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2013 25: 41Rationality and Society
Christopher W. Young and Wayne Eastman
The structural failures of the heavenly markets
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DOI: 10.1177/1043463112473737
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The structural
failures of the heavenly
markets
Christopher W. Young
Seton Hall University, USA; Tinari Economics Group, USA
Wayne Eastman
Rutgers University, USA
Abstract
Previous scholarship analyzing cross-sectional international data has noted that
religious monopolies impede the efficiency of religious markets and that the
benefits of competitive markets apply in religion as elsewhere. Our paper, analyzing
U.S. state-level data, is premised on the complementary point that competitive
markets in religion as elsewhere may fail if there are externalities, public goods, or
asymmetries in information. In our model, we hypothesize that perfect competition
will foster forms of religion that fail to create positive externalities and that in
turn engender doubts about religious faith. We test empirically the Iannaccone
hypothesis that more religious competition/diversity engenders more religious
faith and our contrary hypothesis using state-level data showing overall levels of
religious competition among Protestants provokes less religious faith.
Keywords
Competition, diversity index, Pigou, rational theory, religion, United States
Introduction
Suppose, as seems plausible on the face of it, that religious markets are
analogous to other markets, in that great benefits from free competition
Corresponding author:
Christopher W. Young, Stillman School of Business, Seton Hall University, 400 South
Orange Ave, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA.
Email: youngcha@shu.edu
473737RSS25110.1177/1043463112473737Rationality and SocietyYoung and Eastman
2013
Article

42 Rationality and Society 25(1)
are accompanied by significant failures of competition owing to asym-
metric information, public goods, and externalities. One may reasonably
be hesitant about this suggestion, given that the government regulation
that is the standard if also controversial response to market failure in
other spheres (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) is particularly troubling in
the religious sphere, given principles of religious liberty and government
neutrality (Monsma and Soper, 2009). Troubling though the underlying
normative issues are, the positive issues of how to model market failures
in religious markets and how to test for evidence of such market failures
call for attention by scholars of religion working in a rational choice
framework. Economics writ large needs economists like Keynes, Pigou,
Spence, and Stiglitz who focus on market failure as well as those like
Smith, Ricardo, Marshall, and Friedman who focus on market successes.
Likewise, the economic analysis of religion needs studies that explore the
logic and significance of market failure as well as studies such as Azzi
and Ehrenberg (1975), Olds (1994), Iannaccone (1991), Chaves and Cann
(1992), Introvigne (2005), Borgonovi (2008), Gill (2008), McCleary and
Barro (2006), and Ekelund et al. (1996) that explore the benefits from
competition.
The primary purpose of this paper is to engage in an analysis of religious
market failure along with preliminary empirical testing using U.S. state
comparisons. Although the central contribution of the paper is a positive
one, we will give some attention to the difficult normative issue of whether
the societal cost-benefit ratio of religious institutions can be improved by
regulation of religious market structures, with the hope that our positive
analysis will support a dispassionate, original approach to religious mar-
kets, a topic as to which value positions are often based on reflexive loyal-
ties to particular national or cultural traditions. To that end, the argument
will begin with methodology and then proceed to modeling, hypotheses,
and hypothesis-testing before turning to potential normative implications.
First, the rational choice framework for studying religion that we adopt
will be briefly reviewed. We will defend that approach as consistent with a
change over time in the nature of religion from an institution promoting
supernaturalism and the welcomed irrationalities of an all-knowing God to
a rational institution promoting benefits based on modern values. We will
suggest that this change in religion’s nature, assumed by many to be caused
by the rise of natural science, was also connected to the creation of the mod-
ern state system and the modern ideas of utilitarianism and religious free-
dom. Together, these changes helped create competitive market structures
between different religious sects1 and different religions,2 as well as between
religion and science and religion and the state.

Young and Eastman 43
Given these changes, religion has slowly but methodically become more
of a competitive market product, with buyers3 and sellers4 exchanging
goods and services for religious benefits in a somewhat discrete market-
place.5 This idea is supported by the Pew Forum’s 2007 (2008b) survey on
the Religious Landscape, which demonstrates that religious consumers are
moving from one religion to another or from one denomination to another
more today than ever before. Many of the reasons cited for switching appear
to resonate with the changes in personal preferences. These preferences
include but are not limited to the religious consumer becoming unhappy
with teachings on divorce and remarriage, homosexuality, and abortion, and
include more nebulous reasons such as finding a religion one likes more.
Religious institutions can be effectively analyzed by understanding the
market structure in which suppliers compete. In particular, we can gain the-
oretical insight into how religious markets fail, and then empirically test
whether a given theory of market failure is related to the facts on the ground.
We will theorize that perfectly competitive religious markets suffer from
being unable to effectively influence religious consumers to act in ways
contrary to their personal interests. We then hypothesize that this weakness
of competitive religious markets will be associated with less religious belief
and lower levels of participation and prayer; we test this hypothesis through
state comparisons. Social scientific analysis constitutes the bulk of our
paper, after which we turn briefly in our conclusion to the normative issue
of whether or not religious market failures can be efficiently reduced.
The rational choice approach to religion
Pressure on religions to change in a capitalist society can be explained by
what economist Joseph Schumpeter (1950) calls creative destruction, a
process in which all modes of production must be continually changed,
modified and improved to drive the economic system and the culture con-
stantly towards growth. All values need to be destroyed and reinvented to
meet the demands of market participants and to continue to win against
rival competitors. In a capitalist environment, religion needs to mutate to
maintain its competitiveness and to sustain its ability to influence and
attract the populace.
The production and marketing processes and successes of science and
technology within the modern world created what Schumpeter referred to as
“new impulses that set and keep the capitalist engine in motion” (1950: 83).
The innovations and technologies that were byproducts of the scientific
revolution became worldly rivals to the other-worldly benefits associated
with a supernatural deity. With these innovations and technologies came

continuous new scientific discoveries, further pushing religion and proph-
ecy rearward. To compensate for these new competitive pressures, religions
mutated as well. Religions changed by changing their production and mar-
keting processes and the nature of their organizations (Budde and Brimlow,
2002; Finke and Starke, 1992; Jelen, 2002). These changes fit into the cat-
egory that Schumpeter called “industrial mutation.” He argued that the
alteration of business structures must come from within an organization,
with entrepreneurs “incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating
a new one” (Schumpeter, 1950: 83). To compete with the providers of
worldly benefits, religion adopted a similar course. Religion became to a
significant degree like other business operations, competing to maintain
market share and salience within a market structure.
The trend toward competitive religion was accentuated in the United
States, which adopted a radical policy for its time – the separation of church
and state. The separation of religion from state affairs, although started at
Westphalia after the Reformation, was crystallized in the early years of the
United States. With the separation of church and state came the eventual elim-
ination of direct state funding, putting religions in a competitive position.
With the disestablishment of a state-sponsored, oligopolistic religious market-
place, religions had to obtain their funding via voluntary contributions (Olds,
1994). By ending state subsidies, the United States created a relatively free
market for churches, wherein churches competed against each other for mem-
bers, not to mention against other value systems that were taking hold in the
new nation. Similar to other products sold in a competitive marketplace, com-
peting religions needed to enhance their offerings by extending their products,
enhancing marketing and product distribution, increasing efficiency and or
decreasing price (Finke and Starke, 1992; Hull and Moran, 1989).
In The Churching of America, 1776–1990, Finke and Starke (1992)
describe these changes in the behaviors of Christian ministers by document-
ing the changes in the way religious organizations conducted “revivals” and
attracted new members and competed with other institutions. Rather than
being directed by revelation, the Holy Spirit, Holy Ghost, or early religious
law, clergy started to employ modern business practices, including market-
ing tactics and religious packaging, as part of their everyday tasks in an
effort to attract members. Simultaneously, members started to move into
new churches that appealed to their personal understanding of doctrine or
lack thereof. Finke and Starke suggest that these changes created a market
with a growing number of religious producers which subsequently enticed a
greater number of religious consumers to become church members. At the
heart of Finke and Starke’s argument is their empirical claim that member-
ship in churches and other religious bodies has increased in the United

