1. BPAM214
Topic 4:
Case Study [I] -- China

2. Outline
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong2
1. Historical background leading to its authoritarian
ruling
2. Basic organization: interlocking relations
between party and state
3. Can and will China be democratized under the
persistence of the authoritarian rule?

3. Political framework of a/an (semi-)
authoritarian regime
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong3
Economic liberalization???

4. History [1]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong4
History/civilization shape politics
China: most populous nation with long civilization of
over 5,000 years
Legacies of imperial China:
1.Tradition of unified rule under strong ruler
First emperor of Qin dynasty unified China in 221 B.C. (built
Great Wall, implying a self-defensive mentality)
Emperor Qinshi believed in a unified China under strong
central rule: Opposed federalism, decentralization, and
separatism

5. History [2]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong5
2. Developed bureaucratic structure to maintain power
centralization
• 1 official for every 11,000 in 1650
• 1 for every 20,000 in 1850
2. Bureaucracy staffed by officials trained in Confucianism
• Scholar-officials: emphasized virtuous rule, harmony, morality,
and rule by men (not by law)
2. Examination system tested candidates to master
Confucian classics through rote learning
• Created legacy of educated elites
2. Bureaucrats came from scholar-gentry class whose
members attained social status via scholarship/wealth

6. History [3]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong6
Peasant’s son moved up political/social ladder via exam, conferring
wealth/status upon family
Many scholar-gentry officials stayed in local areas, some as secretaries
Overall, the traditional China was a static and stable
society. Dynastic, rather than political/institutional,
changes took place repeatedly until 1912
Despite the communist revolution in 1949 and a series of
political campaigns thereafter, do you think the
traditional mentality and practices remains unchanged?
The mentality of the national unification, resisting power
decentralization/sharing
Bureaucracy , combining party and state
Confucianism  Socialism + Economic pragmatism
Scholar-officials/gentries were replaced by local party cadres

7. Party-State Insitutions
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong7
CCP as the source of political power
hierarchical, centralist
Determines social, economic and political goals for
society
4 main levels of organizations
1. central
2. Provincial
3. county or district
4. basic/primary (schools, factories, villages)

8. Structure of the CCP & PRC
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong8
PARTY
Central Committee ( 中央委員會 )
 Politburo Standing Committee ( 政治局常務委
員會 )
 Politburo ( 政治局 )
 *Central Military Commission ( 中央軍事委員
會 ) ↓
Provincial Party Committees
↓
District Organizations (Xian Party
Committees)
↓
City and Town Party Organizations
↓
Party sections in villages factory,
neighborhood cells, workplace
↓
Individual Party members
STATE
President
↓
State Council
↓
National’s People Congress
↓
Local’s People Congresses

9. BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong9

10. Party [1]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong10
• CCP as the core
– When it came to power in 1949, it faced the
breakdown of political authority in China, foreign
humiliation of the country, and failure of the old
political order
– succeeded in establishing and upholding the
international status, enhancing its legitimacy in the
eyes of the Chinese
– also inherited nationalism: use it to develop China
economically, as with Great Leap Forward ( 大躍進 )

11. Party [2]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong11
CCP originally clandestine [secretive], hierarchical
1982 constitution abolished chairman position to
prevent another person dominating like Mao
Reform era: top party post has been general secretary,
but real powers in the hands of Deng and other elders
Hu Yaobang as general secretary from 1980 to 87, but
ousted and replaced by Zhao Ziyang
Zhao also ousted after 1989 Tiananmen

12. Party [3]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong12
• Supreme leader generally serves on the Politburo
Standing Committee (PSC):
– Composed of about seven to nine people who belong to
inner circle of political power
– Late 1970s to 1987: Deng served on PSC but generally did
not rule through it
– Deng insisted on being the third ranking member after Hu
and Zhao
– Much authorities were shifted to the CCP Secretariat from
late 1970s to 1987
– Since 1987, power shifted back to PSC
– This has been true in the Jiang era (as general secretary)
and the current Hu Jintao era

13. Party [4]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong13
Each member of Politburo has functional
responsibilities
Highest ranking PSC member usually deals with
overall party affairs and military
Second or third ranking deals with premier of State
Council (like Prime Minister in the West) and
economic affairs
Another leader deals with legal/security issues
Others take charge of propaganda and organization

14. Party [5]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong14
This division of labor reflects six major systems in
Chinese politics (systems: xitong)
1. Party affairs
2. Organization/Personnel
3. Propaganda/Education
4. Political/Legal Affairs
5. Finance/Economics;
6. Military

15. Party [6]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong15
• Politburo has 25 members currently, selected by
the Central Committee with about 200 members
– Central Committee (CC) elected by Party Congress
held every 5 years
– Since 1987, more candidates for CC than the seats in
CC
– Inner-party democracy: debates are permitted, but
consensus should be made after decision-making

16. Party [7]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong16
Central Committee:
has supreme power to govern party affairs and
enact party policies as Party Congress not in
session
As a collective body, it seldom initiates Party policy, but
it approves policies, programs and membership
changes of leading central organs
Usually hold annual plenary sessions
Plenums are forums for discussion and ratification
of policies and programs
Steady increase in CC size
1956: 97 members
2007: 204 members.

