This document summarizes a presentation on indigenous rights and REDD+ programs in Bolivia and Peru. It discusses the legal frameworks around indigenous land rights and free prior informed consent in both countries. It then analyzes strategies used by competing interest groups to undermine indigenous rights through two case studies, the TIPNIS protected area in Bolivia and REDD+ pilot projects in Peru. Effective strategies for indigenous peoples to defend their rights are also discussed, including mobilization, strengthening regional organizations, and acting in international political arenas like the UNFCCC. The document concludes with lessons around how REDD+ intersects with ongoing land conflicts and governance challenges in both countries.

1. WILL REDD+
« ONLY SUCCEED IF IT RESPECTS
INDIGENOUS RIGHTS »?
rights-based and performance-based approaches
for Bolivia and Peru
Deborah Delgado-Pugley
UCL Louvain – EHESS Paris

2. Introduction
• Indigenous peoples have struggled hard to achieve recognition for
community-based management of forests.
• We will focus on the political obstacles they find, arising from
competition over rights & access to resources, and over the benefits
from forests, (including REDD incentives).
• Claims for forests and forestlands may involve:
 Wealthy farmers & agribusiness agents b. Displaced peasants c. Business
consortia (logging, mining) d. The expansion of protected areas.
 On the top of these competing actors and claims, both countries have large,
state-supported infrastructure projects.

3. Analysing strategies of competing actors on
the ground
Ambitious reforms on governance for the Amazon Basin are still insecure.
Useful to analyse strategies displayed by actors on the ground related to IPs or
community rights :
1. What are the strategies of competing interest groups to undermine existing
indigenous rights?
2. How will third parties try to take advantage of communities who have
gained rights?
3. What are the most effective available strategies for indigenous peoples to
defend and continue to deepen rights granted to them by national regimes?
(including the right to participate in opportunities such as REDD+)
(adapted from Larson, 2011)

4. Structure of the presentation
• Brief overview of the legal framework on Indigenous Peoples
rights in Peru and Bolivia (Rights to land and FPIC).
• Analysis of the current political processes that engages
Indigenous Peoples rights and REDD, (employing questions
identified by Larson et al 2011) for Bolivian and Peruvian cases.
• Draw out some practical lessons, for both a rights-based and
performance-based approach to REDD in national contexts.

5. Indigenous peoples rights to land
Bolivia Peru
1990s: Series of executive decrees 1979: The Constitution recognized
recognizing areas as under indigenous indigenous land rights as inalienable,
control and possession. unmortgageable, and imprescriptible.
1996: National Agrarian Reform Service 1993: Current Constitution represents a
Law. Serious obstacles. 5.4 million step backward on this issue making them
hectares of indigenous land entitled. subject to being bought and sold.
2009: AIOC (Autonomias indigenas 2009: Intention to weaken the legal
originario campesinas [Indigenous framwork lead to IPs mobilization
originary peasant autonomies]) is (Bagua)
recognized in the Constitution.

6. Free Prior Informed Consent
Bolivia Peru
• Ratified ILO (1992) • Ratified ILO 107 and, ILO 169 (1994)
• Evo Morales administration (MAS) • Peruvian law on FPIC was one of the
actively promoted the approval of first strong measures adopted by the
UNDRIP at the UN General Assembly. new government (in power since
• Bolivia is the first country to August 2011).
incorporate this UNDRIP in its
Constitution. Law on Consultation and its reglament are
designed (August 2011-March 2012). The
FPIC is now a constitutional right, but Congress has to vote them. All peasant
indigenous peoples are still waiting for and indigenous national organizations (6)
specific regulations to enforce it. have presented their objections and
reserves on both texts.

7. Bolivia in REDD at a glance
• First country to host a large forest carbon project for voluntary
markets: the Noel Kempf Mercado in Santa Cruz.
• Receives direct support from the UN-REDD Programme. The
4th policy board (Nairobi, March 2010) approved $4.7M for
Bolivia.
• First working plan (2010 – 2013). Bolivia’s international
position on REDD (against market schemes) and the TIPNIS
conflict caused significant delay in the project start up.
• Bolivia is not part of the FCPF or FIP.
• COP17 Bolivia presented its approach regarding integral and
sustainable management of forests as a non-market
alternative.