States from approximately 17% of the population in 1776 to approximately
75% today, which they attribute to the changes and enhancements of reli-
gious products associated with a competitive market structure.
In a manner complementary to Finke and Starke’s market success
approach to religious institutions, Iannaccone has argued that an uncompeti-
tive, monopolistic market will negatively impact the number of religious
consumers in the marketplace and their levels of belief and attendance. This
happens presumably because the opportunity costs of religious services pro-
vided by the religious supplier remain higher than the price necessary to
attract more consumers. According to Iannaccone, this theory explains
[competitive] America’s “exceptionally high level of religiosity in contrast
to the pervasive religious apathy of [less competitive] Northern Europe”
(Iannaccone, 1991).
Our claim about the unfortunate side of competition can be related to
Finke and Starke and Iannaccone as follows: We agree with them that move-
ment from a religious monopoly to competition is likely to enhance the
quality of religious goods provided and hence also to enhance religiosity, all
else equal. Our point is that all else is not equal, in that consumers in a free
market for religious goods have an incentive to choose religions that are
personally convenient to them, rather than religions that impose costs on
them by regulating their behavior on behalf of society. Religious competi-
tion in our model will lead to a proliferation of forms of religion that appeal
to the consumer but do not provide social benefits, with a resultant negative
effect on attitudes toward religion and overall levels of religiosity. In other
words, the religious market suffers in our model from consumers not
accounting for externalities, a problem analyzed originally by Pigou (1920)
and subsequently analyzed in a variety of settings, including “sin taxes”
(Ferrell and energy and climate change policy, Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000).
Positive externalities from religion
Because our market failure model relies on an assumption that religious
faith of certain kinds can generate significant positive externalities, we
offer in this brief literature review section some classical and contempo-
rary support for that assumption. Beginning with classical sources:
Referring to the new United States, George Washington stated, “Religion
and morality are indispensable supports of public prosperity” (Bellah et al.,
1996: 222). Washington doubted that “morality can be maintained without
religion,” and he suggested that religion and morality are the “great pillars
of public happiness” (Bellah et al., 1996: 222). Similarly, Alexander de
Tocqueville argued that religion in America is “the first of their political

institutions” and that it supported moral values, a necessity for a successful
democracy (Bellah et al., 1996: 223). The “main business” of religion,
Tocqueville said “is to purify, control, and restrain that excessive and
exclusive taste for well-being” so common among Americans (Bellah et
al., 1996: 223).
In a similar spirit to the classical sources, Robert Putnam (2000: 78)
argues that religion encourages family values and moral ideas and assists in
bridging cultural barriers and breaking down biases and hatreds based on
ethnicity and social and economic class. Putnam suggests that religion nur-
tures civic skills and community involvement and helps individuals learn
how to “run meetings, manage disagreements and bear administrative
responsibility. . . . In part for these reasons, churchgoers are more likely to
be involved in secular organizations, to vote and participate politically in
other ways, and to have deeper informal social connections” (Putnam, 2000:
66). Putnam also suggests that religion rivals education as a powerful form
of civil engagement (Putnam, 2000: 78).
Religious involvement is a strong predictor of volunteering and philanthropy;
75–80 percent of church members in the United States give to charity, opposed to
55–60 percent who are not church members and 50–60 of church members
volunteer with charities while only 30–35 of non members do. (Putnam, 2000: 67)
Putnam states that churches are important providers of social services in
the United States, with approximately $15–$20 billion spent annually. He
states:
Nationwide in 1998 nearly 60 percent of all congregations (and even a higher
proportion of larger congregations) reported contributing to social service,
community development, or neighborhood organizing projects. Congregations
representing 33 percent of all churchgoers support food programs for the hungry,
and congregations represent 18 percent of all churchgoers support housing
programs like Habitat for Humanity. (Putnam, 2000: 68)
Similar to Putnam, Robert Bellah states:
Americans give more money and donate more time to religious bodies and
religiously associated organizations than to all other voluntary associations put
together. Some 40% ofAmericans attend religious services at least once a week and
religious membership is around 60% of total population. (Bellah et al., 1996: 219)
Supporting Putnam and Bellah, the Social Capital Community Benchmark
Survey Study affirms that religiously engaged people have, on average, a

more diverse set of friends than those who are less engaged in religion.
Holding constant their own social status, religiously engaging people are
more likely than other Americans to number among their friends a person of
a different faith, a community leader, a manual worker, a business owner and
even a welfare recipient.
From this brief description, it seems that within the United States, reli-
gious faith in general and Christianity as the dominant form of religious
faith in America provide societal benefits that are more than just insular to
discrete religious communities. If for some reason, religious faiths in gen-
eral and Christianity in particular failed to exist or operate efficiently in the
United States, many of these benefits would be in jeopardy, thus potentially
causing a void that would need to be filled by the state or some other mod-
ern or post-modern institution. In other words: Religion despite being a pri-
vate good provides positive externalities.
Model of market failure in competitive
religious markets
We will first review Pigou’s renowned externalities model (1920), in which
the inability of egoistic consumers to value the positive and negative conse-
quences of their consumption choice to others leads to suboptimal out-
comes. We will then describe informally how the conditions of the
externalities model apply to religious markets.
In the basic Pigouvian model, sellers and buyers alike are assumed to be
egoistic, calculating maximizers. The well-known twist in the model is that
the menu of product choices faced by the buyer includes products with posi-
tive or negative consequences for individuals or firms apart from the buyer.
The intuitively clear consequence of such positive or negative externalities
is that the products supplied and demanded in a private market will not
optimize social welfare. Goods with positive externalities will be undersup-
plied by the market, and goods with negative externalities will be oversup-
plied. Pigou and others working in the Pigouvian tradition (Baumol, 1972)
have recommended taxes and subsidies as means to achieve the social opti-
mum. Ideally, goods with negative externalities should be taxed by the size
of the externality imposed by the buyer’s consumption of the good, while
goods with positive externalities should be subsidized by the size of the
positive externality generated.
Ronald Coase (1960) pointed out that in a zero-transaction cost situation,
Pigouvian taxes and subsidies are unnecessary to achieve the social opti-
mum, since third parties positively or negatively affected by the consumer’s
choice can and will negotiate with the consumer. Allowing for the

importance of this and related points about the ability of private markets to
price in externalities when transaction costs are low (Buchanan and Tullock,
1962; Tullock, 2005), the Pigouvian model remains of fundamental impor-
tance in modern welfare economics. Key contemporary public policy ques-
tions, such as how society should price fossil fuels (Lomborg, 2002;
Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Stern, 2007) and whether addictive drugs should
be taxed or criminalized (Gifford, 1997) are analyzed under an externalities
framework indebted to Pigou.
Let us now consider how an externalities analysis in the Pigouvian
tradition can be translated to the context of sellers and buyers of religious
services. Our first suggestion is that in the religious market, some sellers
may take into account the positive and negative externalities of the ser-
vices they sell, while others do not. Our second suggestion is that the first
type of seller that takes the externalities of its product into account is more
likely to be a well-established provider of religious services, such as the
Roman Catholic Church or the Lutheran Church, that is grounded in a
long historical and liturgical tradition and has strong reputational interests
to protect.
A well-established provider that takes into account the externalities of its
product may well at the same time suffer from the problems of the religious
monopolist. Italian Roman Catholicism and Swedish Lutheranism may well
be sleepy and complacent, just as Iannaccone’s argument and data suggest.
A novel, upstart religious provider will not have those weaknesses of the
religious monopolist or quasi-monopolist. But that religious upstart without
an established tradition and set of values to defend may well have its own
serious weakness. Think of American upstart religious providers such as
Sinclair Lewis’ Elmer Gantry, Aimee Semple McPherson, Jim Bakker, and
Jimmy Swaggart: Hardworking and consumer-oriented as all these preach-
ers no doubt were, they all at the same time suffered from a very serious
weakness. Beyond their personal failings of the flesh, they suffered from a
structural problem that links them and similar upstart religious providers
who lack established reputations and mechanisms in which they are effec-
tively judged by a substantial, enduring faith tradition. Such small, upstart
providers may well be seen as – and may well actually be-egoistic sellers
who are in it for themselves and who do not care about the positive or nega-
tive externalities of their products. A culture with many such small-scale,
egoistic religious providers may not be a culture with a high overall level of
religious faith and devotion. Instead, it may be a culture in which people
who are faced with a plethora of self-seeking religious entrepreneurs
become less believing and less devout than people in a culture with fewer
and better-grounded sellers of religious products.

Model and data
The Pigouvian model applied to religion implies that greater levels of reli-
gious competition and reduced levels of social control, within an already
free religious economy, will lead to greater levels of religious membership
but lower levels of religious belief and practice. In this section, we proceed
to test our market failure hypothesis through examining the state-by-state
relationship between religious competitiveness (independent variable),
which we measure with the Diversity Index (Di) (Voas et al., 2002) and
belief, attendance, and prayer (dependent variables).
The entire cross-sectional data collected and used in the following analy-
ses come from the Pew Forum’s 2008b Religious Landscape Survey. The sur-
vey asked religious based questions of 35,555 Americans age 18 and older.
The data does not include Hawaii or Alaska but includes Washington DC.
The dependent variables represent proxies for religious belief, attend-
ance and prayer. Each dependent variable represents a form of religious
belief, attendance and prayer between different populations of citizens in
States s in the Year j. Each question on the survey provided sequential
numeric answers with the lower numbers representing higher levels of
belief, attendance and prayer. Table 1 below summarizes the questions
asked and the answer choices provided on the survey.
The independent variable of importance is the level of religious competi-
tion/diversity in each state, represented as the Di or Diversity Index. The Di is
Table 1.
Dependent
variables
Questions asked on survey and answers provided
God Exists “Do you believe in God or a universal spirit? How certain are
you about this belief? (1) Are you absolutely certain, (2) fairly
certain, (3) not too certain, or (4) not at all certain?”
Religion Is
Important
“How important is religion in your life? (1) very important,
(2) somewhat important, (3) not too important, or (4) not at
all important”
Attendance
Frequency
“Aside from weddings and funerals, how often do you attend
religious services? (1) more than once a week, (2) once a
week, (3) once or twice a month, (4) a few times a year, (5)
seldom, or (6) never?”
Prayer
Frequency
“People practice their religion in different ways. Outside of
attending religious services, do you pray (1) several times a
day, (2) once a day, (3) a few times a week, (4) once a week,
(5) a few times a month, (6) seldom, or (7) never?”

