SlideShare uma empresa Scribd logo
1 de 41
Baixar para ler offline
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Modern Web Security
Attacks & Improvements
4/2/2014 | Dayton Web Developers
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Who here is responsible

for a website?
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Who here has published code
updates live in the last month?
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Are they secure?
Bill Condo / @mavrck
What We’ll Cover
• Common Threats
• Easy Improvements
• Bonus: Passwords
Bill Condo / @mavrck
CommonThreats
• Cross Site Scripting
• SQL Injection
• Path Disclosure
• Cross Site Request Forgery
• Information Disclosure
Bill Condo / @mavrck
• Denial of Service
• Code Execution
• Memory Corruption
• Arbitrary File
• Local File Include
• Remote File Include
• Buffer overflow
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Cross-site scripting (XSS)
• In a nutshell, websites that allow external code to sent with a
response to a user’s browser.
• Typically this is javascript that is inserted into a query string or form
field that is allowed to run.
• Opens up cookie and sensitive data
Bill Condo / @mavrck
SQL Injection
• Allowing user input to directly be inserted into database queries,
opening the possibility of unexpected data, and database corruption
and data leakage.

• (original) statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id ='" + id + “';"
• (input) 0’; DROP TABLE users
• (final) statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =‘0'; DROP TABLE users;"
Bill Condo / @mavrck
http://xkcd.com/327/
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Path Disclosure
• Allowing an attacker to see the path to the web root. 

/home/site.com/public/index.php
• This could allow viewing of private files, and provides a nugget 

of knowledge that can be combined to allow full access.
• http://site.com/index.php?page=about
• http://site.com/index.php?page=../config
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
• Exploits a website’s unauthenticated functionality from an
authenticated user. This is commonly from features driven from url
parameters that doesn’t have sufficient verification in place.
• http://site.com/send-message.php?from=bill&to=brad&message=hi
• May also be exploited by malicious code injected into a page.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Information Disclosure
• Releasing secure information to an untrusted environment. This 

can be operating environment, customer data, or trade secrets.
• Path that the website runs at, database info, service versions, etc.
• Credit card data, private account info (address, phone), 

and customer history.
• Business logic, processes, and long-term business plans.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Easy Improvements
• Secure Your Environment
• Secure Your Website
• Establish Audits
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Secure your Environment
• Leave your cheap web host (BlueHost, GoDaddy, etc) and go to a Virtual
Private Server (VPS) such as Digital Ocean, Linode, Rackspace, AWS, etc.
You don’t want to share security concerns 

