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CHAPTER 1
 Security Goals

Slides adapted from "Foundations of Security: What Every Programmer
Needs To Know" by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and Anita Kesavan
(ISBN 1590597842; http://www.foundationsofsecurity.com). Except as
otherwise noted, the content of this presentation is licensed under the
Creative Commons 3.0 License.
Agenda
   Seven Key Security Concepts:
     Authentication
     Authorization
     Confidentiality
     Data / Message Integrity
     Accountability
     Availability
     Non-Repudiation


   System Example: Web Client-Server Interaction
1.1. Security Is Holistic
   Physical Security

   Technological Security
     ApplicationSecurity
     Operating System Security
     Network Security


   Policies & Procedures

   All Three Required
1.1.1. Physical Security
   Limit access to physical space to prevent asset
    theft and unauthorized entry

   Protecting against information leakage and
    document theft

   Ex: Dumpster Diving - gathering
    sensitive information by sifting
    through the company’s garbage
1.1.2. Technological Security (1)
   (Application Security)
                                  No flaws in identity
Web Server & Browser Example       verification process

                                  Configure server
                                   correctly
                                    localfiles
                                    database content



                                  Interpret data robustly
1.1.2. Technological Security (2)
(OS & Network Security)
   Apps (e.g. servers) use OS for many functions

   OS code likely contains vulnerabilities
     Regularly download patches to eliminate
      (e.g. Windows Update for critical patches)

   Network Security: mitigate malicious traffic

   Tools: Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems
1.1.3. Policies & Procedures
   Ex: Social engineering attack - taking advantage
    of unsuspecting employees (e.g. attacker gets
    employee to divulge his username & password)

   Guard sensitive corporate information

   Employees need to be aware, be educated to be
    somewhat paranoid and vigilant
Security Concepts
 Authentication
 Authorization
 Confidentiality
 Data / Message Integrity
 Accountability
 Availability
 Non-Repudiation
Archetypal Characters
    Alice & Bob – “good guys”
    Eve – a “passive” eavesdropper
    Mallory – an “active” eavesdropper
    Trent – trusted by Alice & Bob


    Alice                                 Bob
1.2. Authentication
   Identity Verification

   How can Bob be sure that he is communicating
    with Alice?

   Three General Ways:
     Something you know (i.e., Passwords)
     Something you have (i.e., Tokens)
     Something you are (i.e., Biometrics)
1.2.1. Something you KNOW
   Example: Passwords
     Pros:
        Simple to implement
        Simple for users to understand
     Cons:
        Easy to crack (unless users choose strong ones)
        Passwords are reused many times



   One-time Passwords (OTP): different password
    used each time, but it is difficult for user to
    remember all of them
1.2.2. Something you HAVE
   OTP Cards (e.g. SecurID): generates new
    password each time user logs in
   Smart Card: tamper-resistant, stores secret
    information, entered into a card-reader

   Token / Key (i.e., iButton)
   ATM Card
   Strength of authentication depends on difficulty
    of forging
1.2.3. Something you ARE
                        Technique         Effectiveness   Acceptance
    Biometrics         Palm Scan              1              6
                         Iris Scan             2              1
                       Retinal Scan            3              7
                        Fingerprint            4              5
                          Voice Id             5              3
                     Facial Recognition        6              4
                    Signature Dynamics         7              2

    Pros: “raises the bar”
    Cons: false negatives/positives, social
     acceptance, key management
      false positive: authentic user rejected
      false negative: impostor accepted
1.2.4. Final Notes
     Two-factor Authentication: Methods can be
      combined (i.e. ATM card & PIN)
     Who is authenticating who?
       Person-to-computer?
       Computer-to-computer?
     Three types (e.g. SSL):
       ClientAuthentication: server verifies client’s id
       Server Authentication: client verifies server’s id
       Mutual Authentication (Client & Server)
     Authenticated user is a “Principal”
1.3. Authorization
   Checking whether a user has permission to
    conduct some action
   Identity vs. Authority

