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F5 BIG-IP
Misconfigurations
Denis Kolegov
Positive Technologies, Tomsk State University
• Team lead at Positive Technologies Application Firewall Team
• Ex Security Test Engineer at F5 Networks
• Associate professor at Tomsk State University
• https://twitter.com/dnkolegov
#whoami
The research is not related to my current job and current employer
The most vulnerabilities were found and fixed during my work at
F5 Networks
Some new vulnerabilities have been reported to F5 Networks
Platform Security Team
Disclaimer
F5 BIG-IP Security Cheatsheet
https://github.com/dnkolegov/bigipsecurity
OWASP Secure Configuration Guide
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SCG_D_BIGIP
Links
• Local Traffic Manager (LTM)
• Access Policy Manager (APM)
• Application Security Manger (ASM)
• Application Acceleration Manager (AAM)
• Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM)
• Global Traffic Manager (GTM)
• Link Controller (LC)
• Protocol Security Module (PSM)
F5 BIG-IP
• BIG-IP Discovery
• HTTP Server Header Information Leakage
• Mass Enumeration using Search Engines
• Access to Management Interface from Internet
• LTM Information Leakage
• Management IP-address Disclosure
• Route Domain Disclosure
• Persistence Cookie Information Leakage
• APM Attacks
• Session Exhaustion DoS attack
• Sandbox Escaping
• Clickjacking
• SOP Bypass
Agenda
HTTP Server Header
• Send a request to HTTP virtual server
• "Server: BIG-IP" – before 11.4.0
• "Server: BigIP " – after 11.4.0
Google
• inurl:"tmui/login.jsp"
• intitle:"BIG-IP" inurl:"tmui"
• intitle:"BIG-IP logout page"
• "Thank you for using BIG-IP."
Shodan
• WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=BIG-IP
• BIG-IP
• BigIP
Metasploit
• auxiliary/scanner/http/f5_mgmt_scanner
BIG-IP Discovery
BIG-IP Discovery
BIG-IP Discovery
BIG-IP Discovery
BIG-IP Discovery
BIG-IP Discovery
Route Domain Disclosure
Management IP-address Disclosure
BIGipServer<pool name> = Encoded value
• <The encoded server IP>.<The encoded server port>.0000
• BIGipServer~DMZ_V101~web_443=1677787402.36895.0000
• vi<The full hexadecimal IPv6 address>.< The encoded server port>
• BIGipServer~CORP_DC1=vi20010112000000000000000000000030.20480
• rd<The route domain ID>o00000000000000000000ffff<The hexadecimal
representation of the IP address of the pool member>o<The port number>
• BIGipServer~EE_ORACLE=rd5o00000000000000000000ffffc0000201o80
• rd<The route domain ID>o<The full hexadecimal IPv6 address>o<The port number>
• BIGipServer~ES~test.example.com=rd3o20010112000000000000000000000030o80
LTM Persistence Cookies
Tools
• Metasploit - auxiliary/gather/f5_bigip_cookie_disclosure
• BeEF - modules/network/ADC/f5_bigip_cookie_disclosure
• Cookie Decipher Tool -
https://devcentral.f5.com/wiki/AdvDesignConfig.CookiePersistenceDecipherT
ool.ashx
Protection
• Bad: Cookie renaming
• Good: Cookie encryption
LTM Persistence Cookies
• BIG-IP APM allocates a new session after the first unauthenticated
request and deletes the session only if an access policy timeout will
be expired
• Metasploit module - auxiliary/dos/http/f5_bigip_apm_max_sessions
APM Session Exhaustion DoS Attack
APM "Sandbox"
• Vectors (Fixed)
• <video src=1 onerror=alert(document.cookie)>
• <img src=1 onerror=result=document.cookie;>
• BeEF module - modules/network/ADC/f5_bigip_cookie_stealing
• New vectors have been reported to F5 Networks Platform Security Team
APM Sandbox Escaping
APM ignores application’s original Content Security Policy headers
APM removes application’s original "X-Frame-Options: sameorigin"
header, but accepts "X-Frame-Options: deny"
To protect against classic Clickjacking attack it is necessary to configure
LTM iRules
Reproduced on BigIP 12.1.0 build 0.0.1434
APM Clickjacking
APM Clickjacking
X-Frame-Options: deny
X-Frame-Options: sameorigin
APM model changes an idea of browser same-origin policy: all applications
behind BIG-IP share the same origin http(s)://bigip:port/
All real applications origins are HEX-encoded and transmitted via URL path
/f5-w-[HEX-encoded-origin]$$/path
Secure configuration
• Services Isolation
• L4/L7 ACL
Reproduced on BigIP 12.1.0 build 0.0.1434
Same-Origin Policy Bypass
Same-Origin Policy Bypass
<html>
<body>
<p>Frame: http://goodsite.com</p>
<iframe src="http://goodsite.com/secret.php" name="if"></iframe>
<script>
var f = document.getElementsByName("if")[0];
f.onload = function(){
var a=fr.contentDocument;
var b = a.getElementById("secretform");
console.log(b);
}
</script>
</body>
</html>
Same-Origin Policy Bypass
Normal access to http://goodsite.com from http://evil.com
Same-Origin Policy Bypass
Access to http://goodsite.com from http://evil.com via BigIP Portal Access
F5 BIG-IP Security Cheatsheet
https://github.com/dnkolegov/bigipsecurity
OWASP Secure Configuration Guide
https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SCG_D_BIGIP
Links
Thank You!!!