17. Party [8]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong17
CC memberships as reward to loyal supporters
of Party and government
Representation of workers/peasants increased
Now CC members younger, more educated technocrats
Members from military, technocrats, provincial gov’t elites,
and people from mass organizations like intellectuals and
workers
Democratic centralism
Party decisions discussed at lower level first before
decision. Once decision made, all party members carry it
out
Reality, more centralism than democracy
Under CC, the Secretariat that drafts document is crucial
(as in the Soviet case)

18. Party [9]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong18
Central Military Commission (CMC)
CMC: controls military and accountable to the
Politburo
Mao head of the CMC, later Deng, recently Jiang and
now Hu
Jiang as first civilian leading the CMC

19. Party [10]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong19
Local party organizations
Each of China’s 30 provinces is headed by a party
committee with a standing committee and a party
secretary
Below provinces, party organizations exist at each
county, township and village
Recent years, some local party organizations are
loose

20. Party [11]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong20
Party organizational techniques affect the life of
every Chinese
Under the danwei (unit) system, all citizens are attached
to specific bureaucratic, industrial or agricultural
organizations
Organizations affect individual life greatly, offering
medical care and other welfare
Employment was for life
Difficult to move from one place to another
In recent years, the danwei system has begun to loosen
as economy diversifies and labor mobile
In rural areas, peasants allowed to travel and migrate in
recent years, unlike the past when they were tied to the
land

21. Party [12]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong21
The danwei system enforced by household
registration system (hukuo) and dossier system
Citizen assigned a household registration assigning
him or her to a specific location
Dossier maintained on each citizen, like family
background, education history, one’s political
thought and activities
Combination of danwei, hukuo and dossiers let the
state control population
Recently the systems have been weakened (dossiers
less threatening), but at high levels of party/gov’t,
dossiers allow Organization Dept to control
promotion of cadres/officials

22. State [1]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong22
The state apparatus has two parts: administrative and
legislative
Administratively, the State Council and its ministries
(departments) run daily affairs
Led by Premier, vice-premiers, heads of national ministries
and commissions
Premier usually second or third ranking person in Politburo,
showing that party control of the state
Administers gov’t through functional ministries and
commissions
Stable composition: technocrats and administrators
Many departments under State Council, like national defense,
foreign affairs, trade, family planning, national audit, IT, water
resources, public security and national affairs, etc

23. [Party-]State [2]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong23
Party Control of the State
is done through the nomenclatura system
achieved through party cells or groups (dangzu)
existing at different levels of state bureaucracy
Minister usually the party secretary of the
ministry’s party group or cell
Party group sets policy for the ministry

24. State [3]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong24
At the legislative level, the National People’s Congress
(NPC) is crucial
NPC members elected every five years through a multi-
tiered representative electoral system.
Delegates are elected by the provincial people's
congresses, who in turn are elected by lower level
congresses, and so on through a series of tiers to the local
people's congresses which are directly elected by the
electorate.

25. State [4]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong25
Highest gov’t organ and similar duties as parliaments
Upon PRC President’s recommendation, NPC designates
and may remove premier and other members of the State
Council, and can elect President of Supreme People’s
Court and the Chief Procurator
Delegates from mass organizations, the CCP and non-CCP
members

26. State [5]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong26
• Receives (amends) gov’t report, consider
legislation, supervise gov’t
– Delegates divided into groups, submit motions, ask
questions, raise suggestions on a variety of topics
– Criticisms and praise on the quality of legislators in
recent years
– Some heated debate on bankruptcy law
– When NPC not in session, its Standing Committee is
the executive body
– SC can declare martial law

27. Problems in Party-State Institutions
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong27
1. Interlocking relations between Gov’t and Party
 Needs reforms
 Hua Guofeng as chair of CCP, premier of central gov’t and
chair of MAC in 1977-78
 Major economic ministries in hands of ministers who
were members of either Politburo or CC
2. Overstaffing problem in gov’t needs streamlining
work
3. Political reforms are lacking: needs to consolidate
legal system, democratize NPC, separate power
between gov’t and Party
 Not easy to implement all these reforms (Zhao
envisioned reforms but he was disposed)

