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Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !




Rahul Mohandas
Virus Research Analyst,
McAfee Avert Labs - Bangalore
December 09, 2007
2




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Agenda

► Malware   Kits
   ● Role of Malware kits
   ● MPack & IcePack Architecture

► Obfuscation   Techniques
   ● Common Encoders / Decoders
   ● Feebs Polymorphic worm

► Analyzing   Obfuscated Code

► How    Browser Exploits work?
   ● ActiveX Exploits
   ● Heap Spray Technique
   ● Case Study: ANI Vulnerability
3




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Introduction: What are Malware Kits (Exploit Driven)?

► Software components written mostly in PHP which
  allows automatic installation of malware by exploiting
  unpatched vulnerabilities in the system.

► Uses    web browser as the attack vector

► Regular  updates to the malware kit by updating the
  exploit base and improving the management and
  reporting capabilities.

► Most malware kits are sold commercially through
  underground channels (Forums & IRC)
4




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Introduction: Why Malware Kits are popular?

► Ability
        to identify the remote operating system, browser
  type and version, geography and send exploits
  accordingly.

► Probability of successful infection is more when multiple
  exploits are used against dissimilar targets.

► Efficiencyof Attack, Statistics about the infected
  Operating system, browser, exploits could be gathered

► Some   kits like Icepack allow for automatic injection of
  malicious iframes into multiple websites widening the
  chances of infection.
5




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Underground Economy: Why Infect Machines?

► Infectedcomputers used to
  relay Spam

► Carry   out DDOS Attacks

► Affiliatemodel – Pay others
  to infect users with Adware/
  ClickFraud trojans

► Steal Bank and Credit Card
  Information

► StealOnline games
  accounts
6




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Underground Economy: Popular Malware

►   Spy-Agent bv
     ● Harvests email addresses /Steal Information
     ● Currently Spammed on a weekly basis

►   Proxy-Agent.o
     ● Harvests email addresses
     ● Uses system as HTTP proxy to masquerade
       attacks

►   PWS-Goldun
     ● Steals games passwords from the system
     ● Mostly spammed

►   PWS-LDPinch
     ● DIY Malware using the configurator
                                            (Source: AVERT)
7




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Infecting Users

► Hacking     Machines

► Attack    Strategy
   ● Exploiting Un-patched Vulnerabilities
       ○   CGI Vulnerabilities
       ○ Other Application related vulnerabilities
       ○ Operating System related vulnerabilities

► Infection    Methodology
   ● Inject HTML Iframes into the webpages
   ● Inject scripts into the webpages.
8




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Infecting Users

► Using    Stolen / Fake Accounts

► Attack   Strategy
   ● Use stolen / fake accounts in conjunction with scripts like Ftp-
     Toolz which automates iframe injection into the websites

► Infection   Methodology
   ● Post Iframes into HTML enabled websites or forums
9




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Infecting Users

► TypoSquatting
   ● Worldofwarcraft.com and World0fwarcraft.com
   ● Windowsupdate.com and VVindowsupdate.com
   ● Yahoo.com and Yahoo550.com

► Attack   Strategy
   ● Using social-engineering to attempt a drive-by install

► Infection   Methodology
   ● Embedded iframes and scripts in the attacker controlled page.
10




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Infecting Users

► Use    commonly used Search words / Buy sponsored
    links from search engines.

►   Attack Strategy
    ● Manipulating search engine results

► Infection   Methodology
    ● Inject HTML Iframes into the webpages
    ● Inject scripts into the webpages.
11




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Infecting Users: Study on Search Engine Safety

► Overall,    4.0% of search results
    link to risky Web sites

► Sponsored    results contain 2.4
    times as many risky sites as
    organic results.

►   Most dangerous search terms include
    Music and technology.