8. Bolivia’s position on UNFCCC COP16
in Cancun
“The text replaces binding mechanisms for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions with voluntary pledges that are
wholly insufficient. These pledges contradict the stated goal of
capping the rise in temperature at 2C, guiding us instead to a
rise of over 4C or more. ”
Pablo Solon – Bolivian Ambassador to the UN
• Bolivia organized critical social gatherings as the First ‘Peoples'
World Conference on Climate and the Rights of Mother Earth’
after Copenhagen talks (April 2010).

9. Peru in REDD at a glance
• Part of FIP and receives indirect support from the UN-REDD.
• Part of the FCPF since 2008. FCPF Policy Committee positively
assessed Peruvian R-PP during its 8th PC (March, 2011).
IDB will probably accompany Peru as a Delivery Partner as soon as the PC
adopts the Common Approach to environmental and social safeguards for
multiple delivery partners (Oslo, June 2011) and once a Transfer
Agreement between World Bank & the Delivery Partner is signed.
• Peru has ‘pilot projects’ ongoing on indigenous peoples’ land:
Community attitudes to REDD+ range from expectation to
suspicion.

10. Bolivian contradictions: The TIPNIS Case
• Both a protected
area and an
indigenous territory
• Entitled to three
indigenous peoples:
moxeños, yuracarés
and tsimanes D.S.
Nº 22610, 1990;
‘Titulo Ejecutorial’
TCO-1997 for
1.236296,3317 Has.
• Identified as one
pilot project for
Bolivian UN-REDD
GIZ (Germany).

11. 2 main drivers of deforestation:
1. Growing deforestation in the
south of the protected area
because of agriculture (coca leaf
production). Increasing pressure
on land from new settlers.
1. Projected road by the core zone
of the protected area. Bank loan
approved in 2010 by the BNDES
(Brazilian Development Bank).
3 años después 195.792 ha
de la construcción Deforestadas

12. [The road project]
• Very high probability of important impacts in the environment
and livelihoods for the population (core zone of the park
directly affected).
• No public information on the project (key-in-hand).
• A way open for new coca leaf production settlements (rumours
of land allocations ‘lotizacion’ as already underway).
• No FPIC and…
Evo Morales declarations (June 2011)

13. June 1990
1st Indigenous March for the
Territory and Dignity
15 August 2011
8th Indigenous March for the
life, indigenous rights and the
environment
follows the same path.

14. What are the strategies of competing interest groups
to undermine existing indigenous rights?
From competing social actors in the TIPNIS case:
• Strengthen of a peasant-indigenous ‘syndicate’ inside the
TIPNIS territory (Conisur- Indigenous Council of the South, a
group representing 12 of the 69 indigenous communities from
the TIPNIS).
• Organization of a contested ‘Counter-marche’ with support of
the State: Pro-road march is led by Conisur.

15. Strategies of competing interest groups to
undermine existing indigenous rights
From the State in the TIPNIS case:
1. Attempts at ex post and biased consultation processes to
Indigenous Peoples (Law Nº 222)
- without a national regulation on FPIC.
- Intending to include in the consultation populations who are
not part of the IPs entitled to the territory (cf. Conisur).
- On a context of direct intervention in the territories by
Ministers and the President himself in exchange for consent for
the road development, widely documented by national media.

16. « El presidente Evo Morales empezó ayer a honrar sus
compromisos con el Consejo Indígena del Sur (Conisur). »
LA RAZON (Oromomo – March 2012)

17. From the State:
2. Interfering in co-administration of the protected area and the
right of gathering in the territory:
A: Regional and national authorities of SERNAP were
changed arbitrarily. Productive projects have been blocked
(wood and tourism concessions as well as community
management of fauna).
B: Militarization of the territory:
“The army is setting up camps within communities”
C: Limited access to transport inside the territory
(Commercialization of petroleum derivate is controlled; IP
organization is not allowed to buy fuel, because of anti-drug
trafficking policies).
3. Excluding progressively lowland IP (CIDOB members) from
decision-making on the allocation of resources from the
‘Indigenous Fund’ (for indigenous and peasant communities).
4. Undermining the CIDOB alliance by negotiating other regional
vindications case-by-case.

