1. Noha Bakr Ph.D
bakrnoha@aucegypt.edu
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2.  I. Why Did the Egyptians Revolt in 25 Jan 2011?
 II. Transitional Period Under the Military Rule
 III. Why Are We Looking into the Elections in
Egypt?
 IV. Features of Elections in Transitional Period
Under the Military Rule
 V. Features of Elections Under the First Civil Rule
 VI. Over All Observations
 VII. Recommendations
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3.  Why did the Egyptians Revolt?
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4. A. Economic Conditions of Egypt Prior to
25th
of January Revolution.
i.GDP: went up from just under 5% in the mid-1990s to
7% in 2006-08
ii. Egypt’s share of world trade: which had been
falling continuously for 40 years, started expanding as
exports tripled in value.
iii. Foreign investment gushed in at record levels
cumulative total of $46 billion between 2004 and 2009.
iv. Gross public debt in that period fell by nearly a third
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6. . On the Economic level
i. Unbalanced Development
-Socially & Geographically
ii. Corruption
-Legalized & Marriage
between Politics
&Money
iii. Unemployment
-9%
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7. B. Social Conditions of Egypt Prior to 25th
of January Revolution
i. Rapid population growth, with a population f 83 million.
ii.The UNDP Human development report of 2010 claims that 23.5% of population
belong to the age category 18-29 years old
iii. The population was 90% Sunni Muslim, 9% Coptic Christian. While
ethnic and racial groups were in Nubians in Upper Egypt, Sinai Bedouins, and the
Bedouins tribes of western Egypt on the boarder with Libya.
iv. Decrease in enfant mortality rate and increase in life expectancy
reaching average of 73 years. In the last 20 years
v. illiteracy has shown high level of decrease, however quantity doesn’t mean
quality of education that enables competition in job market.
vi. The IT revolution in Egypt has been unprecedented in range and scope. 22
million Egyptians, mostly youth, have access to the internet.
v. Adding that to 21 daily newspapers and 523 other forms of publications to and
700 Arab speaking TV channels with ferocious political talk shows
Why Did the Egyptians Revolt in 25
Jan 2011?
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8.  Why did the Egyptians Revolt
B. On the Social level
i. Demographics
ii. Ethnic, Racial, Religious minorities
Dissatisfaction
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9. C. On the Political Level
i. On the national level
-Dec 2010 Elections (Turn out 23%)
Freud+Use of Money
-Hereditary Rule
-Human Rights abuse
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10. On the Political Level
ii. On the regional level
iii. On the international level
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11. Bread
Freedom
Social Justice
Human Dignity
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12. ◦ Game Over in 18 days
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13. SCAF : The Earliest Phase in the Transitional
Period (The Honey Moon(
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15. ◦ Elections are crucial to the democratic process
and to delivering long-term, stable democratic outcomes,
that the Egyptians revolted to attain.
◦ Support for good electoral process and practice is
therefore central to attain democracy
◦ Elections of 2010 were one of the Pillars that
enhanced discontent against Mubarak
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16.  The elections draws the Path for the future of
Egypt
 A. Constitutional Declaration (March 2011)
◦ *Parliamentary & Presidential Elections before or after
drafting a constitution?
 B. Parliamentary Elections
 *Bi Cameral System
 Presidential Elections (June 2012)
◦ *Two rounds to gain simple majority
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The Culture of the Society reflects on Outcome
*Religion
*Seeking Stability
*Youth verses Old age
*Choices offered Black and White

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•The Culture of the Society reflects on Outcome
History & Experience of Opposition with grass
roots

