Napoleon Part 2, session viii

Napoleon
Part Two
session viii
Waterloo & St. Helena

Napoleon
Part Two
session viii
Waterloo & St. Helena

La Paix de 1815

I felt that Fortune was abandoning
me, I no longer had the feeling that
I was sure to succeed.

--Napoleon

major topics for this session

✦ 18 June

✦ D’Erlon’s Attack

✦ Ney’s Charge

✦ The Crisis

✦ St. Helena

✦ Postscript

A Wet Miserable Night

The enemy followed close after us. The rain began to fall in torrents… The
night was very bad. The ﬁeld where we were was all mud. I got a bundle of
straw to lie upon, and I smeared an old blanket with thick clayey mud, and
covered myself with the blanket, which prevented the rain from passing
through, and kept me tolerably warm.
At daylight the weather cleared. The men commenced cleaning their arms
and preparing for the tremendous contest.

Simmons, Riﬂe Man, p. 364

At ﬁrst light on the 18th both armies gratefully stretched themselves and
shrugged off the miseries of the previous night. At long last it had stopped
raining, although the ground underfoot remained sodden. The soldiers of both
sides were hungry, for the supply arrangements were far from satisfactory,
but the British 95th made the most of their limited resources, as Captain
Kincaid related. “We made a ﬁre...and boiled a huge camp kettle full of tea,
mixed up with a suitable quantity of milk and sugar, for breakfast; and, as it
stood on the edge of the high road, where all the bigwigs of the army had
occasion to pass, in the early part of the morning, I believe almost every one
of them, from the Duke downward, claimed a cupful.”

Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, p. 1064

Lady Elizabeth Butler, Dawn of Waterloo, c. 1893

Blücher and Gneisenau planned boldly. Instead of merely reinforcing
Wellington they would seize the initiative from Napoleon. Bülow,
marching shortly after 0400, 18 June, would proceed to Chapelle-St.-
Lambert (hereafter referred to as St.-Lambert). If Wellington was not
engaged, Bülow was to hold his corps under cover behind that town,
thus conserving his freedom of action. If the battle had begun, he was
to attack Napoleon’s right flank. Pirch would follow immediately
behind him. Zieten and Thielmann were told to stand ready. Blücher,
despite his injuries, would lead the Prussian advance. Gneisenau,
knowing that the Prussians would be dangerously exposed if
Wellington either withdrew or was quickly defeated, was chiefly
concerned with learning whether Wellington really would fight.

Bülow’s corps was as yet undefeated, and Bülow himself was the best
of the Prussian corps commanders. However, he had bivouacked well
east of Wavre, and Gneisenau’s orders routed him by one crooked
road, through the heart of the town. Pirch, also on the east bank,
could have cleared Wavre before Bülow appeared, but he was
required to watch Bülow march past, as it proved, from 0500 to 1300
(1pm). Thielmann, whose corps had suffered least of those engaged at
Ligny--and who was already on the west bank--was left placidly
sitting. Wavre soon was packed with an enormous trafﬁc jam as
northbound wagon trains, and those elements of Thielmann’s corps
which had spent the night on the east bank, wedged into Bülow’s
columns. At noon, Zieten was ordered to Ohain….

Napoleon, as previously noted, had planned to begin his attack at
0900. At that hour, however, Reille’s sluggish corps was just passing
Le Caillou, with most of the Guard infantry, Kellermann, Lobau, and
Durutte still behind him. (The Guard infantry had become scattered
the night before in attempting to get forward along footpaths and side
roads.) Moreover, the senior artillery ofﬁcers considered the ground
still too soft. While waiting, Napoleon dictated an order to Grouchy,
explaining that he was about to attack Wellington, but had become
concerned over reports that the Prussians were massing at Wavre.
Grouchy was to move against any Prussians in that area, detaching a
few light cavalry to observe those who retired eastward.

Though Napoleon believed himself slightly outnumbered (he knew
Wellington’s total strength, but was not aware that almost a fifth of it
was waiting uselessly at Hal), he was full of confidence. According to
several moralizing legends, Soult, Reille, and d’Erlon warned him of
Wellington’s skill in defensive fighting and were rudely rebuked,
Napoleon having no taste for defeatist talk before action. Sometime
before 1000, he received a message (written at 0600) from Grouchy.
Grouchy reported that he was leaving Gembloux at that moment for
Wavre, and that most of the Prussians seemed to be attempting to join
Wellington by way of Brussels. At about 1030, Napoleon ordered
Jacquinot to detach a hussar regiment to reconnoiter Lasne, Couture,
Mousty and Ottignies. This regiment’s primary mission probably was
to seek contact with Grouchy; any enemy information picked up in the
process would be a useful bonus.

As his troops formed, Napoleon again rode along his outpost line for a
final study of Wellington’s position, sending out several officers on
specific reconnaissance missions. One of these, General Haxo of the
engineers, was to locate any field fortifications that Wellington might
have erected. Haxo reported that there were none, which was not
entirely correct, Wellington having hastily barricaded the roads and
loopholed the houses along his front. His inspection completed,
Napoleon rode through the ranks of his army, supervising and
hastening their deployment, and rousing them to a savage pitch of fury
and devotion.

Grouchy could easily have marched at 0300, but there were delays,
and it was almost 0730 before Vandamme moved out. Grouchy
reached Walhain at about 1000. Here an aide-de-camp, whom he had
dispatched earlier on a reconnaissance toward Mousty, rejoined to
report that there were no Prussians between Grouchy and the Dyle
River. (This meant that he had managed to overlook Bülow’s
reinforced regiment in Mont-St.-Guibert.) Highly pleased by this
news, Grouchy sent off an awkwardly worded written letter to
Napoleon, requesting orders for 19 June, and prepared to enjoy his
lunch.

Meanwhile, Exelmans had pushed aggressively on Wavre. Around
0930, his scouts developed masses of Prussians (Pirch, plus stray
elements of Thielmann) east of the town. Heavily outnumbered and
unable to attack effectively because of the broken, wooded country
along the Dyle, Exelmans nevertheless snatched enough prisoners to
prove that Blücher’s whole army had been on the move since morning
to join Wellington. Sending this alarming news back hotspur to
Grouchy, Exelmans took up a position to cover the Gembloux-Wavre
road and the Ottignies bridge.

[Napoleon’s] attack plan was simple enough: Drouet’s corps to strike
Wellington’s center which was defending the ridge north of La Belle
Alliance; simultaneously Prince Jérôme’s division of Reille’s corps to
move on Hougoumont farm to threaten Wellington’s right sufﬁciently to
cause him to weaken his center.

Asprey, p. 397

Napoleon’s line stretched about 3 miles east from the Nivelles-Brussels
road, the allied line about 2 ½ miles northeast from Hougoumont.
Opposing strengths have been variously cited but Napoleon probably
mustered around 70,000 effectives with nearly 250 guns, Wellington
perhaps 65,000 with 150 cannon. If Napoleon had weakened himself by
sending off Grouchy’s right wing, Wellington had reciprocated by leaving a
corps 17,000 strong to guard what he still feared to be his vulnerable
extreme right….

Asprey, p. 397

British Battalion Strengths

At Waterloo, only three battalions had 1,000 or more of all ranks, two of
them Foot Guards, the strongest was the 52nd (1,167) and the weakest
the 42nd (338, having suffered heavy losses at Quatre Bras two days
before) with an average strength of 600….the average number of ofﬁcers
was about 34 per battalion, ranging from the 52nd’s 59 to the 42nd’s 17
(the latter having suffered 18 ofﬁcer casualties at Quatre Bras).

Haythornthwaite, British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, pp. 11 & 19

Wellington’s position was deceptively strong. It’s backbone was a low, narrow plateau, running generally west-
east...its crest marked by the [Ohain] road. The plateau’s south slope was relatively steep; this combined with the
fortuitous bogging at its foot, would take much of the shock out of the French attacks. Wellington’s second line and
reserves, held behind the plateau, were relatively shielded from French observation and fire. East of the Brussels
highway, his first line was given considerable cover and concealment by high, thick hedges along the Ohain road; for
450 yards west of the highway, the road itself was sunk to a depth of from five to seven feet, forming a natural
entrenchment.

