization for “analyzing all intelligence possessed or
acquired…pertaining to terrorism and counterterrorism” (EO‐13354, 2004, p.1).
“Serve as the central and shared knowledge bank on known and suspected
terrorists and international terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies,
capabilities, and networks of contacts and supports” (EO‐13354, 2004, p.1).
“Ensure that agencies…have access to and receive all‐source intelligence
support needed to execute their counterterrorism plans or perform
independent, alternative analysis” EO‐13354, 2004, p.1).
• The NCTC brings together members from various Federal, State and local
agencies including (NCTC, 2006):
• Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
• Department of Agriculture (DOA)
• Department of Defense (DOD)
• Department of Energy (DOE)

5. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
•
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
•
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
•
Department of Justice (DOJ)
•
Department of State (DOS)
•
Department of Treasury (DOT)
•
National Geospatial‐Intelligence Agency (NGIA)
•
National Regulatory Commission (NRC)
•
United States Capitol Police (USCP)
•
Executive Order 13356:
• Authored on August 27, 2004
• The President ordered that a common set of standards be implemented to allow for the
maximum distribution and sharing of information among the IC as well as other Federal,
State, local and tribal entities.
• Furthermore, taking into consideration classification levels which prevents some
information from being shared, the President ordered intelligence/terrorism reports to
be produced at “multiple versions at an unclassified level and at varying levels of
classification, for example on an electronic tearline basis, allowing varying degrees of
access by other agencies and personnel commensurate with their particular security
clearance levels and special access approvals” (EO‐13356, 2004, p.1).
Slide #19:
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
• December 17, 2004
• Director of National Intelligence (DNI): The DNI took over the primary responsibilities of
the DCI however, by law, is no longer based out of the CIA. Among other
responsibilities, the DNI is to promote information sharing among the Intelligence
Community (IC) and coordinate the relationships between the IC and foreign services
(IRTPA, 2004).
• Information Sharing Environment (ISE): The ISE was created to “establish a secure [ISE]
for the sharing of intelligence and related information in a manner consistent with
national security and the protection of privacy and civil liberties, incorporating specified
attributes” (IRTPA, 2004, p.174).
Slide #20:
DCI Responsibilities = three main areas:
• The DCI was responsible for reporting all national intelligence activities to the President,
various senior officials and, where appropriate, to Congress (Best et al., 2005).
• “The DCI [had] served as head of the Intelligence Community with authorities to
establish priorities for collection and analysis, to develop and present to the President
the annual budget for national intelligence programs, and, within tightly prescribed
limits, to transfer funds and personnel from one part of the National Foreign Intelligence
Program (NFIP), recently renamed the National Intelligence Program (NIP), to another”
(Best et al., 2005, p.4).

6. The DCI directed day‐to‐day operations within the CIA including, but not limited to,
•
human collection efforts, covert and counterterrorism operations, as well as various
analytical efforts (Best et al., 2005).
The IRTPA assigned the DNI the first two responsibilities formerly held by the DCI and
•
created the position of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (DCIA) to handle
the third task (IRTPA, 2004).
Presidential Daily Brief (PDB):
• Former DCI Peter Goss admitted that the PDB took approximately six hours of his
workday each day to prepare.
• DNI Negroponte requested involvement from several agencies and received reviews
from the State Department = divergent viewpoints and FBI = first time in 2 years prior to
2005 that they were asked to provide input.
Control of Intelligence Budget:
• Following the passage of the IRTPA, Congress failed to reorganize its committees and
alter the way it conducts oversight in relation to the IC. The reasoning behind this is
complicated and political but for this discussion it will suffice to state that such a change
would possibly compromise the secrecy of the intelligence budget.
• At the end of the day, the DNI was not granted his own unified intelligence budget,
however, it did give him authority on paper to develop and execute around 80 percent
of intelligence spending, including the budgets of the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA), and the intelligence shops of the FBI and the Departments of State,
Homeland Security, Energy, and the Treasury.
• That authority also extends to the biggest part of the intelligence budget, namely, the
money for the Pentagon’s national collection agencies: the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the National Geospatial‐
Intelligence Agency (NGIA) (Fessenden, 2005, p.5‐6).
• It is significant because approximately 80% of the intelligence budget is allocated to the
DoD (Treverton, 2005).
Coordination of Intelligence:
• The NCTC “oversees three video teleconferences a day linking main counterterrorism
officials and posts intelligence on a classified website accessible to some 5,000
government analysis” (Shane, 2006, p.2‐3).
• While this is a step in the right direction there still is no one single database which
unites all IC information and intelligence. Currently NCTC analysts have access to “26
information networks across the intelligence agencies (housed in three computers on
each analyst’s desk) however it is not possible to conduct a search across all 26
networks (Fessenden, 2005, p.8).
• “NCTC analysts can share information with each other person‐to‐person, but if they
wish to share information with intelligence colleagues outside of the NCTC, they must
get the permission of the originating agency” (Fessenden, 2005, p.9).