a measure of probability that two random people in a society belong to the
same denomination. The assumption is that higher the Di, the greater the level
of competition between the religious suppliers. Di represents the religious
market concentration, which is based upon declared adherence6 to a particular
denomination and it is 10,000 less the summation of the market share m
squared for a denomination d in a particular state s is described as follows:
Hisd = (10,000 – ∑ m
2
sd)
The calculated Di for each state can be found in Appendix 1 and Appendix
6. As way of example and displayed on Appendix 1, Washington DC (9511)
is considered the most competitive and Utah (6241) is considered the least
competitive.
To measure the effects of religious competition on levels of religious
belief and practice we estimate the following:
∆religious belief, attendance and prayersj = α + β1sj(religious competi-
tion/religious diversity)
We completed four linear models testing the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables above. Two of the models were sim-
ple regression models where we did not test with controls and the latter
two models we controlled for race, community type, age, gender, popula-
tion, and income. The Pew Forum survey contains multiple categorical
variables, including the following used in our regressions; community
type and race. We created two dummy variables for community type and
race, referencing urban and black, respectively. With these modifications,
all variables used in the regressions appeared evenly distributed.
The first two tests (#1, #2), which included one simple linear and one
multiple linear model, respectively, were primarily created to observe the
effect of Di directly upon the dependent variables when all religions and
denominations in the dataset were used for both the dependent and inde-
pendent variables. Our survey sample size for test #1 and #2, were between
31,087 and 34,529. Survey populations can be seen on Appendix 5. In
these first two tests we wanted to understand the effect of inter and intra-
religious competition on belief, attendance and prayer. Intra-religious
competition is the competition between denominations or sects of a par-
ticular faith. This would include different denominations of Protestants
competing against each other. Inter-religious competition is the competi-
tion between different faiths, such as Catholics versus Muslims. The first
of these tests was a simple linear model analyzing the effect of Di on
belief, attendance and prayer. The second of these tests was a multiple
linear model analyzing the effect of Di on belief, attendance and prayer,

yet controlling for race, community type, age, gender, population and
income. The list of religions used to calculate Di and used for dependent
variables are included in Appendix 11.
The next two tests (#3, #4) were completed in the same manner as the
first two; except for these tests we included only protestant denominations
in both dependent and independent variables. We used Protestants because
this religious group and all of the denominations associated with it, make up
approximately 55% of the entire United States population. Our survey sam-
ple size for test #3 and #4, were between 19,632 and 19,812. Survey popula-
tions can be seen inAppendix 5. Here we tested to see if the Di for Protestants
(only) had a different effect on belief, attendance and prayer for such
Protestants. We were keen to see if states with higher levels of Protestant
competition/diversity experienced higher or lower levels of belief, attend-
ance or prayer. The list of protestant denominations used in the second two
tests is included within Appendix 12.
Utah was removed from all Di calculations. Utah displays very low lev-
els of religious competition, primarily due to the high concentration of
Mormons. In addition, we removed the answers from survey respondents
who were self-claimed atheists.
Results
Test #1 and #2. The outcome for both the simple regression and multiple
regression models (#1 and #2), where we tested intra and inter-religious
competition, against belief, attendance, and prayer, the results were similar.
The results from both regressions (Appendix 5) displayed minimal yet sta-
tistically significant positive relationship between religious competition/
diversity and belief, attendance and prayer. According to the results, the
more inter- and intra-religious competition in each of the states produces
higher levels of religious attendance and prayer, more belief in a God or
Universal Spirit and more people who believe that religion is important.
Though the outcomes show a positive relationship, the R2 effect was mini-
mal demonstrating that less than 2% of the variability of belief, attendance
and prayer was related to Di. The positive statistical relationship between Di
and belief, attendance and prayer remained at relatively similar rates when
we controlled for community type, race, population, age, gender and
income. These tests appear to support the Iannaccone (1991) and Finke and
Starke (1992) outcomes.
Test #3 and Test #4. Tests #3 and #4 were created with the intent of seeing
the effect of intra-religious competition and diversity on belief, attendance

and prayer for members of any of the competing intra-religious denomina-
tions included in the dataset. In this test, we removed all religions and
denominations from the Pew Forum dataset, other than those that are typi-
cally referred to as Protestant. With relation to Di, we recalculated the Di to
only include Protestant denominations (Appendix 6 shows the recalculated
Di for Protestants only). We also removed responses from any survey
respondent who was not a self proclaimed Protestant. Interestingly and
unlike test #1 and test #2, the results showed that more Protestant diversity
and competition within an already competitive Protestant state, actually
lowers the levels of belief, attendance and prayer. Though the results show
similar minimal effects as test #1 and test #2, the change of direction of the
beta is important to note. The significant positive beta suggests that the
more Protestant sects or denominations in each state actually lower the level
of belief, attendance and prayer for all Protestants in the state.
On the one hand, the results show a minimal, yet a positive effect that
when religious diversity/competition increases, religious belief, attendance
and prayer increases as well. Despite the effect being minimal, the hypoth-
esis tested by Iannaccone and supported by many others appears to hold. On
the other hand, there appears to be support for the hypothesis we presented
here. Within the intra-religious market structure of Protestants, where com-
petition and market saturation is the highest, there appears to be support that
with more religious competition/diversity may actually impede the quality
and perhaps efficacy of such religion. Although we cannot support causa-
tion from correlation presented within, the results appear to support the idea
that within some religious market structures, competition may go too far,
with a plethora of egoistic producers flooding the market and producing
greater doubts about religion on the part of consumers.
Further considerations, implications and
concluding remarks
Further considerations
Future research should consider analyzing inter-nation state and intra-nation
state religious competition data together, both on a cross-sectional and time-
series basis. Such integrative research may provide some clarification of
whether there is a “not too little, not too much” level of religious competi-
tion, and join our findings that U.S. states with higher levels of religious
competition featured lower levels of belief, attendance, and prayer with
Iannaccone’s findings (1991) that nations with higher levels of competition
had higher levels of belief, practice, and prayer.

Also, dividing the United States’ religious data further by pulling apart
large religious groups, such as Pew’s Mainline, Historically Black, and
Evangelical classifications, into denominations, may offer additional insight
into religious competition. It may be interesting to understand what impact
each denomination has on the overall competition framework both in a time
series and in cross sectional analysis.
Another important extension may be in relation to the societal impact
caused by the potential market failure of the religious economy. For
instance, future research may consider analyzing, and or developing
causal models, testing levels of anti-social and/or pro-social behavior,
such as homicide, hate crimes, terrorism, philanthropic giving and or civil
engagement against changing levels of religious competition, belief,
attendance and prayer.
Implications and concluding remarks
Joining our results together with those of Iannaccone (1991), there is
some reason to believe that a free religious market may fail to produce
desired positive externalities if there is too much religious competition
as well as too little religious competition. The integration of the market
failure approach of this paper with the market success approach of
Iannaccone (1991) and other rational choice research on religion may
result going forward in a theory elucidating how somewhere between
monopoly and perfect competition there may be a zone of optimality in
the form of a religious market structure with credible reputational assur-
ances and modest but real levels of social control that can continue to
hold the loyalty of the religious consumer, while at the same time gener-
ating positive externalities. The results here open the door for a discus-
sion about the government’s role in religion. Should religion be regulated
in a similar manner as for profit corporations? Although the regulatory
approach within the United States up till now has been to remove the
hands of government from the affairs of religion, the results from this
research and other studies may spark the discussion of government’s
potential role in the religious economy. Moving forward, removing tra-
ditional biases from our thought process may all us to rethink the logic
of the market structure in which the producers in this very important
industry compete.
Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public,
commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes
1. Examples of discrete religious sects would be, for instance, differences in
groups of Christians, such as Catholics and Protestants or differences in groups
of Muslims, such as Shiites and Sunnis.
2. Examples of different religions are Muslims versus Christianity, Buddhism
versus Judaism, etc.
3. Buyers are church members or those who attend religious services where they
contribute their time or donate money to the religious institution.
4. Sellers are the religious leaders and their workers who conduct services with
respect to the doctrines and liturgies of the religious institution.
5. For purposes of this research, the discrete marketplace where religions compete
will be based upon the geographical boundaries of nation-states.
6. Religious adherence is what the respondent provided in the Pew Forum survey.
It does not represent religious membership or attendance but rather general
affiliation with that particular religious denomination.
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212–230.