28. China’s Democracy: Social Tensions in the
Mainland and Political Change in Greater China
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong28
Introduction
The quest for democracy—citizens are masters
determining their own affairs—has become a major theme
in the political development of modern China
Chinese political culture, some argue, has an element of
democracy
Mencius (a Confucian thinker): “The people are the masters,
the country is of secondary importance, and the monarch is of
least importance.”
Historical review
The 1919 May Fourth Movement: students were triggered by
nationalism to demand for better, stronger, more open and
democratic government (Mr. Democracy & Mr. Science)
The 1989 Tiananmen Incident (“Massacre”): People’s
Liberation Army mobilized to crush/suppress student
demonstrators

29. Factors [1]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong29
Factors shaping China’s democratic development
1.Historically, China remained a traditional
dynasty in which political power is concentrated
at the top. Dynastic cycle in Chinese history has
not changed this feature, including the current
Communist regime
•Long history/recent global emergence may
reinforce Chinese civilization:
– China has 3,000 years of recorded history. Not only
do the people feel proud of their civilization, but
the leaders are naturally resistant to Western
values

30. Factors [2]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong30
The 19th
century: China learned Western technology
to strengthen itself, but not Western values (retaining
the traditional values)
Chinese historically are afraid of luan (chaos): The
successive political chaos from 1900 to 1976
Recent entry into the WTO and the successful bid in
holding the 2008 Olympics means PRC leaders are
keen to restore China’s “greatness”, and reinforces
Chinese values

31. Factors [3]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong31
2. Ethnically, China has a heterogeneous
population although Hans are the majority.
There are 56 nationality groups, implying that
democracy, if mismanaged, may lead to
separatism and ethnic nationalism
3. From central-local or central-provincial
perspective, democracy may have the danger
of exacerbating provincialism, a historical
problem in Chinese history that was once
punctuated by warlordism and provincial
struggle against central government
(Revolutionary movements led by Sun Yat-sen
was begun in Guangdong)

32. Factors [4]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong32
4. From economic perspective, China’s political
leaders often emphasize economic liberalization
rather than political democratization. They are
Marxist-Leninists who believe in the leadership of
the Communist Party, and in Marx’s assumption
that economic change is the “base” affecting
superstructure like politics/culture/society

33. Factors [5]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong33
5. The nature of one-party state in China: it
means hegemony of CCP has to be maintained.
Any social/political force independent of the
state has to be suppressed, like Falun Gong
(religious sect)
Although social groups have emerged since reform
era, like business groups, they are not really
challenging the power of the state
Workers are coopted into official trade unions

34. Factors [6]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong34
6. Ideologically: democracy has been viewed as
dangerous, separatist and un-Chinese concept
toppling the regime in power. Tiananmen
incident as well as Falun Gong were cases.
“socialist democracy” is different from capitalist
democracy.
China is resistant to Western democracy because
ideologically it is associated with capitalism, not
socialism
Socialism remains the official ideology

35. Factors [7]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong35
7. Culturally, Chinese (Sinic) civilization
different from Western civilization
Chinese civilization: harmony, hierarchy, political
authoritarianism, group interests and obedience to
authority (Huntington)
Western civilization: conflicts, equality, political
pluralism, individualism and autonomy
Although more Chinese may exhibit “Western” values,
the Chinese civilization remains slow in its process of
transformation

36. Tensions [1]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong36
Social Tensions in Mainland China and the CCP
Response
•A survey conducted by Institute of Macro-Economic
Studies of State Planning Committee and the Chinese
Academy of Social Science in 2001 found urban
residents identified 5 sources of social instability
(1) Rising unemployment/lay-offs,
(2) bureaucratic corruption,
(3) widening gap between rich and poor,
(4) declining social morality,
(5) deteriorating law and order
•Social tensions can be seen in gap between rich & poor,
and conflicts between villagers/workers/the powerless
& cadres/the police/the powerful

37. Citizens Assessment of Stability
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong37

Urban Residents Rural Residents
Rank % Rank %
 Rising unemployment/lay-offs 1 79.1 5 45.4
 Bureaucratic corruption 2 75.1 2 62.9
 Widening rich-poor gap 3 64.5 3 61.1
 Declining social morality 4 61.5 4 50.2
 Deteriorating law/order 5 47.0 7 38.7
 Widespread fake products 6 41.4 6 39.1
 Pollution of environment 7 40.4 8 38.4
 Heavy burden of peasants 8 21.3 1 65.0
 Tension between cadres/masses 9 17.3 9 17.2
 Tension amongst ethnic groups 10 7.9 10 3.5
 Sample size (N) 1,425 574

38. Tensions [2]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong38
Middle-class citizens become more independent
of the government; some are vocal/critical
As economy grows, more middle-class members
emerge and CCP may find it difficult to co-opt all of
them into political institutions
Some form anti-Japanese groups, protest
groups, AIDS concern groups, but most of them
are quickly suppressed

