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Understanding
the Event Log for
a more secured
environment
Dave Millier
Chuck Ben-Tzur
Overview

Introducing… the Event Log
Why Monitor Logs
Enabling Event Logging
Real Time Monitoring
  Example: Security Log Tampering
Auditing and Analysis
Archiving Events
  Example: File Modification Investigation
Event Log Limitation
Vista Event Log
  Example: Creating Log File Using Event Triggered Tasks
Resources and Questions
Introducing…Event Log

Centralized log service to allow applications and the
operating system to report events that have taken place.
Introduced with Windows NT 4 (1993).
Main Windows Logs
   Application (example: Database message)
   System (example: driver failure)
   Security (example: Logon attempt, file access)
A Windows 2003 domain controller will also include
   Directory Service (example: Active Directory connection problem)
   File Replication (example: domain controller information updates)
   DNS
Vista has introduced a lot of changes
Why Should We Monitor Logs

We don’t NEED to… We HAVE to…
Organizations are obligated by regulations to gather and
audit systems activity logs.
   HIPPA (Health Industry)
      Regulatory review of system activity to ensure that a user
      information remains private but accessible
      Identify, respond and document security incidents
   GLBA (Financial)
      Dual control procedures
      Segregation of duties
   SOX (Financial)
      Record Retention and availability
      Accountability
Why Should We Monitor Logs (cont.)

To comply with the regulations organizations require the
following forms of log monitoring
   Real-time monitoring
       Identify attack attempts in progress and if a security breach has
       occurred.
   Audit and analysis
       Periodic reports and analysis for regulation compliance (due diligence).
   Archiving
       Again… regulations compliance (log retention)
       Forensic investigation of an incident


The event log should also enable the organization to
implement internal security policies.
Enabling Event Logging

Each event category is controlled by audit policies:
   Account logon events (for domain accounts)
   Account management (group and account events)
   Directory service access
   Logon events (local machine events)
   Object access (user accessing an object such as file, folder, printer)
   Policy change (changes in the audit, user rights and trust policies)
   Privilege use (user exercising one or more of his rights)
   Process tracking (detailed tracking information)
   System events (events that affect the system security or log)
Each policy can be set to audit success events only, failure
events only, success/failure events, or no auditing at all.
Audit Policies (Member Server)
Real-Time Monitoring

Successful events that grant the user high level privileges
(either by spoofing identity or elevation of privileges)
Events to monitor
  Successful high profile user account / group management events
    #636– Group member added or removed
  Successful logon events of high profile user accounts
    #680 – Logon attempt
  Successful logon events to a domain controller
  Operations on specific high profile resources (files, folder)
    #560 (Object Access), #564 (Object Deleted)
  Successful policy change events
    #612 – Audit Policy Change (logs no more…)
  All system events
    #517 – security log was cleared
Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log)


Security Log
Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log)


Security Log

A User will try
to erase the
logs
Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log)


Security Log

A User will try
to erase the
logs (and not
event save it)
Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log)


Security Log

A User will try to
erase the logs

A New Event is
Created
Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log)


Security Log

A User will try to
erase the logs

A New Event is
Created

The Event
Contains the
User Name
Real-Time Monitoring (cont.)

Tracking and analysing event failure patterns may
indicate a range of malicious attack attempts
  Failed logon activity (e.g. brute force attack)
     #675 – Pre Auth, failed with Kerberos code 24 (Bad password)
     #539 - logon failure due to account lockout (if systematic may be an
     indication of DoS)
  Failed account management activity (e.g. password reset events)
  All failed system events
     #517 – Audit log cleared
 Note: Most of the auditing policies, by default, are set to log
       successful events only. Local policies may be set to no
       auditing at all.
Real-Time Monitoring (cont.)

Possible issues
  Flood of events (domain controller and member server event
  duplication, detailed tracking events)
    Solution: Consolidate log information for better analysis
  Unmonitored systems (e.g. unaudited events on a file server)
    Solution: Threat modeling, identifying assets in organization
  Unmonitored events (detailed user and process activity)
    Solution: Organization security program and policies
  False positives due to configuration problems
  (e.g. expired service password)
      Solution: Knowledge of the network, components and assets
      (Human Factor)
Auditing and Analysis

Most regulations require a periodic review of important
events (not critical or show stoppers) for two reasons:
  A “second chance” to reveal malicious activity originally undetected
  (and unaccountable for).
  Audit the ongoing activity to verify no major changes have taken
  place.
The data is usually reviewed in the form of reports
(detailed and summarized)
Example of Events to Monitor (A short list)
  #529 to #535 and #539 – Logon failure (different reasons)
  #629 – User account Disabled
  #644 – User account Locked Out
Auditing and Analysis (cont.)