Appendix 1. Diversity index for each state Utah was removed
from the analysis but included here – Test #1 and Test #2
State Hi State Hi
ALABAMA 9112 NORTH CAROLINA 9363
ARIZONA 9042 NORTH DAKOTA 8520
ARKANSAS 9167 NEBRASKA 8880
CALIFORNIA 9028 NEVADA 8876
COLORADO 9270 NEW HAVEN 8709
CONNECTICUT 7770 NEW JERSEY 8273
DC 9511 NEW MEXICO 9048
DELAWARE 8871 NEW YORK 8473
FLORIDA 9107 OHIO 9264
GEORGIA 9333 OKLAHOMA 9324
IDAHO 8945 OREGON 9353
ILLINOIS 8909 PENNSYLVANIA 8912
INDIANA 9328 RHODE ISLAND 7277
IOWA 9086 SOUTH CAROLINA 9269
KANSAS 9178 SOUTH DAKOTA 9035
KENTUCKY 9185 TENNESSEE 9217
LOUSIANA 8801 TEXAS 9151
MAINE M 8873 UTAH 6241
MARYLAND 9362 VERMONT 8953
MASSACHUSSETTS 8088 VIRGINIA 9443
MICHIGAN 9192 WEST VIRGINIA 9294
MINNESOTA 8825 WASHINGTON 9405
MISSISSIPPI 8795 WISCONSIN 8702
MISSOURI 9303 WYOMING 9176
MONTANA 9,109

Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics for all variables – Test #1 and
Test #2
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
DI with Protestant
only
34,720.00 5999.00 9519.00 8826.96 505.88
Attendance 34,467.00 1.00 6.00 3.17 1.59
Religion Importance 34,398.00 1.00 4.00 1.62 0.88
God Exists 33,758.00 1.00 2.00 1.04 0.19
Prayer frequency 34,138.00 1.00 7.00 2.68 1.97
Rural 34,720.00 – 1.00 0.22 0.41
Suburban 34,720.00 – 1.00 0.49 0.50
White 34,091.00 – 1.00 0.84 0.37
Asian 34,091.00 – 1.00 0.02 0.15
Other Race 34,091.00 – 1.00 0.04 0.20
Population density
(quintiles)
34,708.00 1.00 5.00 2.78 1.38
Age 33,879.00 18.00 97.00 51.24 17.24
Income 28,711.00 1.00 9.00 5.23 2.35
Gender 34,720.00 1.00 2.00 1.54 0.50

Appendix 3. Frequencies and percentages for categorical
variables – Test #1 and Test #2
Frequency Percent
Population DensityValid
Lowest 8301.00 24
2 7788.00 22
3 7296.00 21
4 6052.00 17
Highest 5271.00 15
Total 34,708.00 100
Missing 12.00 0
34,720.00 100
Race Valid
White 28,597.00 82
Black 3329.00 10
Asian 795.00 2
Other Race 1370.00 4
Total 34,091.00 98
Missing 629.00 2
34,720.00 100
Gender Valid
Male 15,810.00 46
Female 18,910.00 54
34,720.00 100
Community Type Valid
Urban 10,140.00 29
Suburban 17,106.00 49
Rural 7,474.00 22
34,720.00 100
Religious Affiliation Valid
Protestant 19,938.00 57
Catholic 8027.00 23
Jewish 667.00 2
Atheist – 0
Agnostic 816.00 2
Nothing In Particular 3676.00 11
All Other 1326.00 4
Total 34,450.00 99
Missing 270.00 1
34,720.00 100

Appendix4. Correlations–Test#1andTest#2
1234567891011
DIwithProtestantonlyPearsonCorrelation1−.076**−.095**−.048**−.108**.013*.059**−.002.001−.029**
Sig.(2-tailed).000.000.000.000.019.000.677.912.000
N34,72034,46734,39833,75834,13834,09134,72033,87934,72032,508
AttendancePearsonCorrelation−.076**1.595**.237**.539**−.022**−.051**−.107**−.102**.099**
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.0000.0000.000.000.000.000.000.000
N34,46734,46734,21633,57433,98933,89234,46733,68034,46732,327
ImportancePearsonCorrelation−.095**.595**1.387**.647**−.048**−.053**−.122**−.153**.092**
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.0000.0000.000.000.000.000.000.000
N34,39834,21634,39833,50233,89233,81434,39833,60434,39832,259
GodExistsPearsonCorrelation−.048**.237**.387**1.363**−.008−.040**−.031**−.089**.c
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.0000.0000.000.125.000.000.0000.000
N33,75833,57433,50233,75833,30133,20033,75832,99533,75832,508
PrayerFrequencyPearsonCorrelation−.108**.539**.647**.363**1−.048**−.051**−.121**−.214**.109**
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.0000.0000.000.000.000.0000.000.000
N34,13833,98933,89233,30134,13833,56534,13833,39434,13832,067
RacePearsonCorrelation.013*−.022**−.048**−.008−.048**1−.120**−.159**−.011*−.037**
Sig.(2-tailed).019.000.000.125.000.000.000.038.000
N34,09133,89233,81433,20033,56534,09134,09133,35534,09131,975
CommunityTypePearsonCorrelation.059**−.051**−.053**−.040**−.051**−.120**1.056**−.001−.006
Sig.(2-tailed).000.000.000.000.000.000.000.820.286
N34,72034,46734,39833,75834,13834,09134,72033,87934,72032,508
(Continued)

1234567891011
AgePearsonCorrelation−.002−.107**−.122**−.031**−.121**−.159**.056**1.077**.045**
Sig.(2-tailed).677.000.000.000.000.000.000.000.000
N33,87933,68033,60432,99533,39433,35533,87933,87933,87931,774
GenderPearsonCorrelation.001−.102**−.153**−.089**−.214**−.011*−.001.077**1−.024**
Sig.(2-tailed).912.000.000.0000.000.038.820.000.000
N34,72034,46734,39833,75834,13834,09134,72033,87934,72032,508
IncomePearsonCorrelation−.029**.099**.092**.c.109**−.037**−.006.045**−.024**1
Sig.(2-tailed).000.000.0000.000.000.000.286.000.000
N32,50832,32732,25932,50832,06731,97532,50831,77432,50832,508
**Correlationissignificantatthe0.01level(2-tailed);*Correlationissignificantatthe0.05level(2-tailed);cCannotbecomputedbecauseatleastone
ofthevariablesisconstant.
Appendix4.(Continued)

Appendix5. Summaryofregressionanalysisforvariablespredictingdifferinglevelsofreligiosity–Test#1andTest#2
Model#and
variable
1-GodExistsReligionisImportantAttendanceFrequencyPrayerFrequency
BSEBβBSEBβBSEBβBSEBβ
NoControls
DiversityIndex−8.2280.000−0.0680.0000.000−0.0880.0000.000−0.069−0.0010−0.103
R20.0050.0080.0050.011
N31,08734,78434,86034,529
WithControls
HerfindahlIndex−9.5250−0.05600−0.06500−0.05300−0.08
Rural−0.030.012−0.023−0.0840.018−0.038−0.2010.032−0.052−0.1150.04−0.023
Suburban−0.0330.008−0.03−0.0840.013−0.046−0.1220.022−0.038−0.140.028−0.035
White0.1690.0120.1130.4560.0190.1820.7790.0330.1780.9610.0410.174
Asian0.2410.0250.0630.470.0380.0790.8210.0680.0791.0460.0840.079
OtherRace0.1670.020.060.3090.0310.0660.6450.0550.0790.5580.0680.054
Population0.0240.0030.060.040.0050.060.0650.0090.0560.1110.0110.076
Age−0.0010−0.045−0.0060−0.109−0.3150.019−0.098−0.0120−0.102
Income0.0080.0020.0320.0240.0020.061−0.0260.004−0.0380.0470.0050.055
Gender−0.1110.007−0.1−0.2530.011−0.138−0.3150.019−0.098−0.8050.023−0.199
R20.0330.0740.0490.097
N26,24128,18428,27028,093

Appendix 6. Diversity index for each state – Test #3 and Test #4
State Hi State Hi
ALABAMA 8854 NORTH CAROLINA 9177
ARIZONA 9564 NORTH DAKOTA 8498
ARKANSAS 8918 NEBRASKA 9211
CALIFORNIA 9716 NEVADA 9061
COLORADO 9045 NEW HAVEN 9416
CONNECTICUT 9525 NEW JERSEY 9646
DC 9504 NEW MEXICO 9574
DELAWARE 9215 NEW YORK 9601
FLORIDA 9464 OHIO 9571
GEORGIA 9260 OKLAHOMA 9122
IDAHO 8566 OREGON 9643
ILLINOIS 9561 PENNSYLVANIA 9555
INDIANA 9520 RHODE ISLAND 9180
IOWA 9346 SOUTH CAROLINA 7753
KANSAS 9402 SOUTH DAKOTA 9515
KENTUCKY 9015 TENNESSEE 8968
LOUSIANA 9053 TEXAS 9248
MAINE 9306 UTAH 3818
MARYLAND 9505 VERMONT 9349
MASSACHUSSETTS 9597 VIRGINIA 9435
MICHIGAN 9645 WEST VIRGINIA 9192
MINNESOTA 8885 WASHINGTON 9669
MISSISSIPPI 8482 WISCONSIN 9057
MISSOURI 9376 WYOMING 9479
MONTANA 9565

