Ir bonds crash october

Bonds Crash : Myth or Reality ?

Nicolas Forest, Head of Interest Rate Strategy
Koen Van de Maele, CFA, Global Head of Fixed Income

October 2009 - Brussels

Agenda

I. The Usual Suspects

II. Can we really trust Central Banks ?

III. Can we really trust Governments ?

IV. Can we really trust Bonds Market ?
Government bond market
Corporate bond market

3
Source : Bloomberg & Dexia Asset Management Interest Rate Research

The Usual Suspects
The “Money Printers” and “Inglorious Spenders”…

Bonds Crash

4

The Usual Suspects
…could cause a Bond Crash ?
“Central banks around the « L'ensemble de la dette “L'ombre du krach
globe are printing money, américaine (État, entreprises, obligataire de 1994 plane à
lowering interest rates, and ménages) est de 400 % du nouveau sur les marchés” La
altogether loosening up PIB, proche des niveaux de Tribune, 15 September 2009
monetary policy—all of which 1929», prévient Michaël
will lead to inflation and high Benhaïm, responsable de la
commodity (i.e., gold) costs.” gestion obligataire chez
Epoch Times, 15 September Pictet. Faut-il craindre un
2009 krach obligataire ? « On ne
“Ben Bernanke said this
peut pas écarter ce scénario
week that the recession is
lors de la sortie de crise»
"very likely over." Yes, the
Moneyweek, 25 June 2009
recession may be over in
“At some point, the Fed will “The U.S. Congressional nominal terms, but massive
need to drain this cash out of Budget Office is pegging the inflation has just begun and
the financial system as it federal budget deficit for prices of stocks and real
raises interest rates. If it 2009 at US$1.6-trillion "I estate will continue to
doesn't act soon enough, it would not be surprised that at plummet when valued in real
could risk letting inflation rise some point after 2011 that money, gold and silver. And it
above desired levels.” The yields rise as high as 6% to may still be too late to
Wall Street Journal, 17 7%." says Mr. Zandi chief prevent hyperinflation”
September 2009 economist of Moody's. This National Inflation Association,
rise in yields would equate to September 2009
significant capital losses for
bondholders.” Financial Post,
22 September 2009
5

Can we really trust Central Banks ?
The quantity of reserves in the banking system has risen dramatically…

2 500 000
Evolution of Central Bank Supply * 2 500 000
Composition of the Supply
(millions of us dollars)

2 000 000 2 000 000

Central Bank Liquidity Sw aps

1 500 000
+ 1 162 billions of 1 500 000
Portf olio Holding of Commercial Paper Funding Facility
us dollars in 1 year Other loans
i.e. 9% of the GDP Term auction credit
Securities Held Outright
1 000 000 1 000 000

500 000 500 000

- -
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

* The Fed has the ability to purchase assets or offer loans with The massive asset purchases & the liquidity facilities explain
money created by itself : it prints money the increase of the supply offered by the Federal Reserve

6

These facilities have unfreezed the credit markets…

5.0 400 000 300 600 000
Ted Spread & CP Fund Facility Credit Spread & Term Auction Credit
4.5
350 000
250 500 000
4.0
300 000
3.5
200 400 000
The commercial paper 250 000
3.0 facilities aim to unfreeze
The Federal reserve
the money markets and
2.5 200 000 150
wanted to decrease the 300 000
reduce the Ted Spread…
risk premium & normalize
2.0
the credit spreads…
150 000
100 200 000
1.5
100 000
1.0
50 100 000
50 000
0.5

- 0 - 0
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Ted Spread
Credit Spread Term auction credit
Portfolio Holding of Commercial Paper Funding Facility

7

… and have created a large quantity of excess reserves…

1 800 000
Supply absorbed by depository institutions 1 000 000
Supply non absorbed by depository
1 600 000 900 000 institutions

1 400 000 800 000

700 000
1 200 000
600 000
1 000 000
500 000 The supply non absorbed by
800 000
depository institutions are excess
400 000
600 000 reserves
300 000
400 000
200 000