Possible issues
  Finding a critical event that was not detected by the real-time
  monitoring processes
    Solution: Investigate the incident to eliminate or mitigate any results of
    malicious activity.
  Duplicated events (Domain controller and Local Server)
    Solution: Correlate and consolidate events using external system
  Lack of security policies to help and identify events to be audited
  (e.g. Messenger)
    Solution: Define security policies to determine which event types need
    to be audited on a regular basis.
  Report requirements are unclear and affect the log detail level
    Solution: Define auditing processes to determine what type of logs
    and details are required (TIP: when in doubt, use graphs…)
Archiving Events

Event Archiving is done for two main reasons:
  Log retention compliance (e.g. SOX)
  Forensic investigation of a security incident (chain of evidence)
In general, all system events should be logged. However,
by default, not all audit policies are set to generate logs.
In particular, detailed tracking of high profile objects (such
as files, folders, printers, etc.) is turned off by default. A
common misconception is that regular object access
events provide this information.
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Event tracking can include the following events:
  #528 – Successful Login (The user authenticate to the system)
  #592 – A new process has been created (application is launched)
  #560 – Object Open (a file is requested)
  #567 – Object Access (the file is modified and saved)
  #564 – Object Deleted
  #562 – Handle Closed (the file has been closed)
  #593 – A Process Has Exited (the application was terminated)
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Enabling Audit Policies
   Object Access
   Logon (Local and
   Domain)
   Privilege Use
   Process Tracking
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

A Very Important Folder
(e.g. sensitive document on
a file server)
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

A Very Important Folder
(e.g. sensitive document on
a file server)
The folder contains files we
wish to monitor
(compliance, sensitive
information, etc.)
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced >
Auditing Tab
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced >
Auditing Tab > Add
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced >
Auditing Tab > Add
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced >
Auditing Tab > Add
Select the Account or
Group to be audited
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced >
Auditing Tab > Add
Select the Account or
Group to be audited
Select the events to
audit (Read, Write,
Delete…)
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Detailed Tracking is
configured on the
resource itself
Security > Advanced >
Auditing Tab > Add
Select the Account or
Group to be audited
Select the events to
audit (Read, Write,
Delete…)
Each user/group will
require additional
settings
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40
Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40
Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39




Filter who was logged
  in during that time
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39
User Logon ID: 0x43F744D
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916

File Open Handle: 644
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916

File Open Handle: 644
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916

File Open Handle: 644

File (644) Modified at 05:27:39
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916

File Open Handle: 644

File (644) Modified at 05:27:39

File (644) closed
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916

File Open Handle: 644

File (644) Modified at 05:27:39

File (644) closed

Excel Process (2916) Terminated
Example: Detailed Event Tracking

Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40

Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39

User Logon ID: 0x43F744D

Excel Process ID: 2916

File Open Handle: 644

File (644) Modified at 05:27:39

File (644) closed

Excel Process (2916) Terminated

Matching Modification Times
Archiving Events (cont.)

Possible issues
  Volume of events
  (can reach several million events a day from a busy server)
    Solution: Transfer logs to long-term storage (compressed, digitally
    signed, etc.)
  Lack of security policies to help and identify events and
  processes to be audited (e.g. Messenger)
    Solution: Define security policies to determine which processes and
    their relevant events need to be logged on a regular basis.
  The event logs are just a portion of the “chain of evidence”
    Solution: Define auditing processes to ensure that all the required logs
    are being gathered and associated (e.g. a unique ID or a time stamp).
    For example: associate firewall logs through the Windows event logs
    and to the database logs.
Know Your Event Log Limits

Size matters (and its never enough…)
  Solution: For long term logging, use an external storage system.
Know Your Event Log Limits (cont.)

Log Analysis and correlation (especially when using
automatic systems like SEM and SIM) often result in a
large number of false positives.
  Solution: Knowledge of the network and assets to refine alerts, ongoing
  tuning
Logs are a “detective” measure and are not an IPS
(Intrusion prevention system) on their own
  Solution: Vista has a partial solution. For complicated responses,
  leverage external solution to gather and analyze logs
Not all events are logged on the domain controller. These
events require a log gathering process
  Solution: Vista has presented a solution. Otherwise, use external log
  gathering system.
Know Your Event Log Limits (cont.)