              –   Source: McAfee SiteAdvIsor Search Engine Safety 2007
12




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Infecting Users

► Sending     Emails using sensational or enticing subjects

► Attack   Strategy
   ● Using social-engineering to attempt a drive-by install

► Infection   Methodology
   ● HTML formatted mails containing embedded iframes
   ● Email containing phished (a href tags) links which attempts a
     drive-by install

► Popularly adopted by Nuwar a.k.a. Storm worm which
  built a massive botnet of infected computers (zombies)
13




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Popular Incidents: The Italian Job

► Hackers   compromise ~10,000 websites which pointed
  to malicious links hosting Mpack.

► Believed     to have exploited a vulnerability in CPanel
14




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Popular Incidents: Bank of India Hack

► Hackers          compromise Bank of India Website

► Inserted        multiple malicious iframes into the webpage

► Multiple exploits downloaded over 8 trojan variants
  including a rootkit component.

► n404      kit used in this attack




  Source: http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2007/08/31/compromised-bank-of-india-website/
15




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Popular Incidents: IndiaTimes Hack

► Injected   malicious script into the webpage.

► Theinstalled malware included a cocktail of
  Downloader and Dropper Trojans.
16




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
MPACK

► PHP    based malware kit produced by Russian Hackers.

► Soldfor around $700 - $1000 with additional costs for
  updates

► The tool gets initiated when index.php hosted on a server is
  accessed by a user.

► Thisfile determines the browser and operating system of the
  incoming user.

► Based   on the browser type and operating system a web
  exploit is served to the user's machine.

► Post the successful exploitation, a payload file is sent to the
  user’s machine and automatically executed.
17




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
MPACK Architecture
18




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
MPACK Control Panel

► Logs the Operating system and
  browser statistics.

► Logs   the number of attacks and
  efficiency according to IP
  address and geography.

► Software could be configured to
  send exploit only once which
  could hinder analysis by
  researchers
► Blocking country according to
  the predefined 2 letter country
  codes               Image Source: VirusTotal Blog
19




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
ICEPACK Architecture
20




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
ICEPACK Control Panel
Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Analyzing Obfuscated Code
22




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Code Obfuscation

► Most  of the code obfuscation techniques are composed
  of two parts:
   ● Encrypted string
   ● Decryptor

► Thisprocess may be repeated several times, the
  decrypted string may contain another string to be
  decrypted.

► The level of decryption loop varies based on the
  algorithm.
23




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
How De-obfuscation works?

►   Place hooks on the commonly used methods such as
    ● document.write
    ● document.writeln
    ● eval

► Redirect  them to a log window instead of execution,
    where the data can be conveniently interpreted.

► Using   hostilejsdebug to de-obfuscate scripts.
24




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Obfuscating Code

► Base   64 Encoding
   ● http://www.motobit.com/util/base64-decoder-encoder.asp

► Dean     Edwards packer
   ● http://dean.edwards.name/packer/

► String   splits

► Gzip   Encoding

► Custom     Encoders
25




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
IcePack Obfuscated exploit (IE)
26




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
MPack MultiLevel Encoded Decryptor
27




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
HTML Guardian

► Commercial    Product
  ~ 40 $

► Decryptor is encoded and
  the decoded function
  evaluates encrypted string

► The  above spammed
  mail delivers exploit
  MS06-014 vulnerability.
28




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Feebs Worm

►   Polymorphic worm which has
    Javascript and Vbscript
    components.

►   Harvests mail from the
    machine and sends itself
    using its own SMTP engine

►   Injects a ZIP attachment
    containing a copy of the
    worm into outgoing SMTP
    sessions.

►   Drops rootkit component,
    opens backdoor, drops copy
    of the worm into p2p folders
29




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !




                         DEMO
            (Deobfuscating Malicious Scripts)
Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
How Browser Exploits Work?
31




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
MDAC Exploit – MS06-014

► The  exploit is delivered to a user’s browser via an
  iframe on a compromised /malicious web page.

► The iframe contains JavaScript to instantiate an ActiveX
  object with
   ● CLSID {BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36}

► TheJavascript makes an AJAX XMLHTTP request to
  download an executable.

► Adodb.stream     is used to write the executable to disk.