1000 0
scale in yards

(Of Wellington’s whole army, only Bijlandt’s Dutch-Belgian brigade was completely exposed.) Across the southern
approaches to the plateau was a line of strongly built farmhouses--each surrounded by walled gardens and
outbuildings--and small woods, which Wellington had organized for defense. Of these, the strongest and best
prepared for defense was Hougoumont; next, covering the British center, was La Haye-Sainte and the sandpit
behind it; to the east Papelotte and La Haye.

1000 0
scale in yards

Wellington’s left ﬂank was in the air, but it was anticipated that Blücher’s early arrival would correct this. He had
thoroughly intermixed the various national units under his command, so that his veteran British and German
regiments would stiffen their less reliable comrades. Most of his artillery was placed in his front line.

1000 0
scale in yards

Between the two armies, the ground was relatively open and level, offering good fields of fire. To the
east, the terrain was wooded and rough. Generally steep-banked and swollen by the recent rains,
Lasne Brook was a definite obstacle.
The ridgeline along which the French formed was slightly higher that Wellington’s position, but not
high enough to provide good observation of his second line and reserves.

k
oo
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scale in yards

Napoleon’s dispositions were such as to permit him to maneuver in any direction, yet gave no
preliminary hint as to the probable direction of his main effort. Though generally far more efﬁciently
organized than its opponent, his army now suffered from several crippling weaknesses: with Grouchy
absent and Mortier ill, neither the reserve cavalry nor the Guard had a commander of its own; Ney,
left in command of Reille and d’Erlon, assumed that his authority still extended to Kellermann’s corps;
Soult had not yet mastered his assignment, remaining content to send one copy of an order when “my
poor Berthier would have sent six.”

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scale in yards

Napoleon’s plan was simple and drastic. He needed a quick, complete victory, both to restore his old
prestige and to free his hand to deal with his other enemies. Under normal conditions, he undoubtedly
would have maneuvered to envelop Wellington’s left ﬂank, exploiting his greater mobility to thus
strike Wellington’s tactical ﬂank and, at the same time, drive him away from Blücher. But such a
movement at best would be time-consuming, and now--with the ground still boggy in every hollow--
could only proceed at a crawl. Wellington would have warning enough to withdraw to the west or
northwest, leaving Napoleon only an indecisive tactical success. He therefore chose a direct attack on
Wellington’s left. Reille would launch a secondary attack toward Hougoumont, in the hope of
attracting some of Wellington’s reserves, while a heavy artillery preparation would be put down on the
English left and center. D’Erlon would then attack toward Mont-St.-Jean….Once it was cleared, his
engineers would organize it as a strong point….Approximately 80 cannon were massed in one great
battery along a low ridge in front of d’Erlon. Though the best position then available, it was
approximately 1,000 yards from Wellington’s front--a rather long range, even for 12-pounders.

k
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1000 0
scale in yards

could only proceed at a crawl. Wellington would have warning enough to withdraw to the west or
northwest, leaving Napoleon only an indecisive tactical success. He therefore chose a direct attack on
Wellington’s left. Reille would launch a secondary attack toward Hougoumont, in the hope of
attracting some of Wellington’s reserves, while a heavy artillery preparation would be put down on the
English left and center. D’Erlon would then attack toward Mont-St.-Jean….Once it was cleared, his
engineers would organize it as a strong point….Approximately 80 cannon were massed in one great
battery along a low ridge in front of d’Erlon. Though the best position then available, it was
approximately 1,000 yards from Wellington’s front--a rather long range, even for 12-pounders.

k
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1000 0
scale in yards

Reille was ordered to mask Hougoumont by occupying the woods south of it. At about 1120, his
artillery (reinforced by Kellermann’s horse artillery) opened. While Pire demonstrated west of the
Nivelles road, Jerome led a brigade into the woods, clearing them by 1215. This brought him up
against the massive chateau. Wild with success, Jerome tried to rush its six-foot park walls, was
bloodily repulsed, then committed his second brigade west of the chateau. Though mauled by British
artillery, this attack momentarily lapped around to the north face of the chateau. A handful of French
broke in the gate there, but were quickly wiped out. Wellington fed in more and more reinforcements,
but the drain on the french was proportionately greater. All of Jerome’s division and, later, one
brigade of Foy’s became entangled in this ﬁght for an objective Napoleon never wanted.

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An ofﬁcer of the Tenth Hussars noted:
It was the ground that took off the effect of shot, much from its being deep mud,
from the rain and the tramping of horse and foot---so that often shot did not
rise---and shells buried and exploded up and sending up the mud like a fountain.
I had mud thrown over me in this way often.
quoted in Black, p. 96

Mike Chappell, The King’s German Legion (2) 1812-1816 in the Osprey MEN-AT-ARMS series, p. 23

Wellington’s Strong Points

✦ Hougoumont

✦ La Haye Sainte

✦ Papellotte-La Haye-Smohain (PLHS)

The Coldstream Guard Close the Gate at Hougoumont

The battle of Waterloo began at Hougoumont; the fighting there
throughout the afternoon of 18 June was extremely important in the final
outcome. The large farm or château with its walled garden, hedge-
enclosed orchard and woods was so located that possession meant a great
deal. As we have seen, Wellington may well have considered this
rectangle the center of his position early in the day. It formed a kind of
natural strong point which drew enemy units towards it as a magnet does
iron filings. The French attacked Hougoumont with ferocity and
determination for many hours, but never succeeded in taking it
completely. They may have expended more military strength here than
was warranted by its value to the Duke, or to them.

Weller, p. 86

A giant French lieutenant2 seized an axe from one of his pioneers and
weakened the bar where it was exposed between the doors. He then led a
charge which crushed the doors inward breaking the bar. In an instant,
many French rushed into the courtyard. But Macdonell himself and
several ofﬁcers and men including Sergeant Graham3 closed the gates by
main strength, replaced the bar and killed or incapacitated every enemy
soldier inside, probably helped by musket ﬁre from the surrounding
buildings.
_________
2 Sous-Lieutenant Legros of the 1st Légère, nicknamed L’Enforceur
3Sergeant James Graham received in 1817 a small annuity as being ‘the bravest man’ at Waterloo

Weller, p. 91

The battle for Hougoumont was to continue all day, and this serves as a
reminder that events were taking place simultaneously across the battleﬁeld.
Although it was (and is) [and will be in this account] the general pattern of
exposition, in practice there was no sequence of isolated grand French
attacks staged while other units, both French and British, remained isolated
as spectators.

Black, p. 100

Diagram drawn in the 1830s
reproduced in Chappell,
op. cit.

Weller, Wellington at Waterloo, map 7, p. 234

The Defense of La Haye Sainte-Adolph Northen in the 1850s

8th Line Bn KGL
1st Nassau Regt Grubenhagen Bn York Bn
Halkett’s Brigade

33rd Kielmansegge’s Brigade Ompteda’s Brigade
Bremen Bn
Verden Bn 5th Line Bn KGL 1st Light Bn KGL
Lüneburg Bn
2/73rd
2/69th
2/30th

Cleves’ Battery KGL

17 La Haye Sainte and barricade
across the highway, held by
2nd Light Bn KGL
16 Divisional skirmishers; note 2 light 18 Sandpit
Lloyd’s Battery RA companies in reserve behind the line (R) held by 1/95th

Haythornthwaite, British Napoleonic Infantry Tactics, PLATE G

PLATE J: LA HAYE SAINTE
The defense of the farmhouse of La Haye
Sainte was one of the epics of the battle of
Waterloo….the post was entrusted to Major
George Baring and six companies of the 2nd
Light Battalion, King’s German Legion. The
farm and its outbuildings were held until the
great French attack late in the day, Baring
having been reinforced by the skirmishers of
the 5th KGL Line Bn and some 200 Nassauers.
This plate depicts a moment in the defense,
with an officer and men of the 2nd Light Bn,
and a sharpshooter from the 5th Line Bn,
whose equipment was of ‘rifle’ style but in
whitened leather.