Security event logs monitor only the authentication and
authorization mechanisms of the operating system.
  Solution: Most applications write (or should…) logs to the Windows event
  log. These logs can be used to enhance the monitoring capabilities.
Custom application logs neglect to provide information
regarding the log details or the severity or of the event.
  Solution: Educate your developers, develop an API, buy something
  better…
Vista Event Log




 More           More
 Event        Categories
Sources
Vista Event Log


Redesigned
Vista Event Log


Redesigned

XML Based
Vista Event Log


Redesigned

XML Based

Simple to
Understand
Vista Event Log


Redesigned

XML Based

Simple to
Understand.
Vista Event Log


Redesigned

XML Based

Simple to
Understand..??
Vista Event Log


Redesigned

XML Based

Simple to
Understand….
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action

    e-mail settings
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action

    Launch a process
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action

Finalize Settings
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action

Finalize Settings

A New Task is Born…
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action

Finalize Settings

Task Created

Task is Visible in the
Task Scheduler
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Select an Event to
open the Wizard

The type of Event is
pre-selected (basic)

Select Action

Finalize Settings

Task Created

Task is Visible in the
Task Scheduler (new
Tasks Category)
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Problem: Basic Task
Event Details are pre-
defined.
Event Log Tasks (Vista)


Problem: Basic Task
Event Details are pre-
defined.
   The next example will:

   • Trigger on successful logon events of a specific group

   • Create a file with a list of users that logged on

   • Highlight username with “Admin” string
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Triggers Tab > New
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Trigger Task On an Event
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Trigger Task On an Event

Switch from Basic to Custom
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Trigger Task On an Event

Switch from Basic to Custom
and Create New Filter…
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Trigger Task On an Event

Switch from Basic to Custom
and Create New Filter…

Select Event Logs
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Trigger Task On an Event

Switch from Basic to Custom
and Create New Filter…

Select Event Logs (Multiple
Logs!)
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task

Select the User Group

Trigger Task On an Event

Switch from Basic to Custom
and Create New Filter…

Select Event Logs (Multiple
Logs!)

Select Events ID (Possible
Multiple IDs) and Keywords
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task
Select the User Group
Trigger Task On an Event
Switch from Basic to Custom
and Create New Filter…
Select Event Logs (Multiple
Logs!)
Select Events ID (Possible
Multiple IDs)
The trigger is saved as
XMLQuery (Can be modified)
Event Log Tasks (Vista)

Create a New Task
Select the User Group
Trigger Task On an Event
Switch from Basic to Custom
and Create New Filter…
Select Event Logs (Multiple
Logs!)
Select Events ID (Possible
Multiple IDs)
The trigger is saved as
XMLQuery (Can be modified)
The Task Action will be
“Select a Program”…
Event Log Tasks (Vista)




This VB script search for “Admin” string in the
logged user name and add a notes beside it.
Event Log Tasks (Vista)




The output of three different users logging to the machine…
Event Log @ Vista

New Event Viewer (interface)
Over 50 new Event categories
Over 2400 policies (over 1000 in W2K3)
XML based
Events are still written locally
Critical Events can be forwarded
Expanded to serve as single location for all
events (using Windows Remote Manager)
Events can launch system tasks
Resources

TechNet – Auditing Overview
(http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver/en/library/768463f6-02b9-4e5e-af55-
29c089ade6381033.mspx?mfr=true)


EventID.net (http://www.eventid.net/search.asp)

Randy Franklin Smith’s Windows Security Log Encyclopedia
(http://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/encyclopedia.html)
Company:
   Private Canadian company Toronto based
   Providing Security consulting and networking solutions for over 10 years
   Business model focused on delivering timely security information to all areas of an organization
   (CEO down to administrator)
   Dynamic, agile response to client needs
   Experience with customers in multiple verticals
   Experienced management team
Consistent Approach:
   Provide “snapshot” security information for senior executives
   Provide detailed “security to-do” lists for follow-up by onsite personnel
Proven & Scalable Solutions:
   Phased Delivery method ensures client satisfaction
   Successful deployments with large organizations
   Clients need fewer in-house qualified security professionals
   Minimize manual, mundane daily client tasks
   Leverages both Proprietary and Industry Best-of-Breed Technologies
Extensible Framework:
   Adheres to ISO 17799 Framework, Security & Industry Best Practices
   The Sentry Dashboard is an enabler for any security subsystem
   Can be adapted to present information from non-security sources (network availability and trending,
   HR reporting, etc.)
   Engages all areas of an organization, from Senior Executives and security officers, to hands-on
   systems and network administrators
Questions…?