   Is a “subject” (Alice) allowed to access an
    “object” (open a file)?
   Access Control List: mechanism used by
    many operating systems to determine
    whether users are authorized to conduct
    different actions
1.3.1. Access Control Lists (ACLs)
   Set of three-tuples        Table 1-1. A Simple ACL
     <User,  Resource,      User    Resource      Privilege
      Privilege>
                             Alice   /              Read,
     Specifies which                home/Alice/    write,
      users are allowed to           *             execute
      access which
      resources with
                             Bob     /              Read,
      which privileges               home/Bob /     write,
                                     *             execute

   Privileges can be
    assigned based on
    roles (e.g. admin)
1.3.2. Access Control Models
   ACLs used to implement these models

   Mandatory: computer system decides exactly
    who has access to which resources

   Discretionary (e.g. UNIX): users are authorized
    to determine which other users can access files
    or other resources that they create, use, or own

   Role-Based (Non-Discretionary): user’s access
    & privileges determined by role
1.3.3. Bell-LaPadula Model
   Classifications:
     Top Secret
     Secret
     Confidential
     Unclassified

   3 Rules/Properties
     Simple property
     *-property

    (confinement)
     Tranquility property
1.4. Confidentiality
   Goal: Keep the contents of communication
    or data on storage secret

   Example: Alice and Bob want their
    communications to be secret from Eve

   Key – a secret shared between Alice & Bob

   Sometimes accomplished with
     Cryptography,Steganography, Access Controls,
      Database Views
1.5. Message/Data Integrity
   Data Integrity = No Corruption
   Man in the middle attack: Has Mallory tampered with the
    message that Alice sends to Bob?
   Integrity Check: Add redundancy to data/messages

   Techniques:
     Hashing(MD5, SHA-1, …), Checksums (CRC…)
     Message Authentication Codes (MACs)
   Different From Confidentiality:
    A  -> B: “The value of x is 1” (not secret)
     A -> M -> B: “The value of x is 10000” (BAD)
     A -> M -> B: “The value of y is 1” (BAD)
1.6. Accountability
   Able to determine the attacker or principal

   Logging & Audit Trails

   Requirements:
     Secure  Timestamping (OS vs. Network)
     Data integrity in logs & audit trails, must not be able to
      change trails, or be able to detect changes to logs
     Otherwise attacker can cover their tracks
1.7. Availability
   Uptime, Free Storage
     Ex.
        Dial tone availability, System downtime limit,
      Web server response time

   Solutions:
     Add redundancy to remove single point of failure
     Impose “limits” that legitimate users can use


   Goal of DoS (Denial of Service) attacks are to
    reduce availability
     Malwareused to send excessive traffic to victim site
     Overwhelmed servers can’t process legitimate traffic
1.8. Non-Repudiation
   Undeniability of a transaction

   Alice wants to prove to Trent that she did
    communicate with Bob

   Generate evidence / receipts (digitally signed
    statements)

   Often not implemented in practice, credit-card
    companies become de facto third-party verifiers
1.9. Concepts at Work (1)


                                                B2B
                    Bob
 PCs-R-US                                      website
                                      DVD-
               orders parts          Factory



            Is DVD-Factory Secure?
1.9. Concepts at Work (2)
   Availability:
     DVD-Factory    ensures its web site is running 24-7
   Authentication:
              Bob authenticates himself to DVD-Factory, Inc.

              Encrypted Connection

                         authenticates itself to Bob

   Confidentiality:
     Bob’s browser and DVD-Factory web server set up
      an encrypted connection (lock on bottom left of
      browser)
1.9. Concepts at Work (3)
   Authorization:
     DVD-Factory   web site consults DB to check if Bob is
      authorized to order widgets on behalf of PCs-R-Us
   Message / Data Integrity:
     Checksums  are sent as part of each TCP/IP packets
      exchanged (+ SSL uses MACs)
   Accountability:
     DVD-Factory     logs that Bob placed an order for Sony
      DVD-R 1100
   Non-Repudiation:
     Typically   not provided w/ web sites since TTP req’d.
Summary
   Technological Security In Context