Haythornthwaite, British Rifleman, 1797-1815,
NOTES ON PLATE J, p. 60

All these roads cut so deeply into the
sandy clay hillsides as to present
extreme problems for cavalry or infantry
in formation trying to cross them.

AGAIN
orientation
opposite

The most important feature here is the deﬁle south of the two farms

All these roads cut so deeply into the
sandy clay hillsides as to present
extreme problems for cavalry or infantry
in formation trying to cross them.

AGAIN
orientation
opposite

The small stream running through marshland, the
sunken roads and the deﬁle itself were considerable
military obstacles, particularly in view of the wet
condition of the countryside on 18 June 1815.
Weller, p. 134
The most important feature here is the deﬁle south of the two farms

SMOHAIN

LA HAYE
PAPELOTTE

Photo taken from the southwest

Saxe-Weimar’s position was naturally strong; the Nassauers appear to have
had both time and tools to strengthen it with barricades, loop-hole walls and
buildings, and to post artillery so as to be partially protected, but able to
support the infantry. Saxe-Weimar was a ﬁrst-rate leader and a better than
average tactical commander. He held La Haye and Papelotte securely
during a period that was perilous for the Duke’s ﬁrst line farther to the
west.
The stability of Wellington’s left virtually depended upon his connection
with the Prussian Army…

Weller, pp. 138-139

Shortly before 1300 (1 pm), the great battery was ready to ﬁre. Ney requested permission to
launch the main attack. Even as Ney requested orders, Napoleon’s attention was called to an odd
change in the appearance of the ridge around St. Lambert. The whole area was darkening, as if a
large body of troops was massing there. Some of his staff dismissed it as merely the shadow of a
cloud, but cavalry was sent to make certain. If there were troops at St. Lambert, they could only
be enemy. The riddle was solved when Jacquinot’s hussars brought in a group of Prussian
prisoners and an intercepted message from Bülow to Wellington, revealing that Bülow was at St.
Lambert and Blücher’s other three corps around Wavre. Grouchy, the prisoners said, was not in
contact with the Prussians.

The situation demanded a quick decision, which might determine the fate of France and
Napoleon. The French army was fully deployed, but not committed, and so could still withdraw.
Napoleon believed Wellington slightly stronger than himself; in addition, he now had a big
Prussian corps on his right flank, with the rest of Blücher’s army behind it. In 1814, Napoleon
probably would have retired. Now, only quick and decisive victory would suffice. Even if he
withdrew successfully and recalled Grouchy, he would find himself badly outnumbered by the
combined armies of Blücher and Wellington, while other Allied armies were closing in all along
France’s frontiers.

Napoleon courageously chose the bolder course. Even if Wellington should be considerably
reinforced, he was certain of his ability to beat both Wellington and Bülow. Also, Bülow plainly
was not rushing to the rescue of his ally, and Grouchy should now be close enough to Wavre to
have ﬁxed a considerable portion of the Prussians there. Lobau, with Domon and Subervie,
would cover the French right ﬂank. Grouchy was warned that he must march at once to rejoin
the main army and crush Bülow.

Bülow had marched slowly, apparently forgetting his orders en route. Arriving at St.-Lambert,
he neither kept his troops under cover nor attacked. At 1500 (3 pm), with his corps fully
assembled, he was still sitting bashfully in full view around St.-Lambert, unwilling to risk a cross
ing of Lasne Brook. A small Prussian detachment had entered the Bois de Paris, but made no
effort to establish contact with the French right ﬂank. Blücher was back along the road from
Wavre, urging his troops forward through the mud.

Bois de Soignes

At Walhain, Grouchy’s lunch was interrupted by the swelling
sound of artillery fire off to the west. Local citizens placed it along
the southern edge of the Bois de Soignes. Gerard and several other
senior officers immediately urged Grouchy to march to the sound of
the guns. The discussion grew hot, Grouchy, disliking both the
advice and the vehemence with which it was offered, stood stiffly
on his orders--as he understood them--to “follow the Prussians,”
and refused Gerard’s request to be allowed at least to take his own
corps westward. (Had he taken this advice, Grouchy could have
reached the outskirts of Napoleon’s battle by 1900. His mere
approach probably would have kept Blücher off Napoleon’s right
flank.)

Bois de Soignes

At this point (about 1230), Exelmans’ courier came in to report
Wavre swarming with Prussians. Grouchy at once moved on that
town with Vandamme and Gerard. Pajol now reported no trace of
Prussians around Tourinnes; Grouchy ordered him to seize Limale.

Bois de Soignes

Fighting had already begun east of Wavre, the Prussian detachment from Mont-St.-Guibert having
made a dash through Exelmans’ outpost line to reach the town. Grouchy ordered Vandamme to seize
the heights along the east bank of the Dyle, while Exelmans turned the left flank of the Prussian rear-
guard position there. He then rode briefly southward toward Limelette in hopes of getting a better
idea of the constantly growing battle to the west. Returning, still unenlightened, he was overtaken by
a staff officer with Napoleon’s order of 1000, directing him to march on Wavre. Feeling thereby
justified, Grouchy continued to Wavre, to find that Vandamme had, despite his orders, shoved his
head into a sack. Attacking from march column, without reconnaissance or artillery preparation,
Vandamme had quickly cleared the east bank, but lost heavily in repeated, unsuccessful attempts to
rush the Wavre bridges. Caught under the plunging fire of the Prussian batteries on the high west
bank, his troops in the eastern suburb could neither advance nor withdraw.

Bois de Soignes

Thielmann had received orders at about 1500 (3 pm) to march on Couture, leaving two battalions
to garrison Wavre. On attempting to march, he found the roads blocked by Pirch and Zieten until
around 1600. Considering Exelmans no real threat, he then began moving off, but Vandamme’s
appearance forced him to halt and improvise a defense. His effort was somewhat haphazard. One of
his brigades, ordered to retire into corps reserve, wandered off to Ohain. Fortunately, one of Zieten’s
brigades (probably equally lost and confused) had remained at Limale. The ﬁghting was hard, but
indecisive. Grouchy made several attempts to cross above and below Wavre, but was thwarted by
swampy terrain and the determined defense.

Bois de Soignes

At St.Lambert, Bülow gingerly began crossing Lasne Brook sometime after 1500. The slopes were
steep, the bridge narrow, the troops weary; more important, Bülow was unenthusiastic. About 1600,
an unexpected outburst of artillery ﬁre from the direction of Wavre shocked the Prussians. But
Blücher, seeing Wellington under heavy pressure, ﬁnally browbeat Bülow into continuing the
crossing (1630). By 1800, all of his corps was across and ready for action.

The great battery had pounded the Anglo-Dutch left center and left ﬂank for
about a half-hour when (at roughly 1345) d’Erlon advanced. Thanks to its
sheltered position, the anglo-Dutch infantry (except Bijlandt’s brigade) had
suffered relatively little.

The French quickly cleared the enclosures around La Haye-Sainte, but--
lacking artillery--could not break into the main buildings. The sand pit and
Papelotte were captured; Bijlandt’s ill-used brigade ran away. Wellington
sent a battalion to reinforce La Haye-Sainte, but Travers rode it down, then
hunted the skirmishers covering Wellington’s center. Marcognet plunged
across the Ohain road, but Donzelot halted just short of it to deploy. As his
jumbled battalions struggled into line, Picton shouted Pack and Kempt
forward in a counterattack. Staggered by English volleys and artillery fire,
the French gave some ground, but then hung just below the Ohain road in a
furious fire fight. Picton was killed.