with the world.
• Turn of the displaying of errors and debugging info in production, and
redirect them to log files.
• Turn on automatic updates for security patches.
• Turn off broadcasting of service versions and extensions.
• Turn off modules that aren’t required.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Sorry, We’re Not Sharing Security…
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Thanks for letting me know…
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Secure Your Website
• Sanitize user input. Always.
• Escape and sanitize database queries. Better yet, use an established
package for prepared statements.
• Store sensitive data outside of the webroot with proper permissions.
• SSL where possible.
• Sandbox user uploads and treat with suspicion.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Establish Audits
• Black Box: Security/Vulnerability Scanners, Penetration Tests
• White Box: Source Code Analyzers, Code Tests
• Password Testing
Bill Condo / @mavrck
More Security Info
• http://www.webappsec.org
• http://www.owasp.org
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Stretch.
Last minute bucket. We’re in overtime.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Bonus: Password Security
• Terminology
• Landscape/Problems
• Best Practices
• Getting Policy Buy-in
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Password Terminology
• Encrypting - The process of encoding messages or information in
such a way that only authorized parties can read it*. Encryption
typically involves a private key and can be performed two way.
• Hashing - Password hashing is a one way conversion of an input into
a representative string. (i.e. nothing = 4fhk348fhsk48rfk4d3)
• Salting - A unique string of characters (hopefully per user) that helps
keep the password hashes different for users that have the same
password.
*http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption
Bill Condo / @mavrck
• Entropy (Strength) - A measure of the uncertainty associated with a
random variable. (i.e. Password Strength)
• Rainbow Tables - Pre-calculated lookup values that match a string
with a value for a known encrypted algorithm.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
http://xkcd.com/936/
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Problems
Bill Condo / @mavrck
State of Passwords
• Most people share between sites
• Most people don’t use secure passwords
• Secure passwords, with high entropy are impossible to remember
• Most people don’t use a password manager
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Lack of Transparency
• Web Apps & Sites don’t disclosure their password policies,
encryption strength, and their isn’t a standard body to police who’s
following best practices and who’s being risky.
• Users often don’t find out what data was compromised from an
attack, and frequently don’t find out about an breach at all until it
reaches the news cycle.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Forgotten Trail
• With e-commerce, we often have to create an account, provide
payment details, and then may never shop there again. However, the
data persists.
• Users typically don’t keep a master list of sites they have an account
on, or have purchased from. Each account can act as a nugget of
knowledge, slowly building up to enough data for concern.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Best Practices
Worst Practices
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Don’t help the enemy
• Don’t: Policies that enforce things such as “first character must by
upper case” and “must end in a special character”. Allows masking.
• Don’t: To an extent, disclosing the minimum requirements for lower
case, upper case, numeric, and special characters.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Garbage in, garbage out
• Don’t: Having no password policy at all.
• Don’t: Allowing common passwords like ‘password’, ‘123456’.
• Don’t: Allowing common dictionary words.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Getting Policy Buy-in
Bill Condo / @mavrck
#1 Prevent PR Issues
Bill Condo / @mavrck
#2 Cost vs Risk
• Doing security correctly is less expensive upfront. The opportunity
cost is minimal compared the reduction in risk. 

Cost * Risk = Likelihood Cost
• What does it cost to cleanup the mess: reset the passwords, scan
the servers, added support calls/requests, etc…
Bill Condo / @mavrck
#3 Predictability
• Help project/business managers in being able to minimize
unexpected security response events.
• Better understand how your week is going to go.
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Bill Condo / @mavrck
My Ask of You
• If you found this information useful, I ask two things of you:
• Follow me Twitter for development tips: @mavrck
• Back the Salt Mines Device Lab fundraiser for $1+: 

http://igg.me/p/728005
• Also, we’re hiring at LMG. Grab a card if you’re currently 

not next to your boss (otherwise email bill@lmgresults.com).
Bill Condo / @mavrck
Roaring Applause Here.
Thanks for your time.

Mais conteúdo relacionado

Mais procurados

Basic web security model
Basic web security modelBasic web security model
Basic web security modelG Prachi
 
Entrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & Encryption
Entrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & EncryptionEntrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & Encryption
Entrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & EncryptionSachintha Gunasena
 
Eba ppt rajesh
Eba ppt rajeshEba ppt rajesh
Eba ppt rajeshRajeshP153
 
Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]
Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]
Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]Ayes Chinmay
 
Brief description on Web technology
Brief description on Web technology Brief description on Web technology
Brief description on Web technology Rupanshi rawat
 
introduction to web technology
introduction to web technologyintroduction to web technology
introduction to web technologyvikram singh
 
How does the Internet Work?
How does the Internet Work?How does the Internet Work?
How does the Internet Work?Dina Goldshtein
 
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004SOLOMONCHINAEMEUCHEA
 
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004SOLOMONCHINAEMEUCHEA
 
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004SOLOMONCHINAEMEUCHEA
 
Activity 11 Common Online Terminologies
Activity 11 Common Online TerminologiesActivity 11 Common Online Terminologies
Activity 11 Common Online TerminologiesSelina Abasolo
 
Internet website designing_company_in_delhi
Internet website designing_company_in_delhiInternet website designing_company_in_delhi
Internet website designing_company_in_delhiCss Founder
 
Lesson 2 Presentation
Lesson 2 PresentationLesson 2 Presentation
Lesson 2 PresentationKereen Tatham
 

Mais procurados (18)

Basic web security model
Basic web security modelBasic web security model
Basic web security model
 
Entrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & Encryption
Entrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & EncryptionEntrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & Encryption
Entrepreneurship & Commerce in IT - 11 - Security & Encryption
 
Eba ppt rajesh
Eba ppt rajeshEba ppt rajesh
Eba ppt rajesh
 
Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]
Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]
Internet and Web Technology (CLASS-1) [Introduction]
 
Brief description on Web technology
Brief description on Web technology Brief description on Web technology
Brief description on Web technology
 
introduction to web technology
introduction to web technologyintroduction to web technology
introduction to web technology
 
How does the Internet Work?
How does the Internet Work?How does the Internet Work?
How does the Internet Work?
 