7.
Slide #21:
National Intelligence Strategy:
• Published in October 2005
• Contained within the document are several very important and revolutionary changes
meant to enhance information sharing:
• “Remove impediments to information sharing within the Community, and
establish policies that reflect need‐to‐share (versus need‐to‐know) for all data,
removing the “ownership” by agency of intelligence information” (Negroponte,
2005, p.21).
• “Build a user‐friendly system that allows customers to find needed intelligence
and access it immediately” (Negroponte, 2005, p.21).
• “Develop flexible and secure networks adaptable to a rapidly changing
environment and capable of getting intelligence in an unclassified form to non‐
traditional customers such as state, local, and tribal governments and the
private sector” (Negroponte, 2005, p.21).
• “Create an intelligence ‘cyber community’ where analysts, collectors, and
customers can interact swiftly and easily in considering classified information”
(Negroponte, 2005, p.22).
• “Redefine classification guidelines to allow for a large body of ‘sensitive’
information with flexible use and sharing arrangements, and a smaller body of
‘restricted’ information available to fewer personnel” (Negroponte, 2005,
p.23).
• “Establish uniform and reciprocal IC guidance on security issues of common
concern, including access to facilities, and electronic access to systems and
database” (Negroponte, 2005, p.23).
• “Ensure the various IC elements conducting counterintelligence activities act as
a cohesive whole to undertake aggressive, unified counterintelligence
operations” (Negroponte, 2005, p.24).
Slide #24:
Role of Military Intelligence:
• On May 24, 2007, SecDef Gates and DNI McConnell signed a memorandum of
agreement establishing a dual‐hatting role by the Under‐Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence as also the Director of Defense Intelligence within the organizational
structure of the ODNI (ODNI, 2007).
• The current under‐secretary is James R. Clapper who stated that the “creation of the
Office of the Director of Defense Intelligence is in recognition of the importance of
coordinated intelligence efforts to the national security of the United States…this office
will serve to strengthen the relationship between the DNI and the DoD” (ODNI, 2007,
p.1).

8. Then on July 19, 2007, the Chief Information Officers (CIOs) for the DoD and DNI
•
announced a memorandum of agreement establishing a shared vision for a joint‐
services based information sharing environment to enhance homeland security,
intelligence and information sharing (ODNI, 2007).
Human Capital Management:
“Personnel are the critical element in any major organizational transformation. A strategy for progressive
intelligence reform, therefore, must focus on maximizing the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community’s
most crucial resource‐it’s people” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.4).
• To that extent, President George W. Bush instituted Chief Human Capital Officers within
the USG structure including the IC. DNI Negroponte chose Dr. Ronald P. Sanders as the
first Chief Human Capital Officer of the IC.
• To properly implement this plan and in accordance with the IRTPA (2004), the DNI had
also instituted the National Intelligence University (NIU) System which is meant to
integrate the training and education of the IC members into one single facility (ODNI,
2005).
• To further the new concept of “jointness” among the IC, the IRTPA also authorizes the
DNI to “establish positions specifically designed to involve service in two or more
agencies within the IC during the course of a career, and to provide rewards for
undertaking missions with planning or analysis involving two or more agencies of the IC”
(Center for American Progress, 2005, p.14).
• In conjunction with the new importance placed on human capital the DNI, on February
10, 2006, announced the first recipients of the “Director of National Intelligence Fellows
Award.” = $200,000 grant
• National Security Education Program (NESP) which was created as part of the David L.
Boren National Security Education Act of 1991. This program provides scholarships and
fellowships to undergraduate and graduate students to study languages, area studies
and other national security related fields (NSEP, 2006). =2005 = $8 million appropriation
act into trust fund
• Intelligence Community Scholarship Program = “as a return for each year of assistance,
students would commit a two‐year term of service as an employee of an agency in the
IC” (Center for American Progress, 2005, p.15).
Analysis of Progression:
• DNI J.M. McConnell = 100 day plan “lays out specific, measurable short‐term goals:
• Create a Culture of Collaboration
• Foster Collection and Analytic Transformation
• Build Technology Leadership and Acquisition Excellence
• Modernize Business Practices
• Accelerate Information Sharing
• Clarify and Align DNI’s Authorities
• Move from a “need to know” to a “responsibility to provide”
• Move from 100 day plan to 500 day implementation plan