Seizing the exact moment, Uxbridge charged. Somerset’s brigade of British
guard cavalry caught Travers crossing the Ohain road, and drove him down-
hill. Somerset then turned on Bachelu, but was thoroughly repulsed.
Ponsonby’s three regiments charged the flanks of Allix’s, Donzelot’s, and
Marcognet’s struggling divisions. Completely surprised, the French were
herded back across the valley, losing 3,000 men and two eagles. Two
companies of French artillery, caught in the stampede were overrun.
Brilliantly begun, the charge now ran wild. Seeing the great battery
threatened, Napoleon ordered another of Milhaud’s brigades forward;
Jacquinot swung his lancers to the left. Ponsonby was killed, his brigade
wrecked. Durutte had been advancing steadily until the defeat of d’Erlon’s
other divisions left his flank exposed. Though attacked by Vandeleur, he
retired in fair order. Repulsed by Durutte’s reserve regiment, Vandeleur was
finally driven off by Jacquinot.

According to a local peasant, Decoster, forced to serve Napoleon as a guide
on June 18, the Emperor was greatly impressed with the bearing of such
Allied troops as he could see from near La Belle Alliance. “How steadily those
troops take the ground! How beautifully those cavalry form! Look at those
grey horses! Who are those ﬁne horsemen? These are ﬁne troops, but in half
an hour I shall cut them to pieces.”

Chandler, p.1066

Negotiating the difficult sunken road, the Scots Greys charged into action.
“All of us were greatly excited,” recalled Corporal John Dickson, “and began
crying, ‘Hurrah, Ninety-Second! Scotland Forever!’” It so happened that
their advance took them through the 92nd Highlanders, whose blood was also
fully up, and many of the kilted infantry grabbed hold of the horses’ stirrups
and were borne into the fray. There was no withstanding such pressure.
Although the French infantry “fought like tigers” they were inexorably swept
back. Many men were cut down, more than 3,000 forced to surrender, and
both the 45th and the 105th Regiments lost their coveted eagles, the first being
captured by Sergeant Charles Ewart of the Scots Greys, the latter by an
officer and corporal of the Royal Regiment of Dragoons. Very soon, two-
thirds of d’Erlon’s shattered men were running down the slope in complete
disarray.

Chandler, pp.1078-1079

Scotland Forever! Lady Elizabeth Butler, 1881
depicting the start of the charge by the Royal Scots Greys at the Battle of
Waterloo in 1815. In actuality, it appears that Scots Greys never started the charge
at a gallop, due to the broken ground, and instead advanced at a quick walk.

The Eagle of the French 45th Ligne captured by the
Royal Scots Greys. Painted by Stanley Berkeley it
depicts the Scots Greys famous charge. The ﬁgures in
kilts carrying muskets are men of the 92nd Highlanders.
According to legend, the men of the 92nd hung on to the
stirrups of the Scots Greys during the charge. Although
both regiments record it as part of their history,
independent eyewitness accounts do not bear the legend
of the "stirrup charge" out.

Cotton, A Voice from Waterloo, pp. 60-61

Unfortunately, [the British cavalry] now yielded individually and collectively,
officers and men alike, to their greatest weakness. They became intoxicated
with what they had already done, and endeavored to accomplish the
impossible. Superbly mounted young officers were determined to
demonstrate their personal gallantry and forgot they were supposed to be
professional soldiers. Older officers who should have known better joined
them with no more appreciation of the proper employing of cavalry on a
battlefield than a novice in a nunnery. Nearly 2,000 heavy horsemen, who had
suffered trifling loss until this time, crashed through the French grand
battery, inflicting casualties and putting some guns out of action. They were
now completely out of hand; all order and formation were lost. They dashed
forward, however, individually and in small groups, on blown horses, in
muddy fields, against 30,000 formed French infantry, cavalry and artillery
including the entire Imperial Guard.. Uxbridge himself, as gallant and
dashing a man as ever lived, led the Household Brigade, but lost all control of
it. Ponsonby led his own with equal bravery and even less knowledge of his
job….
There was no appreciation of the professional duty of an officer in cavalry
regiments; they insisted on thinking of combat as a kind of glorious foxhunt.

Weller, pp.104-105

...the cavalry was hit by French counterattacks from front, and, more
seriously, from the lancers on their left. Due to the vulnerability of the
exhausted and disorganized British cavalry, these lancers, who could lack
ﬂexibility against prepared forces, proved particularly deadly, their long
lances unmatched by British swords….The British cavalry were driven back
with heavy casualties---including the commander of the Union Brigade,
Ponsonby, who was killed---while the French regained the guns of the Grand
Battery.

Black, p.106

The final defeat of the heavy cavalry does not entirely alter the importance of
their early success. The situation before their charge had been critical. Even
though they finally destroyed themselves, they inflicted further casualties on
the enemy, temporarily broke three divisions of French infantry and
completely drove back Napoleon’s second main attack. ‘It was a harrowing
sight to see the English cavalry breaking through and slaughtering these fine
divisions as if they were flocks of sheep. Intoxicated with slaughter, inciting
each other to kill, they pierced and cut down the miserable mass with glee.
The columns were shattered, divided, scattered, and hurled down to the
slopes by the swords of the dragoons.’ The final broken retreat of the British
heavy cavalry was covered in part by rockets discharged by Whinyate’s
Battery, R.H.A.3
_______
3 Wellington thought less than nothing of rockets because of their extreme inaccuracy and...ordered Whinyates to place
his in store and draw guns. But this battery definitely used both at Waterloo. Duncan, 438, says that it fired 52 rockets on
the 18th, all probably at this time.

Weller, p.105

Cotton, A Voice from Waterloo, p. 69

Ney’s Charge

French Cuirassiers attacking a Highland Square by Felix Philippoteau
(a reconstruction painted in 1874)

The French cavalry came forward in all its magnificence. Men, horses,
uniforms and weapons were remarkable.
The First Line of Cuirassiers shone in burnished steel, relieved by black horse-hair
crested helmets. Next came the Red Lancers of the Guard in their gaudy uniforms
and mounted on richly caparisoned steeds, their fluttering lance flags heightened the
brilliancy of their display. The Third Line comprising the Chasseurs of the Guard in
their rich costumes of green and gold, with fur-trimmed pelisses à la hussard, and
black bearskin shakos completed the gorgeous, yet harmonious, colouring of this
military spectacle.1

These were the French veterans who had been so often victorious under
Murat, Marshal Ney, the bravest of the brave, now led them. Hearts quailed
in the Allied army; more than one young soldier has set down in his memoirs
that he could not see how anything could withstand the mighty host of
mounted Frenchmen.2 Only the Peninsular veterans realized how little they
had to fear cavalry so long as they kept their formation and fire discipline.
________
1Siborne, 443
2Morris, 219 says, “Their appearance was of such a formidable nature, that I thought we could not have the slightest
chance with them.”

Weller, p. 109

D’Erlon’s shaken corps was not reformed until
almost 1600. Meanwhile Wellington reinforced La
Haye-Sainte; Napoleon ordered howitzers employed
against Hougoumont, where pointless brawling still
continued. Shellﬁre soon set the chateau aﬁre, but its
reinforced garrison held out in its walled garden and
chapel.

Assessing the situation, Napoleon now decided to smash the English center. Ordering Ney to clear
the way by taking La Haye-Sainte, he reinforced the great battery, told Pire to demonstrate toward
Braine l’Alleud, and began preparing his main attack.
Pire accomplished nothing. Ney again occupied La Haye-Sainte’s grounds, but could not take the
buildings. By 1600 the artillery duel reached an intensity surpassing Wagram. The more numerous
French guns got the upper hand; Anglo-Dutch losses in men and cannon mounted rapidly.

Under this pounding, Wellington’s fraying line fell back behind the crest of the plateau; Lambert, the
Brunswickers, and elements of Chasse were summoned from his right to rebuild his sagging center, as
was Vincke from his extreme left.