Web technology unit I - Part A
Web technology unit I -  Part AWeb technology unit I -  Part A
Web technology unit I - Part A
 
Tietoturvallisuuden_kevatseminaari_2013_Jarno_Niemela
Tietoturvallisuuden_kevatseminaari_2013_Jarno_NiemelaTietoturvallisuuden_kevatseminaari_2013_Jarno_Niemela
Tietoturvallisuuden_kevatseminaari_2013_Jarno_Niemela
 
Intro to internet 1
Intro to internet 1Intro to internet 1
Intro to internet 1
 
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS2:004
 
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
 
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
HHCJ AMUMARA:COMPUTER STUDIES LECTURE NOTE FOR SS3:004
 
Activity 11 Common Online Terminologies
Activity 11 Common Online TerminologiesActivity 11 Common Online Terminologies
Activity 11 Common Online Terminologies
 
Web Designing
Web Designing Web Designing
Web Designing
 
Internet website designing_company_in_delhi
Internet website designing_company_in_delhiInternet website designing_company_in_delhi
Internet website designing_company_in_delhi
 
Fundamentals of Cryptography
Fundamentals of CryptographyFundamentals of Cryptography
Fundamentals of Cryptography
 
Lesson 2 Presentation
Lesson 2 PresentationLesson 2 Presentation
Lesson 2 Presentation
 

Semelhante a Modern Web Security

Protecting Customer Confidential Information
Protecting Customer Confidential InformationProtecting Customer Confidential Information
Protecting Customer Confidential InformationWilliam McBorrough
 
How to Destroy a Database
How to Destroy a DatabaseHow to Destroy a Database
How to Destroy a DatabaseJohn Ashmead
 
MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...
MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...
MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...MongoDB
 
MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...
MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...
MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...MongoDB
 
Devbeat Conference - Developer First Security
Devbeat Conference - Developer First SecurityDevbeat Conference - Developer First Security
Devbeat Conference - Developer First SecurityMichael Coates
 
Open source security
Open source securityOpen source security
Open source securitylrigknat
 
Cyber 101 for smb execs v1
Cyber 101 for smb execs v1Cyber 101 for smb execs v1
Cyber 101 for smb execs v1NetWatcher
 
Implementing security for your library | PLAN Tech Day Conference
Implementing security for  your library | PLAN Tech Day ConferenceImplementing security for  your library | PLAN Tech Day Conference
Implementing security for your library | PLAN Tech Day ConferenceBrian Pichman
 
Making Software Secure by Design
Making Software Secure by DesignMaking Software Secure by Design
Making Software Secure by DesignOmegapoint Academy
 
SANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for Defense
SANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for DefenseSANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for Defense
SANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for DefenseJohn Bambenek
 
DEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malware
DEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malwareDEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malware
DEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malwareFelipe Prado
 
It security the condensed version
It security  the condensed version It security  the condensed version
It security the condensed version Brian Pichman
 
Practical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public BlockchainsPractical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public BlockchainsJohannes Ahlmann
 
Practical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public BlockchainsPractical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public BlockchainsJohannes Ahlmann
 
Cyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spy
Cyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spyCyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spy
Cyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spyb coatesworth
 
Solvay secure application layer v2015 seba
Solvay secure application layer v2015   sebaSolvay secure application layer v2015   seba
Solvay secure application layer v2015 sebaSebastien Deleersnyder
 
Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity
Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity
Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity Bill Gibbs
 
WEB APPLICATION SECURITY
WEB APPLICATION SECURITYWEB APPLICATION SECURITY
WEB APPLICATION SECURITYyashwanthlavu
 

Semelhante a Modern Web Security (20)

Protecting Customer Confidential Information
Protecting Customer Confidential InformationProtecting Customer Confidential Information
Protecting Customer Confidential Information
 
How to Destroy a Database
How to Destroy a DatabaseHow to Destroy a Database
How to Destroy a Database
 
MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...
MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...
MongoDB World 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Deep Dive i...
 
MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...
MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...
MongoDB .local London 2019: New Encryption Capabilities in MongoDB 4.2: A Dee...
 
Devbeat Conference - Developer First Security
Devbeat Conference - Developer First SecurityDevbeat Conference - Developer First Security
Devbeat Conference - Developer First Security
 
Open source security
Open source securityOpen source security
Open source security
 
Cyber 101 for smb execs v1
Cyber 101 for smb execs v1Cyber 101 for smb execs v1
Cyber 101 for smb execs v1
 
Implementing security for your library | PLAN Tech Day Conference
Implementing security for  your library | PLAN Tech Day ConferenceImplementing security for  your library | PLAN Tech Day Conference
Implementing security for your library | PLAN Tech Day Conference
 
Making Software Secure by Design
Making Software Secure by DesignMaking Software Secure by Design
Making Software Secure by Design
 
SANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for Defense
SANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for DefenseSANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for Defense
SANSFIRE18: War Stories on Using Automated Threat Intelligence for Defense
 
DEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malware
DEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malwareDEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malware
DEF CON 23 - Weston Hecker - goodbye memory scraping malware
 
It security the condensed version
It security  the condensed version It security  the condensed version
It security the condensed version
 
Practical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public BlockchainsPractical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public Blockchains
 
Practical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public BlockchainsPractical Challenges for Public Blockchains
Practical Challenges for Public Blockchains
 
Cyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spy
Cyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spyCyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spy
Cyber espionage - Tinker, taylor, soldier, spy
 
How encryption works
How encryption worksHow encryption works
How encryption works
 
Solvay secure application layer v2015 seba
Solvay secure application layer v2015   sebaSolvay secure application layer v2015   seba
Solvay secure application layer v2015 seba
 
Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity
Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity
Cap Tech Talks Webinar April=l 2020 business email cybersecurity
 
How to hack or what is ethical hacking
How to hack or what is ethical hackingHow to hack or what is ethical hacking
How to hack or what is ethical hacking
 
WEB APPLICATION SECURITY
WEB APPLICATION SECURITYWEB APPLICATION SECURITY
WEB APPLICATION SECURITY
 

Mais de Bill Condo

Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)
Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)
Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)Bill Condo
 
Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)
Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)
Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)Bill Condo
 
Getting to know composer - (PHP)
Getting to know composer - (PHP)Getting to know composer - (PHP)
Getting to know composer - (PHP)Bill Condo
 
Introduction to Web Development: Part 1
Introduction to Web Development: Part 1Introduction to Web Development: Part 1
Introduction to Web Development: Part 1Bill Condo
 
Intro to Laravel PHP Framework
Intro to Laravel PHP FrameworkIntro to Laravel PHP Framework
Intro to Laravel PHP FrameworkBill Condo
 
Hacking Mat Honan
Hacking Mat HonanHacking Mat Honan
Hacking Mat HonanBill Condo
 
Mobile Development with Icenium
Mobile Development with IceniumMobile Development with Icenium
Mobile Development with IceniumBill Condo
 
Seo Session by Bill Condo
Seo Session by Bill CondoSeo Session by Bill Condo
Seo Session by Bill CondoBill Condo
 

Mais de Bill Condo (8)

Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)
Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)
Performance Testing w/ WebPage Test Private Instance (DrupalCamp Ohio)
 
Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)
Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)
Digital Literacy - Web vs Mobile Apps, File Transfers (Session 2)
 
Getting to know composer - (PHP)
Getting to know composer - (PHP)Getting to know composer - (PHP)
Getting to know composer - (PHP)
 
Introduction to Web Development: Part 1
Introduction to Web Development: Part 1Introduction to Web Development: Part 1
Introduction to Web Development: Part 1
 