Appendix 7. Descriptive statistics for all variables – Test #3 and Test #4
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. deviation
DI with Protestant only 19,938 7753.000 9716.000 9316.660 369.463
Attendance 19,807 1.000 6.000 2.750 1.468
Religion Importance 19,814 1.000 4.000 1.368 0.649
God Exists 19,697 1.000 2.000 1.007 0.086
Prayer frequency 19,633 1.000 7.000 2.148 1.580
Rural 19,938 – 1.000 0.262 0.440
Suburban 19,938 – 1.000 0.475 0.499
White 19,682 – 1.000 0.828 0.378
Asian 19,682 – 1.000 0.009 0.094
Other Race 19,682 – 1.000 0.030 0.170
Population density
(quintiles)
19,930 1.000 5.000 2.563 1.340
Age 19,471 18.000 97.000 52.944 17.198
Income 16,577 1.000 9.000 5.085 2.319
Gender 19,938 1.000 2.000 1.569 0.495

Appendix 8. Frequencies and percentages for categorical variables –
Test #3 and Test #4
Frequency Percent
Population DensityValid
Lowest 5598.00 28
2 5033.00 25
3 4089.00 21
4 2894.00 14
Highest 2316.00 12
Total 19,930.00 100
Missing 8.00 0
19,938.00 100
Race Valid
White 16,293.00 82
Black 2625.00 13
Asian 176.00 1
Other Race 588.00 3
Total 19,682.00 99
Missing 256.00 1
19,938.00 100
Gender Valid
Male 8602.00 43
Female 11,336.00 57
19,938.00 100
Community Type Valid
Urban 5246.00 26
Suburban 9465.00 48
Rural 5227.00 26
19,938.00 100
Religious Affiliation Valid
Protestant 19,938.00 100
All Other – 0
Total 19,938.00 100
Missing – 0
19,938.00 100

Appendix9. Correlations–Test#3andTest#4
12345678910
DIwith
Protestantonly
Pearson
Correlation
1.109**.096**.029**.088**.015*−.135**.004.006.043**
Sig.(2-tailed).000.000.000.000.042.000.540.401.000
N19,93819,80719,81419,69719,63319,68219,93819,47119,93816,577
AttendancePearson
Correlation
.109**1.496**.080**.456**−.065**−.024**−.032**−.070**−.011
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.000.0000.000.000.001.000.000.144
N19,80719,80719,70319,58819,54619,56519,80719,35819,80716,516
ImportancePearson
Correlation
.096**.496**1.172**.566**−.084**−.014*−.075**−.133**.107**
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.000.0000.000.000.044.000.000.000
N19,81419,70319,81419,58819,53319,56619,81419,36019,81416,499
GodExistsPearson
Correlation
.029**.080**.172**1.184**−.010−.024**−.004−.035**.035**
Sig.(2-tailed).000.000.000.000.154.001.561.000.000
N19,69719,58819,58819,69719,43919,45619,69719,25419,69716,433
Prayer
Frequency
Pearson
Correlation
.088**.456**.566**.184**1−.087**−.012−.050**−.191**.102**
Sig.(2-tailed).0000.0000.000.000.000.080.000.000.000
N19,63319,54619,53319,43919,63319,39619,63319,21119,63316,412
(Continued)

12345678910
RacePearson
Correlation
.015*−.065**−.084**−.010−.087**1−.132**−.144**.011−.104**
Sig.(2-tailed).042.000.000.154.000.000.000.111.000
N19,68219,56519,56619,45619,39619,68219,68219,26219,68216,425
Community
Type
Pearson
Correlation
−.135**−.024**−.014*−.024**−.012−.132**1.047**−.011−.072**
Sig.(2-tailed).000.001.044.001.080.000.000.133.000
N19,93819,80719,81419,69719,63319,68219,93819,47119,93816,577
AgePearson
Correlation
.004−.032**−.075**−.004−.050**−.144**.047**1.078**−.158**
Sig.(2-tailed).540.000.000.561.000.000.000.000.000
N19,47119,35819,36019,25419,21119,26219,47119,47119,47116,373
GenderPearson
Correlation
.006−.070**−.133**−.035**−.191**.011−.011.078**1−.153**
Sig.(2-tailed).401.000.000.000.000.111.133.000.000
N19,93819,80719,81419,69719,63319,68219,93819,47119,93816,577
IncomePearson
Correlation
.043**−.011.107**.035**.102**−.104**−.072**−.158**−.153**1
Sig.(2-tailed).000.144.000.000.000.000.000.000.000
N16,57716,51616,49916,43316,41216,42516,57716,37316,57716,577
**Correlationissignificantatthe0.01level(2-tailed);*Correlationissignificantatthe0.05level(2-tailed).
Appendix9.(Continued)

Appendix10. Summaryofregressionanalysisforvariablespredictingdifferinglevelsofreligiosity–Test#3andTest#4
Model#and
variable
1-GodExistsReligionisImportantAttendanceFrequencyPrayerFrequency
BSEBβBSEBβBSEBβBSEBβ
NoControls
DiversityIndex
(ProtestantOnly)
6.6500.0000.0290.0000.0000.0960.0000.0000.1090.0000.0000.088
R20.0010.0090.0120.008
N19,69619,81219,80619,632
WithControls
DiversityIndex
(ProtestantOnly)
5.5000.0000.0240.000.000.080.0000.0000.0970.000.000.07
Rural−0.0010.002−0.0030.0010.0170.001−0.1110.038−0.0340.0360.0410.01
Suburban−0.0010.002−0.004−0.0130.013−0.01−0.0190.028−0.007−0.0060.03−0.002
White0.0050.002−0.0040.2580.0160.1490.5360.0360.1380.5350.0380.127
Asian0.0220.0070.0250.1270.0550.0180.1460.1230.0090.2690.1320.016
OtherRace−0.0010.004−0.0010.1410.0320.0370.3280.0730.0380.110.0780.012
Population0.0020.0010.0290.0230.0050.0480.0370.0110.0340.0690.0120.058
Age4.32500.009−0.0030−0.066−0.0050.001−0.052−0.0030.001−0.035
Income0.00100.0250.0150.0020.052−0.0370.005−0.0590.0320.0060.046
Gender−0.0050.001−0.031−0.1470.01−0.111−0.2020.023−0.069−0.5450.025−0.171
R20.0050.0510.0340.06
N16,09516,15316,17216,081

Appendix 11. All religious faiths and denominations
Religion or denomination Frequency Percent
Southern Baptist Convention 2536 7.30
Independent Baptist in the Evangelical
Tradition
911 2.62
Baptist General Conference; Swedish Baptist 21 0.06
Baptist Missionary Association 64 0.18
Conservative Baptist Association of America 24 0.07
Free Will Baptist 75 0.22
General Association of Regular Baptists 31 0.09
American Baptist Association 2 0.01
Baptist Bible Fellowship 3 0.01
Primitive Baptist 12 0.03
Reformed Baptist (Calvinist) 5 0.01
Fundamentalist Baptist 12 0.03
Seventh-Day Baptist 3 0.01
Missionary Baptist in the Evangelical Tradition
– not Baptist Missionary Association
1 0.00
Baptist General Convention of Texas 4 0.01
North American Baptist 3 0.01
Slavic Evangelical Baptist Church 1 0.00
Full Gospel Baptist Association 1 0.00
Evangelical Baptist 1 0.00
United Baptist Church 1 0.00
Evangelical Free Baptist 1 0.00
Electronic ministries 1 0.00
Other Baptist denomination in the Evangelical
Tradition
1 0.00
Baptist not further specified (just a Baptist) in
the Evangelical Tradition
183 0.53
Baptist – Ambiguous affiliation in the Evangelical
Tradition
107 0.31
American Baptist Churches in the USA 411 1.18
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship; Baptist
Alliance
15 0.04
Liberal/Progressive Baptist 2 0.01
the Mainline Tradition
124 0.36
Baptist – Ambiguous affiliation in the Mainline
Tradition
76 0.22
National Baptist Convention 548 1.58

Progressive Baptist Convention 75 0.22
Independent Baptist in the Historically Black
Protestant Tradition
121 0.35
Black Baptist 9 0.03
Christian Baptist Church of God 3 0.01
Evangelical Baptist in the Historically Black
3 0.01
Missionary Baptist in the Historically Black
51 0.15
Full Gospel Baptist in the Historically Black
11 0.03
Fundamentalist Baptist in the Historically Black
1 0.00
Primitive Baptist in the Historically Black
4 0.01
National/Progressive Baptist Convention 2 0.01
International Baptist 1 0.00
Baptist Bible Church in the Historically Black
4 0.01
the Historically Black Protestant Tradition
333 0.96
Baptist – Ambiguous Affiliation in the
Historically Black Protestant Tradition
111 0.32
Primitive Methodist 2 0.01
Congregational Methodist 1 0.00
Traditional Methodist 2 0.01
Evangelical Methodist 2 0.01
Independent Methodist 4 0.01
Missionary Methodist 1 0.00
Methodist not further specified (just a
Methodist) in the Evangelical Tradition
30 0.09
Methodist – Ambiguous Affiliation in the
Evangelical Tradition
12 0.03
United Methodist Church 2,238 6.45
Evangelical United Brethren 2 0.01
Methodist) in the Mainline Tradition
113 0.33
Mainline Tradition
38 0.11
(Continued)
Appendix 11. (Continued)