Half glimpsing this withdrawal through the smoke, Ney excitedly concluded that Wellington was
about to retreat. He ordered Milhaud forward. By some error, Lefebvre-Desnoëttes followed him.
The beginnings of this great cavalry charge were hidden from Napoleon by the dead space in the
valley below his command post. It was in full career when he first glimpsed it, and he could only
remark that it was an hour too early.
Again Ney bungled. Veering erratically across the field, he sent the cavalry against Wellington’s
right center, the least-damaged part of the Anglo-Dutch line. Neither horse artillery nor infantry
followed in support. The British artillerymen fired till the last minute, then took refuge in the nearest
square or ran. Slowed by the muddy slope, artillery fire, and the passage of the Ohain road and the
abandoned guns, the French cavalry came over the crest of the plateau to find the Anglo-Dutch
infantry in two lines of squares placed checkerwise. Without room enough to work up momentum,
met by point-blank musketry, their best efforts to break that infantry failed. Uxbridge
counterattacked, forcing them back down the slope. They rallied, and drove him in. Some English
guns got into action between charges, but many cannoneers simply vanished.

Napoleon had Domon’s report that Bülow was
ﬁnally advancing, and Grouchy’s message from
Walhain, indicating that Grouchy was still far
to the east. Grimly deciding that, premature of
not, Ney’s attack must be supported, he
ordered Kellermann and Guyot forward. This
actually was more cavalry than there was room
to use, but their attack was bitter and
prolonged. British accounts insist no squares
were broken; nevertheless, several seem to have
been thoroughly cut up. After a fourth
unsuccessful charge at 1800 (6 pm), the French
retired, shaken and discouraged, most of their
commanders wounded or dead.

Except for Vivian and Vandeleur, all of Wellington’s British cavalry was used up; much of his artillery
was out of action.

Ney suddenly remembered that he had
Bachelu’s division and one of Foy’s
brigades available, and thrust them,
unsupported, against Wellington’s line.
Caught in converging ﬁre, this effort
quickly crumbled.
Lobau meanwhile had repeatedly
defeated Bülow’s attempts to emerge
from the Bois de Paris. However,
exploiting their greatly superior numbers,
the Prussians began working clumsily
toward Placenoit.

Wellington and his staff were present, controlling this crucial stage of the
battle, with the duke needing to take shelter inside squares. His doing so
reflected Wellington’s personal stamina on what was a very long day and his
preference for direct presence in the key zone of conflict, as well as the fact
that he spent much of the battle on the right side of his position where the
conflict was fiercest. Wellington indeed wrote next day to Lady Frances
Webster, “The finger of Providence was upon me, and I escaped unhurt.”
Such a remark was at once a commonplace, a testimony to the extent to
which soldiers were religious and fatalistic, and an indication of the sense that
a great struggle, one wiyh pronounced religious and moral worth, was taking
place.

Black, pp. 117-118

If the French cavalry, the very ﬁrst squadrons of it, could have maintained
their speed and formation they would have won. A cuirassier and his horse
probably weighed about 2,000 pounds. Half a dozen acting together with
kamikaze courage in man and beast could have broken any battalion. This
never happened for a variety of reasons. The ﬁrepower of the squares was
probably most important, but the horses themselves often refused, perhaps
with some help from their riders. The lines of bayonets and the regular
volleys from such compact small human fortresses were too much for the
Frenchmen and their horses. The squadrons tended to funnel between the
squares rather than careering into them. An average battalion square was
only about 60 feet on a side; there was a much wider open space between two
squares. A maximum swerve of about 35 feet would take a horse and rider
around the formation and clear of its bayonets. Even the oblongs were usually
less than 100 feet.
Weller, p. 110

“We dashed them back as cooly as the sturdy rock repels the ocean’s
foam...we presented our bristly points like the peevish porcupines assailed by
clamorous dogs.”--Ensign Edmund Wheatley, KGL
quoted in Black, p. 153

The French force was formidable, but it faced several major hurdles. First,
there were the serious disadvantages of cavalry attacks on unbroken and
prepared infantry. Secondly, the French were outnumbered, and indeed
heavily so in the contact zone. Although there were ancillary French infantry
assaults on Hougoumont and La Haie Sainte, the cavalry attacked without
infantry support and faced a formidable force of about 14,000 infantry
supported by sixty-ﬁve cannon, and with nearly 8,000 cavalry available in
support. In a very different context, the situation pre-ﬁgured the German
tank attack on the well-entrenched and -prepared Soviets at Kursk in 1943,
an attack that also failed and, indeed, was seen as a turning point of the war
on the eastern front.
Black, p. 114

Three-quarters of the French generals in the French cavalry attack on the
British squares were killed or wounded.
Black, p. 120

No man but a veteran who had displayed
uncommon valor could join the Guard.
Guardsmen were paid more than other troops,
and uniformed in more splendor. In return more
was expected of them, yet the Guard had always
given it. The Guard had never been defeated.
Other French troops might grumble at the
Guard’s privileges, but when the bearskins and
long coats marched, victory was certain. The
Guards wore side-whiskers and mustaches… as
marks of their prowess. To be a Grenadier of the
Guard a man had to be six feet tall, an élite of an
élite.
The Guard were the Emperor’s ‘immortals,’
passionate in their loyalty to him, and fearsome
in battle for him. When Bonaparte had been
defeated and sent to Elba the Guard had been
ordered to disband, but rather than surrender
their colors they had burned the silk ﬂags,
crumbled the ash into wine, and drunk the
mixture. Some of the immortals had gone into
exile with their Emperor, but now

they had returned and been reunited with their
old comrades and been given new colors to fly
beneath new Eagles. The Guard was the élite,
the undefeated, the immortals of the Empire,
and the Guard would deliver the final lethal
blow that would obliterate the British.
But not yet. It was only six o’clock, there
were more than three hours of daylight left,
and the Prussians were far from ready to fight,
so there was time for the Emperor to wear the
British down yet further.

Cornwell, Waterloo, pp.314-315

French skirmishers had worked up close to La Haye-Sainte, and the defenders’ ammunition was
running low. Two of Ompteda’s battalions, sent to their relief, were surprised by cuirassiers. One was
destroyed, the other badly hurt before Uxbridge extricated it. Having ridden along his lines to check
the battle’s progress, at 1730 (5:30) Napoleon again ordered Ney to seize La Haye-Sainte. This time,
there was heavy artillery support, directed at both L H-S and the Anglo-Dutch positions behind it.

7:30 pm

yards

Personally leading an infantry regiment and a company of engineers, Ney took his objective at 1800
in a furious no-quarter assault. Simultaneously, Durutte retook Papelotte. French skirmishers
swarmed through the sandpit; Ney got several guns into action on the knoll just north of L H-S.
Seeing Wellington’s center deﬁnitely ﬂinching, he called on Napoleon for infantry reinforcements.

7:30 pm

yards

Napoleon was ﬁghting for his army’s life against Blücher.

7:30 pm

yards

Blücher’s enveloping attack finally had captured Placenoit. Prussian artillery fire was finally beginning
to reach French units along the Brussels Highway--Napoleon’s Line of Communications (LOC).
Napoleon committed Duhesme’s Young Guard division (4,000), recapturing Placenoit. Bülow
counterattacked, took a costly repulse, rallied, and attacked again--north, west and south. Duhesme was
mortally wounded; the Young Guard thrown out in disorder. Napoleon sent two Old Guard battalions
with orders to use the bayonet. Two battalions against fourteen, they flushed Placenoit, chasing the
Prussians back. Checked at last when Blücher concentrated every available man against their rush, they
retired unpursued. Some 3,000 Prussian casualties marked their track.

7:30 pm

yards

Lobau likewise had counterattacked [at Placenoit] successfully.
Though denied reinforcements, Ney pressed his attack. All along Wellington’s left ﬂank and center,
clouds of French skirmishers, supported by aggressively handled guns, worked up onto the plateau
in snarling, short-range ﬁghting. A few cuirassier squadrons followed, forcing the Anglo-Dutch to
stay in squares, or riding them down if they deployed.

7:30 pm

yards

Kemp was battered, Ompteda
was dead and his brigade
shattered; Kruse wavering;
French guns were demolishing
Kielmansegge’s ruined brigade
at 100-yard range.