19.  Huge Turn Out if Early Elections
◦ Diversified turn out, gender, race, religion
◦ First time Egyptians Abroad Elect
◦ Data base well prepared/Elections with ID
◦ The Sprit of the revolution
Patriotic Approach-Military defending the
revolution
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20. Huge Turn Out in Early Elections With High Female
Participation
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21. Patriotic Approach
Approach-Military
defending the
Revolution
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22.  In Consistence in the Turn Out
 A. Constitutional Declaration March 2011 (turn out
43%)
 B. Parliamentary Elections
◦ *Bi Cameral System
 -People Council: 62% ,Second round higher 67%, Average
64.5%
 -Shora Council: 7.5% (reasons)
 Presidential Elections
◦ First Round: 46.42% per cent of registered voters having
cast ballots in the first round o
◦ Second Round:50.6%
Reasons for In consistency 22

23.  First Time International Observation
Allowed
 Domestic & International Elections observation
missions consider the strengths and weaknesses
of an electoral process and make independent
recommendations
◦ Mubarak International Observation & State
Sovereignty
◦ SCAF International Observation & National
Civil Society Observation = Transparency
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24.  Example of Observation
 The US-based Carter Center, led by former
president Jimmy Carter, observed Egypt's
Parliamentary & first historical presidential elections.
 A delegation assembled of a panel of 80
representatives from over 35 nations as well as deploy
22 international representatives from 14 countries to
travel to Egypt several days before the election.
 The centre has received accreditation from Egypt’s
Supreme Presidential Electoral Commission (SPEC)
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25.  Elections prior to amending or
establishing elections laws or
constitutions
 Judicial Supervision to all Poll stations
◦ Constitutional Declaration declarations
◦ Legislative System
◦ Presidential Elections
◦ Constitutional Referendum (The crisis)
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26.  General Campaigning Defaults
 During the campaign period for 2012 parliamentary
elections, most politicians used a range of illicit mediums to
influence voters including the use of public institutions,
such as moscques, and the distribution of goods and
services. The use of religious slogans and places of
worship by Islamist parties was ubiquitous. The Freedom
and Justice Party and al-Nour Party in particular paid little
attention to the ban on Election Day campaigning, instead
distributing materials inside and outside of polling stations
and constructing “media centers” where voters could
obtain instructions on how and where to vote.
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27. General Logistics Defaults
 Parliamentary Elections Logistics:
◦ All phases of elections (candidate registration, complaints
and appeals, voting, and counting and tabulation) were often
compromised in minor ways by mismanagement and
mistakes.
◦ Some registration venues were so overcrowded that
scuffles broke out among irritable Egyptians.
◦ On election day, some polling stations opened late (in fact,
some never opened whatsoever on the first day of voting) and
ran out of materials including ballots and ink.
◦ Ballot misprints on a large scale was the cause for
cancellation and nullification of elections in some districts.
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28.  Referendums & Elections taking
Place before the Constitution &
Election Laws are drafted
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29.  Constitution Drafting Committee
 Constitutional Referendum
 Legislative System (Nov 2013)
◦ Elections Law
◦ Constitution available
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30.  Judicial Supervision Crisis
 Long Quoes
 Use of Religious Institutions
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31.  To its credit, Egypt’s post-Mubarak elections have
been free from any serious or systematic
foul play. This is not a small accomplishment in
a nation new to the workings of democracy
 Mubarak election legislations was the legal
mechanism that governed the process
 The Military completely secured the elections
process
 Islamic outcome of legislative elections led to
liberal outcome of University and Syndicates
elections
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32.  Civic Education
◦ Many Egyptians still demonstrate a poor
understanding of voting procedure and the broader
democratic process.
◦ The HEC is not obligated by law to undertake
civic education, and accordingly has not.
◦ The same is true of judges tasked with presiding
over polling stations.
◦ An added concern and more cause for confusion in the
Many of these election officials continue to
possess inadequate knowledge of Egypt’s
complex electoral system and have not received
sufficient training to remedy
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33.  In most cases, problems could be remedied
through simple measures like better planning
and communication of the High Elections
Commission.
 Concrete steps to improve electoral procedures
are laid bare in regular reports of
international election observation groups;
the election commission needs only to act on
them.
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34.  Mechanizing Casting the Ballot
◦ India’s Experience
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