   Seven Key Security Concepts

   DVD-Factory Example:
    Security Concepts at Work

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1 security goals

  • 1. CHAPTER 1 Security Goals Slides adapted from "Foundations of Security: What Every Programmer Needs To Know" by Neil Daswani, Christoph Kern, and Anita Kesavan (ISBN 1590597842; http://www.foundationsofsecurity.com). Except as otherwise noted, the content of this presentation is licensed under the Creative Commons 3.0 License.
  • 2. Agenda  Seven Key Security Concepts:  Authentication  Authorization  Confidentiality  Data / Message Integrity  Accountability  Availability  Non-Repudiation  System Example: Web Client-Server Interaction
  • 3. 1.1. Security Is Holistic  Physical Security  Technological Security  ApplicationSecurity  Operating System Security  Network Security  Policies & Procedures  All Three Required
  • 4. 1.1.1. Physical Security  Limit access to physical space to prevent asset theft and unauthorized entry  Protecting against information leakage and document theft  Ex: Dumpster Diving - gathering sensitive information by sifting through the company’s garbage
  • 5. 1.1.2. Technological Security (1) (Application Security)  No flaws in identity Web Server & Browser Example verification process  Configure server correctly  localfiles  database content  Interpret data robustly
  • 6. 1.1.2. Technological Security (2) (OS & Network Security)  Apps (e.g. servers) use OS for many functions  OS code likely contains vulnerabilities  Regularly download patches to eliminate (e.g. Windows Update for critical patches)  Network Security: mitigate malicious traffic  Tools: Firewalls & Intrusion Detection Systems
  • 7. 1.1.3. Policies & Procedures  Ex: Social engineering attack - taking advantage of unsuspecting employees (e.g. attacker gets employee to divulge his username & password)  Guard sensitive corporate information  Employees need to be aware, be educated to be somewhat paranoid and vigilant
  • 8. Security Concepts  Authentication  Authorization  Confidentiality  Data / Message Integrity  Accountability  Availability  Non-Repudiation
  • 9. Archetypal Characters  Alice & Bob – “good guys”  Eve – a “passive” eavesdropper  Mallory – an “active” eavesdropper  Trent – trusted by Alice & Bob Alice Bob
  • 10. 1.2. Authentication  Identity Verification  How can Bob be sure that he is communicating with Alice?  Three General Ways:  Something you know (i.e., Passwords)  Something you have (i.e., Tokens)  Something you are (i.e., Biometrics)
  • 11. 1.2.1. Something you KNOW  Example: Passwords  Pros:  Simple to implement  Simple for users to understand  Cons:  Easy to crack (unless users choose strong ones)  Passwords are reused many times  One-time Passwords (OTP): different password used each time, but it is difficult for user to remember all of them
  • 12. 1.2.2. Something you HAVE  OTP Cards (e.g. SecurID): generates new password each time user logs in  Smart Card: tamper-resistant, stores secret information, entered into a card-reader  Token / Key (i.e., iButton)  ATM Card  Strength of authentication depends on difficulty of forging
  • 13. 1.2.3. Something you ARE Technique Effectiveness Acceptance  Biometrics Palm Scan 1 6 Iris Scan 2 1 Retinal Scan 3 7 Fingerprint 4 5 Voice Id 5 3 Facial Recognition 6 4 Signature Dynamics 7 2  Pros: “raises the bar”  Cons: false negatives/positives, social acceptance, key management  false positive: authentic user rejected  false negative: impostor accepted
  • 14. 1.2.4. Final Notes  Two-factor Authentication: Methods can be combined (i.e. ATM card & PIN)  Who is authenticating who?  Person-to-computer?  Computer-to-computer?  Three types (e.g. SSL):  ClientAuthentication: server verifies client’s id  Server Authentication: client verifies server’s id  Mutual Authentication (Client & Server)  Authenticated user is a “Principal”
