1. Vermelding onderdeel organisatie
1
David Koepsell, TU Delft, TPM Faculty, Philosophy Section
On Genies and Bottles:
Scientists’ Moral Responsibility and
Dangerous R&D

2. April 23, 2014 2
The Ethical Context
Rapid rate of technological progress, and increasing
availability of cheaper tools for scientific and
technological applications, make it harder to ensure
public safety.
It is becoming easier to create catastrophic technologies
without detection.

3. April 23, 2014 3
The Ethical Context
How can we help ensure a safer world? What roles do
governments have, and what roles do scientists and
technologists have?
Who is morally responsible for dangerous research and
development?

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Aims
To provide an argument for individual moral
responsibility of scientists
To provide an argument for governmental responsibility
for moral education of scientists
a) component requirements (a basic principle)
b) institutional requirements

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Science and Ethics
Traditionally, individual responsibility for deployment of dangerous
technology has divorced scientists from the consequences.
Precepts: a) science should inquire into everything
b) politicians and maybe engineers are
responsible for deployment

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Science and Ethics
These precepts lead to a sort of “scientific firewall”
against moral responsibility. Scientists cannot be
morally responsible because their duty is the
unfettered exploration of everything, regardless of
potential consequences.

7. April 23, 2014 7
Science and Ethics
Q: Do scientists ever have a positive moral duty to
refrain? Let’s consider a graphic example…

8. April 23, 2014 8
Smallpox Science
Smallpox was eliminated from the
environment in 1977. It could
have been eliminated altogether,
and all stores of the virus
destroyed. But as late as 2001,
scientists in the US decided to
conduct experiments to create a
monkey-model of variola
infection…

9. April 23, 2014 9
The Australian Mousepox “Trick”
UPI: “CANBERRA, Australia, Jan. 11 (UPI) -- Scientists
working for the Australian government have created a
genetically engineered mousepox virus more deadly to
mice than the original virus. Even when vaccinated
with a normally effective vaccine, half the mice died
after infection with the new virus.
Biological warfare experts are worried that the current
international Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention, abbreviated BTWC, may not be strong
enough to cope with the misuse of the genetic
engineering techniques. Governments from all over
the world have been meeting in Geneva for six years
to address the BTWC shortcomings, but have failed to
reach final agreement.
Dr. Ian Ramshaw, a viral engineer and the immunologist
on the mousepox experiment, told United Press
International that inserting genetic material has
hazards. His team will publish their research in the
February issue of the Journal of Virology.
"It is a potentially vile weapon," Renshaw said.”

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The Australian Mousepox “Trick”
The gene splice involved with the Mousepox Trick may
easily be applied to smallpox, making a nearly
unstoppable weapon.
So why shouldn’t scientists now take the next step and
see if this is true?

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Smallpox Ethics
The Dual-Use argument ultimately is unhelpful, even a nuclear
weapon has a dual-use (like Project Orion, above). Dual-use
was used to justify smallpox research (a catch-22 argument).
Are there or should there be moral limits to some research? Is
some research morally prohibited because of its nature?
Is there a model for shaping researchers’ behaviours?

12. April 23, 2014 12
The Bioethics Example
Nazi crimes, Milgram, Tuskeegee, and other historical
ethical lapses led slowly to the development of
modern bioethics.
Belmont Report guides the development of institutions
and education meant to protect future human
subjects studies

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The Bioethics Example
The eradication of smallpox itself was based upon
initially unethical research:
“Dr. Jenner decided it was time to test his vaccination, and he tested it
on his gardener's son, an eight-year-old boy named James Phipps. (He
got the term "vacca" from the Latin word for "cow.") The boy did
contract Cowpox, but he recovered from it within a few days. Dr. Jenner
then waited eight weeks for the boy's body to build an immunity. To
complete his experiment, Dr. Jenner exposed James to Smallopx.
Amazingly, the boy did not contract the deadly disease, and the doctor
claimed success.”

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The Bioethics Example
Jenner’s work would be unethical under the Nuremburg
Code, which requires animal testing, and the Belmont
Principles, which require informed consent.
Because, even as late as the mid-20th Century,
physicians and researchers still did not always heed
these principles, Ethics Boards and IRBs were created
by law to oversee human subjects research.

15. April 23, 2014 15
Belmont +
Can we re-fashion or re-apply standard bioethics
principles beyond the protection of individual
subjects? When scientific research has either a direct
or potential effect on humanity as a whole, ought we
to apply the principles of dignity, respect,
beneficence, and justice to basic science?
Isn’t there a broader moral horizon at stake?

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Examples
Consider the fictional discovery of
ïce-nine”in Cat’s Cradle…
Ice-nine has a dual use (think,
skating in summer), but does
this justify its initial
development given Belmont
Principles?

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Examples
Science doesn’t kill
people; people with
technologies kill people
…

18. April 23, 2014 18
Examples
But even the most ardent gun-
rights proponent will not
support free ownership of
tactical nuclear weapons, and
international law prohibits
research and development of
such weapons.

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Examples
I contend that when considering the ethics of scientists,
we must not only look at regulations, laws, and codes
used to review or punish their actions, but we should
also consider intentions and motivations with an eye
toward education.
Moral training of scientists, as with other professionals,
presupposes not only that we wish to keep them from
breaking laws or running afoul of professional codes
of conduct, but also that we wish to help develop
moral insight that can guide behaviors.

