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Cody J. Blackwell
Mrs. Corbett
AP Lit/Comp
17 November 2011
Apollo 13: “Failure Is Not an Option”
“I believe that this nation should commit itself to achieving the goal, before this decade is
out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth.” Addressing Congress
on May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy invigorated a war-weary United States of America
with the prospect of extraterrestrial exploration. Although Kennedy never witnessed the “giant
leap for mankind,” the president’s remarks embodied the American scientific community’s
driving force for the next decade. Had Kennedy lived to experience Apollo 13, it is likely he
would have only then grasped the tremendous risk and the depth of scientific precision lunar
landings entail.
On October 4, 1957, the United Soviet Socialist Republic launched into orbit the first
man-made satellite, Sputnik I. The craft was no larger than a grapefruit, but its distinctive beep
and visible light simultaneously frightened and empowered the United States. Although the U.S.
and the Soviet Union had sparred over ideological differences since World War II, neither nation
had ever carried out an act that could be classified “aggressive” until Sputnik’s launch. The very
concept of propelling a synthetic object into low Earth orbit (LEO) reinforced suspicions of the
Soviets’ capability to launch weapons of mass destruction into space. Recognizing that threat,
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration passed the National Aeronautics and Space Act in July
1958. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration became operational just three days
short of the Sputnik launch’s one-year anniversary (Byrnes).
NASA’s initial objective for the Mercury missions was to send at least one newly-dubbed
“astronaut” into LEO, triumphing with Alan Shepard’s historic suborbital flight in May 1961.

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Though the Mercury launches proved highly successful (seven astronauts entered outer space
throughout the program), the administration seems never to have considered further-reaching
lunar exploration possibilities until Shepard’s launch proved humans could, in fact, enter outer
space and return safely to Earth’s surface. President Kennedy made his bold and historic
statement of NASA’s intent just three weeks later. Despite the vital data generated by the
Mercury missions, NASA prudently chose not to transition fully into the lunar exploratory stage
without conducting further endurance tests, justifying the three-year-long Gemini project. Over
ten consecutive successful flights from 1963 to 1966, NASA trained future Apollo astronauts for
the 239,000-mile journey to the Moon. Satisfied with its Gemini results, the administration set
February 24, 1967 for its Apollo 1 mission date, yet based on subsequent events, many historians
believe NASA never adequately asked, “What if?”
Vastly rewarded by the Mercury and Gemini missions, NASA’s first administrators found
their agency the most revered government bureau in the post-New Deal era. While the space race
with Russia seemed to mount with each launch, American patriotism counteracted any prior
aversions to human space exploration. When Roger Chaffee, Virgil “Gus” Grissom, and Edward
White crammed themselves into the compact car-sized Apollo Command/Service Module (CSM)
on January 27, 1967, they and their supervisors experienced a strong sense of euphoria as they
tested the very systems that would carry Chaffee, Grissom, and White to the Moon just one
month later. Harnessed snugly into their seats, the three members of an infant society of “heroes”
listened to the capsule communicator (CAPCOM), twisting dials and adjusting switches as he
dictated their boot-up instructions.
While NASA had ample time beforehand to brainstorm and rehearse all possible
catastrophic failure scenarios, the euphoria of prior mission successes apparently lulled the