African Methodist Episcopal 127 0.37
African Methodist Episcopal Zion 20 0.06
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church 31 0.09
Black Methodist 1 0.00
Reformed Methodist 1 0.00
Missionary Methodist in the Historically Black
1 0.00
Methodist) in the Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
23 0.07
6 0.02
Nondenominational evangelical 411 1.18
Nondenominational fundamentalist 103 0.30
Nondenominational charismatic 172 0.50
Nondenominational Protestant 1 0.00
Nondenominational Christian 29 0.08
Association of Bridge Churches 1 0.00
Nondenominational electronic ministries 1 0.00
Interdenominational in the Evangelical Tradition 186 0.54
Community Church in the Evangelical Tradition 23 0.07
Federated or union church in the Evangelical
Tradition
1 0.00
Nondenominational not further specified (just
Nondenominational) in Evangelical Tradition
183 0.53
Nondenominational – Ambiguous affiliation in
61 0.18
Interdenominational in the Mainline Tradition 102 0.29
Community church in the Mainline Tradition 13 0.04
Federated or union church in the Mainline
Tradition
2 0.01
Emergent church 1 0.00
Liberal Nondenominational 1 0.00
Nondenominational) in Mainline Tradition
148 0.43
the mainline Tradition
36 0.10
Nondenominational) in Historically Black
45 0.13

Nondenominational Protestant – Ambiguous
Affiliation in Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
22 0.06
Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod 587 1.69
Lutheran Church, Wisconsin Synod 63 0.18
Lutheran Brethren 3 0.01
Church of the Lutheran Confession 1 0.00
Free Lutheran 3 0.01
Apostolic Lutheran Church in America 4 0.01
Lutheran Congregations in Mission for Christ 1 0.00
Lutheran not further specified (just a Lutheran)
in the Evangelical Tradition
60 0.17
Lutheran – Ambiguous affiliation in the
17 0.05
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) 868 2.50
American Lutheran Church 14 0.04
Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church in America 2 0.01
Lutheran not further specified (just a Lutheran)
in the Mainline Tradition
229 0.66
Lutheran – Ambiguous affiliation in the Mainline
Tradition
72 0.21
Presbyterian Church in America 166 0.48
Associate Reformed Presbyterian 13 0.04
Cumberland Presbyterian Church 11 0.03
Orthodox Presbyterian 8 0.02
Evangelical Presbyterian 12 0.03
Reformed Presbyterian 3 0.01
Congregational Presbyterian 1 0.00
Bible Presbyterian Church 1 0.00
World Presbyterian Board 1 0.00
Conservative Presbyterian Church 1 0.00
Independent Presbyterian 3 0.01
Community Presbyterian Church in America 2 0.01
Presbyterian not further specified (just a
Presbyterian) in the Evangelical Tradition
51 0.15
Presbyterian – Ambiguous affiliation in the
45 0.13
Presbyterian Church USA 543 1.56
Scotch Presbyterian 2 0.01
(Continued)

United Presbyterian 13 0.04
Liberal Presbyterian 1 0.00
Presbyterian Church of Canada 1 0.00
Other Presbyterian in the Mainline Tradition 3 0.01
Presbyterian) in the Mainline Tradition
176 0.51
Mainline Presbyterian – Ambiguous affiliation in
103 0.30
Assemblies of God 478 1.38
Church of God Cleveland Tennessee 124 0.36
Four Square Gospel 28 0.08
Pentecostal Church of God 32 0.09
Pentecostal Holiness Church 54 0.16
Assembly of Christian Churches 9 0.03
Church of God of Prophecy 5 0.01
Vineyard Fellowship 4 0.01
Open Bible Standard Churches 3 0.01
Full Gospel in the Evangelical Tradition 12 0.03
Calvary Chapel 9 0.03
Apostolic Pentecostal in the Evangelical
Tradition
24 0.07
Church of God not further specified 7 0.02
Hispanic Pentecostal in the Evangelical Tradition 9 0.03
Nondenominational, Independent Pentecostal in
37 0.11
Missionary church 2 0.01
Elim Fellowship 1 0.00
International Pentecostal Church of Christ 1 0.00
Evangelical Pentecostal 4 0.01
Church of God of Kentucky 1 0.00
Church of God of the Midwest 1 0.00
Pentecostal Electronic ministries 1 0.00
Church of God of the Apostolic Faith 52 0.15
Pentecostal not further specified (just a
Pentecostal) in the Evangelical Tradition
127 0.37
Pentecostal – Ambiguous affiliation in the
61 0.18
Church of God in Christ 158 0.46
Apostolic Pentecostal in the Historically Black
18 0.05

World Gospel Mission 1 0.00
Church of God in Christ Holiness 1 0.00
Hispanic Pentecostal in the Historically Black
1 0.00
New Testament Church of God 1 0.00
Nondenominational, Independent Pentecostal in
8 0.02
United Pentecostal Church International 27 0.08
Full Gospel in the Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
1 0.00
United House of Prayer for All People 1 0.00
Pentecostal) in the Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
25 0.07
12 0.03
Anglican Orthodox Church 5 0.01
Reformed Episcopal Church 1 0.00
Conservative Anglican 3 0.01
Anglican not further specified (just an
Episcopalian) in the Evangelical Tradition
20 0.06
Anglican – Ambiguous affiliation in the
5 0.01
Episcopal Church in the USA 473 1.36
Anglican Church (Church of England) 134 0.39
Church of Ireland 1 0.00
Episcopalian) in the Mainline Tradition
43 0.12
Anglican – Ambiguous affiliation in the Mainline
Tradition
19 0.05
Church of Christ 564 1.62
Christian Churches and Churches of Christ 21 0.06
Restorationist not further specified in the
18 0.05
Restorationist – Ambiguous affiliation in the
16 0.05
Disciples of Christ 137 0.39
Mainline Tradition
16 0.05
(Continued)

Mainline Tradition
4 0.01
Conservative Congregational Christian 25 0.07
National Association of Congregational
Christian Churches
3 0.01
Evangelical Congregational 1 0.00
Independent Congregational Church 2 0.01
Congregationalist not further specified (just a
Congregationalist) in the Evangelical Tradition
10 0.03
Congregationalist – Ambiguous affiliation in the
4 0.01
United Church of Christ 246 0.71
Congregationalist) in the Mainline Tradition
32 0.09
Congregationalist – Ambiguous affiliation in the
Mainline Tradition
18 0.05
Church of the Nazarene 103 0.30
Wesleyan Church 42 0.12
Free Methodist Church 103 0.30
Christian and Missionary Alliance/Alliance 23 0.07
Church of God (Anderson, Indiana) 56 0.16
Salvation Army 8 0.02
Wesleyan Methodist Church 13 0.04
Church of God of Findlay, Ohio 1 0.00
Pilgrim Holiness Church 1 0.00
World Gospel Mission/Holiness Missionary 2 0.01
Free Holiness 1 0.00
Church of God of Michigan 1 0.00
Holiness not further specified (just Holiness) in
16 0.05
Holiness – Ambiguous affiliation in the
4 0.01
Independent Holiness in the Historically Black
12 0.03
Apostolic Holiness Church 7 0.02
Holiness Baptist 4 0.01
Holiness not further specified (just Holiness) in
13 0.04
1 0.00

Christian Reformed Church 39 0.11
Sovereign Grace 2 0.01
United Reformed Churches of North America 1 0.00
Evangelical Reformed 2 0.01
Evangelical Association of Reformed and
Congregational Churches
1 0.00
Reformed not further specified (just Reformed)
9 0.03
Reformed – Ambiguous affiliation in the
1 0.00
Reformed Church in America 44 0.13
Free Hungarian Reformed Church 1 0.00
Congregational Union of Scotland 1 0.00
Reformed not further specified (just Reformed)
4 0.01
Mainline Tradition
1 0.00
Seventh-Day Adventist 134 0.39
Advent Christian 1 0.00
Sacred Name Churches (e.g., Yahweh
Assembly, Yahwists)
4 0.01
Worldwide Church of God 4 0.01
Church of God in Abrahamic Faith 2 0.01
Church of God of the 7th Day 1 0.00
Church of God General Conference 3 0.01
Philadelphia Church of God 1 0.00
Brethren in Christ 3 0.01
Brethren (not further specified) in the
13 0.04
Mennonite Brethren 2 0.01
Mennonite (not further specified) 31 0.09
Amish 4 0.01
United Brethren in Christ/United Brethren 5 0.01
Apostolic Christian Church 2 0.01
Church of the Brethren 15 0.04
Moravian Church 9 0.03
Brethren (not further specified) in the Mainline
Tradition
9 0.03
Evangelical Covenant Church 10 0.03
(Continued)