7:30 pm

yards

Stalemated around
Hougoumont, the
French bypassed it
to the west, driving
in Clinton’s right
ﬂank.

7:30 pm

yards

Counterattacks by the Brunswickers and Kruse’s Nassau contingent collapsed. Even English regiments
faltered, having “fed death’ almost beyond endurance. The British and German cavalry sacriﬁced vainly;
Dutch-Belgian cavalry refused to charge; a Hanoverian hussar regiment ran away. The wounded, and
growing numbers of unwounded fugitives, streamed northward. Through this gathering disaster rode
Wellington, to all outward appearances icily unshaken, herding the Brunswickers forward again,
patching his gaping center with his last reserve artillery. Further reinforcements were en route from his
extreme right; meanwhile, it still would take the French some time to kill what remained of his veterans.

7:30 pm

yards

With Blücher repulsed [at Placenoit], Napoleon returned
at 1900 (7 pm) to his original battle. From the smoking
uproar east towards Wavre, Grouchy obviously was at
grips with a part of the Prussian army. In front, the battle
was at high crisis: some reinforcements had reached
Wellington’s center; Ney’s guns, north of L H-S, were
being smothered; in places, the French were being forced
off the plateau. But Durutte had taken Papelotte, and
Wellington’s right ﬂank was sagging. Insofar as Napoleon
could determine, Bülow was whipped, and Wellington’s
army so shattered that one more hard blow would ﬁnish it.

Prussian help was slow. Pirch began
crawling across Lasne Brook at about
1830. Thielmann [in Wavre] begged
for reinforcements, which Gneisenau
(ignorant of Grouchy’s true strength)
> THIELMANN >
refused. It was 1800 before Zieten’s
advance guard reached Ohain.
Wellington demanded that he reinforce
the Anglo-Dutch left; Blücher ordered
him to support Bülow. Both seemed
like unattractive lost causes. After
considerable mental jiggling, Zieten
ﬁnally moved against Durutte. His
confused artillerymen opened on Saxe-
Weimar’s brigade [because of their
blue uniforms!], stampeding it, but
Zieten’s advance gradually forced
Durutte back.

> THIELMANN >

Napoleon had eleven battalions of Old Guard infantry
available. Eight would attack Wellington’s center, with a
ninth detached to cover their left; two would remain in
reserve at Rossome. Several companies of Guard horse
artillery would advance with them, and Ney would
support them with every serviceable unit of Reille, d’Erlon
and the cavalry. Weary French artillerymen redoubled
their pounding.

As the battle drew to a close, Napoleon's Middle Guard launched an assault
on the British line, to the 52nd's left, and were met by a number of regiments
including the 1st Foot Guards, who repulsed the 3rd Chasseurs, but had to
themselves retreat when the 4th Chasseurs moved forward to threaten their
left. The 52nd, under Sir John Colborne, wheeled to the left, deploying
parallel to the French column, and fired volleys against their left flank.
William Hay, a Light Dragoon watching from the right, later recalled that
"so well-directed a fire was poured in, that down the bank the Frenchmen
fell and, I may say, the battle of Waterloo was gained." Seeing the 52nd
begin an advance, Wellington reputedly ordered "Go on, Colborne, they
won't stand!"; the battalion then advanced diagonally across the field.When
this was later followed by a bayonet charge by all of General Adam's 3rd
Brigade, the Guard broke, forced into full retreat. Having pursued the
French down the escarpment of Mont St Jean, the 52nd crossed the valley
floor (that at the start of the battle had separated the armies) and on the
other side attacked a square of Old Guard (part of the personal body guard
of Napoleon,) that had formed up to the British right of the inn La Belle
Alliance and forced it to retreat.
The 1/52nd were the largest battalion at Waterloo, and one of the few British
battalions operating at full strength. Of the 1,130 men and officers present,
Grenadier 168 were wounded, and 38 killed.
52nd Regiment Wikipedia
Light Division
Hill’s II Corps

As the Old Guard battalions came forward, Napoleon turned them over to
Ney, galloped eastward to rally Durutte’s reeling division, then dashed back
to press his main attack. He was too late. Ney---gone berserk---had
committed the ﬁrst ﬁve battalions as they came up. D’Erlon attacked once
more, but Reille scarcely budged. Only a handful of cavalry joined the
advance.

Instead of striking straight ahead, along the short, relatively sheltered route
into Wellington’s wrecked center, Ney led the ﬁve battalions northwestward
along the same diagonal track where he had sent the cavalry. Anglo-Dutch
guns behind Hougoumont enﬁladed their advance. Ney moved with them,
on foot, losing all control of the action.

Raked front and flank by artillery fire, the first battalion attacked just west of the
Brussels highway, routing the Brunswickers and driving Halkett’s battered troops. But
Chasse, arriving with a Dutch-Belgian brigade and battery, overwhelmed it by a flank
attack. Minutes later, the second battalion momentarily broke into Wellington’s center.
The third column (two battalions which had linked up during their advance) collided
with Maitland’s brigade and was driven downhill after a savage fight. The fifth
battalion, pushing through intense artillery fire, drove Maitland back, but was itself
outflanked by Adam.

The Guard’s repulse (around 2010)
staggered the French. La Garde recule!
Wellington ordered his whole line
forward. “Maitland, now’s your time!
They won’t stand!” Zieten wedged in
between Durutte and Lobau; Blücher
again assailed Placenoit. The panic cry
of “Sauve qui peut!” spread from
d’Erlons right ﬂank.

Napoleon did what he could. While his escort squadrons charged desperately to gain
minutes, he stationed the four uncommitted Old Guard battalions in a line of squares
below La Haye-Sainte. The two reserve battalions formed squares astride the Brussels
highway, just south of La Belle Alliance, ﬂanked by a battery of the Guard artillery.
Lobau was told that he must hold Blücher until the army withdrew behind him

Though some French batteries fought to the last, the Allied advance swept Reille and
d’Erlon before it. Donzelot had a brigade ﬁrmly in hand to cover his withdrawal, but
Ney wasted it in a hopeless counterattack---intended, apparently, merely to get himself
killed. The four Guard squares easily checked the British and Prussian cavalry, but
gradually disintegrated under the combined pressures of fugitives seeking protection
and Allied infantry and cavalry attacks.

Dernier carre de la Garde et Général Hill

This more acceptable quote was produced by a newspaperman.
The actual response was most likely Merde!
"La Garde meurt, elle not rend pas!"
The Guard dies, it does ne sesurrender!

The last remnant de la Garde et Général Hill
Dernier carre

Though his corps slowly frayed away as Zieten advanced into its rear, Lobau
somehow kept Blücher from the vital highway. The Guard sold Placenoit house
by blazing house,

Guard Chasseurs at
Placenoit, Dan Horsechief

LOBAU

Though his corps slowly frayed away as Zieten advanced into its
rear, Lobau somehow kept Blücher from the vital highway. The
Guard sold Placenoit house by blazing house, the Old Guard
battalions bayoneting their way out at the end. Blücher’s one feeble
attempt at a deep envelopment was routed by the Old Guard
battalion covering Napoleon’s headquarters.
Twilight and the confused convergence of the Anglo-Dutch and
Prussian advances delayed any immediate effective pursuit. The
Guard’s two squares near La Belle Alliance shrugged off all attacks,
withdrawing slowly, in perfect order. The Guard artillerymen there
ﬁred their last round, then stood stoically by their empty guns. Their
bluff gained their comrades a few minutes. Until the ﬁrst crisis
passed, Napoleon remained with one of the squares; he then rode
ahead to see if a stand could be made at Genappe.