Intro to Laravel PHP Framework
Intro to Laravel PHP FrameworkIntro to Laravel PHP Framework
Intro to Laravel PHP Framework
 
Hacking Mat Honan
Hacking Mat HonanHacking Mat Honan
Hacking Mat Honan
 
Mobile Development with Icenium
Mobile Development with IceniumMobile Development with Icenium
Mobile Development with Icenium
 
Seo Session by Bill Condo
Seo Session by Bill CondoSeo Session by Bill Condo
Seo Session by Bill Condo
 

Último

定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一Fs
 
Q4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptx
Q4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptxQ4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptx
Q4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptxeditsforyah
 
定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一Fs
 
Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...
Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...
Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...Excelmac1
 
Magic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptx
Magic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptxMagic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptx
Magic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptxMartaLoveguard
 
Contact Rya Baby for Call Girls New Delhi
Contact Rya Baby for Call Girls New DelhiContact Rya Baby for Call Girls New Delhi
Contact Rya Baby for Call Girls New Delhimiss dipika
 
Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170
Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170
Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170Sonam Pathan
 
办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一z xss
 
『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书rnrncn29
 
『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书rnrncn29
 
Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作ys8omjxb
 
NSX-T and Service Interfaces presentation
NSX-T and Service Interfaces presentationNSX-T and Service Interfaces presentation
NSX-T and Service Interfaces presentationMarko4394
 
PHP-based rendering of TYPO3 Documentation
PHP-based rendering of TYPO3 DocumentationPHP-based rendering of TYPO3 Documentation
PHP-based rendering of TYPO3 DocumentationLinaWolf1
 
Top 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptx
Top 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptxTop 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptx
Top 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptxDyna Gilbert
 
Git and Github workshop GDSC MLRITM
Git and Github  workshop GDSC MLRITMGit and Github  workshop GDSC MLRITM
Git and Github workshop GDSC MLRITMgdsc13
 
Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24
Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24
Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24Paul Calvano
 
办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书
办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书
办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书zdzoqco
 
A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)
A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)
A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)Christopher H Felton
 

Último (20)

定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Management毕业证书)新加坡管理大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
 
Q4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptx
Q4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptxQ4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptx
Q4-1-Illustrating-Hypothesis-Testing.pptx
 
定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
定制(Lincoln毕业证书)新西兰林肯大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
 
Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...
Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...
Blepharitis inflammation of eyelid symptoms cause everything included along w...
 
Magic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptx
Magic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptxMagic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptx
Magic exist by Marta Loveguard - presentation.pptx
 
Contact Rya Baby for Call Girls New Delhi
Contact Rya Baby for Call Girls New DelhiContact Rya Baby for Call Girls New Delhi
Contact Rya Baby for Call Girls New Delhi
 
Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170
Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170
Call Girls In The Ocean Pearl Retreat Hotel New Delhi 9873777170
 
young call girls in Uttam Nagar🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
young call girls in Uttam Nagar🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Serviceyoung call girls in Uttam Nagar🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
young call girls in Uttam Nagar🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
 
办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
办理(UofR毕业证书)罗切斯特大学毕业证成绩单原版一比一
 
『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买詹姆士库克大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲JCU文凭学位证书
 
『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书
『澳洲文凭』买拉筹伯大学毕业证书成绩单办理澳洲LTU文凭学位证书
 
Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
Potsdam FH学位证,波茨坦应用技术大学毕业证书1:1制作
 
NSX-T and Service Interfaces presentation
NSX-T and Service Interfaces presentationNSX-T and Service Interfaces presentation
NSX-T and Service Interfaces presentation
 
PHP-based rendering of TYPO3 Documentation
PHP-based rendering of TYPO3 DocumentationPHP-based rendering of TYPO3 Documentation
PHP-based rendering of TYPO3 Documentation
 
Top 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptx
Top 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptxTop 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptx
Top 10 Interactive Website Design Trends in 2024.pptx
 