Evangelical Free Church 18 0.05
Pietist 1 0.00
Evangelical Free Mission Church 1 0.00
Church of God Winebrenner Fellowship 1 0.00
Society of Friends 4 0.01
Friends, Quaker (not further specified) 41 0.12
Evangelical (not further specified) 43 0.12
Born again/Bible Believer 9 0.03
Evangelical Bible Church 1 0.00
Bible/Gospel/Missionary churches 33 0.10
Fundamentalist (not further specified) 3 0.01
Charismatic/Spirit-filled 3 0.01
Protestant non-specific in the Evangelical
Tradition
617 1.78
Protestant non-specific/other in the Mainline
Tradition
846 2.44
Metropolitan Community Church 2 0.01
Protestant non-specific in the Historically Black
147 0.42
Catholic 8027 23.12
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 363 1.05
Community of Christ 8 0.02
Mormon not further specified 8 0.02
Mormon – ambiguous affiliation 2 0.01
Greek Orthodox 166 0.48
Russian Orthodox 69 0.20
Orthodox Church in America 27 0.08
Armenian Orthodox 16 0.05
Eastern Orthodox 8 0.02
Serbian Orthodox 13 0.04
Rumanian Orthodox 3 0.01
Syrian Orthodox 2 0.01
Ukrainian Orthodox 3 0.01
Antiochian Orthodox Church 6 0.02
Albanian Orthodox 1 0.00
Ethiopian Orthodox 6 0.02
Coptic/Egyptian Orthodox Church 17 0.05
Macedonian Orthodox 2 0.01

Orthodox not further specified (just Orthodox) 15 0.04
Orthodox ambiguous affiliation 7 0.02
Christian Science 16 0.05
Religious science 18 0.05
Spiritualist 19 0.05
Unity/Unity Church/Christ Church Unity 26 0.07
Metaphysical 9 0.03
Jehovah’s Witness 212 0.61
International Bible Students 2 0.01
Unification Church 1 0.00
Orthodox Lutheran Church (Lutheran Church/
Catholic Rite)
1 0.00
Hebrew Israelite/African Hebrew Israelite 1 0.00
Messianic Jew 11 0.03
New Apostolic Church 3 0.01
Mixed Christians (e.g., Catholic AND
Protestant affiliation)
6 0.02
Mixed Christians and non-Christians (e.g.,
Protestant AND Buddhist)
16 0.05
Indian Shaker Church 1 0.00
Reform Jewish 315 0.91
Conservative Jewish 219 0.63
Orthodox Jewish 53 0.15
Reconstructionist Jewish 10 0.03
Jewish – Multiple traditions 3 0.01
Jewish Renewal 1 0.00
Post Denominational Jewish 3 0.01
Traditional Jewish 2 0.01
Culturally Jewish 13 0.04
Jewish not further specified (just Jewish) 48 0.14
Jewish – ambiguous affiliation 15 0.04
Sunni 62 0.18
Shia 16 0.05
Nation of Islam/Black Muslim 3 0.01
Moor 1 0.00
World Islamic League 1 0.00
Moorish Science Temple of America 1 0.00
Wahhabism 1 0.00
(Continued)

Orthodox Muslim 1 0.00
Al-Islam 1 0.00
Muslim not further specified (just a Muslim) 22 0.06
Muslim – ambiguous affiliation 7 0.02
Theravada (Vipassana) Buddhism 43 0.12
Mahayana (Zen) Buddhism 127 0.37
Vajrayana (Tibetan) Buddhism 69 0.20
Nichiren Buddhism, Soka Gakki (SGI) 10 0.03
Manjushri (Japanese) Buddhism 1 0.00
American Buddhism 2 0.01
Liberal interfaith Buddhism 4 0.01
Jodo Shinshu 3 0.01
Mahamaya 1 0.00
Shaman Buddhist 1 0.00
Buddhist not further specified (just a Buddhist) 114 0.33
Buddhist ambiguous affiliation 34 0.10
Vaishnava Hinduism 51 0.15
Shaivite Hinduism 47 0.14
Shaktism Hinduism 3 0.01
Jainism 8 0.02
Kshatriya 1 0.00
Vedanta 1 0.00
Brahmin 3 0.01
Liberal Hinduism 4 0.01
Kali 1 0.00
Sindhi 3 0.01
Hari Krishna 2 0.01
Hindu – Multiple traditions 3 0.01
BAPS 1 0.00
Cultural Hindu 2 0.01
Hindu not further specified (just a Hindu) 102 0.29
Hindu ambiguous affiliation 25 0.07
New Age 4 0.01
Wica (Wiccan) 39 0.11
Pagan 42 0.12
Asatru 2 0.01
Druid 4 0.01
Scientology 4 0.01
New Thought 2 0.01

Theosophy 1 0.00
Pantheist 10 0.03
Transcendental meditation/Meditation 4 0.01
Eckankar 4 0.01
Satanism 1 0.00
Unitarian (Universalist) 153 0.44
Humanist 6 0.02
Deist 18 0.05
Liberal faith 24 0.07
Self realization 1 0.00
Nihilist 1 0.00
Spiritual but not religious 65 0.19
Eclectic/Bit of everything/Own beliefs 28 0.08
Native American Religions 34 0.10
Bahai 9 0.03
Shinto 2 0.01
Tao 7 0.02
Rastafarian 4 0.01
Sikh 4 0.01
Zoroastrianism 4 0.01
Siddhayoga 2 0.01
Shamanism (non-Western) 2 0.01
Animism 1 0.00
Mixed non-Christians 7 0.02
Agnostic 816 2.35
Nothing in particular 3676 10.59
Don’t know/refused (no information on
religious affiliation)
270 0.78
Total 34,720 100.00

Southern Baptist Convention 2536 12.72
Independent Baptist in the Evangelical
Tradition
911 4.57
Baptist General Conference; Swedish
Baptist
21 0.11
Baptist Missionary Association 64 0.32
Conservative Baptist Association of
America
24 0.12
Free Will Baptist 75 0.38
General Association of Regular Baptists 31 0.16
American Baptist Association 2 0.01
Baptist Bible Fellowship 3 0.02
Primitive Baptist 12 0.06
Reformed Baptist (Calvinist) 5 0.03
Fundamentalist Baptist 12 0.06
Seventh-Day Baptist 3 0.02
Missionary Baptist in the Evangelical Tradition
– not Baptist Missionary Association
1 0.01
Baptist General Convention of Texas 4 0.02
North American Baptist 3 0.02
Slavic Evangelical Baptist Church 1 0.01
Full Gospel Baptist Association 1 0.01
Evangelical Baptist 1 0.01
United Baptist Church 1 0.01
Evangelical Free Baptist 1 0.01
Other Baptist denomination in the Evangelical
Tradition
1 0.01
183 0.92
Baptist – Ambiguous affiliation in the
107 0.54
American Baptist Churches in the USA 411 2.06
Cooperative Baptist Fellowship; Baptist
Alliance
15 0.08
Liberal/Progressive Baptist 2 0.01
124 0.62
Baptist – Ambiguous affiliation in the Mainline
Tradition
76 0.38
Appendix 12. Protestant denominations

National Baptist Convention 548 2.75
Progressive Baptist Convention 75 0.38
Independent Baptist in the Historically Black
121 0.61
Black Baptist 9 0.05
Christian Baptist Church of God 3 0.02
Evangelical Baptist in the Historically Black
3 0.02
Missionary Baptist in the Historically Black
51 0.26
Full Gospel Baptist in the Historically Black
11 0.06
Fundamentalist Baptist in the Historically Black
1 0.01
Primitive Baptist in the Historically Black
4 0.02
National/Progressive Baptist Convention 2 0.01
International Baptist 1 0.01
Baptist Bible Church in the Historically Black
4 0.02
333 1.67
Baptist – Ambiguous Affiliation in the
111 0.56
Primitive Methodist 2 0.01
Congregational Methodist 1 0.01
Traditional Methodist 2 0.01
Evangelical Methodist 2 0.01
Independent Methodist 4 0.02
Missionary Methodist 1 0.01
Methodist) in the Evangelical Tradition
30 0.15
12 0.06
United Methodist Church 2238 11.23
Evangelical United Brethren 2 0.01
Methodist) in the Mainline Tradition
113 0.57
Mainline Tradition
38 0.19
(Continued)

African Methodist Episcopal 127 0.64
African Methodist Episcopal Zion 20 0.10
Christian Methodist Episcopal Church 31 0.16
Black Methodist 1 0.01
Reformed Methodist 1 0.01
Missionary Methodist in the Historically Black
1 0.01
Methodist) in the Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
23 0.12
6 0.03
Nondenominational evangelical 411 2.06
Nondenominational fundamentalist 103 0.52
Nondenominational charismatic 172 0.86
Nondenominational Protestant 1 0.01
Nondenominational Christian 29 0.15
Association of Bridge Churches 1 0.01
Nondenominational electronic ministries 1 0.01
Interdenominational in the Evangelical Tradition 186 0.93
Community Church in the Evangelical
Tradition
23 0.12
Federated or union church in the Evangelical
Tradition
1 0.01
Nondenominational) in Evangelical Tradition
183 0.92
61 0.31
Interdenominational in the Mainline Tradition 102 0.51
Community church in the Mainline Tradition 13 0.07
Federated or union church in the Mainline
Tradition
2 0.01
Emergent church 1 0.01
Liberal Nondenominational 1 0.01
Nondenominational) in Mainline Tradition
148 0.74
the mainline Tradition
36 0.18
Nondenominational) in Historically Black
45 0.23