9. Slide #27:
Directorate for Customer Outcomes
Potential intelligence customers would submit, via an online form located on a secured website,
requests for information, operations, details, etc. to the Directorate for Customer Outcomes. Requests
would only be considered if they were submitted via the secured website thereby creating a standardized
method which could be tracked. Once a request has been approved it will be flagged and forwarded to
the appropriate Directorate, whether that is the Directorate of Analysis or the Directorate of Collection.
Directorate for Analysis
All raw intelligence information would be submitted to the Directorate for Analysis. The
Directorate of Analysis would be where all analysts are housed and informational databases maintained.
A “Library of Intelligence” would be utilized and housed within the Directorate for Analysis. This would
allow analysts to reference previously completed material, research and analysis to prevent unnecessary
duplicative efforts. This library would be located on several secure local and remote servers to prevent a
complete collapse or infiltration of the information.
Directorate for Collection
The Directorate for Collection would be the largest of these five divisions as it would encompass
all intelligence gathering operations and collection disciplines (IMINT, SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, and
OSINT). All covert operations would be initialized, carried out and monitored by the Directorate for
Collection. All information obtained during any operation would be forwarded to the Directorate for
Analysis. All operations would be recorded and would require after‐action reports to be inputted before
the file could be closed. This will attempt to prevent information from being lost during the transfer to
the Directorate for Analysis.

10. Directorate for Management
The Directorate for Management would be a two‐part directorate responsible for ensuring that
compliance measures are being met by the other Directorates. Also, since this Directorate is termed
“Build It” it will be responsible for all science and technology developments and inventions as required by
the Directorates for Analysis and Collection.
Directorate for Information Sharing
The Directorate for Information Sharing would be responsible for the timely dissemination of
reports to the appropriate agencies. This Directorate would also be in charge of redacting documents in a
timely manner as dictated in the National Intelligence Strategy (2005).
This Directorate would further comply with the National Intelligence Strategy (2005) by ensuring
that information is being utilized based on a need‐to‐share basis and not the need‐to‐know foundation
which was a factor in the impediments to information sharing which plagued the IC (Negroponte, 2005).
Along similar lines, the Directorate of Information Sharing would “redefine classification guidelines to
allow for a large body of ‘sensitive’ information with flexible use and sharing arrangements, and a smaller
body of ‘restricted’ information available to fewer personnel” (Negroponte, 2005, p.23). The Directorate
of Information Sharing will have its personnel detailed to the other Directorates to aid in the timely
development and sharing of information.
The problems which exist with the current‐day IC in relation to multiple databases, as was
discussed during the second research paper, would not be an issue with the NIA. There would be a single
database which would be setup by clearance level. Depending on user clearance level the database will
dictate what information you are allowed to access. If the user attempts to access information outside of
their clearance level, the system will alert the user to contact the appropriate department to have their
clearance changed or the information redacted to their clearance level depending on the situation.
Concept Analysis
The National Intelligence Community of Britain is already structured similar to this
recommendation. Britain divides their intelligence and counterterrorism responsibilities across only a