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Morals Matter
So what of ice-nine, smallpox, and other potentially catastrophic
science and technology?
We might argue that beneficence argues in favor of investigating
smallpox because we worry about terrorist uses of it and need
to devise treatments. All of which is recursively self-satisfying,
because we would not have had to worry about this had
scientists done the right thing to begin with, and supported its
ultimate destruction.
In the world of Cat’s Cradle, we could similarly argue in favor of
ethically pursuing ice-nine research only in a post-ice-nine-
apocalypse environment.

21. April 23, 2014 21
Morals Matter
An argument that is often used to justify these sorts of
scientific inquiries is that “someone will devise the
technologies, and employ them harmfully, eventually.
Thus, we should investigate these things first
(because we have good intentions).”

22. April 23, 2014 22
Morals Matter
Of course, this reasoning justifies investigating any and
all science and technologies, no matter how
potentially destructive or threatening to humanity or
the environment.
But it presupposes
a) that the investigators doing the work have good
intentions,
b) that the technology or discovery would eventually
be carried out by others, and
c) that once discovered or applied, it can be contained

23. April 23, 2014 23
Morals Matter
The “eventual” fallacy justifies any investigation, and
scientific inquiry, no matter the potential
consequences. It fails if we broaden the moral
horizon offered by the Belmont principles to include
humanity as a whole ….
Implicit in bioethical principles is some utilitarian
calculus

24. April 23, 2014 24
Morals Matter
Science proceeds not in a vacuum, but as a socially
devised institution. It is conducted by professionals,
with funding from mostly public sources, and with
relative freedom under the auspices of mostly
academic environments. As a largely public
institution, and as the beneficiaries of the public
trust and wealth, scientists must consider the
consequences of their inquiries

25. April 23, 2014 25
Morals Matter
The “eventual” argument makes sense when the risks
posed by investigating a deadly thing is outweighed by
the likelihood of that deadly thing’s being discovered
and used by others combined with the potential of a
scientific investigation developing a plausible
protection of the public at large. So, roughly:
R=risk,
L=likelihood of independent discovery and use, and
P=potential benefit from scientific investigation now

26. April 23, 2014 26
Morals Matter
R=risk,
L=likelihood of independent discovery and use, and
P=potential benefit from scientific investigation now
If L+P>R, then a scientist can make a moral case for
pursing an investigation into something posing a large,
general risk. Otherwise, there is simply no moral
justification for further inquiry.

27. April 23, 2014 27
Cultivating Moral Responsibility
Unlike the Belmont Principles, which could be used to
guide the development of regulatory institutions, the
expanded ethical horizon I have argued for above
requires individual responsibility on the part of
scientists. The calculus proposed must be employed
by scientists before they ever get to the point of
disseminating their ideas. It is a personal, moral
responsibility that must be cultivated.

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Cultivating Moral Responsibility
Nonetheless, encouraging the development and adoption of these
principles, and adopting the notion of a broad horizon of
scientific responsibility (encompassing not just individual human
subjects, but also responsibility toward humanity in general),
can best be encouraged through new institutions.
Legal and regulatory bodies ought to devise these institutions both
within and among sovereigns. Professional organization as well
ought to embrace and adopt ethical training of their members,
understanding that scientists are citizens of broader groups
whose funding and support they require. Education in principles
not just of scientific integrity, but also social responsibility, ought
to be developed and embraced.

29. April 23, 2014 29
Cultivating Moral Responsibility
Just as governments take it upon themselves to fund
and advance research and development, both out of
scientific curiosity and as a way to grow economically,
so should they adopt the responsibility to educate
scientists to be better citizens.
As taxpayers provide for investigations into nature’s
truths, sometimes with no potential for economic
benefit, they must also be considered as beneficiaries
or targets of the fruits of scientific inquiry…

30. April 23, 2014 30
We are all human subjects of certain inquiries

31. April 23, 2014 31
Thank you
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global solutions, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science, Vol. 4, No. 3, pp.
276-286.
Childress, J., Meslin, E., & Shapiro, H., Eds. (2005). Belmont revisited: Ethical principles for research with human
subjects. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press.
Cohen H.W., Gould R.M., Sidel V.W. (2004), The pitfalls of bioterrorism preparedness: the anthrax and smallpox
experiences, American Journal of Public Health, Vol. 94, No. 10, pp. 1667-1671.
Corneliussen F. (2006). Adequate regulation, a stop-gap measure, or part of a package? EMBO Reports, Vol. 7,
pp. s50-s54.
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147-152.
Jones N.L. (2007). A code of ethics for the life sciences, Science, Engineering Ethics, Vol. 13, pp. 25-43.
Kelley M. (2006). Infectious disease research and dual-use risk, Virtual Mentor: Ethics Journal of the American
Medical Association, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 230-234.
Miller S and Selgelid M.J. (2008). Chap. 3: The Ethics of dual-use research, in Ethical and Philosophical
Consideration of the Dual-Use Dilemma in the Biological Sciences (Miller ed.), Springer Sciences, NV.
Musil, R. K. (1980). There must be more to love than death: A conversation with Kurt Vonnegut. The Nation, Vol.
231 (Issue 4): p128–132.
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Minerva Vol. 40, pp. 15-35.
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References