200 000 100 000

- -
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Currency in circulation Deposits w ith Banks Other

8

… which banks don’t transmit into the economy

2 000 000 2.1 10
Components of the Monetary Base The Money Multipliers
1 800 000 1.9 9
1 600 000
1.7
8
1 400 000
1.5
1 200 000 The increase of monetary base is 7
explained by the excess reserves
1 000 000 1.3
6
800 000
1.1

600 000 The excess reserves are not 5
0.9 transmitted to the monetary mass :
400 000 money multipliers have collapsed !
0.7 There is no inflationary 4
200 000
risk in the short term
- 0.5 3
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Currency in circulation Reserve balances w ith Federal Reserve Banks Money Multiplier M1 Money Multiplier M2

9

Should the excess reserves be converted into new loans, money would grow faster…

Current Simulation
Excess Reserves (billion of $) 833 833 20%
Annual Growth of M2
Monetary Base (billion of $) 1 743 1 743 18%

M2 (billion of $) 8 283 15 688 16%

14%
Money Multiplier 4.75 9.00
12%
Annual M2 Growth 8% 13%
10%

8%
The amount of excess reserves doesn’t change…
6%
… but the multiplier normalizes… 4%
M2 increases to 7 405 billions of dollars
2%
The excess reserves are used in the real economy
0%
60 63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05 08 11 14
… and annual M2 growth increase significantly
We assume a shift on 5 years Simulation

The average is close to 13%

10

… and cause severe inflation

14% US M one y Growth & Inflation 12%
US Money Growth & Inflation
12% 1910
10%

10%
8%
1970
8%

Inflation
6% 1980
6%
1940
4%
4% In the long
term, money 1990
growth and 1960
2% 1950 2000
2% inflation are
correlated… Annual Growth of M2
1920
0% 0%
26 31 36 41 46 51 56 61 66 71 76 81 86 91 96 01 06 0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 16%
-2% -2% 1930

-4% M2 CPI
-4%

11

The German example in the 1920s
1200%
Annual Growth of Monetary Mass in Germany
(in percentage)
1000%

800%

600% The currency in
circulation has been
400% multiplied by 215
Currency in circulation between 1910 & 1922

200% Monetary Base

0%
1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922

800 000 000 000
Wholesale Price Index
700 000 000 000

600 000 000 000

500 000 000 000

400 000 000 000

300 000 000 000

200 000 000 000
Wholesale Price Index
100 000 000 000

-
1914 1919 1921 1922 1923 1923

12

But the Federal Reserve could reduce the excess reserves…

The Fed can reduce the size of excess reserves…
By selling securities
Bill, Notes and Bonds
Federal agency debt securities & mortgage-backed securities
By reducing the credit facilities
Term auction credit
Other Programs (ABCP Liquidity Facility, Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility…)

… but that could impact market stability
Selling Securities
risk on interest rates
risk on credit spreads
Reducing the credit facility
Risk on inter banking market

13

…or raise its interest rate to discourage the lending opportunities

Since October 2008, the Fed remunerates 6.00 Ev olution Central Bank Rate
the excess reserves 5.00

An increase of interest rates will reduce the
4.00
transmission from excess reserves to the real
economy 3.00

The Fed can keep its securities and support the 2.00
bond market
1.00
The Fed will reduce the inflation expectations
0.00
The beginning of the tightening cycle can favor the Sep-08 Dec-08 Mar-09 Jun-09
flattening of the curve FF LI BOR 3M OI S 3M

Why does the Federal Reserve want to pay interest on excess balances?
“Paying interest on excess balances should help to establish a lower bound on the federal funds rate by lessening
the incentive for institutions to trade balances in the market at rates much below the rate paid on excess balances.
Paying interest on excess balances will permit the Federal Reserve to provide sufficient liquidity to support
financial stability while implementing the monetary policy that is appropriate in light of the System's
macroeconomic objectives of maximum employment and price stability”
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.