  • 15. 1.3. Authorization  Checking whether a user has permission to conduct some action  Identity vs. Authority  Is a “subject” (Alice) allowed to access an “object” (open a file)?  Access Control List: mechanism used by many operating systems to determine whether users are authorized to conduct different actions
  • 16. 1.3.1. Access Control Lists (ACLs)  Set of three-tuples Table 1-1. A Simple ACL  <User, Resource, User Resource Privilege Privilege> Alice / Read,  Specifies which home/Alice/ write, users are allowed to * execute access which resources with Bob / Read, which privileges home/Bob / write, * execute  Privileges can be assigned based on roles (e.g. admin)
  • 17. 1.3.2. Access Control Models  ACLs used to implement these models  Mandatory: computer system decides exactly who has access to which resources  Discretionary (e.g. UNIX): users are authorized to determine which other users can access files or other resources that they create, use, or own  Role-Based (Non-Discretionary): user’s access & privileges determined by role
  • 18. 1.3.3. Bell-LaPadula Model  Classifications:  Top Secret  Secret  Confidential  Unclassified  3 Rules/Properties  Simple property  *-property (confinement)  Tranquility property
  • 19. 1.4. Confidentiality  Goal: Keep the contents of communication or data on storage secret  Example: Alice and Bob want their communications to be secret from Eve  Key – a secret shared between Alice & Bob  Sometimes accomplished with  Cryptography,Steganography, Access Controls, Database Views
  • 20. 1.5. Message/Data Integrity  Data Integrity = No Corruption  Man in the middle attack: Has Mallory tampered with the message that Alice sends to Bob?  Integrity Check: Add redundancy to data/messages  Techniques:  Hashing(MD5, SHA-1, …), Checksums (CRC…)  Message Authentication Codes (MACs)  Different From Confidentiality: A -> B: “The value of x is 1” (not secret)  A -> M -> B: “The value of x is 10000” (BAD)  A -> M -> B: “The value of y is 1” (BAD)
  • 21. 1.6. Accountability  Able to determine the attacker or principal  Logging & Audit Trails  Requirements:  Secure Timestamping (OS vs. Network)  Data integrity in logs & audit trails, must not be able to change trails, or be able to detect changes to logs  Otherwise attacker can cover their tracks
  • 22. 1.7. Availability  Uptime, Free Storage  Ex. Dial tone availability, System downtime limit, Web server response time  Solutions:  Add redundancy to remove single point of failure  Impose “limits” that legitimate users can use  Goal of DoS (Denial of Service) attacks are to reduce availability  Malwareused to send excessive traffic to victim site  Overwhelmed servers can’t process legitimate traffic
  • 23. 1.8. Non-Repudiation  Undeniability of a transaction  Alice wants to prove to Trent that she did communicate with Bob  Generate evidence / receipts (digitally signed statements)  Often not implemented in practice, credit-card companies become de facto third-party verifiers
  • 24. 1.9. Concepts at Work (1) B2B Bob PCs-R-US website DVD- orders parts Factory Is DVD-Factory Secure?
  • 25. 1.9. Concepts at Work (2)  Availability:  DVD-Factory ensures its web site is running 24-7  Authentication: Bob authenticates himself to DVD-Factory, Inc. Encrypted Connection authenticates itself to Bob  Confidentiality:  Bob’s browser and DVD-Factory web server set up an encrypted connection (lock on bottom left of browser)
  • 26. 1.9. Concepts at Work (3)  Authorization:  DVD-Factory web site consults DB to check if Bob is authorized to order widgets on behalf of PCs-R-Us  Message / Data Integrity:  Checksums are sent as part of each TCP/IP packets exchanged (+ SSL uses MACs)  Accountability:  DVD-Factory logs that Bob placed an order for Sony DVD-R 1100  Non-Repudiation:  Typically not provided w/ web sites since TTP req’d.
  • 27. Summary  Technological Security In Context  Seven Key Security Concepts  DVD-Factory Example: Security Concepts at Work

