Presentation slides from David Hulme,Executive Director, Brooks World Poverty Institute and Professor of Development Studies at the University of Manchester, Sussex Development Lecture, Learning from the Millennium Development Goals

1. Learning from the Millennium Development GoalsDavid Hulme Creating knowledge to end poverty

2. Introduction MDGs – the world’s biggest promise Complicated history – not planned MDGs used to achieve many different aims Strengthen UN credibility Legitimizing the status quo (de-politicization) Improve planning and financing of development Motivating a “results-based” approach Norm change – “ending global poverty”

3. MDG Summary Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women Goal 4: Reduce child mortality Goal 5: Improve maternal health Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development

4. MDGs – HD meets RBM in an unfair world The content of the MDGs is human development(5½out of 8) But, a minimalist basic needs concept not human rights The framing is results-based management – goal/target/indicator – a low trust concept MDGs reflect the IPE of the Millennium – led by rich world with RBM for developing countries but not for rich countries (Goal 8) MDG focus - ends not means - reflected lack of an international consensus

5. Contribution and Attribution “The end of extreme poverty is at hand…the MDGs…are bold but achievable…a crucial mid-station on the path to ending poverty by 2025” (Sachs 2005) “The setting of utopian goals means aid workers will focus efforts on infeasible tasks, instead of feasible tasks that will do some good” (Easterly 2006) “The MDGs: ‘M’ for misunderstood” (Vandemoortele 2007) “I do not believe in the MDGs. I think of them as a Major Distracting Gimmick” (Antrobus 2003) Attribution paradox – achievement of MDGs mainly because of China and India - where MDGs have least influence/impact!

6. Understanding the MDGs as Norms The MDGs were ‘as good as it gets’ in the international political economy of 2000/2001 I argue that the evidence indicates that they have been beneficial overall - but limited impact The focus on selecting and using them for planning, financing and monitoring is misplaced…’lack of political will’ Analyse MDGs as a vehicle to promote the international social norm of “ending extreme poverty”…to create political will

7. International Norm Dynamics Comparisons with abolition of slavery, end of apartheid, rules of war (Fukuda-Parr and Hulme) Norms can spread across national populations and then countries – can stall and reverse Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s model – 3 stages Norm emergence, leading to a ‘tipping point’ Norm cascade, across countries Norm internalization – the norm is applied

8. Finnemore and Sikkink

9. Stage I: Norm emergence and norm entrepreneurs Norm change is driven by norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms – examples Jim Grant (ED, UNICEF) – orchestrated the Children’s Summit(1990) & internalisation NafisSadik (ED, UNFPA) – managed the paradigm shift to reproductive health (emergence) Clare Short/Utstein Group (cascade and internalisation), Ann Pettifor, Martin Khor, and others Women’s movement – many norm entrepreneurs who highlighted role of gender inequality in poverty and shaped civil society contributions

10. MDGs and Norm entrepreneurs (cont.) These norm entrepreneurs had diverse motivations, but had a commitment to ending poverty as an ethical imperative. Many advocated a broad, human-centred development paradigm, drawing from basic needs, human development and feminist approaches Together they drove the UN conference agenda

11. Message entrepreneurs The drafting of the OECD International Development Targets (IDTs) in 1996 and the UN’s MDGs was undertaken by a different set of people: message entrepreneurs These were institutionally embedded and they focused on organisationalgoals. Message entrepreneurs have personal normative positions, but their primary function is to achieve consensus (a purpose of many intergovernmental organisations).

12. Message entrepreneurs (cont.) In the drafting of the MDGs, these message entrepreneurs included: James Michel and officials at DAC in the mid-1990s John Ruggie and the Office of the Secretary General of the UN Mark Malloch Brown, Administrator at UNDP Usually skilled diplomats and senior bureaucrats rather than economists or development specialists They turned the UN declarations and conference goals into something acceptable across the 189 UN delegations, the World Bank, IMF, OECD, DAC and UN specialised agencies - the MDGs (2001) Major negotiations around Goal 8 (in) and reproductive health (out)

13. Stage II- norm cascade The MDGs had global consensus, but still the process of cascade was dependent on follow-up. Obstacles remained - the US was ambivalent or hostile; NGOs criticised MDG content and process of formulation; rich countries keen to avoid Goal 8 implementation Nonetheless, this was partially overcome. From their launch in September 2001 the MDGs influenced international development events Monterrey Consensus in 2002 (Bush launches a major initiative) Brown and Blair used them in the G8 Gleneagles summit and EU Presidency in 2005 Celebrities (Bono, Bob Geldof, and Angelina Jolie) mobilised public support for the MDGs.

14. Stage III Norm internalization In policy documents the MDGs appear to have total acceptance – national and donor goals, General Assembly 2005 and 2010. But, in action (budgets, implementation and accountability) internalization has varied. UK compared to Italy Rwanda compared to Zimbabwe The big success - the MDGs as an emerging EU norm? For example, the EU required the states acceding in 2002 to increase their aid budgets to 0.33% of GNI by 2015. A commitment to reducing poverty globally is now a requirement of joining the European ‘club’.

15. MDGs as a Supernorm Sakiko and I use the concept of the MDGs as a ‘supernorm’ - a cluster of interrelated norms grouped into a unified and coherent framework. Conceptually, the MDGs constitute a single package; although each of the eight MDGs is important as an individual norm, they are strategic components of the broader supernorm that extreme, dehumanizing poverty is morally unacceptable in an affluent world.

16. MDGs as a Supernorm (cont.) The great strength of the MDG supernorm is its communication of a complex set of norms in clear and relatively simple terms. This is also their great weakness…‘too long’ They skirted around and did not resolve ideational divides within the international community - especially the links between economic and social policy. Some norm entrepreneurs saw the MDGs as little more than pretence. Particularly with regard to gender issues and international relations (Goal 8).

17. The Post-2015 Agenda... Post MDGs 2015 will be as complicated as 2000/2001 but very different (the rise of the BICs, energy insecurity, G20, MENA revolution) but also very similar (Doha stalled, climate change stalled, international community fragmented) Four particular ways in which the post-2015 agenda can maintain the progress achieved by MDGs and improve on it

18. Post-2015 Agenda - conclusions From measurement to voice – activate the norm entrepreneurs now Targets and indicators need to be set at the national level – global targets inappropriate for specific countries and negate ‘ownership’ (and democracy) Post-2015 process needs to be linked to policies and plans – not a PRS (WB/IMF) and MDG (rest of UN) divide The Post-2015 Agenda needs to be framed to impact on social norms not as planning tool. How can the global super-norm of the moral unacceptability of extreme poverty be cascaded and internalised… …stop children dying now…

19. The Future of the MDGs The MDGs can be understood as a part of the emergence of a supernorm that sees extreme poverty in an affluent world as being morally unacceptable. Though far from complete, this is changing norms of international behaviour Need to frame the post-2015 agenda in terms of norm change

20. Further reading David Hulme (2010) Global Poverty: How Global Governance is Failing the Poor, (London: Routledge). Sakiko Fukuda-Parr and David Hulme, (2011), ‘International Norm Dynamics and the “End of Poverty”: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals’, Journal of Global Governance, 17(1), pp. 17-36. David Hulme and James Scott, (2010), ‘The Political Economy of the MDGs: Retrospect and Prospect for the World’s Biggest Promise’, New Political Economy, 15(2), pp. 293-306.

21. Status of the MDGs