Git and Github workshop GDSC MLRITM
Git and Github  workshop GDSC MLRITMGit and Github  workshop GDSC MLRITM
Git and Github workshop GDSC MLRITM
 
Hot Sexy call girls in Rk Puram 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
Hot Sexy call girls in  Rk Puram 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort ServiceHot Sexy call girls in  Rk Puram 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
Hot Sexy call girls in Rk Puram 🔝 9953056974 🔝 Delhi escort Service
 
Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24
Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24
Font Performance - NYC WebPerf Meetup April '24
 
办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书
办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书
办理多伦多大学毕业证成绩单|购买加拿大UTSG文凭证书
 
A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)
A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)
A Good Girl's Guide to Murder (A Good Girl's Guide to Murder, #1)
 

Modern Web Security

  • 1. Bill Condo / @mavrck Modern Web Security Attacks & Improvements 4/2/2014 | Dayton Web Developers
  • 2. Bill Condo / @mavrck Who here is responsible
 for a website?
  • 3. Bill Condo / @mavrck Who here has published code updates live in the last month?
  • 4. Bill Condo / @mavrck Are they secure?
  • 5. Bill Condo / @mavrck What We’ll Cover • Common Threats • Easy Improvements • Bonus: Passwords
  • 6. Bill Condo / @mavrck CommonThreats • Cross Site Scripting • SQL Injection • Path Disclosure • Cross Site Request Forgery • Information Disclosure
  • 7. Bill Condo / @mavrck • Denial of Service • Code Execution • Memory Corruption • Arbitrary File • Local File Include • Remote File Include • Buffer overflow
  • 8. Bill Condo / @mavrck Cross-site scripting (XSS) • In a nutshell, websites that allow external code to sent with a response to a user’s browser. • Typically this is javascript that is inserted into a query string or form field that is allowed to run. • Opens up cookie and sensitive data
  • 9. Bill Condo / @mavrck SQL Injection • Allowing user input to directly be inserted into database queries, opening the possibility of unexpected data, and database corruption and data leakage.
 • (original) statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id ='" + id + “';" • (input) 0’; DROP TABLE users • (final) statement = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE id =‘0'; DROP TABLE users;"
  • 10. Bill Condo / @mavrck http://xkcd.com/327/
  • 11. Bill Condo / @mavrck Path Disclosure • Allowing an attacker to see the path to the web root. 
 /home/site.com/public/index.php • This could allow viewing of private files, and provides a nugget 
 of knowledge that can be combined to allow full access. • http://site.com/index.php?page=about • http://site.com/index.php?page=../config
  • 12. Bill Condo / @mavrck Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) • Exploits a website’s unauthenticated functionality from an authenticated user. This is commonly from features driven from url parameters that doesn’t have sufficient verification in place. • http://site.com/send-message.php?from=bill&to=brad&message=hi • May also be exploited by malicious code injected into a page.
  • 13. Bill Condo / @mavrck Information Disclosure • Releasing secure information to an untrusted environment. This 
 can be operating environment, customer data, or trade secrets. • Path that the website runs at, database info, service versions, etc. • Credit card data, private account info (address, phone), 
 and customer history. • Business logic, processes, and long-term business plans.
  • 14. Bill Condo / @mavrck
  • 15. Bill Condo / @mavrck
  • 16. Bill Condo / @mavrck Easy Improvements • Secure Your Environment • Secure Your Website • Establish Audits
  • 17. Bill Condo / @mavrck Secure your Environment • Leave your cheap web host (BlueHost, GoDaddy, etc) and go to a Virtual Private Server (VPS) such as Digital Ocean, Linode, Rackspace, AWS, etc. You don’t want to share security concerns 
 with the world. • Turn of the displaying of errors and debugging info in production, and redirect them to log files. • Turn on automatic updates for security patches. • Turn off broadcasting of service versions and extensions. • Turn off modules that aren’t required.
  • 18. Bill Condo / @mavrck Sorry, We’re Not Sharing Security…
  • 19. Bill Condo / @mavrck Thanks for letting me know…