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F5 BIG-IP Misconfigurations

  • 1. F5 BIG-IP Misconfigurations Denis Kolegov Positive Technologies, Tomsk State University
  • 2. • Team lead at Positive Technologies Application Firewall Team • Ex Security Test Engineer at F5 Networks • Associate professor at Tomsk State University • https://twitter.com/dnkolegov #whoami
  • 3. The research is not related to my current job and current employer The most vulnerabilities were found and fixed during my work at F5 Networks Some new vulnerabilities have been reported to F5 Networks Platform Security Team Disclaimer
  • 4. F5 BIG-IP Security Cheatsheet https://github.com/dnkolegov/bigipsecurity OWASP Secure Configuration Guide https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SCG_D_BIGIP Links
  • 5. • Local Traffic Manager (LTM) • Access Policy Manager (APM) • Application Security Manger (ASM) • Application Acceleration Manager (AAM) • Advanced Firewall Manager (AFM) • Global Traffic Manager (GTM) • Link Controller (LC) • Protocol Security Module (PSM) F5 BIG-IP
  • 6. • BIG-IP Discovery • HTTP Server Header Information Leakage • Mass Enumeration using Search Engines • Access to Management Interface from Internet • LTM Information Leakage • Management IP-address Disclosure • Route Domain Disclosure • Persistence Cookie Information Leakage • APM Attacks • Session Exhaustion DoS attack • Sandbox Escaping • Clickjacking • SOP Bypass Agenda
  • 7. HTTP Server Header • Send a request to HTTP virtual server • "Server: BIG-IP" – before 11.4.0 • "Server: BigIP " – after 11.4.0 Google • inurl:"tmui/login.jsp" • intitle:"BIG-IP" inurl:"tmui" • intitle:"BIG-IP logout page" • "Thank you for using BIG-IP." Shodan • WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=BIG-IP • BIG-IP • BigIP Metasploit • auxiliary/scanner/http/f5_mgmt_scanner BIG-IP Discovery
  • 15. BIGipServer<pool name> = Encoded value • <The encoded server IP>.<The encoded server port>.0000 • BIGipServer~DMZ_V101~web_443=1677787402.36895.0000 • vi<The full hexadecimal IPv6 address>.< The encoded server port> • BIGipServer~CORP_DC1=vi20010112000000000000000000000030.20480 • rd<The route domain ID>o00000000000000000000ffff<The hexadecimal representation of the IP address of the pool member>o<The port number> • BIGipServer~EE_ORACLE=rd5o00000000000000000000ffffc0000201o80 • rd<The route domain ID>o<The full hexadecimal IPv6 address>o<The port number> • BIGipServer~ES~test.example.com=rd3o20010112000000000000000000000030o80 LTM Persistence Cookies
  • 16. Tools • Metasploit - auxiliary/gather/f5_bigip_cookie_disclosure • BeEF - modules/network/ADC/f5_bigip_cookie_disclosure • Cookie Decipher Tool - https://devcentral.f5.com/wiki/AdvDesignConfig.CookiePersistenceDecipherT ool.ashx Protection • Bad: Cookie renaming • Good: Cookie encryption LTM Persistence Cookies
  • 17. • BIG-IP APM allocates a new session after the first unauthenticated request and deletes the session only if an access policy timeout will be expired • Metasploit module - auxiliary/dos/http/f5_bigip_apm_max_sessions APM Session Exhaustion DoS Attack
  • 18. APM "Sandbox" • Vectors (Fixed) • <video src=1 onerror=alert(document.cookie)> • <img src=1 onerror=result=document.cookie;> • BeEF module - modules/network/ADC/f5_bigip_cookie_stealing • New vectors have been reported to F5 Networks Platform Security Team APM Sandbox Escaping
  • 19. APM ignores application’s original Content Security Policy headers APM removes application’s original "X-Frame-Options: sameorigin" header, but accepts "X-Frame-Options: deny" To protect against classic Clickjacking attack it is necessary to configure LTM iRules Reproduced on BigIP 12.1.0 build 0.0.1434 APM Clickjacking
  • 21. APM model changes an idea of browser same-origin policy: all applications behind BIG-IP share the same origin http(s)://bigip:port/ All real applications origins are HEX-encoded and transmitted via URL path /f5-w-[HEX-encoded-origin]$$/path Secure configuration • Services Isolation • L4/L7 ACL Reproduced on BigIP 12.1.0 build 0.0.1434 Same-Origin Policy Bypass
  • 22. Same-Origin Policy Bypass <html> <body> <p>Frame: http://goodsite.com</p> <iframe src="http://goodsite.com/secret.php" name="if"></iframe> <script> var f = document.getElementsByName("if")[0]; f.onload = function(){ var a=fr.contentDocument; var b = a.getElementById("secretform"); console.log(b); } </script> </body> </html>
  • 23. Same-Origin Policy Bypass Normal access to http://goodsite.com from http://evil.com
  • 24. Same-Origin Policy Bypass Access to http://goodsite.com from http://evil.com via BigIP Portal Access
  • 25. F5 BIG-IP Security Cheatsheet https://github.com/dnkolegov/bigipsecurity OWASP Secure Configuration Guide https://www.owasp.org/index.php/SCG_D_BIGIP Links