Notas do Editor

  1. Welcome to SEC103 on Secure Programming Techniques. In this course, I assume that you have some background in computer security, but now you want to put that background to use. For example, in the Computer Security Principles and Introduction To Cryptography courses, we cover topics such concerning trust and encryption. In this course, we put these principles into to practice, and I’ll show you have to write secure code that builds security into your applications from the ground up.
  2. Physical Security: Badges. Must be checked. No piggybacking to be nice. Locks on doors. Screensavers with passwords. Technological Security: OS Security: Encrypted file systems for laptops. Application Security: Web server has no vulnerabilities Network Security: No unauthorized packets are allowed into your network. Policies and procedures: Dumpster diving – use paper shredding Guard against social engineering attacks (i.e., never tell your password to anyone, including a system administrator) Technological Security Policies and Procedures: Guard against social engineering attacks.
  3. Physical Security: Badges. Must be checked. No piggybacking to be nice. Locks on doors. Screensavers with passwords.
  4. Will illustrate each of these concepts through running examples…
  5. (Phone call example… But what about email? Sender name could easily be “spoofed.”) Will provide one example of each general “way” to achieve authentication, and will provide more details on all “ways” in the section of the course on common attacks and defenses. Some security professionals distinguish between Identification and Authentication. Identification is the “public” part of the authentication process (entering username, or biometric scan). Authentication is the “private” part of the authentication process (entering password or PIN).
  6. One-time-passwords can be used to address the second “con.”
  7. Smart cards, ATM cards, and other tokens store “secrets.” (A “secret” is a sequence of bits, 0s and 1s, only know to the card/token and the system into which it is inserted.)
  8. Iris scan: camera take picture of iris features Retinal scan: beam of light projected into eye and scans retinal blood-vessel pattern. Eye put up to device, and puff of air blown into eye. Signature dynamics: physical motions (pressure/speed) translated into characteristic electrical signals that re unique to the person writing signature. Key management: user’s can’t get another thumbprint if their “key” is compromised! Other Cons: people change over time (my face may not be exactly the same over ten years) (See CISSP All-In-One page 131)
  9. Methods can be combined: consider a typical ATM transaction. A user is authenticated based on something he/she HAS (the ATM card), and something he/she KNOWS (the PIN). Also called “two-factor” authentication.
  10. In the ATM example, authorization asks the question (once the user John Doe has been authenticated), “Does John Doe have permission to withdraw $200?” It depends on the amount of money that John Doe has in his bank account (must be &gt;= $200), and the amount of money that John has already withdrawn earlier today (most ATMs let a user take out a maximum of $300 per day). OSes use ACLs. Capabilities are another mechanism that can be used to implement authorization. (See backup slides at end of course.)
  11. Mandatory: System decides which users have access to which objects (i.e. Bell-LaPadula: Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, Top Secret with No Read Up and No Write Down) Discretionary: Users decides who has access to objects they own Role-Based: System decides which users can access which objects based on their *role*.
  12. Basic Security Theorem: If the system starts in a secure state, and every state transition is secure, and the system will be secure after all transitions have been traversed. Simple property: can’t read data at a higher level (no read up) *-property: can’t write down (why? To prevent a Trojan horse executed by someone with a high classification to share data with a lower classification) Tranquility: security level of an object can’t be changed while it is being used Can be used to implement either mandatory or discretionary access control See http://www.itsecurity.com/asktecs/apr3902.htm for more info
  13. Confidentiality can be achieved through some sort of encryption with a “key” but can be achieved through other mechanisms as well.
  14. Downloading security software is another example that illustrates the difference between confidentiality and message/data integrity. It is necessary to take distinct precautions to ensure data integrity even if communications are encrypted
  15. Authentication + Signing in / out of a building creates accountability. Audit trail: a stored sequence of commands that a user issues at a computer terminal. Most existing logging/auditing security systems do not provide secure timestamping or data integrity – hence, an attacker can break into a system, and then change the logs to hid the fact that she was ever there!
  16. Why is Availability a Security Goal? Consider this extreme case: a computer that is turned off is extremely secure (no one can hack into it), but it is unavailable and unusable.
  17. IS DVD-Factory Secure? This is actually a complicated question. Can break down and ask “Is DVD-Factory Available? Confidential? Etc”