  • 20. Bill Condo / @mavrck Secure Your Website • Sanitize user input. Always. • Escape and sanitize database queries. Better yet, use an established package for prepared statements. • Store sensitive data outside of the webroot with proper permissions. • SSL where possible. • Sandbox user uploads and treat with suspicion.
  • 21. Bill Condo / @mavrck Establish Audits • Black Box: Security/Vulnerability Scanners, Penetration Tests • White Box: Source Code Analyzers, Code Tests • Password Testing
  • 22. Bill Condo / @mavrck More Security Info • http://www.webappsec.org • http://www.owasp.org
  • 23. Bill Condo / @mavrck Stretch. Last minute bucket. We’re in overtime.
  • 24. Bill Condo / @mavrck Bonus: Password Security • Terminology • Landscape/Problems • Best Practices • Getting Policy Buy-in
  • 25. Bill Condo / @mavrck Password Terminology • Encrypting - The process of encoding messages or information in such a way that only authorized parties can read it*. Encryption typically involves a private key and can be performed two way. • Hashing - Password hashing is a one way conversion of an input into a representative string. (i.e. nothing = 4fhk348fhsk48rfk4d3) • Salting - A unique string of characters (hopefully per user) that helps keep the password hashes different for users that have the same password. *http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption
  • 26. Bill Condo / @mavrck • Entropy (Strength) - A measure of the uncertainty associated with a random variable. (i.e. Password Strength) • Rainbow Tables - Pre-calculated lookup values that match a string with a value for a known encrypted algorithm.
  • 27. Bill Condo / @mavrck http://xkcd.com/936/
  • 28. Bill Condo / @mavrck Problems
  • 29. Bill Condo / @mavrck State of Passwords • Most people share between sites • Most people don’t use secure passwords • Secure passwords, with high entropy are impossible to remember • Most people don’t use a password manager
  • 30. Bill Condo / @mavrck Lack of Transparency • Web Apps & Sites don’t disclosure their password policies, encryption strength, and their isn’t a standard body to police who’s following best practices and who’s being risky. • Users often don’t find out what data was compromised from an attack, and frequently don’t find out about an breach at all until it reaches the news cycle.
  • 31. Bill Condo / @mavrck Forgotten Trail • With e-commerce, we often have to create an account, provide payment details, and then may never shop there again. However, the data persists. • Users typically don’t keep a master list of sites they have an account on, or have purchased from. Each account can act as a nugget of knowledge, slowly building up to enough data for concern.
  • 32. Bill Condo / @mavrck Best Practices Worst Practices
  • 33. Bill Condo / @mavrck Don’t help the enemy • Don’t: Policies that enforce things such as “first character must by upper case” and “must end in a special character”. Allows masking. • Don’t: To an extent, disclosing the minimum requirements for lower case, upper case, numeric, and special characters.
  • 34. Bill Condo / @mavrck Garbage in, garbage out • Don’t: Having no password policy at all. • Don’t: Allowing common passwords like ‘password’, ‘123456’. • Don’t: Allowing common dictionary words.
  • 35. Bill Condo / @mavrck Getting Policy Buy-in
  • 36. Bill Condo / @mavrck #1 Prevent PR Issues
  • 37. Bill Condo / @mavrck #2 Cost vs Risk • Doing security correctly is less expensive upfront. The opportunity cost is minimal compared the reduction in risk. 
 Cost * Risk = Likelihood Cost • What does it cost to cleanup the mess: reset the passwords, scan the servers, added support calls/requests, etc…
  • 38. Bill Condo / @mavrck #3 Predictability • Help project/business managers in being able to minimize unexpected security response events. • Better understand how your week is going to go.
  • 39. Bill Condo / @mavrck
  • 40. Bill Condo / @mavrck My Ask of You • If you found this information useful, I ask two things of you: • Follow me Twitter for development tips: @mavrck • Back the Salt Mines Device Lab fundraiser for $1+: 
 http://igg.me/p/728005 • Also, we’re hiring at LMG. Grab a card if you’re currently 
 not next to your boss (otherwise email bill@lmgresults.com).
  • 41. Bill Condo / @mavrck Roaring Applause Here. Thanks for your time.