Covered by the remaining units of the Guard, intermixed fragments
of other commands streamed toward Genappe. Reille attempted to
join them by a cross-country march, but most of his remaining
troops scattered when attacked by Prussian cavalry….The French
had fought furiously, only to have victory repeatedly snatched from
them. Their reaction was discouragement,indiscipline, and growing
panic. (Also, being veterans, they understood the danger of being
trapped between Wellington and Blücher, and saw no sense in
lingering.) Real panic began in Genappe, where the main street
ended in a narrow bridge. This was soon almost blocked by
overturned and abandoned vehicles, but---though the Dyle was
easily fordable---men fought among themselves to cross it.
Attempting to restore order, Radet was beaten unconscious. Finding
Genappe jammed with fugitives, the Guard bypassed it to the east.
Napoleon and his escort spent an hour working their way through
the town.

Meeting in La Belle Alliance, Blücher and Wellington agreed that
the Prussians would continue the pursuit. Accordingly, elements of
Pirch’s and Bülow’s corps moved slowly on Genappe. At its
northern edge, a few still acrimonious Frenchmen held an
improvised barricade until Prussian artillery demolished it.
Thereafter, the Prussians sabered and shot the milling fugitives until
fright drove them to ford the Dyle. Most of the Prussians then
halted, but Gneisenau, ordering Pirch to aid Thielmann, himself
pushed on with 4,000 men, harrying and slaughtering stragglers
until exhaustion halted him south of Frasnes. (Though energetic, his
operations were less effective than commonly believed. Organized
groups were not molested; the hard core of practically every French
regiment engaged withdrew successfully.) Bülow’s cavalry joined
Gneisenau the next morning, but all contact with the French had
been lost.

Though dazed and exhausted, Napoleon had dispatched an
administrative ofﬁcer to evacuate the army’s trains from Charleroi, and
ordered the division at Ligny to Quatre-Bras. Reaching Quatre-Bras
at 0100, he learned that this division, which could have ruined
Gneisenau’s pursuit, had not arrived. The army obviously could not be
rallied, especially since the Guard had continued toward Charleroi.
There was no news of Grouchy. Dispatching couriers to warn Grouchy
and other detachments, Napoleon proceeded to Charleroi, but found
(0500) the town in wild confusion. A drunken garrison commander
had hampered the administrative ofﬁcer’s attempt to organize the
evacuation. Consequently, it had hardly begun when the fugitive horde
engulfed it, turning the Charleroi bridge into another tumultuous jam.

Napoleon continued southward to Philippeville (0900). Reorganization
now became possible, contact with the enemy being completely broken,
and the fugitives halting from complete exhaustion. Giving the
necessary orders, Napoleon left Soult in command, and proceeded to
Paris to organize a defensive campaign.

Waterloo casualties were approximately:

Casualties Prisoners Missing
KIA & WIA

15,094
plus several
Anglo-Dutch thousand
temporarily
missing

Prussian 7,000

French 26,000 9,000 9,000

E & E, opposite map 168

June 22. This morning I went to visit the ﬁeld of battle,
which is a little beyond the village of Waterloo, on the
plateau of Mont-Saint-Jean; but on arrival there the
sight was too horrible to behold. I felt sick in the stomach
and was obliged to return. The multitude of carcasses,
the heaps of wounded men with mangled limbs unable to
move, and perishing from not having their wounds
dressed or from hunger, as the Allies were, of course,
obliged to take their surgeons and waggons with them,
formed a spectacle I shall never forget. The wounded,
both of the Allies and the French, remain in an equally
deplorable state.

—Major W. E Frye After Waterloo: Reminiscences of European Travel 1815–1819

The Morning after the Battle of Waterloo, (Detail)John Heaviside Clarke (1771 - 1863)
England, 1816, oil on canvas (from the copy in the German Historical Museum, Berlin)

a contemporary picture. Note the naked corpses, right.
Dead and wounded were stripped of their clothing. It
had economic value. Soldiers “traded up” on shoes, boots

“Well, thank God, I don’t know what it is to lose a battle; but
certainly nothing can be more painful than to gain one with the
loss of so many of one’s friends.”

Wellington, to Dr. John Hume, on 19 June,
after being presented with the preliminary casualty list

In the Waterloo campaign, Wellington made no mistakes. His distribution of
the Allied troops along the Belgian frontier, his rapid concentration at
Quatre Bras in concert with the Prussian Army at Ligny, his success on
June 16th, his subsequent withdrawal to Waterloo, the manner in which he
handled his troops before and during the battle, and the arrangements he
made with Blücher for the ﬂank attack from Wavre and for the pursuit of
the defeated enemy, prove him to be a profound master of the art of war.

General, Lord Roberts, The Rise of Wellington, London, 1895, p. 190, quoted in Weller, p. 186

The Waterloo Medal
a silver medal for ofﬁcers and common soldiers alike
“As we had all shared equally in the dangers of the day,
we should all partake alike in its glories.”
--Sergeant Robertson

After the Russian disaster of 1812 and the French defeat at Leipzig
in 1813, materiel had been replaced, and patriotism revived, to an
astonishing degree.
Weller, p. 156

Wellington and Blücher realized that the way to prevent such a revival was to take full advantage of their victory
and move rapidly on Paris. they decided to put into operation their original plans for moving into France, whether or
not the Austrian and Russian armies were ready….Wellington and his army, now mostly British and Hanoverian,
moved to Nivelles on the 20th and the next day in two columns crossed the border into France….
Weller, p. 156

The return of Louis XVIII (“Louis the Unavoidable”) and the
dismemberment of the French army brought on the so-called White Terror--
an explosion of reactionary hate and fear. It was fanned by the Allies, who
wanted the heads of as many of Napoleon’s lieutenants as possible, but
preferred to let Louis take the blame. Ney was shot for treason after a
grossly unfair trial (Bourmont being one of the witnesses against him).

Ney was arrested (on 3 August 1815), and tried (4 December 1815) for treason by the
Chamber of Peers. On 6 December 1815 he was condemned, and executed by firing squad in
Paris near the Luxembourg Garden on 7 December 1815 – an event that deeply divided the
French public. He refused to wear a blindfold and was allowed the right to give the order to
fire, reportedly saying:
"Soldiers, when I give the command to fire, fire straight at my heart. Wait for the order. It will
be my last to you. I protest against my condemnation. I have fought a hundred battles for
France, and not one against her ... Soldiers, Fire!"


The Execution of Marshal Ney, Jean-Leon Gerome

Ney's execution was an example intended for Napoleon's other marshals and generals, many
of whom were eventually exonerated by the Bourbon monarchy. Ney is buried in Paris at
Père Lachaise Cemetery.

The return of Louis XVIII (“Louis the Unavoidable”) and the
dismemberment of the French army brought on the so-called White Terror--
an explosion of reactionary hate and fear. It was fanned by the Allies, who
wanted the heads of as many of Napoleon’s lieutenants as possible, but
preferred to let Louis take the blame. Ney was shot for treason after a
grossly unfair trial (Bourmont being one of the witnesses against him).
Lavalette, the postmaster general and a loyal and honest public servant, was
likewise condemned to death, but escaped, thanks to a gallant wife and some
disgusted English ofﬁcers. Other proscribed ofﬁcers were warned in time,
thanks to professional collusion between Macdonald (whom Louis placed in
charge of the army’s demobilization) and Davout. Soult vanished;
Vandamme visited America; Brune was murdered by a mob. Murat made a
harebrained attempt to recover his former Kingdom of Naples, but was
quickly captured and executed.

Esposito & Elting, A Military History and Atlas of the Napoleonic Wars, “EPILOGUE.”

Blücher’s Revenge Forestalled

In 1807, Napoléon I ordered, by an imperial decree issued in
Warsaw, the construction of a bridge overlooking the Military
School, and named the bridge after his victory in 1806 at the Battle
of Jena. Prussian General Blücher wanted to destroy the bridge
after the Battle of Waterloo in 1815 and when the Prussians were the
ﬁrst to capture Paris, but was persuaded not to by the Allied forces.
Blücher had been present at the humiliating defeat of the Prussians
by Napoleon at the Battle of Jena, where approximately 28,000
Prussians were killed to France's 2,480, after which Prussia was
occupied by France.
Wikipedia

“By God, I don’t think it would have done if I had not been
there.”