11. couple agencies. The British Security Service (most commonly known as MI5) is responsible for “gathering
and assessing security intelligence, taking action to counter national security threats, and advising the
government and various departments on the nature of national threats” (Henderson, 2003, p.208). The
British Secret Intelligence Service (most commonly known as MI6) is mandated to produce “secret
intelligence in support of the security, defense, foreign, and economic policies of the British government”
(Henderson, 2003, p.208). MI5 and MI6 are the two main security and intelligence services however they
are assisted by the Government Communications Headquarters which is responsible for SIGINT collection
and assessment; the Defense Intelligence Staff whose primary responsibility is towards military
intelligence; Special Air Service, Special Branch‐Metropolitan Police, and the National Criminal Intelligence
Service. These additional agencies each have separate mandates however the two main agencies for
security, counterterrorism and intelligence are MI5 and MI6.
This organizational system would be similar to having DHS and the NIA within the United States.
There would be other support agencies whose missions were similar such as the FBI and other Federal,
State and local law enforcement agencies but the main agencies would be DHS and the NIA when it came
to the protection of the United States and prevention of terrorist attacks within the homeland and
abroad. Such a system would require a close working relationship with the DoD as it appears has been
taking place in recent years.
Concept Criticisms
The creation of the NIA is certainly a viable concept which would, in theory, revolutionize the IC
and fix many of the problems which have been identified throughout this document. However, it may not
be the best option and could possibly hinder progress already being made by the IC.
One of the first obvious concerns of such a creation would be the problems experienced by the
formation of DHS. DHS currently employs approximately 180,000 people, spread across more than 20
agencies with a budget of approximately $36.5 billion per year and is currently the third largest cabinet‐
level department within the USG (Bogdanos, 2005). This has created an atmosphere plagued by
“personality conflicts, bureaucratic bottlenecks and an atmosphere of demoralization, undermining its

12. ability to protect the nation against terrorist attack, according to current and former administration
officials and independent experts” (Mintz, 2005, p.1). Former DHS Inspector General Clark Kent Irvin
stated: quot;DHS is still a compilation of 22 agencies that aren't integrated into a cohesive whole…quot; (Mintz,
2005, p.3).
Many of the comments currently being issued by former high‐ranking officials within DHS such as
Irvin sound eerily familiar to those made during the post‐9/11 investigations and inquiries which were
discussed earlier. Therefore, would the creation of the NIA only set the IC back in time to an earlier
version of the community who was not making progress in information sharing and cohesion? There is no
correct answer however DHS statistics rival those of the IC and would therefore propel the NIA past DHS
on the rankings. It must be expected that the standing up of an NIA would not be as smooth as provided
through the utopian concept outlined above. Inherent in such a consolidation would be similar ingrown
problems as currently being experienced by DHS. Also, the concept of keeping specialties separated
needs to be considered.
The IC has “evolved over nearly 50 years and now amounts to a confederation of separate
agencies and activities with distinctly different histories, missions and lines of command. Some were
created to centralize the management of key intelligence disciplines. Others were set up to meet new
requirements or take advantage of technological advances” (Brown et al., 1996, p.10). It can be expected
that over time there has been a duplication of effort among agencies. However, the various agencies
each have distinctive missions which are focused on specific areas of the intelligence cycle or intelligence
disciplines. For example, the CIA is focused on HUMINT while the NSA is focused on SIGINT. This allows
each agency to specifically recruit for those disciplines. The standing up of an NIA may cause problems
with such recruitment as the concept has suggested that the agencies would not simply be transferred
under a new departmental heading but instead stripped of their titles and reorganized under new
directorates. Therefore, since the CIA and NSA wouldn’t exist any longer, it would be the responsibilities
of the Directorates of Management and Collection to recruit personnel. This presents some benefits such
as the cross‐training and jointness which has been suggested through previous recommendations
however it may also cause the recruitment of specialties to be lost and instead a focus on those who can

13. learn multiple disciplines. The ability to learn multiple disciplines is important and an attractive quality
but there is still a need to have operators and analysts who are specifically trained in certain intelligence
disciplines.