39. Tensions [3]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong39
China also has large number of floating
population, who are migrant workers in
provinces.
They are a source of crime: Robbery, kidnapping,
theft, secret societies???
Urban unemployment can become a source of
instability as many state-owned enterprises lay off
workers
Ethnic minorities’ relations with the Hans are
political: Tibet and Xinjiang are sensitive
regions, more Hans populated there than before

40. Tensions [4]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong40
• China’s social interactions with the outside world,
esp. HK/Taiwan have complicated internal social
relations
– Mainland workers confront HK/Taiwan factory owners;
mainland Chinese in Guangdong more participative in
protests and strikes (influenced by HK media)
– Some mainlanders are also influenced by criminal
elements in HK/Taiwan/Macau
– Number of protests, according to Ministry of Public
Security, increased from 8.700 incidents in 1993 to 11,000
in 1995, and to 32,000 in 1999
– Social tensions have increased over time, but they do not
necessarily promote democracy although the state does
respond (after Tiananmen, anti-corruption work has been
enhanced but achieved so limitedly)

41. Tensions [5]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong41
CCP response:
1. Co-opt capitalists into the Party;
2. channel middle-class participation into institutions
(like Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conferences and provincial congresses),
3. suppress middle-class organizations independent of the
state;
4. Co-opt workers/women into officially sanctioned
unions;
5. closely monitor ethnic minorities while localizing the
bureaucracy in Tibet, co-opting ethnic representatives
into NPC;
6. urge village cadres to continue using “mass line” to
listen to views of the masses;
7. introduce village elections to increase openness and
accountability of elected representatives to the public

42. Tensions [6]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong42
Village elections held in China in 1987 but the
election law was revised in 1998 so that there
could be free nomination of candidates, secret
ballot and transparent ballot counting
Elected cadres need support of villagers to stay
in office, and also check the power of the
village’s Party secretary
Village elections can be seen as a means of
democratizing the countryside, but in urban
cities, CCP maintains a hard-line policy toward
any political dissent

43. Tensions [7]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong43
Democratic change in Taiwan/Hong Kong
constitutes a threat to the national security and
one-party rule in China
Taiwan’s democratization
direct election of President since 1996
Universal suffrage of Legislative Yuan counselors, city
manors in Taipei and Kaohsiung, as well as heads in
cities, counties and townships

44. Tensions [8]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong44
Democratization in Taiwan is characterized by
(1) changes from one-party dominance to multi-party
competition,
(2) the rotation of party in power (KMT to DPP, and then
KMT again),
(3) the persistence of money politics (but this has been
under the severe criticism from the public under the Chan
Shui-bian’s administration)
(4) growth of strong Taiwan identity (not Chinese identity)
De-Chiangization (e.g., the removal of Chiang Kai-shek’s colossus,
the retitling of Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall as Liberty Square)
De-sinicization (e.g., Taiwan’s history is NOT a part of Chinese
history; China is regarded as a potential and an immediate threat
to Taiwan)

45. Tensions [9]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong45
• These features are politically unacceptable in the PRC
– Taiwan’s capitalist and liberal democracy is rejected by the
PRC’s one-party authoritarianism
• HKSAR’s gradual democratic reform in the colonial era
(now the Chief Executive is elected by a 800-member
Election Committee) and the protest by half a million
people in July 2003 against the government have
alarmed Beijing
– The large-scale protests in 2003 were shocking to PRC leaders
(Premier Wan Jiabao) who visited HK at that time
– Beijing is concerned about impact of HK democratic
development on provinces like Guangdong and Xinjiang, and on
regions like Tibet (the Dalai Lama exile government calls for the
adoption of HK model of “one country, two systems”)

46. Conclusion [1]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong46
1. Difficulties of China’s transition are perhaps
common in many developing states: influence
of history, culture, tradition; one-party
authoritarianism; presence of economic
reform without political democratization;
strong state vs. weak society; the
interventionist role of the military if necessary
(Tiananmen incident, suppression of Tibetan
protests)

47. Conclusion [2]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong47
2. Taiwan’s democratic consolidation and HK’s
democratic aspirations are huge challenges to
Beijing
– The PRC regime is now keen to contain the spread of
democracy from Taiwan/HK to the mainland, thus
determining to restrain democratic development in
HKSAR whereas criticizing Taiwan’s democratization
as the path to independence
– Beijing: does not want to see the Chief Executive
directly elected by all HK people in 2007 and the
direct elections of the entire Legislative Council in
2008

48. Conclusion [3]
BPAM214|T4|Dr. Wong48
3. Because of China’s long history, culture and
political tradition, perhaps it is difficult to
foresee a democratic breakthrough in the PRC
in the years to come
 Yet, it should be noted that the intentional
resistance of democratization, corresponding with
socio-political unrest (polarization, ethnical
conflicts, corruption and power abuse) under a
partial economic flourishing, may produce a
volatile effect that goes beyond the CCP’s
expectation and prevention.