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Understanding the Event Log

  • 1. Understanding the Event Log for a more secured environment Dave Millier Chuck Ben-Tzur
  • 2. Overview Introducing… the Event Log Why Monitor Logs Enabling Event Logging Real Time Monitoring Example: Security Log Tampering Auditing and Analysis Archiving Events Example: File Modification Investigation Event Log Limitation Vista Event Log Example: Creating Log File Using Event Triggered Tasks Resources and Questions
  • 3. Introducing…Event Log Centralized log service to allow applications and the operating system to report events that have taken place. Introduced with Windows NT 4 (1993). Main Windows Logs Application (example: Database message) System (example: driver failure) Security (example: Logon attempt, file access) A Windows 2003 domain controller will also include Directory Service (example: Active Directory connection problem) File Replication (example: domain controller information updates) DNS Vista has introduced a lot of changes
  • 4. Why Should We Monitor Logs We don’t NEED to… We HAVE to… Organizations are obligated by regulations to gather and audit systems activity logs. HIPPA (Health Industry) Regulatory review of system activity to ensure that a user information remains private but accessible Identify, respond and document security incidents GLBA (Financial) Dual control procedures Segregation of duties SOX (Financial) Record Retention and availability Accountability
  • 5. Why Should We Monitor Logs (cont.) To comply with the regulations organizations require the following forms of log monitoring Real-time monitoring Identify attack attempts in progress and if a security breach has occurred. Audit and analysis Periodic reports and analysis for regulation compliance (due diligence). Archiving Again… regulations compliance (log retention) Forensic investigation of an incident The event log should also enable the organization to implement internal security policies.
  • 6. Enabling Event Logging Each event category is controlled by audit policies: Account logon events (for domain accounts) Account management (group and account events) Directory service access Logon events (local machine events) Object access (user accessing an object such as file, folder, printer) Policy change (changes in the audit, user rights and trust policies) Privilege use (user exercising one or more of his rights) Process tracking (detailed tracking information) System events (events that affect the system security or log) Each policy can be set to audit success events only, failure events only, success/failure events, or no auditing at all.
  • 8. Real-Time Monitoring Successful events that grant the user high level privileges (either by spoofing identity or elevation of privileges) Events to monitor Successful high profile user account / group management events #636– Group member added or removed Successful logon events of high profile user accounts #680 – Logon attempt Successful logon events to a domain controller Operations on specific high profile resources (files, folder) #560 (Object Access), #564 (Object Deleted) Successful policy change events #612 – Audit Policy Change (logs no more…) All system events #517 – security log was cleared
  • 9. Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log) Security Log
  • 10. Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log) Security Log A User will try to erase the logs
  • 11. Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log) Security Log A User will try to erase the logs (and not event save it)
  • 12. Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log) Security Log A User will try to erase the logs A New Event is Created
  • 13. Example: Event #517 (Clear Security Log) Security Log A User will try to erase the logs A New Event is Created The Event Contains the User Name
  • 14. Real-Time Monitoring (cont.) Tracking and analysing event failure patterns may indicate a range of malicious attack attempts Failed logon activity (e.g. brute force attack) #675 – Pre Auth, failed with Kerberos code 24 (Bad password) #539 - logon failure due to account lockout (if systematic may be an indication of DoS) Failed account management activity (e.g. password reset events) All failed system events #517 – Audit log cleared Note: Most of the auditing policies, by default, are set to log successful events only. Local policies may be set to no auditing at all.
  • 15. Real-Time Monitoring (cont.) Possible issues Flood of events (domain controller and member server event duplication, detailed tracking events) Solution: Consolidate log information for better analysis Unmonitored systems (e.g. unaudited events on a file server) Solution: Threat modeling, identifying assets in organization Unmonitored events (detailed user and process activity) Solution: Organization security program and policies False positives due to configuration problems (e.g. expired service password) Solution: Knowledge of the network, components and assets (Human Factor)
  • 16. Auditing and Analysis Most regulations require a periodic review of important events (not critical or show stoppers) for two reasons: A “second chance” to reveal malicious activity originally undetected (and unaccountable for). Audit the ongoing activity to verify no major changes have taken place. The data is usually reviewed in the form of reports (detailed and summarized) Example of Events to Monitor (A short list) #529 to #535 and #539 – Logon failure (different reasons) #629 – User account Disabled #644 – User account Locked Out