18. ‘Climate change, the Green Fund and REDD’
(Act of negotiations 23th October 2011)
The government says no to REDD, but it has received money for REDD programs. What is demanded
by CIDOB is to know to which activities this funding will be allocated for. We, Indigenous peoples, as
owners of most of the forests of the country, have claimed to know on what we will work. “
Dilfredo Moreno, enlace técnico de la CIDOB-REDD
Demand:
"We demand that the government recognizes our right to receive direct
• )
retributions (payments) in compensation for the mitigation of greenhouse gases
emission that our territories ensure (environmental services)."
Agreement:
1. The Government and the IP agree to enforce the agreements of the World Conference
of Peoples held in Tiquipaya in April 2010 through a common agreement.
2. Based on the agreed Plan, build programs and concrete projects that strengthen the
capacity of the indigenous communities for the management of their forests and to
ensure that the benefits meet the social needs of communities in indigenous territories.
3. Socialize existing documents of the National Strategy for Forest and Climate Change,
CIDOB proposals and other existing initiatives.”

19. Effective strategies for Indigenous peoples to
defend and deepen rights
1. Building on ILO 169 and UNDRIP. Assembly (February 13th -15th) to
evaluate the regulation of the Peruvian law on Consultation (N°29785). 4 of 6
finally asked for ‘amendements’ of the law arguing that it had articles that
were against ILO 169.
2. Strengthening supra communal - regional organisations and
building autonomous indigenous REDD committees.
Regional organizations in Peru have agreed not to sign REDD+ contracts until
IP’ and local communities’ rights are guaranteed, due processes for FPIC are
agreed and the nature of REDD+ projects and programmes have been clearly
defined.

20. Effective strategies for Indigenous peoples to
defend and deepen rights
3. Mobilisation seeking for solidarity among the national
society: The impact on public opinion proves to be crucial.
A new mobilization is programed for the 22th April, although in harder
conditions, as the government starts breaking alliances among indigenous
organizations.

21. 4. Acting in different political
arenas
UNFCCC COP 17 (Durban)
Press Conference CONAMAQ,
CIDOB, COICA
VIII March. Negotiation
with State representatives
(Puerto San Borja – Bolivia)

22. Reinforcing rights through performance?
Phase 1 The development of strategies or action plans, policies and measures and
capacity building (the readiness phase)
Phase 2 The implementation of these strategies or plans, policies and measures that
could involve further capacity building and technology transfer;
Phase 3 Results-based actions that are measured reported and verified.
• Opportunity-cost calculations and result-based approach defined as emission
reductions is dominant on REDD proposals.
• In order to to address drivers of deforestation and degradation finance would
need to catalyse the structural change in forest governance: policy and legal
reform and long-term strategic planning.
• Performance-based: measure and directly pay for ‘co-benefinits’ as core-
benefits that result in reversing forest cover & carbon loss.

23. Some lessons
• As the Bolivian case shows, governments can act against
Constitutions that recently represented their biggest political
achievement; confronting them to important segments of
society that brought them to power.
• As Governments don’t put in practice legal principles, this
contentious space continues to be insufficient: confrontations,
which aren’t free of violence, still the way to get claims heard.
• Development imperatives undermines IP rights: Constitutions
specifically let the central governments override indigenous
and tribal land titles (Roldan Ortiga, 2004); as well as co-
management of protected (TIPNIS co management contract
1.8).

24. Some lessons
How does REDD places itself in this context?
• In both cases there is a lack of national debate / public
information on REDD.
• REDD is setting up incentives that increase the value of a
contested asset leading to conflict.
• Procedural issues and expectations with no contract: Opening
of misunderstandings and competition.
• Pushing for improvements in governance?

25. Thanks!
deborah.delgado@uclouvain.be