► Shell.Application   is used to launch the newly written
  executable.
32




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Heap Spray Exploit

► Stateof the art in browser exploitation – developed by
  SkyLined in 2004.

► System    heap accessible from JavaScript Code
33




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Background: ANI Vulnerability

► What    Microsoft had to say?
   ● “A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that
     Windows handles cursor, animated cursor, and icon formats.
     An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by constructing
     a malicious cursor or icon file that could potentially allow remote
     code execution” – ms07-017

► Related    vulnerability reported by eeye in 2005.
       ○ Vulnerability in LoadCursorIconFromFileMap() function in user32.dll
       ○ Caused due to improper bound checking while reading the
         structure.
34




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Defining the Vulnerability: ANI File Format

►   ANI file format is used for storing animated cursors

►   Based on RIFF multimedia file format

►   Each chunk starts with a 4 byte ASCII tag, followed by a dword
    specifying the size of the data contained in the chunk.

►   One of the chunks in an ANI file is the anih chunk, which contains a
    36-byte animation header structure.
     ● "anih" {(DWORD)Length_of_AnimationHeader}
       {AnimationHeaderBlock}

►   The vulnerable code did not validate the length of the anih chunk
    before reading the chunk data into fixed size buffer on the stack.
35




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Defining the Vulnerability: LoadAniIcon() Patched
36




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Defining the Vulnerability: LoadAniIcon() Unpatched
37




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Exploit
38




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !




                     DEMO
         (Exploiting ANI Vulnerability MS07-017)
39




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !
Revisiting the Agenda

► Malware    Kits
   ● Role of Malware kits
   ● MPack & IcePack Architecture

► Obfuscation    Techniques
   ● Common Encoders / Decoders
   ● Feebs Polymorphic worm

► Analyzing   Obfuscated Code

► How   Browser Exploits work?
   ● ActiveX Exploits
   ● Heap Spray Technique
   ● Case Study: ANI Vulnerability
40




Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits !




                   Questions ?
              rahul_mohandas@avertlabs.com

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Rahul - Analysis Of Adversarial Code - ClubHack2007