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administration into skipping essential safety precautions, and the cost of such insufficient
diligence was measured in the ghastly loss of human lives. After five-and-a-half hours in the
CSM, tragedy struck: “Fire broke out in the command module of the Apollo spacecraft, which
had been filled with a pure oxygen atmosphere, and [Chafee, Grissom, and White] died”
(Newton et al.). It was physically impossible for any of the three, lying with their backs toward
the ground, to unbuckle and abandon the capsule. Even if the astronauts had been able to escape
their seats, design engineers had installed a new six-bolt capsule hatch that required ninety
seconds to open. For eighteen months following the Apollo 1 disaster, scientists and engineers
effectively rewrote the agency’s numerous safety manuals and redesigned the CSM hatch to
alleviate future evacuations. In light of the meticulous retooling process, astronauts Walter
“Wally” Schirra Jr., Donn F. Eisele, and R. Walter Cunningham cleared the atmosphere with
Apollo 7 on October 11, 1968 (“Project Apollo”). NASA followed its first triumphant Apollo
mission with two lunar orbits and three landings.
Since its inception, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration strove to recruit
the brightest and most qualified engineers, scientists, and military personnel worldwide. The
Apollo program boasted an especially diverse spectrum of contributors, from elite Air Force test
pilots serving as astronauts and flight commanders to former German scientists applying their
experience with Nazi V-2 rockets on Saturn V’s propulsion systems. NASA’s proficiency
became particularly apparent with the eighth Apollo mission. Astronauts James Lovell, Thomas
Kenneth “Ken” Mattingly II, and Fred W. Haise Jr. spent several months completing rigorous
training for Apollo 13, the third planned lunar landing. Mattingly frequently encompassed
himself in the CSM simulator at Houston’s Johnson Space Center and attempted particularly
arduous recovery scenarios while Lovell and Haise performed mock space walks nearby.

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Unfortunately, “[d]ays before the mission, backup lunar module pilot Charles Duke [sic]
inadvertently exposed [Mattingly] to German measles…Mattingly had no immunity to measles
and was replaced by backup command module pilot, [John L. ‘Jack’] Swigert” (Ryba).
Fortunately for his crewmates, Mattingly may have better served his purpose on the ground at
Mission Control. NASA inserted Lovell, Haise, and Swigert into orbit at 2:13 P.M. on April 11,
1970, and 55 hours, 55 minutes, 35 seconds after launch, Swigert radioed CAPCOM Jack
Lousma, “Houston, we’ve had a problem” (Barry and Garber). Swigert’s fear-laden but calmly
delivered message followed the explosion of the command module’s second oxygen tank, which
cut the remaining tank’s capacity in half and effectively crippled two of three fuel cells powering
the entire apparatus. Just nine minutes before Lousma received the signal, the crew had signed
off from a national news conference showcasing their working conditions inside Odyssey, Apollo
13’s command module.
For the first time in NASA’s brief history, Houston’s Mission Control Center took on its
most daunting task yet: Keep three astronauts alive in a floundering spacecraft 200,000 miles
from Earth. Acting on protocol, Mission Control immediately aborted the lunar landing and
ordered Lovell, Haise, and Swigert to stand by for further instructions from CAPCOM Lousma.
Lovell radioed back to Lousma, “It looks to me, looking out the hatch, that we are venting
something. We are venting something out into the—into space” (“One Minute with”). The
“something” Lovell saw leaking from Odyssey was oxygen he and his comrades needed to
survive the remainder of the journey. In addition to sacrificing breathable air, the destroyed
tanks’ contents failed to combine with cryogenic hydrogen as a water source for the astronauts.
Approximately ninety minutes after the initial explosion, assistant Flight Director Glynn Lunney
issued a last-ditch directive through Lousma: “The astronauts were instructed to move into [the

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lunar module] Aquarius, which would serve as a lifeboat while the disabled Apollo 13 swung
around the Moon and headed homeward” (“Apollo 13”). Haise and Lovell proceeded into
Aquarius as Swigert prepared to shut down Odyssey and readied the crippled service module for
pre-entry jettison. Meanwhile, Ken Mattingly wrestled through the shutdown process in the CSM
simulator, generating instructions for Swigert. Swigert eventually floated out of the lifeless
service module, and Lovell and Haise immediately sealed Odyssey to conserve Aquarius’s
oxygen supply for the ninety-hour journey ahead.
Ironically, the two prior missions had proven the lunar module (LM) design reliable…on
the Moon. NASA fabricated the LM to sustain two astronauts for a total of 45 hours, but Mission
Control devised procedures for Aquarius to support Lovell, Haise, and Swigert for double that
time. “The module designed to land on the Moon was refashioned…as engineers struggled to
come up with a way to bring the spacecraft back to Earth” (Brown). To conserve Aquarius’s
diminutive power supply, Mission Control directed the astronauts to shut off all non-vital
systems, including heat sources, for twelve-hour periods. “The four-day return trip, during which
temperatures in the LM were near [38 degrees Fahrenheit], was uncomfortable and tense.”
(“Project Apollo”). Due to the unpleasant conditions inside Aquarius, the three astronauts
shivered rather than slept, and their labored breathing from the depleted oxygen levels never
fully subsided. The astronauts’ increased exhalation formed condensation on Aquarius’s poorly-
insulated walls and signaled a subsequent rise in carbon dioxide levels. “There were enough
lithium hydroxide canisters, which remove carbon dioxide from the spacecraft, but the square
canisters from the command module were not compatible with the round openings in the lunar
module environmental system….Mission control devised a way to attach the CM canisters to the
LM system by using plastic bags, cardboard and [duct] tape all materials carried on board”