Nondenominational Protestant – Ambiguous
Affiliation in Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
22 0.11
Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod 587 2.94
Lutheran Church, Wisconsin Synod 63 0.32
Lutheran Brethren 3 0.02
Church of the Lutheran Confession 1 0.01
Free Lutheran 3 0.02
Apostolic Lutheran Church in America 4 0.02
Lutheran Congregations in Mission for Christ 1 0.01
Lutheran not further specified (just a
Lutheran) in the Evangelical Tradition
60 0.30
17 0.09
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America
(ELCA)
868 4.35
American Lutheran Church 14 0.07
Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church in
America
2 0.01
Lutheran not further specified (just a
Lutheran) in the Mainline Tradition
229 1.15
Mainline Tradition
72 0.36
Presbyterian Church in America 166 0.83
Associate Reformed Presbyterian 13 0.07
Cumberland Presbyterian Church 11 0.06
Orthodox Presbyterian 8 0.04
Evangelical Presbyterian 12 0.06
Reformed Presbyterian 3 0.02
Congregational Presbyterian 1 0.01
Bible Presbyterian Church 1 0.01
World Presbyterian Board 1 0.01
Conservative Presbyterian Church 1 0.01
Independent Presbyterian 3 0.02
Community Presbyterian Church in America 2 0.01
Presbyterian) in the Evangelical Tradition
51 0.26
Presbyterian – Ambiguous affiliation in the
45 0.23
Presbyterian Church USA 543 2.72
(Continued)

Scotch Presbyterian 2 0.01
United Presbyterian 13 0.07
Liberal Presbyterian 1 0.01
Presbyterian Church of Canada 1 0.01
Other Presbyterian in the Mainline Tradition 3 0.02
Presbyterian) in the Mainline Tradition
176 0.88
Mainline Presbyterian – Ambiguous affiliation
103 0.52
Assemblies of God 478 2.40
Church of God, Cleveland, Tennessee 124 0.62
Four Square Gospel 28 0.14
Pentecostal Church of God 32 0.16
Pentecostal Holiness Church 54 0.27
Assembly of Christian Churches 9 0.05
Church of God of Prophecy 5 0.03
Vineyard Fellowship 4 0.02
Open Bible Standard Churches 3 0.02
Full Gospel in the Evangelical Tradition 12 0.06
Calvary Chapel 9 0.05
Apostolic Pentecostal in the Evangelical
Tradition
24 0.12
Church of God not further specified 7 0.04
Hispanic Pentecostal in the Evangelical
Tradition
9 0.05
Nondenominational, Independent Pentecostal
37 0.19
Missionary church 2 0.01
Elim Fellowship 1 0.01
International Pentecostal Church of Christ 1 0.01
Evangelical Pentecostal 4 0.02
Church of God of Kentucky 1 0.01
Church of God of the Midwest 1 0.01
Pentecostal Electronic ministries 1 0.01
Church of God of the Apostolic Faith 52 0.26
Pentecostal) in the Evangelical Tradition
127 0.64
61 0.31
Church of God in Christ 158 0.79

Apostolic Pentecostal in the Historically Black
18 0.09
World Gospel Mission 1 0.01
Church of God in Christ Holiness 1 0.01
Hispanic Pentecostal in the Historically Black
1 0.01
New Testament Church of God 1 0.01
Nondenominational, Independent Pentecostal
in the Historically Black Protestant Tradition
8 0.04
United Pentecostal Church International 27 0.14
Full Gospel in the Historically Black Protestant
Tradition
1 0.01
United House of Prayer for All People 1 0.01
Pentecostal not further specified (just
a Pentecostal) in the Historically Black
25 0.13
12 0.06
Anglican Orthodox Church 5 0.03
Reformed Episcopal Church 1 0.01
Conservative Anglican 3 0.02
Episcopalian) in the Evangelical Tradition
20 0.10
5 0.03
Episcopal Church in the USA 473 2.37
Anglican Church (Church of England) 134 0.67
Church of Ireland 1 0.01
Episcopalian) in the Mainline Tradition
43 0.22
Mainline Tradition
19 0.10
Church of Christ 564 2.83
Christian Churches and Churches of Christ 21 0.11
18 0.09
16 0.08
Disciples of Christ 137 0.69
(Continued)

Mainline Tradition
16 0.08
Mainline Tradition
4 0.02
Conservative Congregational Christian 25 0.13
National Association of Congregational
Christian Churches
3 0.02
Evangelical Congregational 1 0.01
Independent Congregational Church 2 0.01
Congregationalist) in the Evangelical Tradition
10 0.05
Congregationalist – Ambiguous affiliation in
4 0.02
United Church of Christ 246 1.23
Congregationalist) in the Mainline Tradition
32 0.16
Congregationalist – Ambiguous affiliation in
18 0.09
Church of the Nazarene 103 0.52
Wesleyan Church 42 0.21
Free Methodist Church 103 0.52
Christian and Missionary Alliance/Alliance 23 0.12
Church of God (Anderson, Indiana) 56 0.28
Salvation Army 8 0.04
Wesleyan Methodist Church 13 0.07
Church of God of Findlay, Ohio 1 0.01
Pilgrim Holiness Church 1 0.01
World Gospel Mission/Holiness Missionary 2 0.01
Free Holiness 1 0.01
Church of God of Michigan 1 0.01
Holiness not further specified (just Holiness)
16 0.08
4 0.02
Independent Holiness in the Historically Black
12 0.06
Apostolic Holiness Church 7 0.04
Holiness Baptist 4 0.02
Holiness not further specified (just Holiness)
in the Historically Black Protestant Tradition
13 0.07

1 0.01
Christian Reformed Church 39 0.20
Sovereign Grace 2 0.01
United Reformed Churches of North America 1 0.01
Evangelical Reformed 2 0.01
Evangelical Association of Reformed and
Congregational Churches
1 0.01
Reformed not further specified (just
Reformed) in the Evangelical Tradition
9 0.05
1 0.01
Reformed Church in America 44 0.22
Free Hungarian Reformed Church 1 0.01
Congregational Union of Scotland 1 0.01
Reformed not further specified (just
Reformed) in the Mainline Tradition
4 0.02
Mainline Tradition
1 0.01
Seventh-Day Adventist 134 0.67
Advent Christian 1 0.01
Sacred Name Churches (e.g., Yahweh
Assembly, Yahwists)
4 0.02
Worldwide Church of God 4 0.02
Church of God in Abrahamic Faith 2 0.01
Church of God of the 7th Day 1 0.01
Church of God General Conference 3 0.02
Philadelphia Church of God 1 0.01
Brethren in Christ 3 0.02
13 0.07
Mennonite Brethren 2 0.01
Mennonite (not further specified) 31 0.16
Amish 4 0.02
United Brethren in Christ/United Brethren 5 0.03
Apostolic Christian Church 2 0.01
Church of the Brethren 15 0.08
Moravian Church 9 0.05
(Continued)

Mainline Tradition
9 0.05
Evangelical Covenant Church 10 0.05
Evangelical Free Church 18 0.09
Pietist 1 0.01
Evangelical Free Mission Church 1 0.01
Church of God Winebrenner Fellowship 1 0.01
Society of Friends 4 0.02
Friends, Quaker (not further specified) 41 0.21
Evangelical (not further specified) 43 0.22
Born again/Bible Believer 9 0.05
Evangelical Bible Church 1 0.01
Bible/Gospel/Missionary churches 33 0.17
Fundamentalist (not further specified) 3 0.02
Charismatic/Spirit-filled 3 0.02
Protestant non-specific in the Evangelical
Tradition
617 3.09
Protestant non-specific/other in the Mainline
Tradition
846 4.24
Metropolitan Community Church 2 0.01
Protestant non-specific in the Historically
Black Protestant Tradition
147 0.74
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints 363 1.82
Community of Christ 8 0.04
Mormon not further specified 8 0.04
Mormon – ambiguous affiliation 2 0.01
Greek Orthodox 166 0.83
Russian Orthodox 69 0.35
Orthodox Church in America 27 0.14
Armenian Orthodox 16 0.08
Eastern Orthodox 8 0.04
Serbian Orthodox 13 0.07
Rumanian Orthodox 3 0.02
Syrian Orthodox 2 0.01
Ukrainian Orthodox 3 0.02
Antiochian Orthodox Church 6 0.03
Albanian Orthodox 1 0.01
Ethiopian Orthodox 6 0.03

Coptic/Egyptian Orthodox Church 17 0.09
Macedonian Orthodox 2 0.01
Orthodox not further specified (just
Orthodox)
15 0.08
Orthodox ambiguous affiliation 7 0.04
Christian Science 16 0.08
Religious science 18 0.09
Spiritualist 19 0.10
Unity/Unity Church/Christ Church Unity 26 0.13
Metaphysical 9 0.05
Jehovah’s Witness 212 1.06
Total 19,936 100.00

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