14

Excess reserves are not always inflationary

35 000
New-Zealand - Components of Monetary Base 6%
New-Zealand - Inflation & Monetary Mass 25.00%

30 000
5% 20.00%
Despite the increase
of excess reserves,
25 000 The Reserve bank of New Zeeland inflation has
4% 15.00%
has used the same framework since decreased since 2006
2006…and the excess
20 000
reserves have been 3% 10.00%
multiplied X 2
15 000
2% 5.00%

10 000
1% 0.00%

5 000
0% -5.00%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
-
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 -1% -10.00%

Currency in Circulation Excess Reserves A nnual Grow th of M2 [R.H.S] CPI

Sweden’s Riksbank pays banks a negative interest rate of minus 25 basis points for dumping excess reserves
in its deposit facility. The idea is to give them an incentive to lend excess reserves to the real economy.

15

Yes, we can

The massive excess reserves have saved the banking system…
Normalization of money markets
Reduction of risk premiums

…and can be controlled by a specific framework
Increase of interest rates
Without removing the excess reserves from the banking system

The quantitative easing permits to regulate the economy…
Stabilization of mortgage rates
Stabilization of bonds market

…if central banks keep their credibility
Perfect economic consensus to avoid the deflation risk
Unusual coordination of monetary policy

16

We expect the end of the Zero Interest Policy in 2010

10
Fed Fund Target & Logit Model Central Bank can
8 raise interest rate
without removing
liquidity…a useful
6
tool in the case of
rebound of the
4 economy

2

0
87 90 93 96 99 02 05 08
-2 ACT FI T +3

6 ECB Target Rate & Logit M odel
The Taylor rules
5 suggest possibility
of hikes…if the
4 employment market
improves
3

2

1

0

96 99 02 05 08
ACT FI T T+3

17

Can we really trust Governments ?
The global public debt increases… 1999

18
Source : Bloomberg & Dexia Asset Management Interest Rate Research Source : The economist

…more and more 2011

19

…more and more
European Budget Deficit
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
2%

0%

-2%

-4%

-6%

-8%

-10% Belgium France Germany

25%
Government Debt
(as a percentage of the global public debt)
20%

15%

10%

5%

0%
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Belgium France Germany US

20

But the relation between public debt and government yield is not very stable...

8% 1950-1970 16% 1970-1985 14% 1985-2009

7% 14% 12%

6% 12%
10%
5% 10%
Yield Level

Yield Level
Yield Level
8%
4% 8%
6%
3% 6%
4%
2% 4%

1% y = -0.7643x + 0.1162 2% y = -0.1105x + 0.1226
2% y = 0.4552x + 0.0293
R2 = 0.7586 R2 = 0.6817 R2 = 0.7521
0% 0% 0%
6% 8% 10% 12% 14% 6% 11% 16% 21% 26% 31% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
De bt/Gdp De bt/Gdp De bt/Gdp

The impact of rising government debt on bond yields is unclear
The sign of the relation between debt and yield can be negative

The Fed estimates the possible impact of government debt
For 1% of Debt / Gdp, interest rates can increase between 3 and 4 basis points
For a change of 35% of the Debt / Gdp, the bonds yield could increase to 1.25%

21

The demand for government debt changes… (Central Banks Demand)
850 000
Initial Situation US Treasuries Held by the FED
800 000 (milions of USD)

750 000

700 000

650 000

600 000

550 000

500 000

450 000

Source 400 000
Gongdon 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(2003)
Final Situation
If a central bank buys treasury bonds
It increases the bank reserves
And impacts the government bond prices

The Fed held 740 billions of treasuries
7% of the total public debt
The announcement of purchases has
significant impact on government yield

22

The demand for government debt changes… (Central Banks Demand)

BOE announces to buy £75 billion

FED announces to buy $300 billion

23

The demand for government debt changes… (Foreign Holders Demand)
3 500 Foreign Holders Treasuries 30% Foreign Holders Treasuries
(billion of US dollars) (as a percentage of the total public debt)
3 000
25%

2 500
20%
2 000
15%
1 500

10%
1 000 32%
Debt Held by Foreign
30% Holders 5%
500 (on total public debt)
28%
- 0%
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 26% 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

A sia Emu Europe ex EMU A merica Other A sia Emu Europe ex EMU A merica Other
24%

22% In 1 year, US public
debt has increased
20% with 22%...