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(Ryba). Reading from notes recorded by NASA’s ingenious design engineers, CAPCOM
Lousma walked Lovell and Haise through the assembly process for the makeshift valve. Tested
through simple trial and error at Mission Control, the entire apparatus supplied all three
astronauts enough oxygen to survive, however uneasily, as they rounded the Moon on April 15th.
Fortunately, the expedition from the dark side of the Moon to Earth’s outer orbit
transpired without life-threatening incidents, but leftover “space trash” from the explosion three
days earlier continually hampered Mission Control’s positioning efforts. Unable to find a true
star among the debris, Commander Lovell aligned the LM with the Sun. “As [Aquarius]
approached Earth, [Lovell] fired the lander's engine again to put [the crew] on the proper
trajectory. Then they moved back into the lifeless command module and cut it loose for a
landing” (Damon). To say that the crew “cut [Odyssey] loose” is an understatement: Lovell,
Haise, and Swigert followed procedures that flight controllers had written in three days instead
of the usual three months. Yet, the instructions allowed the crew to completely shed the wrecked
service module four hours before landing and the command module one hour later. Thankfully,
Lovell, Haise, and Swigert landed in the Pacific Ocean off the coast of American Samoa,
completing the mission in approximately five days, twenty-two hours, and fifty-five minutes on
April 17, 1970 (Ryba).
Celebrating with assistants Glynn Lunney and Gerald Griffin, head Flight Director Gene
Kranz passed the customary box of cigars around the Mission Control Center in Houston while a
Coast Guard flotilla retrieved his jubilant comrades. In a 2009 interview with TIME magazine,
columnist Jeffrey Kruger asked Commander Lovell if he, Haise, or Swigert had panicked at any
point after the initial explosion. “Lovell answered that the three men had agreed never to discuss
that matter with anyone else and never would.” Lovell’s response personified the entire astronaut

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corps’ sworn secrecy regarding their trials within and traverses of space, but one can conjecture
that if any one of the men had lost his nerve, all three would have died in space.
Sadly, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration cannot boast perfection: the
Apollo 1, Challenger, and Columbia disasters claimed a total of seventeen astronauts’ lives.
Regardless, outstanding feats in engineering and psychological endurance aided Jim Lovell, Fred
Haise, and Jack Swigert as they navigated through outer space in the United States space
program’s ultimate survival tale, Apollo 13.

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Works Cited
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Web. 14 Oct. 2011. <http://www.school.eb.com/eb/article-9474373>.
Barry, Bill, and Steve Garber. “Detailed Chronology of Events Surrounding the Apollo 13
Accident.” NASA History. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 17 June 2011.
Web. 14 Oct. 2011. <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/Timeline/
apollo13chron.html>.
Brown, Irene. “Emergencies.” Space Sciences. Ed. Pat Dasch. Vol. 3. New York: Macmillan
Reference USA, 2002. 50-52. Humans in Space. Gale Virtual Reference Library. Web.
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Byrnes, Mark E. "National Aeronautics and Space Administration." Dictionary of American
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Kruger, Jeffrey. “Moon Walkers.” Time 27 July 2009: 28-35. Academic Search Complete. Web.
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