  • 17. Auditing and Analysis (cont.) Possible issues Finding a critical event that was not detected by the real-time monitoring processes Solution: Investigate the incident to eliminate or mitigate any results of malicious activity. Duplicated events (Domain controller and Local Server) Solution: Correlate and consolidate events using external system Lack of security policies to help and identify events to be audited (e.g. Messenger) Solution: Define security policies to determine which event types need to be audited on a regular basis. Report requirements are unclear and affect the log detail level Solution: Define auditing processes to determine what type of logs and details are required (TIP: when in doubt, use graphs…)
  • 18. Archiving Events Event Archiving is done for two main reasons: Log retention compliance (e.g. SOX) Forensic investigation of a security incident (chain of evidence) In general, all system events should be logged. However, by default, not all audit policies are set to generate logs. In particular, detailed tracking of high profile objects (such as files, folders, printers, etc.) is turned off by default. A common misconception is that regular object access events provide this information.
  • 19. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Event tracking can include the following events: #528 – Successful Login (The user authenticate to the system) #592 – A new process has been created (application is launched) #560 – Object Open (a file is requested) #567 – Object Access (the file is modified and saved) #564 – Object Deleted #562 – Handle Closed (the file has been closed) #593 – A Process Has Exited (the application was terminated)
  • 20. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Enabling Audit Policies Object Access Logon (Local and Domain) Privilege Use Process Tracking
  • 21. Example: Detailed Event Tracking A Very Important Folder (e.g. sensitive document on a file server)
  • 22. Example: Detailed Event Tracking A Very Important Folder (e.g. sensitive document on a file server) The folder contains files we wish to monitor (compliance, sensitive information, etc.)
  • 23. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself
  • 24. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced
  • 25. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced > Auditing Tab
  • 26. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced > Auditing Tab > Add
  • 27. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced > Auditing Tab > Add
  • 28. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced > Auditing Tab > Add Select the Account or Group to be audited
  • 29. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced > Auditing Tab > Add Select the Account or Group to be audited Select the events to audit (Read, Write, Delete…)
  • 30. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Detailed Tracking is configured on the resource itself Security > Advanced > Auditing Tab > Add Select the Account or Group to be audited Select the events to audit (Read, Write, Delete…) Each user/group will require additional settings
  • 31. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40
  • 32. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39
  • 33. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 Filter who was logged in during that time
  • 34. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D
  • 35. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916
  • 36. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916 File Open Handle: 644
  • 37. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916 File Open Handle: 644
  • 38. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916 File Open Handle: 644 File (644) Modified at 05:27:39
  • 39. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916 File Open Handle: 644 File (644) Modified at 05:27:39 File (644) closed
  • 40. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916 File Open Handle: 644 File (644) Modified at 05:27:39 File (644) closed Excel Process (2916) Terminated
  • 41. Example: Detailed Event Tracking Timestamp: 13-06-07 04:27:40 Last Modify: 13-06-07 05:27:39 User Logon ID: 0x43F744D Excel Process ID: 2916 File Open Handle: 644 File (644) Modified at 05:27:39 File (644) closed Excel Process (2916) Terminated Matching Modification Times
  • 42. Archiving Events (cont.) Possible issues Volume of events (can reach several million events a day from a busy server) Solution: Transfer logs to long-term storage (compressed, digitally signed, etc.) Lack of security policies to help and identify events and processes to be audited (e.g. Messenger) Solution: Define security policies to determine which processes and their relevant events need to be logged on a regular basis. The event logs are just a portion of the “chain of evidence” Solution: Define auditing processes to ensure that all the required logs are being gathered and associated (e.g. a unique ID or a time stamp). For example: associate firewall logs through the Windows event logs and to the database logs.
  • 43. Know Your Event Log Limits Size matters (and its never enough…) Solution: For long term logging, use an external storage system.
  • 44. Know Your Event Log Limits (cont.) Log Analysis and correlation (especially when using automatic systems like SEM and SIM) often result in a large number of false positives. Solution: Knowledge of the network and assets to refine alerts, ongoing tuning Logs are a “detective” measure and are not an IPS (Intrusion prevention system) on their own Solution: Vista has a partial solution. For complicated responses, leverage external solution to gather and analyze logs Not all events are logged on the domain controller. These events require a log gathering process Solution: Vista has presented a solution. Otherwise, use external log gathering system.