Wellington, to the diarist Thomas Creevey, on 19 June

Black, p. 37

“Not a private in the ranks but felt that the Duke of Wellington--
the man of Wealth, Rank, and Success with the World at his
feet--was jeopardising his life to at least the same degree as the
poor outcast who had become a soldier from starvation.”

Sir William Fraser, Words on Wellington (1902), quoted in Weller, pp. 167-168

The Duke was now the most powerful man in Europe; his military
reputation soared. He was made a prince of the Netherlands, and received
many foreign honors, but there was little more that Britain could do other
than grant him another 200,000 pounds. He had received almost everything
there was to give at home in 1814.
Weller, p. 159

Well, almost everything...

Wellington Testimonial
Phoenix Park, Dublin
the foundation stone was laid in 1817.
However, in 1820 it ran short of its construction costs
and therefore remained unﬁnished until 18 June 1861
when it was opened to the public.


Wellington Monument
Wellington, Somerset,
England
is a 175 feet high triangular tower located
on the highest point of the Blackdown
Hills

n

Wellington Arch
Hyde Park, London

The arch, and Marble Arch to the
north of Hyde Park, were both
planned in 1825 by George IV to
commemorate Britain's victories in
the Napoleonic Wars


Wellington Statue
Hyde Park, London

Sculpted by Matthew Cotes Wyatt,
it was the largest equestrian statue
in Britain when it was unveiled at its
original location at Hyde Park
Corner in 1846.


Wellington
Monument
St. Paul’s Cathedral,
London
completed in 1872

Battleﬁeld Tours

began the next day, as civilians, both upper and lower class, came to see
this amazing, and now historic site. The aristocrats, who the day before
were planning to ﬂee Brussels, now came to see the place of Napoleon’s
demise. And, sadly, the civilian looters arrived to strip what valuables
remained on the dead and dying bodies which the soldiers had
overlooked. Over the years a tourist industry developed which
continues to this day.

Battleﬁeld Tours

began the next day, as civilians, both upper and lower class, came to see
this amazing, and now historic site. The aristocrats, who the day before
were planning to ﬂee Brussels, now came to see the place of Napoleon’s
demise. And, sadly, the civilian looters arrived to strip what valuables
remained on the dead and dying bodies which the soldiers had
overlooked. Over the years a tourist industry developed which
continues to this day.

Sergeant Major Edward Cotton (late 7th Hussars). A Voice from Waterloo,
7th rev. ed. (1895), p. 6

Wellington’s Smallest Victory
In 1830, he was offered a commission to create a model of the Battle of
Waterloo, which was to be the main exhibit of the new United Services
Museum and a memorial to Wellington's crowning victory.
Siborne undertook the commission with alacrity and on an understanding
that the War Office would fund the project. To his lasting regret, that
understanding was not given in writing. Nevertheless, he put his heart
and soul into the enterprise and, at his own expense, spent the next eight
months on the battlefield of Waterloo making meticulous notes and
sketches of the topography. [The WO refunded his expenses up to and
including 1833, but cut off funding then, forcing Siborne to raise his own
funds]. He also interviewed survivors on all sides of the last great conflict
of the French wars: veterans of the French, German, British and Dutch
armies.

The resulting work, first exhibited in 1838, should have brought Siborne
public distinction and wealth.

Intent on portraying the state of affairs at the moment of victory, Siborne
set the time of his diorama of the battle at 7:15 p.m. It went on display in
1838 and showed the true position of the combatants with 48,000
Prussian troops actively engaged. The finished model measured 24 feet
by 19 and included over 90,000 hand-painted lead soldiers. Siborne's
model was a magnificent achievement, but he reckoned without the
extreme displeasure of Wellington and his sycophantic supporters. This William Siborne
was bad news for Siborne, who suffered immensely for his honesty of 1797–1849
purpose.

Wellington’s Smallest Victory

William Siborne
1797–1849

Re-enacting Waterloo

The [private estate] became Vauxhall Gardens in 1785
and admission was charged to gain entrance to its many
attractions. The Gardens drew all manner of people and
supported enormous crowds, with its paths being noted
for romantic assignations. [Also a favorite venue for
London’s prostitutes] Tightrope walkers, hot air balloon
ascents, concerts and ﬁreworks provided amusement. ….
In 1827, the Battle of Waterloo was re-enacted with
1,000 soldiers participating.
Wikipedia

Plan of Vauxhall Gardens
in the south bank London suburb of
Kennington,1826

Ready to Join Up for the Bicentennial?

http://www.napoleonicassociation.org/promo_vidio.htm

America’s First Lady and Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth
between two ceremonial guards. On the left, the uniform
is that of the “Blues and Royals.” To the right, the
Coldstream Guards. Both are dressed as they were in
1815 at Waterloo.

http://www.drudgereport.com/ on 25 May 2011

The Blues and Royals (Royal Horse
Guards and 1st Dragoons) is a
cavalry regiment of the British Army,
part of the Household Cavalry.

“Blues and Royals” at trooping the color, 2007

battle honors of the Coldstream during the Napoleonic Wars:
Egypt, Talavera, Barrosa, Fuentes d'Onoro, Salamanca, Nive,
Peninsula, Waterloo

St Helena

Napoleon on the Island of St. Helena
by Ivan Constantinovich Aivazovsky, 1897

! 3 July-a French frigate was ready at
Rochefort, but the winds were contrary and
a British squadron blockaded the port

! he rejected a variety of plans, using a swift
American vessel or a Danish brig as
unworthy of an emperor (lack of dignity +
high risk of capture)

! 10 July-he began negotiations with Admiral
Maitland, the blockade commander

! 15 July-he boarded Bellerophon, throwing
himself on the protection of the “most
powerful, the most steadfast, and the most
generous of my enemies”

! this was the ﬁrst step in his quick
banishment to the utterly isolated,
unhealthy island of Saint Helena, where
shabby treatment under a fourth rate local
commander contributed to his early death
Napoleon on HMS Bellerophon

Ascension, the nearest island, was 700 miles away!

Napoleon’s Exile “Family”

What Napoleon called his court was a mixed bag….General Count
Bertrand, veteran of many battles and grand marshal of the palace...was 42
years old. A refined, intelligent, brave and capable officer, he was a great
favorite of Napoleon. Not so his small and restless wife….
Next in the pecking order were Count and Countess Montholon and
their three year old son. General Montholon was a 33-year-old converted
royalist whose professional career was as mediocre as his social career was
execrable. The countess, whose reputation was also sordid, was three years
older…. His wife although aging was not unattractive physically, she
played the piano and sang well. She was also a true schemer, easily
insinuating herself first into Napoleon’s favor and then his bed. Rivalry
between the two countesses was keen….
General Baron Gaspard Gourgaud was a year younger than
Montholon…. A rather unattractive bachelor, in or out of drink he was a
braggart, conceited, childishly petulant and dangerously jealous of his
position.

Exile Family (cont.)
The oldest member of this weird group was the marquis de Las Cases, 49
years old. From a noble family, he had become a royalist naval officer, had
emigrated and spent 10 years in England, becoming something of a
celebrity as author of a scholarly and very profitable historical atlas. Upon
return to France under Napoleon’s amnesty he became a respected
councillor of state…. He...begged to accompany the emperor into exile as
amanuensis [one who takes down dictation], his plan being to return to
France and sell the memoirs at vast profit. His idolatry and greed caused
him to leave behind wife and children with the exception of 15-year-old
Emmanuel, a very bright lad who soon became a favorite of the emperor.
Finally, there was Barry O’Meara, a Royal Navy surgeon formerly of
HMS Bellerophon, and recruited at the last minute, whose fluency in Italian
caused Napoleon to name him personal physician.
In addition, the party included eleven servants: a maître d’hôtel, four
valets; chef; steward; grooms and footmen….First valet Marchand had
also served him on Elba and had become a great favorite….

Asprey, pp. 409-410

Napoleon Part 2, session viii

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Napoleon Part 2, session viii