  • 1. Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Rahul Mohandas Virus Research Analyst, McAfee Avert Labs - Bangalore December 09, 2007
  • 2. 2 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Agenda ► Malware Kits ● Role of Malware kits ● MPack & IcePack Architecture ► Obfuscation Techniques ● Common Encoders / Decoders ● Feebs Polymorphic worm ► Analyzing Obfuscated Code ► How Browser Exploits work? ● ActiveX Exploits ● Heap Spray Technique ● Case Study: ANI Vulnerability
  • 3. 3 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Introduction: What are Malware Kits (Exploit Driven)? ► Software components written mostly in PHP which allows automatic installation of malware by exploiting unpatched vulnerabilities in the system. ► Uses web browser as the attack vector ► Regular updates to the malware kit by updating the exploit base and improving the management and reporting capabilities. ► Most malware kits are sold commercially through underground channels (Forums & IRC)
  • 4. 4 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Introduction: Why Malware Kits are popular? ► Ability to identify the remote operating system, browser type and version, geography and send exploits accordingly. ► Probability of successful infection is more when multiple exploits are used against dissimilar targets. ► Efficiencyof Attack, Statistics about the infected Operating system, browser, exploits could be gathered ► Some kits like Icepack allow for automatic injection of malicious iframes into multiple websites widening the chances of infection.
  • 5. 5 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Underground Economy: Why Infect Machines? ► Infectedcomputers used to relay Spam ► Carry out DDOS Attacks ► Affiliatemodel – Pay others to infect users with Adware/ ClickFraud trojans ► Steal Bank and Credit Card Information ► StealOnline games accounts
  • 6. 6 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Underground Economy: Popular Malware ► Spy-Agent bv ● Harvests email addresses /Steal Information ● Currently Spammed on a weekly basis ► Proxy-Agent.o ● Harvests email addresses ● Uses system as HTTP proxy to masquerade attacks ► PWS-Goldun ● Steals games passwords from the system ● Mostly spammed ► PWS-LDPinch ● DIY Malware using the configurator (Source: AVERT)
  • 7. 7 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Infecting Users ► Hacking Machines ► Attack Strategy ● Exploiting Un-patched Vulnerabilities ○ CGI Vulnerabilities ○ Other Application related vulnerabilities ○ Operating System related vulnerabilities ► Infection Methodology ● Inject HTML Iframes into the webpages ● Inject scripts into the webpages.
  • 8. 8 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Infecting Users ► Using Stolen / Fake Accounts ► Attack Strategy ● Use stolen / fake accounts in conjunction with scripts like Ftp- Toolz which automates iframe injection into the websites ► Infection Methodology ● Post Iframes into HTML enabled websites or forums
  • 9. 9 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Infecting Users ► TypoSquatting ● Worldofwarcraft.com and World0fwarcraft.com ● Windowsupdate.com and VVindowsupdate.com ● Yahoo.com and Yahoo550.com ► Attack Strategy ● Using social-engineering to attempt a drive-by install ► Infection Methodology ● Embedded iframes and scripts in the attacker controlled page.
  • 10. 10 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Infecting Users ► Use commonly used Search words / Buy sponsored links from search engines. ► Attack Strategy ● Manipulating search engine results ► Infection Methodology ● Inject HTML Iframes into the webpages ● Inject scripts into the webpages.
  • 11. 11 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Infecting Users: Study on Search Engine Safety ► Overall, 4.0% of search results link to risky Web sites ► Sponsored results contain 2.4 times as many risky sites as organic results. ► Most dangerous search terms include Music and technology. – Source: McAfee SiteAdvIsor Search Engine Safety 2007
  • 12. 12 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Infecting Users ► Sending Emails using sensational or enticing subjects ► Attack Strategy ● Using social-engineering to attempt a drive-by install ► Infection Methodology ● HTML formatted mails containing embedded iframes ● Email containing phished (a href tags) links which attempts a drive-by install ► Popularly adopted by Nuwar a.k.a. Storm worm which built a massive botnet of infected computers (zombies)
  • 13. 13 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Popular Incidents: The Italian Job ► Hackers compromise ~10,000 websites which pointed to malicious links hosting Mpack. ► Believed to have exploited a vulnerability in CPanel
  • 14. 14 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Popular Incidents: Bank of India Hack ► Hackers compromise Bank of India Website ► Inserted multiple malicious iframes into the webpage ► Multiple exploits downloaded over 8 trojan variants including a rootkit component. ► n404 kit used in this attack Source: http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/index.php/2007/08/31/compromised-bank-of-india-website/
  • 15. 15 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Popular Incidents: IndiaTimes Hack ► Injected malicious script into the webpage. ► Theinstalled malware included a cocktail of Downloader and Dropper Trojans.
  • 16. 16 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! MPACK ► PHP based malware kit produced by Russian Hackers. ► Soldfor around $700 - $1000 with additional costs for updates ► The tool gets initiated when index.php hosted on a server is accessed by a user. ► Thisfile determines the browser and operating system of the incoming user. ► Based on the browser type and operating system a web exploit is served to the user's machine. ► Post the successful exploitation, a payload file is sent to the user’s machine and automatically executed.