  • 45. Know Your Event Log Limits (cont.) Security event logs monitor only the authentication and authorization mechanisms of the operating system. Solution: Most applications write (or should…) logs to the Windows event log. These logs can be used to enhance the monitoring capabilities. Custom application logs neglect to provide information regarding the log details or the severity or of the event. Solution: Educate your developers, develop an API, buy something better…
  • 46. Vista Event Log More More Event Categories Sources
  • 49. Vista Event Log Redesigned XML Based Simple to Understand
  • 50. Vista Event Log Redesigned XML Based Simple to Understand.
  • 51. Vista Event Log Redesigned XML Based Simple to Understand..??
  • 52. Vista Event Log Redesigned XML Based Simple to Understand….
  • 53. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event
  • 54. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard
  • 55. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic)
  • 56. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action
  • 57. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action e-mail settings
  • 58. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action
  • 59. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action Launch a process
  • 60. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action Finalize Settings
  • 61. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action Finalize Settings A New Task is Born…
  • 62. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action Finalize Settings Task Created Task is Visible in the Task Scheduler
  • 63. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Select an Event to open the Wizard The type of Event is pre-selected (basic) Select Action Finalize Settings Task Created Task is Visible in the Task Scheduler (new Tasks Category)
  • 64. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Problem: Basic Task Event Details are pre- defined.
  • 65. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Problem: Basic Task Event Details are pre- defined. The next example will: • Trigger on successful logon events of a specific group • Create a file with a list of users that logged on • Highlight username with “Admin” string
  • 66. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task
  • 67. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group
  • 68. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Triggers Tab > New
  • 69. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event
  • 70. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom
  • 71. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom and Create New Filter…
  • 72. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom and Create New Filter… Select Event Logs
  • 73. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom and Create New Filter… Select Event Logs (Multiple Logs!)
  • 74. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom and Create New Filter… Select Event Logs (Multiple Logs!) Select Events ID (Possible Multiple IDs) and Keywords
  • 75. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom and Create New Filter… Select Event Logs (Multiple Logs!) Select Events ID (Possible Multiple IDs) The trigger is saved as XMLQuery (Can be modified)
  • 76. Event Log Tasks (Vista) Create a New Task Select the User Group Trigger Task On an Event Switch from Basic to Custom and Create New Filter… Select Event Logs (Multiple Logs!) Select Events ID (Possible Multiple IDs) The trigger is saved as XMLQuery (Can be modified) The Task Action will be “Select a Program”…
  • 77. Event Log Tasks (Vista) This VB script search for “Admin” string in the logged user name and add a notes beside it.
  • 78. Event Log Tasks (Vista) The output of three different users logging to the machine…
  • 79. Event Log @ Vista New Event Viewer (interface) Over 50 new Event categories Over 2400 policies (over 1000 in W2K3) XML based Events are still written locally Critical Events can be forwarded Expanded to serve as single location for all events (using Windows Remote Manager) Events can launch system tasks
  • 80. Resources TechNet – Auditing Overview (http://technet2.microsoft.com/windowsserver/en/library/768463f6-02b9-4e5e-af55- 29c089ade6381033.mspx?mfr=true) EventID.net (http://www.eventid.net/search.asp) Randy Franklin Smith’s Windows Security Log Encyclopedia (http://www.ultimatewindowssecurity.com/encyclopedia.html)
  • 81. Company: Private Canadian company Toronto based Providing Security consulting and networking solutions for over 10 years Business model focused on delivering timely security information to all areas of an organization (CEO down to administrator) Dynamic, agile response to client needs Experience with customers in multiple verticals Experienced management team Consistent Approach: Provide “snapshot” security information for senior executives Provide detailed “security to-do” lists for follow-up by onsite personnel Proven & Scalable Solutions: Phased Delivery method ensures client satisfaction Successful deployments with large organizations Clients need fewer in-house qualified security professionals Minimize manual, mundane daily client tasks Leverages both Proprietary and Industry Best-of-Breed Technologies Extensible Framework: Adheres to ISO 17799 Framework, Security & Industry Best Practices The Sentry Dashboard is an enabler for any security subsystem Can be adapted to present information from non-security sources (network availability and trending, HR reporting, etc.) Engages all areas of an organization, from Senior Executives and security officers, to hands-on systems and network administrators