18%
… of which 38%
16% has been
bought by
14% foreign holders
12%
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Foreign Holders
24

The demand for government debt changes… (Internal Demand)
800
Net Purchases of Tresuries Bonds
In 2006, 7% of treasuries have
600
been purchased by households…
Household sector Rest of the w orld
in 2008, 12% !
400 Monetary authority Money market mutual f unds
Brokers and dealers
200

-
2006 2007 2008 2009 S1
-200

-400
400 14.0% 14
Treasuries pruchased by households Real 10Y Government Yield
12
12.0%
300
10
10.0% 8
200

8.0% 6

100 4
6.0%
2
-
-
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 4.0%
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
-2
-100
2.0%
-4
Savings Ratio
-200 0.0% -6
Savings Ratio [R.H.S] Real 10Y Govt Y ield

Us Treasury - Households Sector
25

The Japanese example
10.00 Japan Government Debt 180
9.00 160
8.00 140
7.00 120
6.00
In Japan, the increase in debt has 100
5.00 not caused a rebound of 80
4.00 government yields…
3.00 60

2.00 40
1.00 20
- 0
82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
Govt Bench Bond Y ield 10Y Debt / GDP [R.H.S]

1 000 000 Holdings of JGB 180%
900 000 (billion of JPY )
160%
800 000 140%
700 000
120%
600 000
100%
500 000
80%
400 000
60%
300 000
200 000 40%
100 000 20%
- 0%
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008

Overseas Non-Fin Corp. Households BoJ Debt / Gdp [R.H.S]

26

The capacity to reach a fiscal equilibrium again

80%
Average of Past Cycle Debt / Gdp 40%
Net Borrowing in credit Markets
We have calculated an average of (as a percentage of GDP)
the Debt / Gdp for different countries
70%
including Canada, Finland or 30%
Sweden…

60%
20%

50%

10%
40%

0%
30% … after a deep recession, we 70 73 76 79 82 85 88 91 94 97 00 03 06 09
observe a rebound then a decrease
of the government debt
20% -10%

10%
-20% Government Non-Government

0%
0 Years to peak -30%

27

Yes, we can

The fiscal stimulus avoided new “Great Depression”…
Rescue of the banking system
Help for consumers

…but caused an explosion of budget deficit
Record of budget deficit
And increase of government debt supply

The increased supply can be absorbed by new demand…
Quantitative easing via Central Banks
Foreign Holders
Internal demand due to increased savings

…if government keeps it credibility
Possibility to the return to equilibrium
The releveraging public sector compensates the deleveraging in the private sector

28

Can we really trust Bonds markets ?
The US bond market has offered significant excess returns against money market rates

15% Excess Return of Us Government Bond Market
(against Cash 1 Month Index)

10%

5%

0%
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

-5% End of the
recession…

-10% End of the Tightening cycle
recession and
tightening cycle

US EMU
-15%

29

The combination of inflation and a tightening cycle put pressure on bond markets

Gove rnm e nt Bonds Pe rform ance & Inflation
20% 6.00%
An increase of inflation
15% causes a negative return of 5.00%
government bonds…
4.00%
10%
3.00%
5%
2.00%

0% 1.00%
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
-5% 0.00%
A nnual return of US Gvt Bonds CPI (average 12M) [R.H.S]

Gove rnm e nt Bonds Pe rform ance & M one tary Policy
20% 12.0%
The last tightening cycle
15% has not had not a direct 10.0%
impact on government
bond yields: it is the 8.0%
10%
famous conundrum
6.0%
5%
4.0%

0% 2.0%
86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
-5% 0.0%
A nnual return of US Gvt Bonds Fed Fund Target Rate [R.H.S]

30

Today, global government bond yield is close to its fair value
5.50 Global Gov ernment Bond Yield