  • 17. 17 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! MPACK Architecture
  • 18. 18 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! MPACK Control Panel ► Logs the Operating system and browser statistics. ► Logs the number of attacks and efficiency according to IP address and geography. ► Software could be configured to send exploit only once which could hinder analysis by researchers ► Blocking country according to the predefined 2 letter country codes Image Source: VirusTotal Blog
  • 19. 19 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! ICEPACK Architecture
  • 20. 20 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! ICEPACK Control Panel
  • 21. Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Analyzing Obfuscated Code
  • 22. 22 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Code Obfuscation ► Most of the code obfuscation techniques are composed of two parts: ● Encrypted string ● Decryptor ► Thisprocess may be repeated several times, the decrypted string may contain another string to be decrypted. ► The level of decryption loop varies based on the algorithm.
  • 23. 23 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! How De-obfuscation works? ► Place hooks on the commonly used methods such as ● document.write ● document.writeln ● eval ► Redirect them to a log window instead of execution, where the data can be conveniently interpreted. ► Using hostilejsdebug to de-obfuscate scripts.
  • 24. 24 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Obfuscating Code ► Base 64 Encoding ● http://www.motobit.com/util/base64-decoder-encoder.asp ► Dean Edwards packer ● http://dean.edwards.name/packer/ ► String splits ► Gzip Encoding ► Custom Encoders
  • 25. 25 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! IcePack Obfuscated exploit (IE)
  • 26. 26 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! MPack MultiLevel Encoded Decryptor
  • 27. 27 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! HTML Guardian ► Commercial Product ~ 40 $ ► Decryptor is encoded and the decoded function evaluates encrypted string ► The above spammed mail delivers exploit MS06-014 vulnerability.
  • 28. 28 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Feebs Worm ► Polymorphic worm which has Javascript and Vbscript components. ► Harvests mail from the machine and sends itself using its own SMTP engine ► Injects a ZIP attachment containing a copy of the worm into outgoing SMTP sessions. ► Drops rootkit component, opens backdoor, drops copy of the worm into p2p folders
  • 29. 29 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! DEMO (Deobfuscating Malicious Scripts)
  • 30. Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! How Browser Exploits Work?
  • 31. 31 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! MDAC Exploit – MS06-014 ► The exploit is delivered to a user’s browser via an iframe on a compromised /malicious web page. ► The iframe contains JavaScript to instantiate an ActiveX object with ● CLSID {BD96C556-65A3-11D0-983A-00C04FC29E36} ► TheJavascript makes an AJAX XMLHTTP request to download an executable. ► Adodb.stream is used to write the executable to disk. ► Shell.Application is used to launch the newly written executable.
  • 32. 32 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Heap Spray Exploit ► Stateof the art in browser exploitation – developed by SkyLined in 2004. ► System heap accessible from JavaScript Code
  • 33. 33 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Background: ANI Vulnerability ► What Microsoft had to say? ● “A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way that Windows handles cursor, animated cursor, and icon formats. An attacker could try to exploit the vulnerability by constructing a malicious cursor or icon file that could potentially allow remote code execution” – ms07-017 ► Related vulnerability reported by eeye in 2005. ○ Vulnerability in LoadCursorIconFromFileMap() function in user32.dll ○ Caused due to improper bound checking while reading the structure.
  • 34. 34 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Defining the Vulnerability: ANI File Format ► ANI file format is used for storing animated cursors ► Based on RIFF multimedia file format ► Each chunk starts with a 4 byte ASCII tag, followed by a dword specifying the size of the data contained in the chunk. ► One of the chunks in an ANI file is the anih chunk, which contains a 36-byte animation header structure. ● "anih" {(DWORD)Length_of_AnimationHeader} {AnimationHeaderBlock} ► The vulnerable code did not validate the length of the anih chunk before reading the chunk data into fixed size buffer on the stack.
  • 35. 35 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Defining the Vulnerability: LoadAniIcon() Patched
  • 36. 36 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Defining the Vulnerability: LoadAniIcon() Unpatched
  • 37. 37 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Exploit
  • 38. 38 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! DEMO (Exploiting ANI Vulnerability MS07-017)
  • 39. 39 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Revisiting the Agenda ► Malware Kits ● Role of Malware kits ● MPack & IcePack Architecture ► Obfuscation Techniques ● Common Encoders / Decoders ● Feebs Polymorphic worm ► Analyzing Obfuscated Code ► How Browser Exploits work? ● ActiveX Exploits ● Heap Spray Technique ● Case Study: ANI Vulnerability
  • 40. 40 Analysis of Adversarial Code: The role of Malware Kits ! Questions ? rahul_mohandas@avertlabs.com