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Social Engineering in Banking Trojans
Attacking the weakest link
Jose Miguel Esparza
Mikel Gastesi
Agenda
• Social Engineering??
• Social Engineering + Malware
• HTML Injections
• Underground Market
• Solutions??
Social Engineering??
• The art of…
– … knowing how to handle people
Social Engineering??
• …or how to manipulate them
Social Engineering??
• …to Achieve an Objective
– Information gathering
– Buildings / Rooms access
– Power
– Material possessions
– Others: flirting, favors…
Social Engineering??
• …to Achieve an Objective
– Information gathering
– Buildings / Rooms access
– Power
– Material possessions
– Others: flirting, favors (sexual or not)…
• How?
– Face to face
– Phone / SMS
– Mail
– …
• Used by
– Politicians
– Salesmen
– Delinquents / Fraudsters
– You and me
Social Engineering??
Social Engineering??
Social Engineering??
• Take advantage of human nature
– Feelings / emotions / state of mind
– Behavior / personality
Social Engineering??
• Take advantage of human nature
– Feelings / emotions / state of mind
• Sadness
• Fear
• Rancor
• Embarrassment
• Happiness
• Love
• Hope
– Behavior / personality
Social Engineering??
• Take advantage of human nature
– Feelings / emotions / state of mind
– Behavior / personality
• Curiosity
• Inocence
• Honesty
• Generosity
• Gratitude
• Avarice
Social Engineering??
• Take advantage of human nature
– Feelings / emotions / state of mind
– Behavior / personality
• Tendency to trust
Social Engineering + Malware
Ransomware
Ransomware
Ransomware
Ransomware
Fake Antivirus
Banking Trojans
• Images Overlapping
• GUI Applications
• Pharming
• WebFakes
• HTML Injections
Banking Trojans
• Images Overlapping
• GUI Applications
• Pharming
• WebFakes
• HTML Injections
Banking Trojans
• Images Overlapping
• GUI Applications
• Pharming
• WebFakes
• HTML Injections
GUI Applications
GUI Applications
Banking Trojans
• Images Overlapping
• GUI Applications
• Pharming
• WebFakes
• HTML Injections
Banking Trojans
• Images Overlapping
• GUI Applications
• Pharming
• WebFakes  Phishings
• HTML Injections
Banking Trojans
• Images Overlapping
• GUI Applications
• Pharming
• WebFakes
• HTML Injections
HTML Injections
HTML Injections
HTML Injections VS WebFakes
Injections – How they work (I)
• Trojan
– Binary
• Generic
– Keylogging, form-grabbing, etc.
– Stealing data silently
– Configuration file
• Specific affectation
– Custom attack to entities
– User interaction
Injections - How they work (II)
• Configuration
– Injecting where?
– Injecting what?
– Injecting when?
• Flags: G,P,L
Injections - How they work (III)
1. URI found?
2. Obtain webpage
3. Find starting mark
4. Injection
5. Copy from the ending mark
6. Obtain data thanks to formgrabbing
Injections – How they work (IV)
Authentication
Virtual Keyboard
Code Card
OTP Token
SMS : mTAN
PasswordID +
2FA
Bypassing Authentication
• ID + Password + Operations Password
Bypassing Authentication
• Virtual Keyboard
– Injection is not necessary here
Bypassing Authentication
• 2FA: Code Card
Bypassing Authentication
• 2FA: SMS
– Cheat on the user to infect his mobile phone
• Always after login
• Security Software simulation
• Activation simulation
• Profit from the ignorance of the threat
Bypassing Authentication
• ZeuS + Mobile Component (I)
Bypassing Authentication
• ZeuS + Mobile Component (and II)
Bypassing Authentication
• SpyEye + Mobile Component (I)
Bypassing Authentication
• SpyEye + Mobile Component (and II)
Bypassing Authentication
• 2FA: Token
– MitB Attack  It is NOT Social Engineering
• Mobile Transfer warnings?
– Let’s play “Simon says…”
Demo
Affected countries
Affected Sectors
Underground Market
• Binaries Market
• Injections Market
– Standardized
– Single Injections
– Full-package
Underground Market
• Binaries Market
• Injections Market
– Standardized  ZeuS & co. / SpyEye
– Single Injections
– Full-package
Underground Market
• Binaries Market
• Injections Market
– Standardized
– Single Injections
• Per countries and entities
• 60 WMZ/LR (WebMoney / Liberty Reserve)
• Package: 700-800 WMZ/LR
• Update / Modification: 20 WMZ/LR
– Full-package
Underground Market
Underground Market
• Binaries Market
• Injections Market
– Standardized
– Sólo inyecciones
– Full-package
• Botnet Renting + Injections
• $400??
Underground Market
Underground Market
• How do they create them?
– Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Injection creation
– Testing
Underground Market
• How do they create them?
– Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Injection creation
– Testing
Underground Market
• Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Manual
• Login + Dumping pages
Underground Market
• Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Automatic
• Specific modules
• Configuration file
Underground Market
• Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Automatic
• Specific modules
– Tatanga
• Configuration file
Underground Market
Underground Market
Underground Market
• Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Automatic
• Specific modules
• Configuration files
– ZeuS
– SpyEye
Underground Market
Underground Market
• How do they create them?
– Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Injection creation
– Testing
Underground Market
• How do they create them?
– Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Injection creation  SOCIAL ENGINEERING!!
– Testing
Underground Market
• How do they create them?
– Obtaining legit code from the banking pages
– Injection creation
– Testing
• Login
• Screenshots
• Video  Tatanga, Citadel
• Detection / Prevention
• Information / Trainings
• Common sense
Solutions??
• Detection / Prevention
– Client
• Check HTML structure (DOM)
– Server
• Additional parameters
• Dynamique pages  Avoid locating injection point
Solutions??
• Detection / Prevention
Solutions??
• Detection / Prevention
• Information / Trainings
• Common sense
Solutions??
• Detection / Prevention
• Information / Trainings
• Common sense
Solutions??
• Detection / Prevention
• Information / Trainings
• Common sense…is not so common
Solutions??
Conclusions
• If the user can make a transfer you will always
be able to cheat on him and change the
destination of the money
• How would you cheat on the user by phone?
Do it after the login, use a fake webpage, or
even call him!
Questions??
¡¡Thanks!!
Mikel Gastesi
@mgastesi
Jose Miguel Esparza
@EternalTodo

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