5.00
2.50
G7 Bond Valuation Indicator
4.50
2.00
4.00
1.50
3.50
Bargain Area
1.00
3.00

0.50
2.50
98 99 01 02 04 05 06 08 09
0.00
4.00 Global G7 CPI 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
3.50
-0.50

3.00
-1.00
2.50
Expensive Area
2.00 -1.50
1.50
1.00 -2.00
0.50
0.00
-2.50

-0.50 98 99 01 02 04 05 06 08 09
-1.00
-1.50
31

The recession’s end is near…
Implied Volatility
US TED Spread
04 05 06 07 08 -1.00
0 0 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09

10 10 0.00

20
20
1.00
30
30
40
40 2.00
50
50
60 3.00
60
70

70 80 4.00

80 VDAX VI X 90
5.00

Probability of Recession in US
100%

75%

50%

25%

0%
63 66 69 72 75 78 81 84 87 90 93 96 99 02 05 08
NBER Recessions Probability

32

… due to technical rebounds
80 1600
ISM New Orders US Ho me Sales
1400
70
1200
60
1000

50 800

600
40
400
30
200
20 0
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04
23 06 08
US A uto Sales 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
New O r ders 21
US New O ne family Houses Sold
19

17

15

13

11

9

7

5
93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
33 US Auto Sales

But the deleveraging process could substantially impact consumer spending…
The household
leverage reached
an all-time high of
133% in 2007 !!!

How much further will be
the deleveraging process
go ?

Real consumption
and real debt are
correlated…

34

… and durably affect the labor market
6 Core CPI & Employment 600 12
Unemployment Rate On the road to
400 a double digit
5 10 figure...
200
4 8
0
3 6
-200
2 4
-400

1 -600 2

0 -800 -
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
EMU US UK
NFP Core CPI
8%
Part time for economic reasons
7% The part time has
increased
6% significantly and will
put wages under
5% pressure…

4%

3%

2%
99 01 03 05 07 09
total employed part time f or economic reasons as a percent
of all civilian labor f orce
35

Headline inflation will remain in the comfort zone…

7% US CPI (yoy) 7% EMU CPI (yoy)
6%
6%
5%
5%
4%
Seasonal models expect 4%
3% the end of negative
inflation for the months 3% Seasonal models expect
2% to come the end of negative
2% inflation for the months
1% to come
1%
0%
0%
-1%Aug-07 Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10
-1% Jul-08 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10
-2%
-2%
-3%
-3%
2% US CPI (mom) 2% EMU CPI (mom)
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
0% 0%
-1%Aug-07 Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10 -1%Aug-07 Jan-08 Jun-08 Nov-08 Apr-09 Sep-09 Feb-10 Jul-10
-1% -1%
-2% -2%
-2% -2%

36

…if commodities prices remain under control
16% 100%
Inflation & Commoditie s
14% 80%
12% The increase of
commodities creates 60%
10%
inflation…
8% 40%

6% 20%
4% 0%
2%
-20%
0%
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 -40%
-2%
-4% CRY (yoy) [R.H.S] CPI -60%

10% 100%
GDP & Commoditie s
… but also a slowdown
8% of the GDP ! 80%

6% 60%

4% 40%

2% 20%

0% 0%
70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08
-2% -20%

-4% -40%

-6% CRY (yoy) [R.H.S] GDP -60%
37

Myth or Reality ?

The bonds Crash could become But the bonds crash remains a
reality… myth
If central banks lose the control over the Credibility of the central banks
money Success in the financial crisis
Injection of the excess reserves in the real Unusual coordination
economy
New framework to control the reserves
Sale of securities & market instability

Credibility of the governments
If governments lose their credibility
Success in the financial crisis
Explosion of the debt without return at
Possibility to equilibrium
equilibrium
New structural demand
Buyers' strike of Foreign Holders

No domestic inflation risk
In the case of the V recovery
High level of unemployment
Increase in risky assets and commodities
The risk of the W
Inflation via fiscal stimuli
A too strong rebound of commodities leads
a new recession

38

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46

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47

Ir bonds crash october

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